Lawsuit: In Session YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76

[dearev]

 

[dearev]

May it please the court.
I have noticed that i have answered for question 73. "Y" when i intended to write "N".

I request this court to allow that question 73's answer be changed to a "N"

Thank you.

 

[Franciscus]

View attachment 70957View attachment 70958View attachment 70959

Brief

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
SUBMISSION OF FOLLOW-UPS REGARDING QUESTION SHEET HANDWRITTEN ANSWERS

1. What is your answer to Question No. 35 in the above quoted post?
2. There is writing in the margin next to Questions 61 and 62 in the above quoted post. To which question does that writing attach?
3. What is your answer to Question No. 65 in the above quoted post?
4. There are arrows pointing to the margin near Question No. 67 and Question No. 68. What text attaches to the answer to question No. 67?
5. There are arrows pointing to the margin near Question No. 67 and Question No. 68. What text attaches to the answer to question No. 68?
6. There is an arrow from question No. 72 that heads to the bottom of the sheet in the above quoted post. There is a line from question No. 78 that merges with that line. What is the text of your answer to question No. 72?
7. There is an arrow from question No. 72 that heads to the bottom of the sheet in the above quoted post. There is a line from question No. 78 that merges with that line. What is the text of your answer to question No. 78?
8. Holding the questions mentioned by question numbers 1-7 of this followup brief aside, which questions should we understand your answer to not be in the affirmative?

 

[Muggy21]

@dearev Please respond to clarifications from Multiman155 by 1/10/26 @ 5pm EST.

No additional questions posed to witnesses will be permitted at this time.

 

[dearev]

1. What is your answer to Question No. 35 in the above quoted post? It seems like i have forgotten to write it. Consider it as a “Y”
2. There is writing in the margin next to Questions 61 and 62 in the above quoted post. To which question does that writing attach? Q61
3. What is your answer to Question No. 65 in the above quoted post? My answer leaves a “Y” implicit
4. There are arrows pointing to the margin near Question No. 67 and Question No. 68. What text attaches to the answer to question No. 67? Same text of Q 65
5. There are arrows pointing to the margin near Question No. 67 and Question No. 68. What text attaches to the answer to question No. 68? Same text of Q 65
6. There is an arrow from question No. 72 that heads to the bottom of the sheet in the above quoted post. There is a line from question No. 78 that merges with that line. What is the text of your answer to question No. 72?Its is all of the text on the bottom of the page

1. There is an arrow from question No. 72 that heads to the bottom of the sheet in the above quoted post. There is a line from question No. 78 that merges with that line. What is the text of your answer to question No. 78?

Its is all of the text on the bottom of the page

1. Holding the questions mentioned by question numbers 1-7 of this followup brief aside, which questions should we understand your answer to not be in the affirmative? I have responded “N” to questions 78 and 73 it seems

 

[Muggy21]

@Franciscus

You shall have 5 days to present your Closing Statement. Deadline 1/16/26 @ 9pm EST. An extension of up to three days will be automatically granted, just let the Court know.

 

[Muggy21]

(Writing this for posterity)

By the grace of Lord Tuk and his infinitesimal wisdom, the deadlines of this Court have been modified due to forums outages.

The deadline for Closing Statements from the Plaintiff is flexible, with a suggested deadline of January 18th, 2026. When the CW is invited to present a Closing Statement, the same flexibility shall be extended to the CW's counselor.

Parties are not prejudiced when the Court grants generous deadlines relief in an equitable manner or when otherwise directed by Staff intervention.

 

[Franciscus]

Closing Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CLOSING STATEMENT

Your Honor:

This case is one in which the Commonwealth illegally evicted the Plaintiff, omitted key information from the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff sought to contest his evictions, and then began to auction off his plots (and successfully auctioned one off). An Inspection Manager who had a conflict-of-interest corruptly sought to acquire plots which he illegally evicted. The “Department of Construction and Transportation did not do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand,” nor “inform[] the plaintiff that [the DCT’s agents] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction” (see: BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44), causing concrete damages to my client.

This case has been long, full of discovery submissions, and substantial witness questioning. This closing statement will discuss the issues raised and rules as the facts apply to them, and demonstrate that on balance of probabilities we have proven every claim and are entitled to relief in full.

In our complaint, we laid out eight claims for relief. Let us re-examine the key issues posed by each of them, what the law says about these issues, and how the facts apply.

Claim 1: Violations of Constitutional Right Against Unreasonable Seizure​

Issue: The first issue is whether the Commonwealth’s premature eviction of the Plaintiff’s property violated his constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable seizures. The Plaintiff asserts that by seizing his plots before the authorized date, the government acted unlawfully and unconstitutionally.

