Lawsuit: Adjourned YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76

[dearev]

 

[dearev]

May it please the court.
I have noticed that i have answered for question 73. "Y" when i intended to write "N".

I request this court to allow that question 73's answer be changed to a "N"

Thank you.

 

[Franciscus]

View attachment 70957View attachment 70958View attachment 70959

Brief

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
SUBMISSION OF FOLLOW-UPS REGARDING QUESTION SHEET HANDWRITTEN ANSWERS

1. What is your answer to Question No. 35 in the above quoted post?
2. There is writing in the margin next to Questions 61 and 62 in the above quoted post. To which question does that writing attach?
3. What is your answer to Question No. 65 in the above quoted post?
4. There are arrows pointing to the margin near Question No. 67 and Question No. 68. What text attaches to the answer to question No. 67?
5. There are arrows pointing to the margin near Question No. 67 and Question No. 68. What text attaches to the answer to question No. 68?
6. There is an arrow from question No. 72 that heads to the bottom of the sheet in the above quoted post. There is a line from question No. 78 that merges with that line. What is the text of your answer to question No. 72?
7. There is an arrow from question No. 72 that heads to the bottom of the sheet in the above quoted post. There is a line from question No. 78 that merges with that line. What is the text of your answer to question No. 78?
8. Holding the questions mentioned by question numbers 1-7 of this followup brief aside, which questions should we understand your answer to not be in the affirmative?

 

[Muggy21]

@dearev Please respond to clarifications from Multiman155 by 1/10/26 @ 5pm EST.

No additional questions posed to witnesses will be permitted at this time.

 

[dearev]

1. What is your answer to Question No. 35 in the above quoted post? It seems like i have forgotten to write it. Consider it as a “Y”
2. There is writing in the margin next to Questions 61 and 62 in the above quoted post. To which question does that writing attach? Q61
3. What is your answer to Question No. 65 in the above quoted post? My answer leaves a “Y” implicit
4. There are arrows pointing to the margin near Question No. 67 and Question No. 68. What text attaches to the answer to question No. 67? Same text of Q 65
5. There are arrows pointing to the margin near Question No. 67 and Question No. 68. What text attaches to the answer to question No. 68? Same text of Q 65
6. There is an arrow from question No. 72 that heads to the bottom of the sheet in the above quoted post. There is a line from question No. 78 that merges with that line. What is the text of your answer to question No. 72?Its is all of the text on the bottom of the page

1. There is an arrow from question No. 72 that heads to the bottom of the sheet in the above quoted post. There is a line from question No. 78 that merges with that line. What is the text of your answer to question No. 78?

Its is all of the text on the bottom of the page

1. Holding the questions mentioned by question numbers 1-7 of this followup brief aside, which questions should we understand your answer to not be in the affirmative? I have responded “N” to questions 78 and 73 it seems

 

[Muggy21]

@Franciscus

You shall have 5 days to present your Closing Statement. Deadline 1/16/26 @ 9pm EST. An extension of up to three days will be automatically granted, just let the Court know.

 

[Muggy21]

(Writing this for posterity)

By the grace of Lord Tuk and his infinitesimal wisdom, the deadlines of this Court have been modified due to forums outages.

The deadline for Closing Statements from the Plaintiff is flexible, with a suggested deadline of January 18th, 2026. When the CW is invited to present a Closing Statement, the same flexibility shall be extended to the CW's counselor.

Parties are not prejudiced when the Court grants generous deadlines relief in an equitable manner or when otherwise directed by Staff intervention.

 

[Franciscus]

Closing Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CLOSING STATEMENT

Your Honor:

This case is one in which the Commonwealth illegally evicted the Plaintiff, omitted key information from the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff sought to contest his evictions, and then began to auction off his plots (and successfully auctioned one off). An Inspection Manager who had a conflict-of-interest corruptly sought to acquire plots which he illegally evicted. The “Department of Construction and Transportation did not do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand,” nor “inform[] the plaintiff that [the DCT’s agents] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction” (see: BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44), causing concrete damages to my client.

This case has been long, full of discovery submissions, and substantial witness questioning. This closing statement will discuss the issues raised and rules as the facts apply to them, and demonstrate that on balance of probabilities we have proven every claim and are entitled to relief in full.

In our complaint, we laid out eight claims for relief. Let us re-examine the key issues posed by each of them, what the law says about these issues, and how the facts apply.

Claim 1: Violations of Constitutional Right Against Unreasonable Seizure​

Issue: The first issue is whether the Commonwealth’s premature eviction of the Plaintiff’s property violated his constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable seizures. The Plaintiff asserts that by seizing his plots before the authorized date, the government acted unlawfully and unconstitutionally.

Rule: Section 32(15) of the Constitution guarantees that “every citizen has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” In practical terms, any government taking of property must be lawful, justified, and follow due process. Towards this end, the DCT has created a notice-cure period-eviction framework under its Evictions Policy (see: Exhibit P-003). Even the DCT’s own Secretary at the relevant time, xEndeavour, had previously acknowledged under oath that the eviction timeline exists to ensure “players are protected from unreasonable seizure in line with their constitutional right” (see Complaint, first claim for relief, quoting filing in FlyingBlocks v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 1).
In short, the law and the government’s policies forbid arbitrary confiscations of property, and require reasonable process to be followed when making seizures.

Application: Here, the evidence proves the Commonwealth flagrantly disregarded the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

The evidence proves the Plaintiff’s plots were seized one day early, with no legal excuse. DCT agent Dearev admitted he executed the evictions at “14:00 (2pm) GMT-3” on July 30, before the July 31 eviction date (Dearev's Testimony, Post No. 301, answer to questions 9-13; Exhibit P-021). He knew or should have known this was premature. In fact, Dearev conceded that when he carried out the evictions, he “believed…[he] was following policy as written, however that was later confirmed to be false” (Dearev's Testimony, Post No. 273, Answer to Defense question 3.2). By his own testimony, the evictions did not conform to policy or law. The seizure was done without lawful basis and despite the Plaintiff having met the activity requirement in time. Commonwealth’s assertion when pressed by the Plaintiff in Exhibit P-002 that “[t]he department has acted completely legally, within policy, and how it always carries out evictions”. In short, the government snatched the Plaintiff’s property early, with Dearev’s “several hours early” eviction now essentially undisputed.

Conclusion: Evicting the Plaintiff’s plots a day early was an unreasonable seizure of private property. It flouted the seven-day grace period and the Plaintiff’s due compliance. The Plaintiff’s constitutional right was violated, and this Court should declare so. The Commonwealth cannot pretend an early taking was “completely legal” when its own agent admits it was not.

Claim 2: Violations of Constitutional Duty of Care​

Issue: The second claim asks whether the Commonwealth breached its constitutional duty of care to the Plaintiff by failing to act in accordance with its constitutional obligations during the eviction. In essence, did the government neglect the duty to respect citizens’ fundamental rights (such as property and due process rights) in carrying out its policies?

Rule: Redmont law recognizes that executive agencies owe a duty of care to uphold the Constitution when dealing with citizens. As the Federal Court held in smokeyybunnyyy v. Commonwealth [2024] FCR 103, “Every department within the executive branch has a duty of care to uphold its constitutional obligations.” Likewise, in RaiTheGuy v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 29, the Court noted that when such a duty of care “is not upheld, it is considered a breach, and the party who is obliged to uphold the duty can be liable for damages.”

As it specifically applies to the DCT, this Court has concluded that the Government is liable when the “Department of Construction and Transportation did not do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand,” nor “inform[] the plaintiff that [the DCT’s agents] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction” (see: BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44).

In short, the government must act consistently with constitutional rights, and if it fails to do so, it breaches a duty it owes to citizens, giving rise to relief.

Application: The Commonwealth’s conduct in this case egregiously breached its constitutional duty of care owed to the Plaintiff:

• Duty to act lawfully and protect rights: DCT officials had an affirmative duty to conduct evictions lawfully and to honor citizens’ property and due process rights throughout the enforcement of inactivity policies. This means following the Constitution’s requirements and the law’s spirit of fairness when taking any action against a citizen’s property. As has been shown in the analysis of Claim 1, the DCT has plainly and clearly failed to do this.
• Breaching the duty by early eviction: By evicting the Plaintiff prior to the permissible date, the Defendant blatantly violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional guarantees. The premature eviction trampled on the Plaintiff’s property rights and denied him the due process of the full notice period (see: Exhibit P-001; Exhibit P-003). In other words, the agency failed to act within the bounds of its constitutional obligations, directly breaching the duty of care it owed.
• Failure to remedy compounding the breach: What’s worse, even after the Plaintiff protested through a timely support ticket (bringing, albeit imperfectly, the spectre of constitutional violation to light; see Exhibit P-002), the Commonwealth did nothing to promptly restore his rights. The DCT Secretary brushed off the Plaintiff’s plea and insisted the eviction was proper, instead of performing due diligence in regards to the matter at hand and informing the plaintiff that the DCT’s agents had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction (see: Exhibits P-001, P-002, P-011, P-014). This indifferent response, as noted in our Complaint, “reflects a broader neglect of the duty of fairness and justice owed to citizens.” The Commonwealth’s inaction in the face of its mistake compounded the constitutional breach and showed a disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights and dignity.

Conclusion: In sum, the Commonwealth owed a duty of care to uphold the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and it failed that duty completely. The early eviction, and the government’s failure to do its due diligence to fix it, demonstrates a textbook breach of its constitutional obligations. The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to relief for this breach of duty. We ask the Court to hold the Defendant accountable for not just the unlawful seizure itself, but also for violating the fundamental duty every government agency has: to act constitutionally and protect the rights of the people it serves.

Claim 3: Violations of Statutory Duty of Care​

Issue: Separately from the Constitution, did the Commonwealth violate a statutory duty of care owed to the Plaintiff by failing to follow the eviction laws and regulations set by Congress and its own department? The Plaintiff asserts that specific laws and DCT policies imposed duties on the government, which were breached by the improper eviction.

Rule: When Congress enacts laws or empowers agencies with regulations, the government has a legal duty to comply with those standards. As the Court noted in RaiTheGuy v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 29, “all laws set out by Congress can impose a duty [on the Commonwealth].” One such law is the Property Standards Act, which explicitly authorized the DCT to establish eviction regulations and required the DCT to conduct evictions in accordance with those laws and its own regulations. In short, the DCT must follow its own rules. The DCT’s Evictions Policy at the time (Exhibit P-003) stated that “Department employees and staff may process an eviction at any time on or after the eviction date, based on their own timezone.” This policy, backed by statute, created a clear duty: do not evict before the stated date, as reckoned by the acting official’s timezone.

Application: The Commonwealth’s agent blatantly breached this statutory and policy-based duty in the Plaintiff’s case:

• Duty established by law: The Property Standards Act and DCT policy imposed a specific duty on the Defendant – namely, that evictions must not be carried out before the designated date in the staffer’s local time. This rule exists to protect property owners from exactly what happened here.
• Clear breach of the duty: Despite this unambiguous rule, Dearev processed the eviction on July 30, even though it was still July 30 in his own Brazil timezone (not yet July 31) (see, generally, Dearev’s testimony in Post No. 301). By acting “before ‘on or after’ the eviction date,” the DCT violated the very regulation it was obliged to follow. The action directly contravened the statute-based duty of care – a textbook breach of a legal requirement.
  
  This admission is damning – the very agent of the Commonwealth recognizes the eviction was against the rules. Indeed, after this lawsuit brought the truth to light, xEndeavour was forced to admit that Dearev “did not act within department policy and evicted the plot several hours early.” (xEndeavour’s testimony n Post No. 258). No amount of post hoc rationalization can escape that fact. The defense’s own position tacitly concedes liability: the Commonwealth offered to return the plots and issue a public apology, calling the early eviction the only “arguable liability” in this case.
  
  In other words, the Commonwealth itself recognizes that its agent broke the rules. Furthermore, Dearev’s attempts to justify his actions only underscore the breach. He noted that current policy says “time is approximate and depends on the officer’s time zone,” but that does not license jumping the gun. . His excuse – that he “believed” the Plaintiff’s plots were “ready to be actioned” – is both incorrect and irrelevant. The law required him to wait, and he failed to do so. The result was an unlawful eviction, period.
• Clear Damages of Unlawful Eviction: Because the DCT failed to meet this minimum standard of care set by law, the Plaintiff’s plots were seized when they should not have been. The harm (losing his property rights prematurely) is precisely what the statute and policy were designed to prevent. The Defendant cannot claim it upheld its duty when the facts show such a bright-line rule was broken.

Conclusion: By failing to follow the law and its own regulations, the Commonwealth breached a statutory duty of care owed to the Plaintiff. In Redmont, no agency is above the law – when the DCT broke the rules, it became civilly liable for the consequences. The Plaintiff therefore seeks a finding that the Commonwealth violated its statutory duty, and that he is entitled to damages flowing from this illegal eviction.

Claim 4: Common Law Negligence​

Issue: Did the government owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff, breach that duty by acting unreasonably (failing to follow the standard of care), and thereby cause harm? The Plaintiff argues that the same facts underlying the statutory breach amount to negligence under the Common Law.

Rule: Under Redmont law, when a statute or regulation creates a duty to protect a class of persons (like property owners) and a party violates that statute, it can be evidence of negligence or negligence per se. The Federal Court in RaiTheGuy explained that if a duty is created by statute, “failing to follow the statute necessarily implies a breach, which is consistent with the common law.” In other words, the breach of a legal duty meant to safeguard others is inherently an unreasonable act under common law standards. To prove negligence, the Plaintiff must show duty, breach, causation, and damages – all of which are present here.