Rule: Section 32(15) of the Constitution guarantees that “every citizen has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” In practical terms, any government taking of property must be lawful, justified, and follow due process. Towards this end, the DCT has created a notice-cure period-eviction framework under its Evictions Policy (see: Exhibit P-003). Even the DCT’s own Secretary at the relevant time, xEndeavour, had previously acknowledged under oath that the eviction timeline exists to ensure “players are protected from unreasonable seizure in line with their constitutional right” (see Complaint, first claim for relief, quoting filing in FlyingBlocks v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 1).
In short, the law and the government’s policies forbid arbitrary confiscations of property, and require reasonable process to be followed when making seizures.

Application: Here, the evidence proves the Commonwealth flagrantly disregarded the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

The evidence proves the Plaintiff’s plots were seized one day early, with no legal excuse. DCT agent Dearev admitted he executed the evictions at “14:00 (2pm) GMT-3” on July 30, before the July 31 eviction date (Dearev's Testimony, Post No. 301, answer to questions 9-13; Exhibit P-021). He knew or should have known this was premature. In fact, Dearev conceded that when he carried out the evictions, he “believed…[he] was following policy as written, however that was later confirmed to be false” (Dearev's Testimony, Post No. 273, Answer to Defense question 3.2). By his own testimony, the evictions did not conform to policy or law. The seizure was done without lawful basis and despite the Plaintiff having met the activity requirement in time. Commonwealth’s assertion when pressed by the Plaintiff in Exhibit P-002 that “[t]he department has acted completely legally, within policy, and how it always carries out evictions”. In short, the government snatched the Plaintiff’s property early, with Dearev’s “several hours early” eviction now essentially undisputed.

Conclusion: Evicting the Plaintiff’s plots a day early was an unreasonable seizure of private property. It flouted the seven-day grace period and the Plaintiff’s due compliance. The Plaintiff’s constitutional right was violated, and this Court should declare so. The Commonwealth cannot pretend an early taking was “completely legal” when its own agent admits it was not.

Claim 2: Violations of Constitutional Duty of Care​

Issue: The second claim asks whether the Commonwealth breached its constitutional duty of care to the Plaintiff by failing to act in accordance with its constitutional obligations during the eviction. In essence, did the government neglect the duty to respect citizens’ fundamental rights (such as property and due process rights) in carrying out its policies?

Rule: Redmont law recognizes that executive agencies owe a duty of care to uphold the Constitution when dealing with citizens. As the Federal Court held in smokeyybunnyyy v. Commonwealth [2024] FCR 103, “Every department within the executive branch has a duty of care to uphold its constitutional obligations.” Likewise, in RaiTheGuy v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 29, the Court noted that when such a duty of care “is not upheld, it is considered a breach, and the party who is obliged to uphold the duty can be liable for damages.”

As it specifically applies to the DCT, this Court has concluded that the Government is liable when the “Department of Construction and Transportation did not do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand,” nor “inform[] the plaintiff that [the DCT’s agents] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction” (see: BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44).

In short, the government must act consistently with constitutional rights, and if it fails to do so, it breaches a duty it owes to citizens, giving rise to relief.

Application: The Commonwealth’s conduct in this case egregiously breached its constitutional duty of care owed to the Plaintiff:

• Duty to act lawfully and protect rights: DCT officials had an affirmative duty to conduct evictions lawfully and to honor citizens’ property and due process rights throughout the enforcement of inactivity policies. This means following the Constitution’s requirements and the law’s spirit of fairness when taking any action against a citizen’s property. As has been shown in the analysis of Claim 1, the DCT has plainly and clearly failed to do this.
• Breaching the duty by early eviction: By evicting the Plaintiff prior to the permissible date, the Defendant blatantly violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional guarantees. The premature eviction trampled on the Plaintiff’s property rights and denied him the due process of the full notice period (see: Exhibit P-001; Exhibit P-003). In other words, the agency failed to act within the bounds of its constitutional obligations, directly breaching the duty of care it owed.
• Failure to remedy compounding the breach: What’s worse, even after the Plaintiff protested through a timely support ticket (bringing, albeit imperfectly, the spectre of constitutional violation to light; see Exhibit P-002), the Commonwealth did nothing to promptly restore his rights. The DCT Secretary brushed off the Plaintiff’s plea and insisted the eviction was proper, instead of performing due diligence in regards to the matter at hand and informing the plaintiff that the DCT’s agents had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction (see: Exhibits P-001, P-002, P-011, P-014). This indifferent response, as noted in our Complaint, “reflects a broader neglect of the duty of fairness and justice owed to citizens.” The Commonwealth’s inaction in the face of its mistake compounded the constitutional breach and showed a disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights and dignity.

Conclusion: In sum, the Commonwealth owed a duty of care to uphold the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and it failed that duty completely. The early eviction, and the government’s failure to do its due diligence to fix it, demonstrates a textbook breach of its constitutional obligations. The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to relief for this breach of duty. We ask the Court to hold the Defendant accountable for not just the unlawful seizure itself, but also for violating the fundamental duty every government agency has: to act constitutionally and protect the rights of the people it serves.

Claim 3: Violations of Statutory Duty of Care​

Issue: Separately from the Constitution, did the Commonwealth violate a statutory duty of care owed to the Plaintiff by failing to follow the eviction laws and regulations set by Congress and its own department? The Plaintiff asserts that specific laws and DCT policies imposed duties on the government, which were breached by the improper eviction.

Rule: When Congress enacts laws or empowers agencies with regulations, the government has a legal duty to comply with those standards. As the Court noted in RaiTheGuy v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 29, “all laws set out by Congress can impose a duty [on the Commonwealth].” One such law is the Property Standards Act, which explicitly authorized the DCT to establish eviction regulations and required the DCT to conduct evictions in accordance with those laws and its own regulations. In short, the DCT must follow its own rules. The DCT’s Evictions Policy at the time (Exhibit P-003) stated that “Department employees and staff may process an eviction at any time on or after the eviction date, based on their own timezone.” This policy, backed by statute, created a clear duty: do not evict before the stated date, as reckoned by the acting official’s timezone.

Application: The Commonwealth’s agent blatantly breached this statutory and policy-based duty in the Plaintiff’s case:

• Duty established by law: The Property Standards Act and DCT policy imposed a specific duty on the Defendant – namely, that evictions must not be carried out before the designated date in the staffer’s local time. This rule exists to protect property owners from exactly what happened here.
• Clear breach of the duty: Despite this unambiguous rule, Dearev processed the eviction on July 30, even though it was still July 30 in his own Brazil timezone (not yet July 31) (see, generally, Dearev’s testimony in Post No. 301). By acting “before ‘on or after’ the eviction date,” the DCT violated the very regulation it was obliged to follow. The action directly contravened the statute-based duty of care – a textbook breach of a legal requirement.
  
  This admission is damning – the very agent of the Commonwealth recognizes the eviction was against the rules. Indeed, after this lawsuit brought the truth to light, xEndeavour was forced to admit that Dearev “did not act within department policy and evicted the plot several hours early.” (xEndeavour’s testimony n Post No. 258). No amount of post hoc rationalization can escape that fact. The defense’s own position tacitly concedes liability: the Commonwealth offered to return the plots and issue a public apology, calling the early eviction the only “arguable liability” in this case.
  
  In other words, the Commonwealth itself recognizes that its agent broke the rules. Furthermore, Dearev’s attempts to justify his actions only underscore the breach. He noted that current policy says “time is approximate and depends on the officer’s time zone,” but that does not license jumping the gun. . His excuse – that he “believed” the Plaintiff’s plots were “ready to be actioned” – is both incorrect and irrelevant. The law required him to wait, and he failed to do so. The result was an unlawful eviction, period.
• Clear Damages of Unlawful Eviction: Because the DCT failed to meet this minimum standard of care set by law, the Plaintiff’s plots were seized when they should not have been. The harm (losing his property rights prematurely) is precisely what the statute and policy were designed to prevent. The Defendant cannot claim it upheld its duty when the facts show such a bright-line rule was broken.

Conclusion: By failing to follow the law and its own regulations, the Commonwealth breached a statutory duty of care owed to the Plaintiff. In Redmont, no agency is above the law – when the DCT broke the rules, it became civilly liable for the consequences. The Plaintiff therefore seeks a finding that the Commonwealth violated its statutory duty, and that he is entitled to damages flowing from this illegal eviction.

Claim 4: Common Law Negligence​

Issue: Did the government owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff, breach that duty by acting unreasonably (failing to follow the standard of care), and thereby cause harm? The Plaintiff argues that the same facts underlying the statutory breach amount to negligence under the Common Law.

Rule: Under Redmont law, when a statute or regulation creates a duty to protect a class of persons (like property owners) and a party violates that statute, it can be evidence of negligence or negligence per se. The Federal Court in RaiTheGuy explained that if a duty is created by statute, “failing to follow the statute necessarily implies a breach, which is consistent with the common law.” In other words, the breach of a legal duty meant to safeguard others is inherently an unreasonable act under common law standards. To prove negligence, the Plaintiff must show duty, breach, causation, and damages – all of which are present here.

Application: By flouting the eviction law and policy, the DCT acted negligently and caused foreseeable harm to the Plaintiff. The eviction rules were in place to protect citizens like Mr. YeetGlazer from wrongful loss of their property. Here, that protective duty unquestionably existed (as shown above), and the DCT plainly breached it by evicting the Plaintiff early. This breach was not a minor technicality – it directly led to the unjust loss of the Plaintiff’s plots which the Court had to stop on an emergency basis (see: Exhibit P-001, P-002, Order Granting Emergency Injunction).