Application: By flouting the eviction law and policy, the DCT acted negligently and caused foreseeable harm to the Plaintiff. The eviction rules were in place to protect citizens like Mr. YeetGlazer from wrongful loss of their property. Here, that protective duty unquestionably existed (as shown above), and the DCT plainly breached it by evicting the Plaintiff early. This breach was not a minor technicality – it directly led to the unjust loss of the Plaintiff’s plots which the Court had to stop on an emergency basis (see: Exhibit P-001, P-002, Order Granting Emergency Injunction).

But for the DCT’s failure to use the ordinary care mandated by law and prior precedent (e.g.: BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44, the “Department of Construction and Transportation did not do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand…” and did not “inform[] the plaintiff that [the DCT’s agents] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction”), the Plaintiff would never have been evicted at all. Dearev himself now knows this was wrong (he admitted his actions fell outside policy), and xEndeavour has confessed that new information showed the eviction was handled “several hours early” in violation of procedure (Post No. 257).

The Commonwealth’s negligence is further demonstrated by what followed: instead of promptly correcting the error, DCT officials doubled down. They ignored the Plaintiff’s urgent Discord ticket and falsely insisted nothing was amiss. This compounded the breach – a reasonable department would have quickly reviewed the timeline and reversed the eviction. Instead, DCT’s Secretary stubbornly declared the eviction valid without even checking the offending officer’s timezone - even as Courts have prior found the DCT liable when “Department of Construction and Transportation did not do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand,” and did not “inform[] the plaintiff that [the DCT’s agents] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction” in BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44).

YeetGlazer lost land because the government employee did not act as a reasonable official would. All elements of negligence are satisfied: the Commonwealth owed a duty, it breached that duty through unreasonable action, and that breach proximately caused the Plaintiff to suffer damages (loss of property and the ensuing consequential damages discussed below). While some properties were eventually returned, it took the filing of this lawsuit to finally spur that action, and not all properties were returned.

Conclusion: In sum, the Commonwealth’s mishandling of the eviction constitutes common law negligence. The violation of the statute and policy “necessarily implies a breach” of the duty of care. and the Plaintiff’s injuries were the direct result. The Court should therefore find the Defendant negligent and hold it accountable for the damages flowing from its carelessness and unlawful conduct.

Claim 5: Loss of Enjoyment​

Issue: The question is whether the Plaintiff’s enjoyment of the game and community was significantly diminished by the Defendant’s actions. The Plaintiff contends that the wrongful eviction caused him profound frustration, stress, and an inability to engage in normal activities – in short, a loss of enjoyment in Redmont.

Rule: The Legal Damages Act of Redmont explicitly recognizes “Loss of Enjoyment in Redmont” as a form of consequential damage that can be recovered. This is defined as situations where an injured party loses or has a diminished ability to engage in activities they used to enjoy before the harm occurred. In other words, if the Plaintiff can show that the eviction ordeal made his experience of the community significantly less enjoyable or prevented him from doing the things he used to do, he is entitled to damages for that lost enjoyment, provided there is evidence or a reasonable person would expect such harm.
Application: The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the Plaintiff suffered a serious loss of enjoyment due to the Commonwealth’s wrongful eviction:

• Disruption of Daily Activities: After the eviction, the Plaintiff could no longer access or use several plots of land that he lawfully owned until after the filing of this case. These plots included his residence and business properties, which were central to his in-game life. Being locked out of his own properties meant he was barred from engaging in his usual building, commerce, and recreational activities on those lands. The normal pleasures of ownership – developing his plots, using them, sharing them with friends or customers – were all suddenly taken away. This was only restored after the Order Granting Emergency Injunction was entered, and only partially so; at least one plot was sold off at auction before this Court intervened (Exhibit P-001; Exhibit P-011).
• Forced Focus on the Dispute: Instead of enjoying the game and community, the Plaintiff was forced to spend his time, energy, and money fighting to regain his lawfully owned property. What should have been days of creative gameplay or community participation turned into days of anxiety, paperwork, and uncertainty. He had to contest via support tickets (beginning with Exhibit P-002), gather evidence, and later even participate in this legal case – none of which is remotely enjoyable and all of which took him away from the regular activities he cherished (see: Testimony of YeetGlazer, Post No. 265, Plaintiff Questions No. 1-3; Testimony of YeetGlazer, Post No. 278, Questions 28-34).
• Indefinite Impact: The loss of enjoyment was not just a brief inconvenience; it lasted for an extended time. The Commonwealth’s refusal to promptly return the plots extended the Plaintiff’s hardship indefinitely until after this Court intervened. Every additional day the Plaintiff was without access to his lands was another day he could not enjoy the fruits of his labor. This prolonged deprivation magnified the loss of enjoyment far beyond a minor hiccup. And, in at least one case, the Court was unable to return a plot to the Plaintiff (Exhibit P-001; Exhibit P-011).

Conclusion: The Plaintiff’s loss of enjoyment is real, significant, and directly attributable to the Defendant’s wrongful acts. The Legal Damages Act explicitly permits recovery for such intangible harms when proven and here the harm is well-documented. We ask the Court to award consequential damages for Loss of Enjoyment to compensate the Plaintiff for the very real (if non-monetary) detriment to his Redmont experience caused by this illegal eviction - some of which continues through this very day.

Claim 6: Humiliation​

Issue: The issue is whether the manner in which the eviction was conducted, and the government’s handling of it, caused the Plaintiff to be disgraced or belittled, thus entitling him to damages for humiliation. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants’ actions publicly shamed him and harmed his reputation, which is a compensable injury under the law.

Rule: The Legal Damages Act Section 7(1) recognizes “Humiliation” as a form of consequential damage, defined as situations “in which a person has been disgraced, belittled or made to look foolish.” In plain terms, if the Defendant’s conduct made the Plaintiff feel ashamed or lowered in the estimation of the community, and if a reasonable person would feel the same in that situation, then humiliation damages are warranted. Prior cases confirm that when the government violates a citizen’s rights, reputational harm and personal humiliation are not mere side effects but actual damages that the law will remedy.

Application: The manner of this eviction and the Commonwealth’s subsequent denials inflicted profound humiliation upon the Plaintiff:

The manner in which the Commonwealth treated the Plaintiff was calculated to humiliate. Evicting someone for “inactivity” carries a stigma – it broadcasts to the community that the individual was derelict in managing their property. Here, the Plaintiff was anything but inactive (he actually had the required playtime), yet the DCT’s premature eviction painted him as neglectful or non-compliant. As the Plaintiff testified, “Seeing the denial of the ticket made me feel as if the government did not care…It made me feel as if my problems were being disregarded” (Testimony of YeetGlazer, Post No. 265). He felt belittled and brushed off by those in power – a classic humiliation scenario.

The evidence shows multiple layers of humiliation: the public forum posts showed his plots seized by the government, prompting others to think he lost them fairly. In the Discord ticket, when the Plaintiff pleaded his case, xEndeavour effectively called him wrong or misinformed in front of everyone, asserting the eviction was proper when it was not (Exhibit P-002).

Being told “everything was done right” when you know it was wrong is extremely belittling – it implies the Plaintiff was either lying or clueless. One witness in that ticket, Sir_Dogeington, vouched for the Plaintiff (“I can vouch, I saw it”), meaning he saw the Plaintiff had the needed hours (Exhibit P-002; Post No. 247). The DCT’s response? Ignore Sir_Dogeington and shut down the ticket. Dearev hurried to mark the ticket “resolved” and said “Please close it,” an unmistakably dismissive move (Exhibit P-002).This made the Plaintiff appear as a nuisance at best, a fool at worst, for continuing to protest. Such treatment in a channel is demeaning

Additionally, the Commonwealth’s initial refusal to return the plots – forcing the Plaintiff to effectively beg for his own property – is deeply humiliating. It told the community that the Plaintiff’s land was forfeit and that he had to come on bended knee to authorities who still said “no.” Only after legal action and this Court ordering an emergency injunction did the government relent.

Conclusion: The Plaintiff endured genuine humiliation at the hands of the Commonwealth. Being unfairly portrayed as an inattentive landowner, ignored and dismissed by officials, and forced to fight for vindication is precisely the kind of disgrace our law compensates. The Court should award damages for humiliation, to officially acknowledge the indignity the Plaintiff suffered and to deter the government from ever treating a citizen in such a belittling manner again.

Claim 7: Fraud​

Issue: Did the Commonwealth (through its agents) commit fraud against the Plaintiff by misrepresenting a material fact – the legality and timing of the eviction – causing him harm?

Rule: Under the Criminal Code Act, a person commits the crime of Fraud when that person “knowingly or recklessly misrepresents or omits a material fact to another, causing the other party to rely on that misrepresentation, resulting in actual, quantifiable harm.” As always under the CCA, “In civil lawsuits, crimes may be used to seek damages”.

Application: The Defendant’s agents engaged in a textbook fraud by lying, or recklessly omitting, the true timing of the eviction in Dearev’s timezone. The material fact: whether the plots were evicted on July 31 (lawful) or July 30 (unlawful) in Dearev’s timezone. The misrepresentation: xEndeavour told the Plaintiff that “properties were evicted on 31 Jul” and thus the eviction was proper. This was false. We know from the evidence – and Dearev’s own admissions – that the plots were actually evicted on July 30 in the relevant timezone (See generally: Post No. 301).

Did the DCT officials know it was false? At the very least, xEndeavour spoke with reckless disregard for the truth. As DCT Secretary, he had the means to verify the evicting officer’s location. Indeed, he had read Dearev’s job application listing “GMT-3” as his timezone (Answer to Complaint, affirming 44-47). Yet he chose to respond to the Plaintiff’s ticket by affirming an eviction date he hadn’t confirmed. The Defense affirms that xEndeavour “assumed” rather than checked (Answer to complaint, affirming 49). That is the definition of reckless misrepresentation.

Let’s also consider Dearev’s role: he sat in the ticket conversation as user “clocktest200” (Exhibit P-002; Exhibit P-021). He reasonably should have known that it was still July 30 for him, yet when xEndeavour stated the eviction was on July 31, Dearev stayed silent. He never corrected the falsehood. This omission was as fraudulent as an overt lie – he intentionally failed to disclose a truth he was duty-bound to reveal. When asked on the stand why he “did not volunteer that [his] timezone was GMT-3” during that conversation, Dearev lamely replied, “I do not recall.” (Dearev in Post #273). That non-answer speaks volumes: there is no benign explanation for his silence, and he knows it. The intent behind these misrepresentations was clear – to induce the Plaintiff to drop his challenge and accept the loss of his property. By convincing him the eviction was “completely legal,” DCT officials hoped the Plaintiff would be duped into giving up.

The Plaintiff did rely on these falsehoods, at least initially. Thinking the eviction might somehow be legal despite his compliance, the Plaintiff attempted to regain his land by other means – he placed bids in the auction for plot c343, trying desperately to buy back what was already his (Exhibit P-011). He wouldn’t have done so if the officials had told the truth and returned his plot; he did it because they misled him to believe the only way forward was through the auction. This wasted the Plaintiff’s time.Moreover, the Plaintiff refrained from immediately pursuing legal action for a brief period, hoping the internal process was correct – exactly what the Commonwealth intended by lying to him.

The fraud caused concrete harm. Because of the misrepresentation, plot r054 slipped away from the Plaintiff permanently – he made several bids in vain only for the DCT to invalidate his bids on pretext and sell to someone else (see: Exhibit P-011). The Plaintiff thus lost that unique property and the opportunity to reclaim it.

He also suffered additional humiliation and loss of enjoyment (as discussed above) prolonging this fight, and he incurred legal expenses to unravel the lie. In sum, DCT’s deceit forced the Plaintiff into a worse position at every turn.

There is no question the misrepresentation occurred – it’s documented in Exhibit P-002 (the ticket transcript) and not actually denied by the defense. Instead, we got evasions. Dearev could not summon any innocent explanation for his failure to tell the truth in that ticket, responding “I do not recall” to pointed questions about his deceptive conduct (Post No. 273) and proffering an incoherent explanation for claiming that his computer had the wrong date (see: Post No. 301; Exhibit P-028).

The Court should treat these feigned memory lapses as indicators of scienter (guilty knowledge). Honest witnesses don’t suddenly forget why they said basic things unless the true answer is incriminating. The same goes for xEndeavour – his “assumption” defense is simply not credible given the evidence that the DCT had ample data on Dearev’s timezone.

At best, it shows a reckless disregard for the truth (which satisfies intent for fraud); at worst, it was a calculated lie to cover up a colleague’s wrongdoing. And notably, when the lie fell apart under scrutiny, the Commonwealth swiftly changed tune and offered to return everything – a tacit admission that the Plaintiff had been wronged by false information.

Conclusion: The Commonwealth, through DCT officials, committed fraud against the Plaintiff. They misrepresented the legality of the eviction, intending the Plaintiff to rely on that falsehood – which he did to his detriment. This civil fraud entitles the Plaintiff to compensatory damages (for the property and opportunities he lost due to the lie) and punitive damages. A message must be sent that our government cannot lie to its citizens and get away with it. The Court should find for the Plaintiff on fraud.

Claim 8: Corruption​

Issue: Did the DCT’s premature eviction of the Plaintiff’s plots amount to “Corruption” as defined in Redmont law, and can the Commonwealth be held liable for it?

Rule: Under the Criminal Code Act, a government official commits Corruption when such official “uses a government position to gain an unfair advantage for oneself or another, inconsistent with official duty”. In civil suits, such criminal acts can be treated as tortious conduct for which the government employer may be held accountable. Key elements are abuse of power, an unfair benefit, and inconsistency with duty.

Application: Dearev’s conduct checks every box of corruption. He leveraged his authority as a DCT inspector to evict the Plaintiff’s land earlier than permitted for an improper purpose. What was that purpose? To confer an unfair advantage – to himself and possibly to others – in the subsequent auction of that land. The evidence of self-dealing intent is overwhelming.