But for the DCT’s failure to use the ordinary care mandated by law and prior precedent (e.g.: BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44, the “Department of Construction and Transportation did not do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand…” and did not “inform[] the plaintiff that [the DCT’s agents] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction”), the Plaintiff would never have been evicted at all. Dearev himself now knows this was wrong (he admitted his actions fell outside policy), and xEndeavour has confessed that new information showed the eviction was handled “several hours early” in violation of procedure (Post No. 257).

The Commonwealth’s negligence is further demonstrated by what followed: instead of promptly correcting the error, DCT officials doubled down. They ignored the Plaintiff’s urgent Discord ticket and falsely insisted nothing was amiss. This compounded the breach – a reasonable department would have quickly reviewed the timeline and reversed the eviction. Instead, DCT’s Secretary stubbornly declared the eviction valid without even checking the offending officer’s timezone - even as Courts have prior found the DCT liable when “Department of Construction and Transportation did not do their due diligence in regards to the matter at hand,” and did not “inform[] the plaintiff that [the DCT’s agents] had made a mistake before putting the plot to auction” in BananaNova v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 44).

YeetGlazer lost land because the government employee did not act as a reasonable official would. All elements of negligence are satisfied: the Commonwealth owed a duty, it breached that duty through unreasonable action, and that breach proximately caused the Plaintiff to suffer damages (loss of property and the ensuing consequential damages discussed below). While some properties were eventually returned, it took the filing of this lawsuit to finally spur that action, and not all properties were returned.

Conclusion: In sum, the Commonwealth’s mishandling of the eviction constitutes common law negligence. The violation of the statute and policy “necessarily implies a breach” of the duty of care. and the Plaintiff’s injuries were the direct result. The Court should therefore find the Defendant negligent and hold it accountable for the damages flowing from its carelessness and unlawful conduct.

Claim 5: Loss of Enjoyment​

Issue: The question is whether the Plaintiff’s enjoyment of the game and community was significantly diminished by the Defendant’s actions. The Plaintiff contends that the wrongful eviction caused him profound frustration, stress, and an inability to engage in normal activities – in short, a loss of enjoyment in Redmont.

Rule: The Legal Damages Act of Redmont explicitly recognizes “Loss of Enjoyment in Redmont” as a form of consequential damage that can be recovered. This is defined as situations where an injured party loses or has a diminished ability to engage in activities they used to enjoy before the harm occurred. In other words, if the Plaintiff can show that the eviction ordeal made his experience of the community significantly less enjoyable or prevented him from doing the things he used to do, he is entitled to damages for that lost enjoyment, provided there is evidence or a reasonable person would expect such harm.
Application: The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the Plaintiff suffered a serious loss of enjoyment due to the Commonwealth’s wrongful eviction:

• Disruption of Daily Activities: After the eviction, the Plaintiff could no longer access or use several plots of land that he lawfully owned until after the filing of this case. These plots included his residence and business properties, which were central to his in-game life. Being locked out of his own properties meant he was barred from engaging in his usual building, commerce, and recreational activities on those lands. The normal pleasures of ownership – developing his plots, using them, sharing them with friends or customers – were all suddenly taken away. This was only restored after the Order Granting Emergency Injunction was entered, and only partially so; at least one plot was sold off at auction before this Court intervened (Exhibit P-001; Exhibit P-011).
• Forced Focus on the Dispute: Instead of enjoying the game and community, the Plaintiff was forced to spend his time, energy, and money fighting to regain his lawfully owned property. What should have been days of creative gameplay or community participation turned into days of anxiety, paperwork, and uncertainty. He had to contest via support tickets (beginning with Exhibit P-002), gather evidence, and later even participate in this legal case – none of which is remotely enjoyable and all of which took him away from the regular activities he cherished (see: Testimony of YeetGlazer, Post No. 265, Plaintiff Questions No. 1-3; Testimony of YeetGlazer, Post No. 278, Questions 28-34).
• Indefinite Impact: The loss of enjoyment was not just a brief inconvenience; it lasted for an extended time. The Commonwealth’s refusal to promptly return the plots extended the Plaintiff’s hardship indefinitely until after this Court intervened. Every additional day the Plaintiff was without access to his lands was another day he could not enjoy the fruits of his labor. This prolonged deprivation magnified the loss of enjoyment far beyond a minor hiccup. And, in at least one case, the Court was unable to return a plot to the Plaintiff (Exhibit P-001; Exhibit P-011).

Conclusion: The Plaintiff’s loss of enjoyment is real, significant, and directly attributable to the Defendant’s wrongful acts. The Legal Damages Act explicitly permits recovery for such intangible harms when proven and here the harm is well-documented. We ask the Court to award consequential damages for Loss of Enjoyment to compensate the Plaintiff for the very real (if non-monetary) detriment to his Redmont experience caused by this illegal eviction - some of which continues through this very day.

Claim 6: Humiliation​

Issue: The issue is whether the manner in which the eviction was conducted, and the government’s handling of it, caused the Plaintiff to be disgraced or belittled, thus entitling him to damages for humiliation. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants’ actions publicly shamed him and harmed his reputation, which is a compensable injury under the law.

Rule: The Legal Damages Act Section 7(1) recognizes “Humiliation” as a form of consequential damage, defined as situations “in which a person has been disgraced, belittled or made to look foolish.” In plain terms, if the Defendant’s conduct made the Plaintiff feel ashamed or lowered in the estimation of the community, and if a reasonable person would feel the same in that situation, then humiliation damages are warranted. Prior cases confirm that when the government violates a citizen’s rights, reputational harm and personal humiliation are not mere side effects but actual damages that the law will remedy.

Application: The manner of this eviction and the Commonwealth’s subsequent denials inflicted profound humiliation upon the Plaintiff:

The manner in which the Commonwealth treated the Plaintiff was calculated to humiliate. Evicting someone for “inactivity” carries a stigma – it broadcasts to the community that the individual was derelict in managing their property. Here, the Plaintiff was anything but inactive (he actually had the required playtime), yet the DCT’s premature eviction painted him as neglectful or non-compliant. As the Plaintiff testified, “Seeing the denial of the ticket made me feel as if the government did not care…It made me feel as if my problems were being disregarded” (Testimony of YeetGlazer, Post No. 265). He felt belittled and brushed off by those in power – a classic humiliation scenario.

The evidence shows multiple layers of humiliation: the public forum posts showed his plots seized by the government, prompting others to think he lost them fairly. In the Discord ticket, when the Plaintiff pleaded his case, xEndeavour effectively called him wrong or misinformed in front of everyone, asserting the eviction was proper when it was not (Exhibit P-002).

Being told “everything was done right” when you know it was wrong is extremely belittling – it implies the Plaintiff was either lying or clueless. One witness in that ticket, Sir_Dogeington, vouched for the Plaintiff (“I can vouch, I saw it”), meaning he saw the Plaintiff had the needed hours (Exhibit P-002; Post No. 247). The DCT’s response? Ignore Sir_Dogeington and shut down the ticket. Dearev hurried to mark the ticket “resolved” and said “Please close it,” an unmistakably dismissive move (Exhibit P-002).This made the Plaintiff appear as a nuisance at best, a fool at worst, for continuing to protest. Such treatment in a channel is demeaning

Additionally, the Commonwealth’s initial refusal to return the plots – forcing the Plaintiff to effectively beg for his own property – is deeply humiliating. It told the community that the Plaintiff’s land was forfeit and that he had to come on bended knee to authorities who still said “no.” Only after legal action and this Court ordering an emergency injunction did the government relent.

Conclusion: The Plaintiff endured genuine humiliation at the hands of the Commonwealth. Being unfairly portrayed as an inattentive landowner, ignored and dismissed by officials, and forced to fight for vindication is precisely the kind of disgrace our law compensates. The Court should award damages for humiliation, to officially acknowledge the indignity the Plaintiff suffered and to deter the government from ever treating a citizen in such a belittling manner again.

Claim 7: Fraud​

Issue: Did the Commonwealth (through its agents) commit fraud against the Plaintiff by misrepresenting a material fact – the legality and timing of the eviction – causing him harm?

Rule: Under the Criminal Code Act, a person commits the crime of Fraud when that person “knowingly or recklessly misrepresents or omits a material fact to another, causing the other party to rely on that misrepresentation, resulting in actual, quantifiable harm.” As always under the CCA, “In civil lawsuits, crimes may be used to seek damages”.

Application: The Defendant’s agents engaged in a textbook fraud by lying, or recklessly omitting, the true timing of the eviction in Dearev’s timezone. The material fact: whether the plots were evicted on July 31 (lawful) or July 30 (unlawful) in Dearev’s timezone. The misrepresentation: xEndeavour told the Plaintiff that “properties were evicted on 31 Jul” and thus the eviction was proper. This was false. We know from the evidence – and Dearev’s own admissions – that the plots were actually evicted on July 30 in the relevant timezone (See generally: Post No. 301).

Did the DCT officials know it was false? At the very least, xEndeavour spoke with reckless disregard for the truth. As DCT Secretary, he had the means to verify the evicting officer’s location. Indeed, he had read Dearev’s job application listing “GMT-3” as his timezone (Answer to Complaint, affirming 44-47). Yet he chose to respond to the Plaintiff’s ticket by affirming an eviction date he hadn’t confirmed. The Defense affirms that xEndeavour “assumed” rather than checked (Answer to complaint, affirming 49). That is the definition of reckless misrepresentation.