MysticPhunky, the very official who handled the auction, contemporaneously remarked that “Dearev has been doing evictions a bit early… [he] asked me to auction a plot just for him to bid on it.” (Exhibit P-018). That plot was one of the Plaintiff’s plots (c343) that Dearev targeted. This statement, made directly to xEndeavour at the time, is essentially a whistle-blow on Dearev’s corrupt scheme. Little wonder MysticPhunky refused to repeat it under oath – he literally would not answer any questions in this case, instead posting “I will not testify” and earning a contempt citation and disbarment for outbursts. The only reasonable inference is that MysticPhunky knew his truthful answers would confirm Dearev’s abuse of power, so he chose silence. The Court should indeed draw an adverse inference that Dearev evicted early to gain a personal bidding opportunity.

But we don’t even need to rely solely on that inference. Dearev’s own actions speak loudly. Prior to the eviction, he had privately attempted to buy plot c343 from the Plaintiff and was rebuffed.By evicting c343 through his official powers, he transformed the situation: the plot would go to auction where he could try to buy it compulsorily. Sure enough, once c343 was up for auction, Dearev jumped in as a bidder. He openly admitted on the stand, “I bidded on the auction,” trying to acquire c343 for his company (Dearev in Post No. 273). And he came prepared: AsexualDinosaur, an expert witness, calculated that the banknotes Dearev displayed in his bid screenshot amounted to a staggering $177,400 in available funds.

That war chest was ready to deploy toward c343. This gave Dearev a huge advantage that he wouldn’t have absent the eviction. The Plaintiff, by contrast, was severely disadvantaged. Because of DCT’s “fairness fee” rules, the Plaintiff (as the former owner) would have had to pay a 50% surcharge on any winning bid (as opposed to $0 to maintain the plot had it not gone to auction), whereas Dearev (who owned fewer plots) faced only a 25% fee. In practical terms, Dearev made the Plaintiff compete on unequal footing for his own property. This is the very definition of an “unfair advantage” obtained via official position.

Dearev’s protests to the contrary are not credible. He claimed he didn’t think evicting c343 made it easier for him to get it – “I do not believe it would have affected the difficulty” of acquisition (Dearev in Post No. 273). This is a self-serving denial that flies in the face of reality. By evicting, he forced the sale; by bidding, he seized the chance to buy what he otherwise could not. His denial is as hollow as a bank robber saying the vault door being pried open “didn’t make it easier” to take the money.

Moreover, Dearev asserted that his hostility toward the Plaintiff’s political party (the GER) played “none” role in his decision. Yet the record shows he branded the GER a “paramilitary extremist group” and ran in the same election as the Plaintiff when was a prominent GER member. His bias against the Plaintiff provided an additional improper motive – to punish a political opponent by abusing his eviction power.

Even if we set that motive aside, the direct personal gain motive is sufficient. Evicting for personal gain is blatantly “inconsistent with official duty”. DCT officers are supposed to enforce policy neutrally, not manipulate timing to enrich themselves.

The starkest indicator of corruption is how Dearev and his colleague reacted when questioned. Dearev grew evasive, claiming “it was my duty as a employee of the DCT to action evictions” and “it did not cross my mind” that the Plaintiff was GER – statements that ring false given the evidence. And MysticPhunky’s refusal to testify (and the contempt finding that followed) is practically an admission that there was dirt to hide. Innocent officials don’t risk contempt fines to avoid answering questions like “‘Dearev has been doing evictions a bit early, Dearev asked me to auction a plot just for him to bid on it, which was one of the plots he evicted early. What did you mean by this?”

The reasonable conclusion is that the truth would confirm corruption, so the witness clammed up. Finally, the Commonwealth as an entity bears responsibility. This was not one rogue actor in a vacuum - That ratifies the misconduct. Only after the fact, as xEndeavour noted, did they scramble to implement conflict-of-interest rules – a tacit acknowledgment that Dearev’s conduct was corrupt and should have been barred.

That ratifies the misconduct. Only after the fact, as xEndeavour noted, did they scramble to implement conflict-of-interest rules – a tacit acknowledgment that Dearev’s conduct was corrupt and should have been barred.

Conclusion: The Plaintiff has proven that the DCT agent’s actions meet the definition of corruption. By abusing his office to create a buying opportunity for himself, Dearev gained an unfair advantage inconsistent with his duty. The Commonwealth, in turn, is answerable for the corrupt acts of its agent, especially since it failed to supervise or prevent them. This Court should find the Defendant liable for corruption and award punitive damages. Government corruption is an egregious wrong that strikes at the heart of public trust. A strong verdict here will send the message that no official is above the law, and that when public power is perverted for private gain, the courts of Redmont will deliver justice – relentlessly, fact-driven, and precise.

On Relief​

Declaratory Judgement​

As noted in our Complaint:

The Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this court that the DCT’s eviction of the Plaintiff’s plots was unlawful, unconstitutional, and void ab initio. The Plaintiff asks this Court to explicitly rule that the eviction executed on July 30, 2025 violated the Evictions Policy and the Plaintiff’s rights, and therefore had no legal effect. Such a declaratory judgment will clarify the parties’ rights and ensure the record reflects that the Government’s actions were illegal.

The evidentiary record makes the conclusion bare and clear: the evictions were illegal, and the Court ought recognize this.

Injunctive Relief / Return of Property​

In our Complaint, we asked as follows:

The Plaintiff asks this Court to issue an order requiring the Commonwealth to return ownership of all wrongly-evicted plots to the Plaintiff immediately. Because the eviction was wrongful, the appropriate remedy is to restore the status quo ante by reinstating the Plaintiff as the rightful owner of each plot. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction compelling the Defendant to reverse any transfer of ownership or auction process initiated for his properties. This Court’s equitable powers permit it to undo the effects of the illegal eviction – just as wrongfully dispossessed tenants or owners are entitled to recover possession of their property.

Again, we ask here that the Court order that the properties unlawfully seized be permanently returned to YeetGlazer, and that an order to this effect be entered to formalize any temporary returns which have occurred during this case.

Compensatory Damages​

In our Complaint, we prayed as follows:

The Plaintiff asks for an award of compensatory damages in an amount to fully compensate the Plaintiff for all quantifiable losses suffered as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions. This includes the value of any property or items lost due to the eviction, any lost profits or income from the plots during the period of wrongful possession, and any other monetary losses the Plaintiff can prove.

In this case, we have proven that the Commonwealth unlawfully seized plot r054 and sold it. Compensatory damages are sought equal to the fair market value of this plot; as P-011 establishes, this is at least $27,500.

Consequential Damages​

In our Complaint, we prayed as follows:

The Plaintiff asks for an award of consequential damages for the non-economic injuries inflicted, specifically including Loss of Enjoyment and Humiliation suffered by the Plaintiff. As detailed in Claims for Relief 4 and 5, the Plaintiff endured a diminished ability to enjoy the Redmont community and personal mortification as a result of the Defendant’s conduct. The Legal Damages Act expressly recognizes these intangible harms as compensable. These damages, while not easily reduced to a number, are capped by law except in cases when punitive damages are sought (c.f. Legal Damages Act §7(2)(b)). As the Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in this case, and consequential damages are therefore not capped, the Plaintiff asks that the Court award $150,000 in humiliation damages and $150,000 in loss of enjoyment damages.

The Plaintiff seeks consequential damages in full, supported by the voluminous evidence in case, and our analysis in our conclusion.

Punitive Damages​

In our Complaint, we prayed as follows:

The Defendant’s actions were not mere negligence but willful and egregious violations of law – evincing reckless disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights and for the rule of law. Punitive damages are warranted, per Legal Damages Act §5(1)(a), “to punish [a defendant] for their outrageous conduct and to deter them and others like them from similar conduct in the future.”

The Commonwealth’s conduct in this case has been egregious and outrageous. Here, the Commonwealth (acting through DCT officials) engaged in a gross abuse of power by illegally evicting plots, then persisted in dishonesty to cover it up even when contested, and showed deep contempt for the Plaintiff throughout the whole process. This kind of conduct strikes at the heart of public trust in government and must be strongly dissuaded.

How should the Commonwealth be dissuaded? Treble damages serve as a strong deterrent to future wrongful conduct and are called for in these heinous and outrageous actions by the Defendants; this Court has granted them in the past, such as in lucaaasserole v Naezaratheus et al. [2025] FCR 50. But, for some violations (such as abstract violations of rights), treble damages may be difficult to calculate, and further specification for a calculation of punitive damages is necessary. And, for damages that occurred as the result of criminal activities, the Federal Court has found it permissible for Plaintiffs to seek punitive damages equal to the amount of fines that would be collected in a criminal proceding (c.f. MegaMinerM v. Blazora Corporation [2025] FCR 27, Section III(2)(E), par. 6).

As such, the Plaintiff prays for Punitive Damages as follows:

1. $280,000 in punitive damages for unreasonable seizure, in direct violation of the Plaintiff’s express constitutional rights against the same, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
2. $280,000 in punitive damages for violations of Constitutional Duty of Care, as laid out in the second Claim for Relief, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
3. $280,000 in punitive damages for violations of Statutory Duty of Care, as laid out in the third Claim for Relief, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
4. $300,000 in punitive damages for loss of enjoyment: treble damages resulting from the Commonwealth’s actions described in this Complaint and in this Case,;
5. $300,000 in punitive damages for humiliation: treble damages resulting from the Commonwealth’s actions described in this Complaint and in this Case;
6. $200,000 in punitive damages for Corruption, equivalent to the maximum monetary penalty for eight charges of Corruption (one for each plot illegally seized) as laid out under the Criminal Code Act;
7. $80,000 in punitive damages for Fraud, equivalent to the maximum monetary penalty for eight charges of Fraud (one for each plot illegally seized) as laid out under the Criminal Code Act.

The Plaintiff believes that we have demonstrated each and every claim for relief on balance of probabilities. The outrageous nature of this case is evident from the analysis-in-case. It exacerbated by the Commonwealth's actions at trial, where the DCT Secretary-turned-special counsel (Docket Filing No. 9) engaged in repeated antics in Court that resulted in this Court summarily charging perjury (Docket Filing No. 138) and Contempt of Court (Docket Filing No. 185).

The Plaintiff thus asks for punitive damages in full.

Legal Fees​

As has been noted in our Complaint:

The Plaintiff prays for an award of legal fees equal to 30% of the total monetary relief obtained (or sought, if the Defendant prevails on some claims) in accordance with this provision.Given the complexity of this case and the egregious nature of the Defendant’s conduct, the Plaintiff’s counsel has and will have expended significant time and resources to vindicate the Plaintiff’s rights. Thirty percent of the recovery is a fair and statutorily-supported measure of legal fees, and should be ordered against the Defendant if it is found liable. This not only compensates the Plaintiff’s costs but also encourages capable advocacy in cases where citizens challenge governmental abuse.

This case has taken a tremendous amount of time and resources, and counsel has competently and voraciously represented the Plaintiff over several months - full legal fees of 30% are warranted.

Conclusion​

Your Honor, this has been a long case with large volumes of evidence and witness testimony. And it points plainly in one direction: the Commonwealth caused damages to my client, did not swiftly move to correct it (despite a duty to do so) until we fired, and its agents have engaged in criminal actions that negatively affected my client. To put a stop to this sense of impunity, once and for all, and to deliver justice, the Court should take a bold step in its verdict to deter future malfeasance.

 

[Muggy21]

@End

The Court granted Plaintiff 10 days to submit a Closing Statement.
Please submit the CW's Closing Statement by 2/2/26 @ 9pm AEST

 

[Muggy21]

Absent an extension, the Court will enter recess for verdict on Feb 4th, 2026 at 9am EST.

I will prioritize this case and endeavor (yes an End pun) to have it done within a week. (Don't @ me if its longer)

 

[End]

Objection

Perjury
The plaintiff has admitted in their own testimony that:

1. The initial complaint in the Discord ticket concerned plot eviction timing, not the timezone of Dearev.
2. They did not raise any concerns regarding Dearev’s timezone in the initial ticket.

In their closing statement, the plaintiff claims that DCT officials ignored their urgent Discord ticket regarding this matter and implies the primary concern of this case (dearev's timezone) was mishandled. This directly contradicts their prior testimony and the several times it has been argued throughout this case.

The plaintiff cannot claim that the Department ignored a concern that, by their own admission, was not raised in the initial ticket. This misrepresentation is material to the case and constitutes perjury, as it knowingly misstates the facts to influence the outcome of the case.

Testimony:

1. The basis of the complaint when first opening the ticket was that my plots had been evicted before seven days had passed and I questioned the legality of this.

4. I did not raise any concern with dearev’s timezone in the initial ticket because I wasn’t sure his exact timezone, and that information isn’t mine to provide or know.

5. I am unsure when I initially raised the complain of Dearev’s timezone.

Closing Statement:

Instead of promptly correcting the error, DCT officials doubled down. They ignored the Plaintiff’s urgent Discord ticket and falsely insisted nothing was amiss. This compounded the breach – a reasonable department would have quickly reviewed the timeline and reversed the eviction.

Closing Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CLOSING STATEMENT

Your honour,

This case is primarily concerned with the extent of the Commonwealth’s vicarious liability for the actions of its agents where those agents are alleged to have acted contrary to law, departmental policy, or established legal norms.

Where the Commonwealth Agrees
Of the fifty-two facts advanced by the plaintiff, the Commonwealth affirms thirty-six. The Commonwealth accepts that the evictions were processed narrowly prior to what Department policy allows.

Where the Commonwealth is Neutral n
The Commonwealth cannot adequately represent Dearev in respect of allegations concerning his alleged individual conduct. Accordingly, the Commonwealth has submitted that matters relating specifically to Dearev’s personal actions should be severed from the proceedings against the Commonwealth, and that any such allegations be determined separately, with Dearev afforded appropriate individual representation where personal liability or wrongdoing is alleged.

Where the Commonwealth Disagrees
The Plaintiff alleges that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith and engaged in corrupt conduct, and further claims that the Commonwealth was afforded a sufficient opportunity to remedy the matter prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

The Commonwealth offers that the plaintiff has:
1. Deliberately mischaracterised the facts of this case;
2. Thrown every legal concept at the wall to see what sticks;
3. Objected to almost every single material submission or objection made by the Commonwealth; and
4. Refused proposed remedies in order to maintain maximum liability, increase loss, and pursue an outsized and unjustified monetary award.
5. Attempted to disadvantage the Defence by posting legal arguments minutes before concurrent deadlines, acting in bad faith through what is, perhaps, the longest trial this nation has ever seen.

RESPONDING TO PLAINTIFF"S CLAIMS
Claim 1: Alleged Violations of Constitutional Right Against Unreasonable Seizure

The Commonwealth acknowledges that the eviction of the Plaintiff’s plots occurred prior to the stated eviction date in the evicting officer's timezone. The evicting officer was not authorised under department policy or law to execute the evictions.

Once the DCT became aware of this breach of policy and law - which was first raised in this case - the Department moved immediately to correct it and nullify the eviction.

Vicarious liability arises only where a principal can be shown to have authorised, condoned, or failed to take reasonable steps to correct an agent’s unlawful conduct. Therefore, it requires showing that the act or omission:

1. Was carried out with the principal’s approval, express, implied, or otherwise;

2. Occurred within the scope of the agent’s lawful duties; or

3. Was not addressed or corrected despite the principal being aware of it.

In this scenario, the early eviction was carried out by an agent who was not authorised to act, and the Department took steps to correct and compensate for the error once it became known. With the exception of a single asset, any loss was temporary. There is no basis to hold the Commonwealth vicariously liable, as the Department did not authorise, condone, or fail to remedy the agent’s actions.

Claim 2: Alleged Violations of Constitutional Duty of Care & Claim 3: Alleged Violations of Statutory Duty of Care

The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a systemic failure by the Department to uphold Constitutional duties of care and statutory duties of care - in fact, the evidence demonstrates the opposite. An agent of the DCT unlawfully evicted the plaintiff's property, which was reversed by the Department as soon as it was made aware of the time discrepancy. There is no basis to hold the Commonwealth vicariously liable, as the Department subsequently acted to uphold it's duty of care and remedy the matter upon becoming aware of it.

Perhaps the Plaintiff's argument would have had a leg to stand on if they had notified the Department of the alleged timing error before filing suit. By failing to do so, he denied the DCT the opportunity to correct the issue, before subsequently exaggerating claims of negligence and duty of care breaches. On the contrary, perhaps a duty to inform the department of the agents unlawful actions is necessitated before the court considers such a hyperbolic sum of damages?

Claim 4: Common Law Negligence

Negligence cannot arise on the Commonwealth's behalf when:

1. The eviction was carried out by an unauthorised agent acting outside departmental policy and the law.

2. This was a personal error by the agent (whatever their motivation), not a systemic failure or departmental decision.

3. The Commonwealth did not direct, condone, or fail to correct the agent’s actions.

4. All but one plot were restored to the plaintiff's ownership when the Commonwealth were made aware of the breach, making almost all loss minor and temporary.

5. For the remaining asset, the Department offered compensation exceeding five times its market value.

6. There is no evidence presented in this case that the Commonwealth itself acted unreasonably or negligently.

7. Assigning liability to the Commonwealth would wrongly conflate an individual’s unauthorised act with the conduct of the government. The acts of a rogue police officer, for example, are not generally indicative of a systemic issue and negligence on the Government's behalf. Is it reasonable that the Government be held accountable for hundreds of thousands of dollars where an administrative error or rogue agent causes minor, temporary loss which the Commonwealth moves promptly to remedy.

The Plaintiff has lied throughout this case, and even perjured themselves.

Instead of promptly correcting the error, DCT officials doubled down. They ignored the Plaintiff’s urgent Discord ticket and falsely insisted nothing was amiss. This compounded the breach – a reasonable department would have quickly reviewed the timeline and reversed the eviction.

The concern raised with the department was that the Department evicted the plaintiff prior to exactly 7 days from the eviction report date as demonstrated in previously submitted evidence.

In response to the complaint raised:

1. The Defence explained to the Plaintiff that evictions could be processed by an officer on the eviction date in the officer’s own timezone.

2. This advice was factually accurate and directly addressed the concern raised by the Plaintiff.

3. The matter was not ignored, and the Commonwealth acted appropriately based on the information presented.

4. The guidance provided was consistent with policy and the complaint was handled properly.

Based on the information available at the time, the Secretary reasonably concluded that:

1. The plots were evicted on the correct date.

2. The Plaintiff had been misinformed about department policy regarding the seven-day period.

3. The eviction of the plot was therefore appropriate under departmental rules.

4. On that basis, the Department had acted legally and in accordance with policy, and no further concerns were raised regarding the evicting officer’s timezone.

The filing of this case brought new information to light indicating that the evicting officer did not act within departmental policy and had evicted the plot several hours early. This was subsequently reversed by the Department after the Department was made aware of this complaint.

There were two complaints made. Both were answered appropriately based on the complaint made. The plaintiff admits this fact in their testimony and then lies about it in their closing statement.

Testimony:

1. The basis of the complaint when first opening the ticket was that my plots had been evicted before seven days had passed and I questioned the legality of this.

4. I did not raise any concern with dearev’s timezone in the initial ticket because I wasn’t sure his exact timezone, and that information isn’t mine to provide or know.

5. I am unsure when I initially raised the complain of Dearev’s timezone.

Closing Statement:

Instead of promptly correcting the error, DCT officials doubled down. They ignored the Plaintiff’s urgent Discord ticket and falsely insisted nothing was amiss. This compounded the breach – a reasonable department would have quickly reviewed the timeline and reversed the eviction.

Claim 5: Alleged Loss of Enjoyment

The Commonwealth offers that you are suing the wrong entity.

1. The Commonwealth's rogue agent caused the alleged harm.

2. The Commonwealth assisted the plaintiff in reversing and compensating the temporary and permanent harm suffered.

3. The Commonwealth has upheld it's duty of care in all matters. The agent has not, and is not protected under law for failing to abide by the law, policy, or training in the conduct of their duties.

Timeline:
31 Jul: Plots evicted
03 Aug: Case filed, complaint seen.
08 Aug: Commonwealth Representation established.
09 Aug: Plots returned (less one).

A total of 9 days of ownership loss, and 1 plot loss, according to the plaintiff, justifies:

1. $280,000 in punitive damages for unreasonable seizure, in direct violation of the Plaintiff’s express constitutional rights against the same, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
2. $280,000 in punitive damages for violations of Constitutional Duty of Care, as laid out in the second Claim for Relief, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
3. $280,000 in punitive damages for violations of Statutory Duty of Care, as laid out in the third Claim for Relief, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
4. $300,000 in punitive damages for loss of enjoyment: treble damages resulting from the Commonwealth’s actions described in this Complaint and in this Case,;
5. $300,000 in punitive damages for humiliation: treble damages resulting from the Commonwealth’s actions described in this Complaint and in this Case;
6. $200,000 in punitive damages for Corruption, equivalent to the maximum monetary penalty for eight charges of Corruption (one for each plot illegally seized) as laid out under the Criminal Code Act;
7. $80,000 in punitive damages for Fraud, equivalent to the maximum monetary penalty for eight charges of Fraud (one for each plot illegally seized) as laid out under the Criminal Code Act.
8. As the Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in this case, and consequential damages are therefore not capped, the Plaintiff asks that the Court award $150,000 in humiliation damages and $150,000 in loss of enjoyment damages.
9. Compensatory damages are sought equal to the fair market value of this plot; as P-011 establishes, this is at least $27,500.
10. Creating more harm by seizing a plot back off of someone else.
11. Plus 30%.

Mathematicians would tend to agree that this total is around $2,306,000. Lawyers would tend to agree that this is completely disproportionate to a rogue agent. Society would tend to agree that this is completely unreasonable.

To get here, the plaintiff has:

1. Turned down just compensation.
2. Maximised their continued losses.
3. Sought maximum penalties against a department which acted reasonably with the information presented to them, sought to remedy the matter when the complaint was raised, and upheld their duty of care.
4. Ignored the agent who acted unlawfully and attempted to attribute their rogue actions as a liability for the taxpayer.

Claim 6: Alleged Humiliation

Any perception of humiliation arose from the Plaintiff’s misinterpretation or lack of awareness of the procedural rules, rather than deliberate or reckless conduct by the Commonwealth. Officials did not make false claims to belittle the Plaintiff - they relied on the information they were presented with.

Much of the public facing humiliating content arises from the plaintiff's own actions:

1. They were inactive, their properties were marked for eviction.
2. The plots were temporarily marked as evicted, which was the consequence of a corrected administrative error, not an intentional effort to disgrace the Plaintiff.
3. The Plaintiff’s property was restored once the Department verified the error, and a public post acknowledging that the plot was returned was made to the same forum.
4. The plaintiff then publicly launched a case against the government instead of addressing the issue privately, which they failed to do concerning the complaint raised in this case.

Plaintiff Testimony:

1. The basis of the complaint when first opening the ticket was that my plots had been evicted before seven days had passed and I questioned the legality of this.

4. I did not raise any concern with dearev’s timezone in the initial ticket because I wasn’t sure his exact timezone, and that information isn’t mine to provide or know.

5. I am unsure when I initially raised the complain of Dearev’s timezone.

Claim 7: Alleged Fraud

1. I would like to invite the court to remind the Plainitff of the advent of timezones.

The material fact: whether the plots were evicted on July 31 (lawful) or July 30 (unlawful) in Dearev’s timezone. The misrepresentation: xEndeavour told the Plaintiff that “properties were evicted on 31 Jul” and thus the eviction was proper. This was false. We know from the evidence – and Dearev’s own admissions – that the plots were actually evicted on July 30 in the relevant timezone

2. If a citizen opens a ticket about a missing red apple, it is unreasonable to expect the Department to check for a green apple. Similarly here, the Plaintiff raised an issue regarding the eviction date; the Department acted on the information presented. It cannot be held liable for misinterpretations, assumptions, or facts the Plaintiff did not clearly raise.

Just the same, the Plaintiff opened a ticket complaining that he had not been given exactly seven days. The Department cannot be expected to investigate the evicting officer’s timezone because the Plaintiff misunderstood the policy. In some timezones, the eviction date had already passed, and the Department had no reason to suspect a rogue agent was acting outside policy. These occurrences are extremely rare. Just the same, the court does not check my legal license every time I post in this case. It's easy to criticise in hindsight.

The Secretary cannot be reasonably expected to check where people live when the matter wasn't contested.

Claim 8: Alleged Corruption

Liability on the Commonwealth requires proof that the Department authorised, condoned, or knew about the conduct and failed to prevent it.

Again, the Commonwealth reversed the rogue agent's conduct. The Commonwealth proposed significant compensation for alleged conduct. The Commonwealth gained nothing from the conduct, but a 6 month-long court trial on the matter.

DEFENCE ARGUMENTS

Failure to Raise the Matter

Your Honour, the Plaintiff is asking the Court to award significant damages for an error that could have been fixed before any lawsuit was filed. There is both a legal expectation and a standard procedural norm in Redmont that citizens give the Defence - in particular government agencies - a chance to correct administrative mistakes before rushing to court. Is this the standard we want to set? What could have been solved in a Discord ticket has been dragged out over 6 months, wasting Court and Commonwealth resources to maximise gains for the plaintiff, not to remedy real loss.

The court should view such failure as evidence against claims of negligence, unreasonable delay, and aggravated damages. The Plaintiff cannot claim that the Commonwealth acted unreasonably or caused ongoing harm when the Department was never given the opportunity to fix the issue before litigation. This failure to notify first undermines almost every claim in this case and should weigh heavily in the Court’s consideration of liability and damages.

Vicarious Liability

As per the Commercial Standards Act, the employer assumes all legal liability where policy is followed or is unlawful.

The inference is, that if the policy is lawful and not followed, the employee is liable.

(2) Deferral of Responsibility - a worker cannot be held legally accountable where there is a deficiency in training provided by the employer, where training would reasonably be required.
(2) A worker cannot be sued for their individual actions when they are in accordance with lawful organisational directions and policy.
(a) The employer assumes all legal liability where policy is followed or the policy is unlawful.

The Plaintiff sued the wrong entity - the Commonwealth has only sought to return the property and compensate them. The taxpayers should not be footing the bill for rouge agent actions.

Harm

The Plainitff's own arguments undermine their prayer for relief. The plaintiff is asking the court to seize a property which was legally purchased by someone else, to satisfy the plaintiff who suffered harm. Causing harm to create more harm.

Proportionality

Justice is society's concept of fairness. The justice system seeks to remedy harm and loss. The Plaintiff is clearly trying to gain from this case and it's apparent when they are asking for approx. 70x the market value of the property that they permanently lost. Let alone mentioning that they would have received the auction amount back from the auction.

The prayers for relief are comical.

Throw everything at the wall and see what sticks

This case will go down in history as an example of what not to do as the plaintiff:

1. Go from 0 to 100 and launch a case against an entity for a problem they arent aware of.
2. Sue the entity which tried to remedy the problem.
3. Ignore the entity which acted unlawfully.
4. Try and land civil damages against a rogue agent in a case where they are not represented.
5. Spam objections.
6. Spam legal arguments.
7. Maximise your own loss.
8. Ask for the world at the expense of the taxpayers.
9. Spend 6 months arguing about harm to your client and then ask the court to create more harm by doing the same as you argued against.
10. Ask a witness over 100 questions.
11. Seek a prayer for relief that would place the plaintiff in breach of plot limits.