Let’s also consider Dearev’s role: he sat in the ticket conversation as user “clocktest200” (Exhibit P-002; Exhibit P-021). He reasonably should have known that it was still July 30 for him, yet when xEndeavour stated the eviction was on July 31, Dearev stayed silent. He never corrected the falsehood. This omission was as fraudulent as an overt lie – he intentionally failed to disclose a truth he was duty-bound to reveal. When asked on the stand why he “did not volunteer that [his] timezone was GMT-3” during that conversation, Dearev lamely replied, “I do not recall.” (Dearev in Post #273). That non-answer speaks volumes: there is no benign explanation for his silence, and he knows it. The intent behind these misrepresentations was clear – to induce the Plaintiff to drop his challenge and accept the loss of his property. By convincing him the eviction was “completely legal,” DCT officials hoped the Plaintiff would be duped into giving up.

The Plaintiff did rely on these falsehoods, at least initially. Thinking the eviction might somehow be legal despite his compliance, the Plaintiff attempted to regain his land by other means – he placed bids in the auction for plot c343, trying desperately to buy back what was already his (Exhibit P-011). He wouldn’t have done so if the officials had told the truth and returned his plot; he did it because they misled him to believe the only way forward was through the auction. This wasted the Plaintiff’s time.Moreover, the Plaintiff refrained from immediately pursuing legal action for a brief period, hoping the internal process was correct – exactly what the Commonwealth intended by lying to him.

The fraud caused concrete harm. Because of the misrepresentation, plot r054 slipped away from the Plaintiff permanently – he made several bids in vain only for the DCT to invalidate his bids on pretext and sell to someone else (see: Exhibit P-011). The Plaintiff thus lost that unique property and the opportunity to reclaim it.

He also suffered additional humiliation and loss of enjoyment (as discussed above) prolonging this fight, and he incurred legal expenses to unravel the lie. In sum, DCT’s deceit forced the Plaintiff into a worse position at every turn.

There is no question the misrepresentation occurred – it’s documented in Exhibit P-002 (the ticket transcript) and not actually denied by the defense. Instead, we got evasions. Dearev could not summon any innocent explanation for his failure to tell the truth in that ticket, responding “I do not recall” to pointed questions about his deceptive conduct (Post No. 273) and proffering an incoherent explanation for claiming that his computer had the wrong date (see: Post No. 301; Exhibit P-028).

The Court should treat these feigned memory lapses as indicators of scienter (guilty knowledge). Honest witnesses don’t suddenly forget why they said basic things unless the true answer is incriminating. The same goes for xEndeavour – his “assumption” defense is simply not credible given the evidence that the DCT had ample data on Dearev’s timezone.

At best, it shows a reckless disregard for the truth (which satisfies intent for fraud); at worst, it was a calculated lie to cover up a colleague’s wrongdoing. And notably, when the lie fell apart under scrutiny, the Commonwealth swiftly changed tune and offered to return everything – a tacit admission that the Plaintiff had been wronged by false information.

Conclusion: The Commonwealth, through DCT officials, committed fraud against the Plaintiff. They misrepresented the legality of the eviction, intending the Plaintiff to rely on that falsehood – which he did to his detriment. This civil fraud entitles the Plaintiff to compensatory damages (for the property and opportunities he lost due to the lie) and punitive damages. A message must be sent that our government cannot lie to its citizens and get away with it. The Court should find for the Plaintiff on fraud.

Claim 8: Corruption​

Issue: Did the DCT’s premature eviction of the Plaintiff’s plots amount to “Corruption” as defined in Redmont law, and can the Commonwealth be held liable for it?

Rule: Under the Criminal Code Act, a government official commits Corruption when such official “uses a government position to gain an unfair advantage for oneself or another, inconsistent with official duty”. In civil suits, such criminal acts can be treated as tortious conduct for which the government employer may be held accountable. Key elements are abuse of power, an unfair benefit, and inconsistency with duty.

Application: Dearev’s conduct checks every box of corruption. He leveraged his authority as a DCT inspector to evict the Plaintiff’s land earlier than permitted for an improper purpose. What was that purpose? To confer an unfair advantage – to himself and possibly to others – in the subsequent auction of that land. The evidence of self-dealing intent is overwhelming.

MysticPhunky, the very official who handled the auction, contemporaneously remarked that “Dearev has been doing evictions a bit early… [he] asked me to auction a plot just for him to bid on it.” (Exhibit P-018). That plot was one of the Plaintiff’s plots (c343) that Dearev targeted. This statement, made directly to xEndeavour at the time, is essentially a whistle-blow on Dearev’s corrupt scheme. Little wonder MysticPhunky refused to repeat it under oath – he literally would not answer any questions in this case, instead posting “I will not testify” and earning a contempt citation and disbarment for outbursts. The only reasonable inference is that MysticPhunky knew his truthful answers would confirm Dearev’s abuse of power, so he chose silence. The Court should indeed draw an adverse inference that Dearev evicted early to gain a personal bidding opportunity.