Your honour, if anyone in this case has acted with bad faith, it has been the plaintiff.

The Commonwealth has been transparent from the start, sought solutions to remedy a problem which it did not condone nor accept.

The Plaintiff has lied about how the Commonwealth was notified on the matter.

The Commonwealth has upheld it's duty of care in the best way it could.

Prayer

The Commonwealth suggests that an abridged prayer is offered to the plaintiff for wasting Commonwealth resources, for chasing profit in court, and for misrepresenting the facts as shown by the evidence presented.

The original offer from the Commonwealth was:

1. $75,000 (treats losses x4 and compensates)
2. A public apology
3. All properties returned in the Commonwealths care.

The proposed offer to cover vicarious liability is:

1. $40,000 (treats losses x2 and compensates)
2. All properties returned in the Commonwealths care.

The Defence thanks the court for it's time.

 

[Franciscus]

Objection

Perjury
The plaintiff has admitted in their own testimony that:

1. The initial complaint in the Discord ticket concerned plot eviction timing, not the timezone of Dearev.
2. They did not raise any concerns regarding Dearev’s timezone in the initial ticket.

In their closing statement, the plaintiff claims that DCT officials ignored their urgent Discord ticket regarding this matter and implies the primary concern of this case (dearev's timezone) was mishandled. This directly contradicts their prior testimony and the several times it has been argued throughout this case.

The plaintiff cannot claim that the Department ignored a concern that, by their own admission, was not raised in the initial ticket. This misrepresentation is material to the case and constitutes perjury, as it knowingly misstates the facts to influence the outcome of the case.

Testimony:


Closing Statement:

Response

Your Honor,

These two are not in contradiction. "Ignore" here is used in the idiomatic sense of "to do nothing about or in response to" (such as "he ignored warning signs" or "even though he knew the law, he ignored it and shot her dead cold"), not in the literal sense of "to refuse to show that you hear or see" (e.g. "I can't believe she's ingoring my texts").

The ignoring of the Plaintiff's pleas for assistance are borne out by evidence-in-case, namely P-002, where the DCT essentially told the Plaintiff to go pound sand, repeatedly attempted to close the ticket, and failed to do due diligence as to whether or not the eviction took place 7 days after the report was made. In that sense, the Plaintiff's pleas for assistance were ignored - the DCT took no action to remedy the situation.

Separately: we are arguing improper predetermination here - in other words, we are trying to demonstrate that the DCT did falsely insist nothing was amiss and that this did breach the DCT's duty of care established by prior precedent (BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44) to "do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand" and "inform[] the plaintiff that [a DCT agent] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction". As previously noted by your honor after opposing counsel's prior objections on what essentially is the same substantial question, this is a coherent legal argument, not a false factual claim as movant incorrectly asserts.

 

[Muggy21]

Objection

Perjury
The plaintiff has admitted in their own testimony that:

1. The initial complaint in the Discord ticket concerned plot eviction timing, not the timezone of Dearev.
2. They did not raise any concerns regarding Dearev’s timezone in the initial ticket.

In their closing statement, the plaintiff claims that DCT officials ignored their urgent Discord ticket regarding this matter and implies the primary concern of this case (dearev's timezone) was mishandled. This directly contradicts their prior testimony and the several times it has been argued throughout this case.

The plaintiff cannot claim that the Department ignored a concern that, by their own admission, was not raised in the initial ticket. This misrepresentation is material to the case and constitutes perjury, as it knowingly misstates the facts to influence the outcome of the case.

Testimony:


Closing Statement:

Overruled, this is a factual disagreement that the Court already noted in its Predetermination Order. As to the Commonwealth's point, I'd agree. Plaintiff's use of "ignored" isn't colloquially appropriate and may cause confusion or judicial misapprehension.

That being said, the Court doesn't see a material harm. This is something so readily apparent in P-002 as to make Plaintiff's argument in Closing Statement simply in support of what is in evidence. If P-002 didnt exist, this would be a different story.

 

[Muggy21]

@Franciscus @End

The Court will enter recess for verdict on 1/29/26 @ 9am EST, in case there are other filings by parties. Furthermore, the Court issues the following order.


Parties are not to ping the Court in any public channel in reference to this case, a legal theory reasonably construed about this case, or regarding any discussion about this case. I don't wish to stop your discussions, if there any or will be any; The Court has no interest in being involved in it.

 

[End]

Overruled, this is a factual disagreement that the Court already noted in its Predetermination Order. As to the Commonwealth's point, I'd agree. Plaintiff's use of "ignored" isn't colloquially appropriate and may cause confusion or judicial misapprehension.

That being said, the Court doesn't see a material harm. This is something so readily apparent in P-002 as to make Plaintiff's argument in Closing Statement simply in support of what is in evidence. If P-002 didnt exist, this would be a different story.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

With respect, this is not a factual disagreement.

1. P-002 does not record any complaint concerning the Evicting Officer’s timezone.

2. The Plaintiff has expressly admitted in testimony that they did not raise the timezone issue in the Discord ticket.

The Plaintiff has repeatedly asserted throughout the trial that the issue was raised with the Commonwealth and mishandled. No evidence supports this assertion. Neither P-002 nor any other evidence or testimony substantiates that the timezone issue was ever put to the Department prior to this case.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s submissions do not reflect a competing interpretation of the evidence, but rather rely on a fact not in evidence - or simply, a lie. Characterising this as a 'factual disagreement' downplays that there is no evidentiary basis upon which the Court could find that the Commonwealth was notified of, or failed to address, a timezone concern.

The Commonwealth therefore submits that:

1. The plaintiff be found to have committed perjury;

2. Repeated references to having raised this issue should be afforded no weight and struck from the record; and

3. The Court’s opinion is reflective of what is in evidence and the plaintiff’s own admissions.

There is no argument here: No evidence. Admission that it wasn't raised in the ticket. Yet, they continually claim it was - they are openly perjuring and contradicting themselves.

The DCT said nothing was amiss according to the complaint raised, not according to the time zone issue which wasn't even discovered by the plaintiff until days later - as they openly testified themselves.

 

[Franciscus]

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

With respect, this is not a factual disagreement.

1. P-002 does not record any complaint concerning the Evicting Officer’s timezone.

2. The Plaintiff has expressly admitted in testimony that they did not raise the timezone issue in the Discord ticket.

The Plaintiff has repeatedly asserted throughout the trial that the issue was raised with the Commonwealth and mishandled. No evidence supports this assertion. Neither P-002 nor any other evidence or testimony substantiates that the timezone issue was ever put to the Department prior to this case.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s submissions do not reflect a competing interpretation of the evidence, but rather rely on a fact not in evidence - or simply, a lie. Characterising this as a 'factual disagreement' downplays that there is no evidentiary basis upon which the Court could find that the Commonwealth was notified of, or failed to address, a timezone concern.

The Commonwealth therefore submits that:

1. The plaintiff be found to have committed perjury;

2. Repeated references to having raised this issue should be afforded no weight and struck from the record; and

3. The Court’s opinion is reflective of what is in evidence and the plaintiff’s own admissions.

There is no argument here: No evidence. Admission that it wasn't raised in the ticket. Yet, they continually claim it was - they are openly perjuring and contradicting themselves.

The DCT said nothing was amiss according to the complaint raised, not according to the time zone issue which wasn't even discovered by the plaintiff until days later - as they openly testified themselves.

Response

Your Honor,

Let's look through exhibit P-002:

1. The first message sent by the Plaintiff is the Plaintiff stating that sufficient playtime was achieved.
2. DCT employee Sir_Dogeington then confirmed the playtime had been achieved.
3. Dearev then checks and says the plots were already evicted.
4. The Plaintiff questions Dearev in disbelief.
5. Dearev confirms that the plots were evicted and pending auction.
6. Plaintiff said he had seven days and that it had not been seven days.
7. Dearev states that "reports were marked to be actioned on jul 31st"
8. Then Plaintiff makes the (erroneous) argument that Plaintiff's own timezone/exact 7*24 hours matters.
9. After an image is posted, Plaintiff asks if it's possible to get the plots back or if it's too late.
10. Dearev says that the plots will likely have to be auctioned.
11. After some discussion about things involving Oakridge and plot prices, xEndeavour comes in. Plaintiff provides links to the reports.
12. Dearev says that Plaintiff had 4.5 hours of playtime at the time of eviction.
13. Plaintiff states again that seven days had not passed.
14. xEndeavour then makes the statement that caused this whole mess, "Our policy is that the eviction date is actioned at any time in the actioning member’s timezone," and denied the request. (While xEndeavour should have known that he had to actually look at the timezone for him to be correct, he did not, and merely proclaimed that plots were evicted on 31 July).

The Plaintiff's chief complaint is that they plots were evicted early, before seven days had passed. This is what was stated in testimony. The DCT has a wonky definition of "seven days" (see: Exhibit P-003, specifically the Evictions Policy) in that it starts on the date of the reporter and ends on the date of the actioning officer. That same policy gives inactivity a "resolve time" of "7 Days"; while the way that those seven days are counted is different than the Plaintiff had initially thought (it is not literally 7*24 hours), the chief complaint (that seven days had not passed) should have rung a bell - particularly because the eviction policy explicitly uses "7 days" in reference to this all.

The Plaintiff raised a complaint that seven days had not yet passed, yet (not being a policy expert) subsequently misstated how to count these days. xEndeavour, in light of policy, argued that the eviction date (which is set with a "7 days" resolve time) had occurred prior to eviction on the basis of timezone. While xEndeavour's analysis was false, the underlying complaint in this all (that 7 days had not passed) was brought up.

What the Plaintiff is arguing in this case is that the Commonwealth failed to act when it should have, because 7 days (even under the DCT's wonky definition) had not passed, and the Commonwealth made up out of whole cloth that the Plaintiff was actually evicted on the eviction date in the evicting officer's timezone. This is the central question on the predetermination question. It is not perjury.

Plaintiff therefore asks that the motion to reconsider be denied.

 

[Muggy21]

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

With respect, this is not a factual disagreement.

1. P-002 does not record any complaint concerning the Evicting Officer’s timezone.

2. The Plaintiff has expressly admitted in testimony that they did not raise the timezone issue in the Discord ticket.

The Plaintiff has repeatedly asserted throughout the trial that the issue was raised with the Commonwealth and mishandled. No evidence supports this assertion. Neither P-002 nor any other evidence or testimony substantiates that the timezone issue was ever put to the Department prior to this case.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s submissions do not reflect a competing interpretation of the evidence, but rather rely on a fact not in evidence - or simply, a lie. Characterising this as a 'factual disagreement' downplays that there is no evidentiary basis upon which the Court could find that the Commonwealth was notified of, or failed to address, a timezone concern.

The Commonwealth therefore submits that:

1. The plaintiff be found to have committed perjury;

2. Repeated references to having raised this issue should be afforded no weight and struck from the record; and

3. The Court’s opinion is reflective of what is in evidence and the plaintiff’s own admissions.

There is no argument here: No evidence. Admission that it wasn't raised in the ticket. Yet, they continually claim it was - they are openly perjuring and contradicting themselves.

The DCT said nothing was amiss according to the complaint raised, not according to the time zone issue which wasn't even discovered by the plaintiff until days later - as they openly testified themselves.

I'll rule on this motion later. At this point the Court will treat this as a ruling for perjury under the CCA; a ruling that can be made while the verdict is being written. The CW's arguments herein are noted as are those of Plaintiff.

I'll rule on this next week, thx.

 

[Muggy21]

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order - On Reconsideration, Perjury

Movant's Position:

On motion from the Court's denial of Perjury, the Commonwealth moves for this Court's reconsideration. The Commonwealth identifies that there is a distinction between what the Plaintiff complained about in the ticket (P-002) and what the Plaintiff claims in his Closing Statement.

Court's Analysis:

According to P-002,
1) Plaintiff complained that "seven days had not passed" and believed that the evictions were untimely.
2) Plaintiff did not raise the timezone concern.

Plaintiff's Closing Statement correctly determines and is responsive to the distinction between the underlying complaint (the timing of the eviction) and the legal claim of the untimely nature of the dispute. That being said, saying the ticket was "ignored" is not colloquially intelligible and is confusing. The ticket wasn't ignored, it was not resolved in the Plaintiff's favor.

Order of the Court:

GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART

Perjury is denied. This is still a legal argument based on a fact, not a falsehood.

Plaintiff's language regarding the ticket being "ignored" is functionally disregarded. (The Court won't modify the existing docket)

The Court will construe the evidence, especially P-002, as its exists.


So ordered,
Judge Mug

 

[Muggy21]

The Verdict in this case has been delivered via 3 Minecraft Books to Parties.

After some formatting and minor edits, the Verdict will be released on here.

189 Days...

 

[Muggy21]

Verdict

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Verdict - YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76

SUMMARY OF CONTROVERSY
Plaintiff approaches seeking equitable relief arising from the allegedly premature eviction of multiple plots owned by Plaintiff for inactivity. Plaintiff contends that the eviction reports issued on July 24th, dated for eviction on July 31st, DCT Inspector Dearev, executed evictions on July 30th, 2025 (GMT -3), in contravention of the DCT's Eviction Policy. Although Plaintiff rectified the inactivity deficiency, the properties were not returned. As further alleged, the controversy is compounded by allegations of executive dysfunction, on the part of Secretary xEndeavour, who allegedly failed to act in a reasonable and prudent manner on notification of the incident. As a result of the premature eviction, Plaintiff approaches the Court seeking damages under several damage theories, such as unconstitutional seizure of property, breaches of constitutional and statutory duties of care, negligence, loss of enjoyment, humiliation, fraud, corruption, and other theories.