But we don’t even need to rely solely on that inference. Dearev’s own actions speak loudly. Prior to the eviction, he had privately attempted to buy plot c343 from the Plaintiff and was rebuffed.By evicting c343 through his official powers, he transformed the situation: the plot would go to auction where he could try to buy it compulsorily. Sure enough, once c343 was up for auction, Dearev jumped in as a bidder. He openly admitted on the stand, “I bidded on the auction,” trying to acquire c343 for his company (Dearev in Post No. 273). And he came prepared: AsexualDinosaur, an expert witness, calculated that the banknotes Dearev displayed in his bid screenshot amounted to a staggering $177,400 in available funds.

That war chest was ready to deploy toward c343. This gave Dearev a huge advantage that he wouldn’t have absent the eviction. The Plaintiff, by contrast, was severely disadvantaged. Because of DCT’s “fairness fee” rules, the Plaintiff (as the former owner) would have had to pay a 50% surcharge on any winning bid (as opposed to $0 to maintain the plot had it not gone to auction), whereas Dearev (who owned fewer plots) faced only a 25% fee. In practical terms, Dearev made the Plaintiff compete on unequal footing for his own property. This is the very definition of an “unfair advantage” obtained via official position.

Dearev’s protests to the contrary are not credible. He claimed he didn’t think evicting c343 made it easier for him to get it – “I do not believe it would have affected the difficulty” of acquisition (Dearev in Post No. 273). This is a self-serving denial that flies in the face of reality. By evicting, he forced the sale; by bidding, he seized the chance to buy what he otherwise could not. His denial is as hollow as a bank robber saying the vault door being pried open “didn’t make it easier” to take the money.

Moreover, Dearev asserted that his hostility toward the Plaintiff’s political party (the GER) played “none” role in his decision. Yet the record shows he branded the GER a “paramilitary extremist group” and ran in the same election as the Plaintiff when was a prominent GER member. His bias against the Plaintiff provided an additional improper motive – to punish a political opponent by abusing his eviction power.

Even if we set that motive aside, the direct personal gain motive is sufficient. Evicting for personal gain is blatantly “inconsistent with official duty”. DCT officers are supposed to enforce policy neutrally, not manipulate timing to enrich themselves.

The starkest indicator of corruption is how Dearev and his colleague reacted when questioned. Dearev grew evasive, claiming “it was my duty as a employee of the DCT to action evictions” and “it did not cross my mind” that the Plaintiff was GER – statements that ring false given the evidence. And MysticPhunky’s refusal to testify (and the contempt finding that followed) is practically an admission that there was dirt to hide. Innocent officials don’t risk contempt fines to avoid answering questions like “‘Dearev has been doing evictions a bit early, Dearev asked me to auction a plot just for him to bid on it, which was one of the plots he evicted early. What did you mean by this?”

The reasonable conclusion is that the truth would confirm corruption, so the witness clammed up. Finally, the Commonwealth as an entity bears responsibility. This was not one rogue actor in a vacuum - That ratifies the misconduct. Only after the fact, as xEndeavour noted, did they scramble to implement conflict-of-interest rules – a tacit acknowledgment that Dearev’s conduct was corrupt and should have been barred.

That ratifies the misconduct. Only after the fact, as xEndeavour noted, did they scramble to implement conflict-of-interest rules – a tacit acknowledgment that Dearev’s conduct was corrupt and should have been barred.

Conclusion: The Plaintiff has proven that the DCT agent’s actions meet the definition of corruption. By abusing his office to create a buying opportunity for himself, Dearev gained an unfair advantage inconsistent with his duty. The Commonwealth, in turn, is answerable for the corrupt acts of its agent, especially since it failed to supervise or prevent them. This Court should find the Defendant liable for corruption and award punitive damages. Government corruption is an egregious wrong that strikes at the heart of public trust. A strong verdict here will send the message that no official is above the law, and that when public power is perverted for private gain, the courts of Redmont will deliver justice – relentlessly, fact-driven, and precise.

On Relief​

Declaratory Judgement​

As noted in our Complaint:

The Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this court that the DCT’s eviction of the Plaintiff’s plots was unlawful, unconstitutional, and void ab initio. The Plaintiff asks this Court to explicitly rule that the eviction executed on July 30, 2025 violated the Evictions Policy and the Plaintiff’s rights, and therefore had no legal effect. Such a declaratory judgment will clarify the parties’ rights and ensure the record reflects that the Government’s actions were illegal.

The evidentiary record makes the conclusion bare and clear: the evictions were illegal, and the Court ought recognize this.

Injunctive Relief / Return of Property​

In our Complaint, we asked as follows:

The Plaintiff asks this Court to issue an order requiring the Commonwealth to return ownership of all wrongly-evicted plots to the Plaintiff immediately. Because the eviction was wrongful, the appropriate remedy is to restore the status quo ante by reinstating the Plaintiff as the rightful owner of each plot. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction compelling the Defendant to reverse any transfer of ownership or auction process initiated for his properties. This Court’s equitable powers permit it to undo the effects of the illegal eviction – just as wrongfully dispossessed tenants or owners are entitled to recover possession of their property.