In response, Commonwealth acknowledges that the eviction occurred too soon but maintains that the error was made in good faith, amongst other legal defenses. The Commonwealth returned the properties and offered financial compensation. Plaintiff requests equitable and monetary relief and the Commonwealth stands in general opposition and presents several affirmative defenses.



Findings of Fact

On July 24th, 2025, an agent of the Commonwealth, Inspector Lawanoesepr filed an eviction report against "Plots" (defined in Complaint) for Player Inactivity (less than 6 hours in 30d); The eviction date was 7 days after the report, as is consistent with DCT Policy ("Policy", all DCT policies in general), which was rightfully noted as July 31st, 2025. On July 30th, 2025 at 2:42pm EDT, Inspector Dearev unlawfully transferred the plots in question to the Government, in contravention of Policy.

1. Inspector Dearev violated Policy
On cross examination, Dearev affirmed that he was in UTC-3 and that he evicted Plots prior to the eviction date of July 31st, 2025 with respect to his timezone as per Policy. Dearev affirmed the implications of his actions with respect to the untimely eviction.

2. Inspector Dearev was conflicted, possibly corrupt.
Under the Criminal Code Act, Corruption is defined as the use of "a government position to gain an unfair advantage for oneself or another, inconsistent with official duty." As a DCT Inspector, Dearev had access to extraordinary tools (eg: the ability to seize plots, the ability to evict, and to cause reports that will result in eviction), where reasonable due regard is expected. Reasonable due regard is the careful and dutiful exercise of lawful authority within a framework of regulations as to the greatly discourage and prohibit discretionary self-serving actions. Prior to July 24th, 2025, Dearev held and publicly called the GER "a paramilitary extremist group." Furthermore, "GlobalCenter", an enterprise that Dearev in part controls, attempted to purchase plot C343, a part of Plots; Although the personal business dealings of an Inspector generally are not germane, they are indicative of bias in consideration of Inspector's actions. Further, prior to the eviction, Dearev, on behalf of GlobalCenter (an enterprise he in part controls), had attempted to purchase Plot c343 from the Plaintiff and was refused (Exhibit P-010). In discovery returns (Post No. 123), Dearev disclosed a message in which he stated "missing c343 cuz yeet wont sell." After the eviction of c343 and its placement at auction, Dearev actively bid on the plot using corporate funds from GlobalCenter. In the auction thread, Dearev posted an image of "GlobalCenter's bank acc" displaying various dyes (Exhibit P-014). Expert witness AsexualDinosaur identified these dyes as DNB banknotes valued at approximately $177,400, demonstrating that Dearev had prepared substantial liquid funds to deploy toward acquiring c343 (Post No. 265; Exhibit P-016). Dearev stated in the auction "we can't afford this" and "I'm not blowing 80% of corporate funds on a plot," confirming active financial participation and deliberation regarding the purchase (Exhibit P-014).

3. The eviction was approximately six to nine hours premature in Dearev's own timezone.
Dearev testified that he actioned the evictions at approximately "14:00 (2pm) GMT-3" on July 30, 2025 (Post No. 301, answers to questions 9-13; Exhibit P-021). The eviction date was July 31, 2025. Even in the most favorable timezone to the Commonwealth (UTC-3), the evictions occurred approximately ten hours before the earliest permissible moment (midnight on July 31 in Dearev's timezone). Dearev himself conceded that he "believed…[he] was following policy as written, however that was later confirmed to be false" (Post No. 273, Answer to Defense question 3.2). The Defense's own representative, xEndeavour, subsequently admitted that Dearev "did not act within department policy and evicted the plot several hours early" (Post No. 257).

4. Secretary xEndeavour erroneously represented the legality of the eviction to the Plaintiff despite having access to contrary information.
When the Plaintiff opened a DCT ticket on July 30, 2025, to contest the eviction, xEndeavour stated that "properties were evicted on 31 Jul" and that "[t]he department has acted completely legally, within policy, and how it always carries out evictions" (Exhibit P-002). xEndeavour affirmed that this was based on an "assumption" and that he did not "go and find where dearev lives" before responding (Answer to Complaint, affirming Fact 49). However, xEndeavour had previously read Dearev's Apprentice Constructor Application (affirmed in Answer to Complaint, Facts 44-47), which listed Dearev's activity times in "GMT-3." xEndeavour made two posts in that application, one on July 20 and one on July 24, 2025, mere days before the eviction (Exhibit P-026). xEndeavour therefore had readily available information regarding Dearev's timezone and failed to consult it before dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint.


5. The auction structure disadvantaged the Plaintiff relative to Dearev.
Under the DCT's Auction Policy, the Plaintiff faced a 50% "repurchasing fee" as the former owner, whereas Dearev faced only a 25% "fairness fee" based on his lower plot count (Exhibit P-017; Exhibit P-014; affirmed in Answer to Complaint, Facts 33-37). This meant that for any equivalent nominal bid, the Plaintiff was required to commit substantially more cash than Dearev, a structural bidding advantage that Dearev could reasonably have foreseen prior to actioning the eviction.

6. MysticPhunky made contemporaneous statements implicating Dearev in self-dealing.
MysticPhunky, a DCT official who handled eviction auctions, stated to xEndeavour that "Dearev has been doing evictions a bit early" and that "Dearev asked me to auction a plot just for him to bid on it, which was one of the plots he evicted early" (Exhibit P-018). This statement was made directly to the DCT Secretary. When called as a witness and asked to explain this statement, MysticPhunky refused to testify, stating "I will not testify" (page 3 proceedings). MysticPhunky was subsequently held in contempt. An adverse inference may reasonably be drawn from his refusal to answer questions about his own prior statement.

7. The DCT lacked structural oversight of its Inspection Officers' actions.
xEndeavour acknowledged that the DCT did not provide any structural oversight of its Inspection Officers' actions (Exhibit D-014; affirmed in Answer to Complaint, Fact 51). No conflict-of-interest rules existed within the DCT at the time of the evictions. xEndeavour testified that conflict-of-interest policies were only formalized after the events giving rise to this lawsuit (Post No. 257), constituting an implicit acknowledgment that Dearev's conduct warranted such safeguards.

8. The Commonwealth returned seven of the eight plots only after the filing of this lawsuit and the Court's emergency injunction.
The Commonwealth did not return the Plaintiff's plots upon the Plaintiff's initial complaint in the DCT Discord ticket (Exhibit P-002). Only after this lawsuit was filed and the Court granted an emergency injunction (Post No. 3) did the Commonwealth move to return the plots (Post No. 13-14). Plot r054 had already been auctioned and sold to a third party on August 2, 2025, prior to the injunction (Exhibit P-011; Post No. 13), and was never returned to the Plaintiff. The Commonwealth remitted $26,000 in auction proceeds for r054, but this does not constitute full restitution.

9. Dearev proffered inconsistent and incredible explanations regarding the timing of his actions.
When confronted with the premature timing, Dearev suggested his computer's system clock may have displayed an incorrect date, referencing a "CMOS battery" issue (Exhibit P-028; Post No. 67). The Plaintiff asked Dearev to read from his own prior statements in Exhibit P-028, where Dearev had written words to the effect that his system showed a "time and date from long, long ago" and "that's a very good sign that the CMOS battery died." Dearev acknowledged these statements. However, this explanation is inconsistent with his other testimony that he actioned evictions at "14:00 (2pm) GMT-3" on July 30 — a statement that presupposes awareness of both the correct time and date. These mutually contradictory explanations undermine Dearev's credibility as a witness.

10. The Plaintiff argues that he suffered emotional and reputational harm.
YeetGlazer testified that seeing the evictions made him feel as though the government did not care about his rights, that his problems were being disregarded, and that the public nature of the eviction notices, posted on the forums, suggested to the community that he had neglected his properties when in fact he had met the playtime requirement (Post No. 265, Plaintiff Questions 1-3; Post No. 278, Questions 28-34). The Plaintiff was forced to expend time and resources contesting the evictions rather than participating in normal community activities.


11. Foreclosure Inquiry Avoidance was Intentional
Dearev was present in the Plaintiff's complaint ticket as "clocktest200" and actively sought to foreclose inquiry.In the DCT Discord ticket depicted in Exhibit P-002, a user named "clocktest200" sent multiple messages. Dearev was identified as this user (Exhibit P-021). After xEndeavour stated in the ticket that "Our policy is that the eviction date is actioned at any time in the actioning member's timezone," clocktest200, who knew his own timezone was GMT-3 and that the eviction had occurred on July 30 in that timezone, did not volunteer this information or correct xEndeavour's erroneous assertion that the eviction was lawful. Instead, on July 31, 2025, clocktest200 wrote in rapid succession: "This ticket was resolved," "You got your question answered," and "Please close it" (Exhibit P-002), evidencing an attempt to foreclose further inquiry into the eviction's legality. When asked on cross-examination why he did not disclose his timezone in the ticket, Dearev responded "I do not recall" (Post No. 273). The absence of any benign explanation for this silence, combined with the affirmative effort to shut down the ticket, supports an inference of deliberate concealment of a material fact.




​

Opinion and Analysis of the Court

On Colour of Law and Institutional Liability

The acts giving rise to this controversy were not private wrongs. They were committed by government agents wielding powers available to them solely by virtue of their offices. Inspector Dearev seized the Plaintiff's property using eviction tools conferred upon him by the Department. Secretary xEndeavour rendered a final determination on the Plaintiff's complaint as head of that Department. Both acted under colour of law.

This Court's inquiry does not end with the individual agent. It is well established that when a government department causes harm through its officers, liability attaches to the department itself. In nnmc v. Department of Justice [2021] SCR 15, the Supreme Court held that the Department of Justice, as the employing entity, was the proper defendant in a misconduct suit and bore monetary liability for its officer's failures, recognizing that individual officers acting within departmental frameworks are not the appropriate locus of institutional accountability. The principle is straightforward: where the institution arms the agent with authority and fails to constrain its exercise, the institution answers for the consequences.
That principle applies with full force here. The Department of Construction and Transportation maintained no structural oversight of its Inspection Officers (Finding No. 7). No conflict-of-interest safeguards existed. No protocol required verification of evictions against an officer's time zone. No supervisory review preceded the transfer of private property to the government. When the Plaintiff complained, no procedure compelled the Secretary to consult records already in the Department's possession before dismissing the challenge.
This is not the first time the DCT has appeared before a court of this Commonwealth for institutional failures in its eviction process. In Partypig678 v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2021] SCR 14, the Supreme Court found the DCT acted in bad faith when it executed an eviction without providing adequate notice or concluding a pending investigation, holding that executive departments must complete their processes and provide clear, timely notice before depriving citizens of property. In BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44, the Federal Court held the Commonwealth liable for $105,000 in damages where the DCT granted an extension on a property, then took contradictory action by auctioning that property without informing the affected party, establishing that negligent administration by a government department gives rise to both emotional damages and loss of enjoyment. And in smokeyybunnyyy v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 103, this Court held that a government agency conducting auctions must apply its own policies consistently and that failure to do so constitutes a breach of its duty of care.

The pattern is unmistakable. Across multiple proceedings, courts of this Commonwealth have found the DCT and its parent government liable not for aberrant acts by rogue officers, but for systemic failures in administration, oversight, and policy application. The present case fits squarely within that line of authority. The Commonwealth cannot characterize this as the isolated error of a single inspector when the institutional architecture permitted and facilitated that error at every stage.
Government agencies are bound by their own rules. In Ko531 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 97, the Federal Court held that government agencies must comply with their own statutory requirements "regardless of system feasibility or administrative burden," and that the rule of law requires departments to abide by the law as written. In RaiTheGuy07 v. Department of Homeland Security [2025] FCR 21, the Federal Court held that departments cannot act in violation of their own codes of conduct, even where the Constitution grants broad executive discretion. Here, the DCT's own Evictions Policy required that evictions be processed "on or after" the eviction date in the actioning member's timezone. The Department failed to verify compliance with its own rule and, when confronted, declined to investigate.
This Court therefore holds that the Commonwealth bears institutional liability not solely on a theory of respondeat superior, but on the independent ground that the Department's own policies, customs, and failures of supervision were the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. Where the policy of an institution is indifference to the rights of those subject to its authority, the institution bears responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of that indifference. The DCT's post-hoc adoption of conflict-of-interest rules (Finding No. 7) constitutes the Commonwealth's own acknowledgment that the prior framework was deficient. This Court accepts that acknowledgment.


Immunities of State and the Limitations of Judicial Oversight

This Court is mindful that not every act of government is amenable to judicial correction. The Commonwealth exercises powers that, in certain domains, are constitutionally committed to coordinate branches and shielded from suit. In Justice Compass, Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 98, this Court recognized that the Commonwealth enjoys Limited-Scope State Immunity when it exercises powers arising directly from the Constitution in good faith, describing the standard as "a reasonable, non-arbitrary effort that does not require the Executive to pursue futile or impossible enforcement measures." In Toadking v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 18, the Supreme Court declined to invalidate a judicial confirmation despite a statutory violation, holding that "a regular statute cannot limit the Senate in exercising a power the Constitution gives exclusively to it," and that where a constitutional actor proceeds knowingly within the scope of its exclusive authority, the omission is "part of [that body's] own process" rather than a basis for judicial intervention.
These doctrines define the outer boundary of this Court's reach. They do not define the present case. The DCT does not exercise an exclusive constitutional power immune from scrutiny. It exercises delegated administrative authority under the Property Standards Act, authority that is at all times subject to the constraints of law, regulation, and the Constitution. The eviction of a citizen's property is not an act of sovereign prerogative comparable to the Senate's confirmation power or the Executive's good-faith enforcement of a judgment. It is the exercise of statutory authority over private rights. Where that authority is exercised unlawfully, or in a manner that infringes constitutional guarantees, this Court is not merely permitted to intervene; it is obligated to do so. As this Court stated in Justice Compass, Limited-Scope State Immunity "does not insulate the government from actions alleging abuses of arrest, unlawful conduct, or violations of constitutional guarantees," and where State Power is "tainted by bad faith, or infringes protected rights, the doors of the Court remain fully open."



This Court has considered the Findings of Fact (Nos. 1-11), its analysis/dicta on Colour of Law, State Power, and Institutional Liability, the arguments of both parties, and the full evidentiary record. The Court now renders its verdict on each claim of relief.

​

Order of the Court

I. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE


The Commonwealth argues that a premature eviction is a mere administrative error and does not constitute an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of Section 32(15) of the Constitution. The Commonwealth cites Yeet_Boy v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 11 and Dartanman v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 16 for the proposition that the government retains broad authority to manage property and enforce building regulations. This Court does not dispute those holdings. But neither case is apposite here.

In Yeet_Boy, the Supreme Court found that no valid contract existed and that the government acted within its lawful prerogatives. The eviction was authorized. In Dartanman, the Federal Court upheld an eviction where the DCT had properly established and published its regulations and the plaintiff had failed to comply. In both cases, the government acted lawfully. The distinguishing feature of the present case is that the government did not act lawfully. The Plaintiff had cured his inactivity. The eviction date had not yet arrived in any timezone material to this dispute. The Plaintiff's property was seized before the government had any legal authority to seize it. That is not an administrative error. That is an unreasonable seizure.

This Court has already addressed the boundaries of State Immunity in its dicta. In Justice Compass, Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 98, this Court held that Limited-Scope State Immunity shields the Commonwealth where it makes "a reasonable, non-arbitrary effort" in the faithful execution of its constitutional mandate. But this Court was equally clear that such immunity "does not insulate the government from actions alleging abuses of arrest, unlawful conduct, or violations of constitutional guarantees." The seizure of the Plaintiff's property was not a reasonable effort. It was premature by approximately ten hours, carried out by an officer with a disclosed personal interest in one of the plots (Finding No. 6), and defended by a Secretary who made false representations to the Plaintiff without consulting records already in his possession (Finding No. 4). This conduct is not the good-faith exercise of constitutional authority that Limited-Scope State Immunity protects.

The Commonwealth further argues that its prompt remedial action in returning seven plots demonstrates good faith and should mitigate against a constitutional finding. This Court notes, however, that the Commonwealth did not return the plots upon the Plaintiff's initial complaint. The plots were returned only after the filing of this lawsuit and the issuance of this Court's emergency injunction (Finding No. 10). Remedial action taken only under compulsion of judicial process does not constitute the voluntary good faith the Commonwealth claims. As observed in smokeyybunnyyy v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 103, while a willingness to settle is relevant to mitigation, it does not erase the underlying breach.

This Court declares that the eviction of the Plaintiff's eight plots on July 30, 2025 constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of Section 32(15) of the Constitution and a breach of the DCT's Evictions Policy under the Property Standards Act, Section 4(1).


II. RETURN OF PROPERTY AND RESTITUTION


Seven of the eight plots have been returned to the Plaintiff. This claim is moot as to those seven plots.

The Commonwealth argues that $26,000 represents the fair market value as determined by competitive auction and cites Partypig678 v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2021] SCR 14 for the proposition that compensation should be "limited to the current market value of the property as established by standard appraisal or flat pricing."

This Court accepts the Partypig678 standard but notes that the auction in question was not a fair measure of market value. It was an auction of improperly seized property, conducted by the very department that had unlawfully evicted it, under a fee structure that imposed a 50% repurchasing fee on the Plaintiff and only a 25% fairness fee on Inspector Dearev (Finding No. 7). The auction was, in effect, tainted by the underlying illegality. This Court cannot accept the proceeds of an unlawful seizure as the definitive measure of the property's value.

The Plaintiff has claimed $27,500 for Plot r054. The Commonwealth has already remitted $26,000. This Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to $27,500 in compensatory damages for the permanent loss of Plot r054, less the $26,000 already remitted, for a net compensatory award of $1,500.


III. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR TEMPORARY DEPRIVATION

The Commonwealth argues that no compensatory damages are warranted for the seven returned plots because the Plaintiff has been made whole through their physical return. This Court disagrees.

The Plaintiff was deprived of the use and enjoyment of seven plots for a period of approximately two weeks. During this period, the Plaintiff could not access, develop, rent, or otherwise benefit from properties that were lawfully his. The deprivation was not de minimis. It was the product of an unlawful act by a government department, and the Plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the period of deprivation.

This Court notes, however, that the Plaintiff has not submitted business records, rental agreements, or financial projections demonstrating specific income lost during the deprivation period. The Commonwealth's argument that the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving quantifiable losses is well taken. In 4DCube v. AnArab [2024] FCR 26, the Federal Court held that a plaintiff must "affirmatively prove damages, including lost income."

In the absence of particularized evidence of lost income, this Court awards nominal compensatory damages of $3,500 ($500 per plot) for the temporary deprivation of the seven returned plots. This figure reflects the inconvenience and loss of use suffered by the Plaintiff during the period of unlawful deprivation, without speculating as to revenue the Plaintiff might have earned.

IV. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES


The Plaintiff seeks $300,000 in consequential damages for disruption to business operations, lost rental income, and commercial harm.

This Court finds that the Plaintiff has not met the evidentiary burden required to sustain this claim. No business records, rental contracts, financial statements, or revenue projections have been placed before the Court. The Plaintiff has not identified specific tenants, specific contracts, or specific commercial arrangements that were disrupted by the two-week deprivation. This Court cannot award $300,000 on the basis of unsubstantiated assertions.

In 4DCube v. AnArab [2024] FCR 26, the Federal Court held that "illegality of an action does not automatically guarantee compensation to those affected" and that "contradictions between a party's opening arguments and their own" evidence undermine damages claims. In Smokeyybunnyyy v. Keeerun [2023] FCR 88, the Federal Court held that a plaintiff seeking damages for loss of enjoyment "must present affirmative evidence demonstrating that specific activities or benefits previously available are now unavailable or diminished."

The Plaintiff's consequential damages claim is speculative. It is denied.

V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Plaintiff seeks $1,440,000 in punitive damages. The Commonwealth asks this Court to treat the underlying conduct as a timing error in a routine administrative action and to limit any punitive exposure to a sum consistent with prior precedent.

This Court has listened carefully to the Commonwealth's arguments; It rejects them entirely.

What happened to YeetGlazer was not an administrative error. It was not a procedural irregularity. It was not a timing miscalculation. It was theft under colour of law. A government officer, entrusted with the coercive power of the state over the property rights of every citizen in this Commonwealth, used that power to seize a citizen's plots because that citizen had the temerity to refuse to sell it to him. And when the citizen complained, the Department closed ranks, lied to him, and told him the government had acted lawfully. Every layer of this case, from the initial eviction to the final moments of trial testimony, reveals a deeper rot than the last. This Court will address each layer in turn, because the Commonwealth's defense depends upon this Court examining none of them too closely.

A. The Self-Dealing

The facts are not in serious dispute. They are damning.

Inspector Dearev wanted Plot c343. He wanted it badly enough to approach the Plaintiff and attempt to purchase it on behalf of GlobalCenter, an enterprise he in part controls. The Plaintiff refused. Dearev then wrote, in words recovered through the discovery process, that he was "missing c343 cuz yeet wont sell" (Finding No. 6; Exhibit P-010). That message is the Rosetta Stone of this case. It establishes motive in Dearev's own hand, in his own words, in terms that admit of no innocent interpretation. He wanted the plot. He could not get it. And then he evicted it.

The Commonwealth would have this Court believe that what followed was coincidence. That an inspector who coveted a citizen's property, who was refused that property through lawful commerce, who expressed frustration at being refused, then happened to evict that property one full day before the eviction date, then happened to bid on it at auction with $177,400 in pre-assembled corporate funds, and all of this happened by accident. This Court does not believe in that coincidence. No reasonable finder of fact could.

Dearev did not merely evict Plot c343. He evicted all eight of the Plaintiff's plots (Finding No. 3). He cast a wide net. Whether this was done to disguise his interest in c343 by burying it among seven other evictions, or whether it reflected a broader intent to strip the Plaintiff of his holdings, the effect was the same: a citizen who had met every requirement imposed by the Commonwealth, who had cured his inactivity, who owed the government nothing, woke to find that the government had taken everything.

Dearev then bid on the seized property at auction. He did so using GlobalCenter's corporate funds. AsexualDinosaur identified DNB banknotes in Dearev's disclosed bank image valued at approximately $177,400 (Finding No. 6; Exhibit P-014; Exhibit P-016). Dearev himself confirmed active financial participation, stating in the auction thread "we can't afford this" and "I'm not blowing 80% of corporate funds on a plot." These are not the words of a disinterested public servant. These are the words of a bidder calculating his ceiling. And the auction itself was rigged against the Plaintiff from the start: the DCT's own Auction Policy imposed a 50% repurchasing fee on the Plaintiff as the former owner, while Dearev faced only a 25% fairness fee (Finding No. 7; Exhibit P-017). The man who seized the property paid half the surcharge of the man from whom it was seized.

Let this Court be unambiguous: Inspector Dearev abused the eviction power of the Department of Construction and Transportation to effectuate a forced transfer of private property to himself. He could not buy what he wanted, so he confiscated it. That is not an administrative error. That is the exercise of state violence for private enrichment. It is the precise evil that Section 32(15) of the Constitution exists to prevent, and it is an offense against every citizen of this Commonwealth who trusts that the officers of their government will not turn the machinery of the state against them for personal gain.

B. The Corroboration

If the documentary evidence were not sufficient, the testimony of the Commonwealth's own officials confirms the scheme.

MysticPhunky, the DCT official responsible for conducting eviction auctions, told Secretary xEndeavour directly that "Dearev has been doing evictions a bit early" and that "Dearev asked me to auction a plot just for him to bid on it, which was one of the plots he evicted early" (Finding No. 8; Exhibit P-018). This statement was not extracted through adversarial cross-examination. It was made voluntarily, by a DCT insider, to the Secretary of the Department, in what appears to have been a candid disclosure of departmental misconduct. It is a statement against interest by a member of the very institution now defending this case. Its evidentiary weight is substantial.

And when MysticPhunky was called to testify before this Court and asked to explain his own words, he refused. He said "I will not testify." He was held in contempt. This Court draws the strongest adverse inference the law permits from that refusal. MysticPhunky made a contemporaneous statement to his superior identifying Dearev as a self-dealer. When given the opportunity to recant, clarify, or contextualize that statement under oath, he chose silence and contempt over testimony. The only reasonable inference is that his testimony would have confirmed what his prior statement already established: that Dearev evicted properties early so that he could bid on them at auction.

The Commonwealth has offered no explanation for MysticPhunky's statement. It has offered no alternative reading of his words. It has not called him as a witness to rebut the inference. The statement stands unrebutted, uncontradicted, and unimpeached. It is a confession from within the walls of the Department itself.

C. The Concealment

What transforms this case from serious misconduct into conduct deserving of the most severe civil sanction available is not merely the act of self-dealing, but the systematic concealment that followed.

When the Plaintiff opened a DCT complaint ticket on July 30, 2025, to contest the eviction of his properties, Inspector Dearev was present in the channel. He was not present under his own name. He was present under the alias "clocktest200" (Finding No. 5). He watched as Secretary xEndeavour told the Plaintiff that "properties were evicted on 31 Jul" and that the department had "acted completely legally, within policy, and how it always carries out evictions" (Finding No. 4; Exhibit P-002). Both statements were false. Dearev knew they were false. He was the one who had actioned the evictions on July 30, in GMT-3, approximately ten hours before the earliest permissible moment. He said nothing.

When xEndeavour stated that evictions were actioned "at any time in the actioning member's timezone," Dearev had the opportunity to end this matter. He could have disclosed that his timezone was GMT-3. He could have acknowledged that the eviction was premature. He could have allowed the Department to self-correct. Instead, he pressed for the ticket to be closed. "This ticket was resolved." "You got your question answered." "Please close it." Three messages in rapid succession, not from a disinterested observer, but from the officer who had carried out the eviction and who stood to benefit from its finality. This was not passivity. This was active suppression of a citizen's attempt to seek redress.

Secretary xEndeavour bears his own share of responsibility for what happened in that ticket. His false assurances were not innocent. He admitted they were based on an "assumption." But xEndeavour had read Dearev's Apprentice Constructor Application mere days before the eviction, an application that listed Dearev's activity times in "GMT-3" (Finding No. 4; Exhibit P-026). He made two posts in that application on July 20 and July 24, 2025. The information was not buried in some forgotten archive. It was in xEndeavour's recent memory, in a document he had actively engaged with less than two weeks prior. He did not consult it. He did not investigate the Plaintiff's complaint. He dismissed it with a false assurance of legality and closed the door.

This Court cannot determine whether xEndeavour's failure was negligence or something worse. But this Court observes that xEndeavour's "assumption" served Dearev's interests perfectly. Whether by design or by indifference, the Secretary of the Department provided cover for the inspector who had just seized a citizen's property for his own benefit. The result is the same: the Plaintiff was told the government had acted lawfully. He was given no remedy. He was turned away. The only reason his property was returned is that he had the resources, the knowledge, and the determination to file a federal lawsuit. A citizen with fewer resources would have lost everything.

That is the most chilling aspect of this case. The system did not fail because of one rogue officer. It failed because there was no system. The Department had no conflict-of-interest rules, no verification protocols, no supervisory review of eviction actions (Finding No. 9). When the citizen complained, the Department did not investigate. It assumed its own officer had acted correctly and told the citizen he was wrong. The safeguards that should have caught this abuse did not exist. The ones that should have corrected it were not activated. The citizen was left entirely alone to vindicate his own rights, against the full institutional weight of the Commonwealth.

D. The Trial Testimony

Inspector Dearev's conduct at trial compounded the offense. When confronted with the premature timing of his actions, Dearev suggested that his computer's system clock may have displayed an incorrect date, referencing a "CMOS battery" issue (Finding No. 11; Exhibit P-028). He stated that his system showed a "time and date from long, long ago" and that "that's a very good sign that the CMOS battery died."

This explanation is not merely unpersuasive. It is insulting to the intelligence of this Court. In the same proceedings, Dearev testified that he actioned the evictions at "14:00 (2pm) GMT-3" on July 30 (Post No. 301). One who knows the precise hour and timezone of his actions knows what day it is. One whose computer displays a date "from long, long ago" does not testify with confidence about the exact hour of his actions in a specific timezone. These two accounts are mutually exclusive. Dearev offered whichever explanation he believed would serve him in the moment, without regard for whether his statements could be reconciled with each other. This Court finds that Dearev's trial testimony was not credible on any material point, and that his attempt to fabricate an exculpatory technical malfunction reflects consciousness of guilt.

E. The Legal Framework

The Commonwealth argues, citing lawanoesepr v. Milqy [2022] SCR 9, that corruption and fraud are criminal charges that cannot be adjudicated in a civil action. This Court has acknowledged the distinction throughout these proceedings. This Court does not convict Inspector Dearev of corruption. This Court does not impose a criminal sentence. Those are matters for the Department of Justice, and this Court takes this opportunity to observe that the evidentiary record compiled in this case would amply support a referral.

But the Commonwealth's invocation of the criminal/civil distinction is not a shield. It is an evasion. The Commonwealth asks this Court to recognize that its officer's conduct satisfies no criminal standard, while simultaneously asking this Court not to look at the conduct at all. This Court rejects that framing. A civil court is entitled, and indeed obligated, to consider the nature, gravity, and moral character of a defendant's conduct in calibrating punitive damages. The more egregious the conduct, the more substantial the sanction must be to serve the twin purposes of punishment and deterrence. The fact that the conduct may also constitute a crime does not immunize it from civil consequences. It aggravates them.

In Reveille Legion v. BabySoga [2025] DCR 52, the District Court held that "a conscious decision to ignore a self-stated rule despite clear evidence to the contrary is not mere negligence but willful misconduct," and that such conduct "falls outside the protected sphere of administrative immunity." In Corporate Security Union v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 15, the Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for corruption: (1) whether the official used a government position to act inconsistently with official duty, and (2) whether the action provided an unfair advantage to oneself or another. In Commonwealth of Redmont v. Milqy [2022] SCR 16, the Supreme Court held that a government official who exercises powers not granted to his office to benefit himself or an entity he controls commits corruption. In Commonwealth of Redmont v. ReinausPrinzzip [2021] SCR 20, the Supreme Court held that "using a government position to advance private political interests, rather than serving the public interest, constitutes corruption."

Every element of every one of these tests is satisfied here. Dearev used his government position to evict property he personally coveted, in a manner inconsistent with official duty and departmental policy, providing a direct and substantial financial advantage to himself and to GlobalCenter. The fact that this Court cannot enter a criminal conviction does not prevent it from observing that the civil record speaks for itself.

F. Departure from Precedent

The Commonwealth has argued that punitive damages must be proportionate and consistent with prior awards. This Court has considered that argument carefully. The largest punitive damages award in Commonwealth history is $50,000, entered in Commonwealth of Redmont v. Milqy [2022] SCR 16 against a sitting Senator convicted of corruption, perjury, and abuse of the declassification power. The Commonwealth invites this Court to treat that figure as a ceiling. This Court declines.

Precedent is a guide, not a cage. The purpose of precedent is to ensure consistency and predictability in the administration of justice. But consistency does not mean uniformity in the face of categorically different facts. If every case of government corruption were identical, a uniform award would be appropriate. They are not identical. The facts of this case are without parallel in the recorded jurisprudence of this Commonwealth.

In Milqy, the corruption was political. A Senator abused his office for the benefit of allies. In Partypig678 [2021] SCR 14, the DCT acted in bad faith by executing an eviction without completing its investigation. The Supreme Court awarded $3,000 in punitive damages. There was no evidence of personal financial interest. In BananaNova [2024] FCR 44, the DCT negligently auctioned property after granting an extension. There was no evidence that an officer sought to acquire the property for himself. In Reveille Legion [2025] DCR 52, a government official willfully departed from self-stated rules. The $25,000 punitive award reflected serious but impersonal misconduct.

None of these cases involved a government officer who identified a specific piece of private property he wanted, was refused the opportunity to purchase it, used the enforcement power of his office to seize it, concealed the illegality of the seizure from the victim, and then bid on the seized property at a government auction using pre-assembled corporate funds under a fee structure that advantaged him over the victim. That sequence of events is not merely worse than prior cases. It is different in kind. It represents the most fundamental betrayal of the public trust that a government officer can commit: the conversion of state power into a tool of personal acquisition.

Prior awards were calibrated to prior misconduct. This misconduct demands a new calibration.

This Court further observes that the track record of the DCT before the courts of this Commonwealth is, by itself, a matter of institutional disgrace. In Partypig678 [2021] SCR 14, the DCT evicted property in bad faith without concluding its investigation. In BananaNova [2024] FCR 44, the DCT auctioned property after granting an extension without informing the owner. In smokeyybunnyyy [2024] FCR 103, the DCT was again found liable for institutional failures in the handling of citizen property. In every case, courts awarded modest damages. In every case, the Department returned to this Court, or courts like it, with new variations of the same fundamental failure: a lack of internal controls, a lack of oversight, and a willingness to prioritize departmental convenience over the property rights of the citizens it exists to serve. The deterrent signals sent by prior courts have failed. The modest awards of $3,000, $25,000, and even $50,000 have not impressed upon the Department of Construction and Transportation the seriousness with which this Commonwealth's judiciary regards the abuse of government power over private property. This Court intends for today's award to leave no room for misunderstanding.

G. The Award

This Court awards punitive damages of $750,000.

This is, by a substantial margin, the largest punitive damages award in the history of the Commonwealth of Redmont. This Court arrives at this figure deliberately, and with full awareness of the precedent it sets. It is justified by the following considerations, each of which independently supports a substantial departure from prior awards:

First: the gravity of the abuse. Inspector Dearev did not make a mistake. He did not misread a policy. He did not miscalculate a date. He identified a piece of private property he wanted, was refused the opportunity to buy it, and used the power of his government office to take it. He then attempted to purchase the property he had seized, at a government auction, using $177,400 in pre-assembled corporate funds. This is not a case of negligent governance. This is a case of predatory governance. The eviction power exists to serve the public interest by maintaining property standards. Dearev perverted it into a mechanism for forced acquisition of private property. If this Court were to treat that conduct with the same measured restraint applied to cases of bureaucratic negligence, it would be announcing to every government officer in this Commonwealth that the seizure of a citizen's property for personal gain carries a financial consequence no greater than the penalty for losing a piece of paperwork. This Court refuses to send that message.

Second: the concealment and the cover-up. Dearev did not merely commit the act. He concealed it. He sat in the complaint ticket under an alias. He pressed for its closure when the Plaintiff raised concerns. He allowed false statements to be made on his behalf without correction. At trial, he fabricated a technical malfunction to explain the timing of his actions while simultaneously testifying with precision about the hour and timezone in which those actions occurred. xEndeavour, the Secretary of the Department, dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint with false assurances based on an "assumption" that he could have disproven by consulting a document in his own recent history. The Department did not self-correct. It did not investigate. It did not acknowledge the error until compelled to do so by this Court's emergency injunction, issued only after the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. The concealment transforms this case from one of corrupt action into one of corrupt action followed by institutional suppression of the victim's attempt to seek redress. That combination demands a punitive response of the highest order.

Third: the institutional pattern. This is not the first time the DCT has appeared before the courts of this Commonwealth as a defendant in a property rights case. It is the fourth. In each prior case, courts identified the same structural deficiencies: no oversight, no safeguards, no accountability. In each prior case, courts awarded damages intended to signal the need for reform. And in each prior case, the Department continued on substantially the same course. The conflict-of-interest safeguards that might have prevented this case did not exist at the time of the eviction (Finding No. 9). They were adopted only after the filing of this lawsuit, in what amounts to an admission by conduct that the Department's prior practices were inadequate. This Court has no confidence that a modest award will produce a different outcome than the modest awards that preceded it. The award must be large enough to compel institutional change, not merely suggest it.

Fourth: the need for meaningful deterrence. Inspector Dearev deployed $177,400 in corporate funds to bid on the property he had seized. An award of $50,000 or $100,000 would represent a fraction of the funds Dearev was prepared to spend to acquire the Plaintiff's property. It would establish, as a matter of Commonwealth jurisprudence, that the financial risk of using government power to seize private property is lower than the market price of the property itself. That calculation must never be rational. The punitive award must ensure that no government officer, present or future, can conclude that the potential gains of self-dealing outweigh the potential consequences. $750,000 achieves this objective. It is a sum that exceeds, by a wide margin, any benefit Dearev could have extracted from the scheme, and it is a sum that will be noted by every officer of the Commonwealth who exercises enforcement authority over private property.

Fifth: the vulnerability of the Plaintiff and the asymmetry of power. The Plaintiff was a private citizen. The Commonwealth was the government. The Plaintiff had no enforcement authority, no institutional resources, and no means of compelling the return of his property except through the courts. When he complained through internal channels, he was dismissed with false assurances. When the truth emerged, the Department did not come to him. He came to the Department, through litigation, at his own expense. The asymmetry of power between a citizen and the state is the reason constitutional protections exist. When the state abuses that asymmetry, the remedy must be proportionate not merely to the financial harm, but to the breach of trust that the abuse represents. The Plaintiff entrusted his property rights to the protection of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth repaid that trust by seizing his property, lying to him about it, and forcing him to sue to get it back. A substantial punitive award is the only mechanism available to this Court to vindicate the principle that the government serves the citizen, not the other way around.

The Plaintiff's demand of $1,440,000 is reduced. While this Court recognizes the severity of the Plaintiff's grievance and the force of his arguments, the punitive award must retain some proportionality to the compensatory harm established on the record. $750,000 is a figure that punishes the conduct, deters its repetition, sets a precedent commensurate with the gravity of the offense, and remains within the outer bounds of what a responsible court should award in a case where the total compensatory loss is comparatively modest. It is not a windfall. It is the cost of corruption.
​

VI. LEGAL FEES


The Plaintiff seeks legal fees calculated at 30% of the total recovery. The Commonwealth argues that fees should be proportionate to the actual award, not the inflated prayer for relief.

This Court agrees with the Commonwealth that legal fees should be measured against the actual recovery. In RaiTheGuy07 v. Department of Homeland Security [2025] FCR 21, the Federal Court awarded $6,450, significantly less than the requested 30%. In Reveille Legion v. BabySoga [2025] DCR 52, the Court awarded $7,500, reduced from the requested amount based on damages actually awarded.

This Court calculates legal fees at 30% of the total damages award:

Compensatory damages: $5,000
Punitive damages: $750,000
Total damages: $755,000

30% of $755,000 = $226,500.

This Court pauses on this figure. While the Plaintiff is entitled to recover fees as the prevailing party, and while this Court has applied the 30% rate requested, the resulting sum is substantial. This Court has considered whether a reduced percentage is warranted, as in RaiTheGuy07 v. Department of Homeland Security [2025] FCR 21, where the Court awarded $6,450 against a requested $21,450. However, this Court notes that the complexity of this litigation, the volume of evidence adduced, the number of witnesses examined, and the duration of proceedings justify a fee commensurate with the effort expended. The Plaintiff's counsel was required to overcome false representations by the Department, compel discovery, secure an emergency injunction, examine hostile witnesses, and establish a factual record of government corruption that the Commonwealth resisted at every turn.

This Court awards $226,500 in legal fees.
​

Thus, the Court orders the following
1) The Eviction on July 30th, 2025 was unconstitutional.
2) The Commonwealth is liable to Plaintiff in the amount of $755,000.
3) The Commonwealth is liable to Plaintiff's Attorney, Multiman155, in the amount of $226,500

Total Award: $981,500


So Ordered,
Judge Mug.

Case Law Cited:
nnmc v. Department of Justice [2021] SCR 15
Partypig678 v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2021] SCR 14
BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44
smokeyybunnyyy v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 103
Ko531 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 97
RaiTheGuy07 v. Department of Homeland Security [2025] FCR 21
Justice Compass, Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Redmont, [2025] FCR 98
Toadking v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 18
Yeet_Boy v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 11
Dartanman v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 16
4DCube v. AnArab [2024] FCR 26
Smokeyybunnyyy v. Keeerun [2023] FCR 88
Reveille Legion v. BabySoga [2025] DCR 52
Corporate Security Union v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 15
Commonwealth of Redmont v. Milqy [2022] SCR 16
Commonwealth of Redmont v. ReinausPrinzzip [2021] SCR 20


Notes from Judge Mug:
This case is an example of why Court Rules need to be implemented properly. Also, I'm pretty sure I may have said the Commonwealth directly argued something, I meant the Commonwealth made an argument that RELIED on that something. (This was 18 pages on GDocs, yea...)

 

[Muggy21]

I also RP'd a pdf of it too.

The forum post (the" [/verdict/]" one is controlling over all iterations.)[/verdict]