Again, we ask here that the Court order that the properties unlawfully seized be permanently returned to YeetGlazer, and that an order to this effect be entered to formalize any temporary returns which have occurred during this case.

Compensatory Damages​

In our Complaint, we prayed as follows:

The Plaintiff asks for an award of compensatory damages in an amount to fully compensate the Plaintiff for all quantifiable losses suffered as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions. This includes the value of any property or items lost due to the eviction, any lost profits or income from the plots during the period of wrongful possession, and any other monetary losses the Plaintiff can prove.

In this case, we have proven that the Commonwealth unlawfully seized plot r054 and sold it. Compensatory damages are sought equal to the fair market value of this plot; as P-011 establishes, this is at least $27,500.

Consequential Damages​

In our Complaint, we prayed as follows:

The Plaintiff asks for an award of consequential damages for the non-economic injuries inflicted, specifically including Loss of Enjoyment and Humiliation suffered by the Plaintiff. As detailed in Claims for Relief 4 and 5, the Plaintiff endured a diminished ability to enjoy the Redmont community and personal mortification as a result of the Defendant’s conduct. The Legal Damages Act expressly recognizes these intangible harms as compensable. These damages, while not easily reduced to a number, are capped by law except in cases when punitive damages are sought (c.f. Legal Damages Act §7(2)(b)). As the Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in this case, and consequential damages are therefore not capped, the Plaintiff asks that the Court award $150,000 in humiliation damages and $150,000 in loss of enjoyment damages.

The Plaintiff seeks consequential damages in full, supported by the voluminous evidence in case, and our analysis in our conclusion.

Punitive Damages​

In our Complaint, we prayed as follows:

The Defendant’s actions were not mere negligence but willful and egregious violations of law – evincing reckless disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights and for the rule of law. Punitive damages are warranted, per Legal Damages Act §5(1)(a), “to punish [a defendant] for their outrageous conduct and to deter them and others like them from similar conduct in the future.”

The Commonwealth’s conduct in this case has been egregious and outrageous. Here, the Commonwealth (acting through DCT officials) engaged in a gross abuse of power by illegally evicting plots, then persisted in dishonesty to cover it up even when contested, and showed deep contempt for the Plaintiff throughout the whole process. This kind of conduct strikes at the heart of public trust in government and must be strongly dissuaded.

How should the Commonwealth be dissuaded? Treble damages serve as a strong deterrent to future wrongful conduct and are called for in these heinous and outrageous actions by the Defendants; this Court has granted them in the past, such as in lucaaasserole v Naezaratheus et al. [2025] FCR 50. But, for some violations (such as abstract violations of rights), treble damages may be difficult to calculate, and further specification for a calculation of punitive damages is necessary. And, for damages that occurred as the result of criminal activities, the Federal Court has found it permissible for Plaintiffs to seek punitive damages equal to the amount of fines that would be collected in a criminal proceding (c.f. MegaMinerM v. Blazora Corporation [2025] FCR 27, Section III(2)(E), par. 6).

As such, the Plaintiff prays for Punitive Damages as follows:

1. $280,000 in punitive damages for unreasonable seizure, in direct violation of the Plaintiff’s express constitutional rights against the same, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
2. $280,000 in punitive damages for violations of Constitutional Duty of Care, as laid out in the second Claim for Relief, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
3. $280,000 in punitive damages for violations of Statutory Duty of Care, as laid out in the third Claim for Relief, equivalent to $35,000 for each of the 8 Plots unlawfully seized;
4. $300,000 in punitive damages for loss of enjoyment: treble damages resulting from the Commonwealth’s actions described in this Complaint and in this Case,;
5. $300,000 in punitive damages for humiliation: treble damages resulting from the Commonwealth’s actions described in this Complaint and in this Case;
6. $200,000 in punitive damages for Corruption, equivalent to the maximum monetary penalty for eight charges of Corruption (one for each plot illegally seized) as laid out under the Criminal Code Act;
7. $80,000 in punitive damages for Fraud, equivalent to the maximum monetary penalty for eight charges of Fraud (one for each plot illegally seized) as laid out under the Criminal Code Act.

The Plaintiff believes that we have demonstrated each and every claim for relief on balance of probabilities. The outrageous nature of this case is evident from the analysis-in-case. It exacerbated by the Commonwealth's actions at trial, where the DCT Secretary-turned-special counsel (Docket Filing No. 9) engaged in repeated antics in Court that resulted in this Court summarily charging perjury (Docket Filing No. 138) and Contempt of Court (Docket Filing No. 185).

The Plaintiff thus asks for punitive damages in full.

Legal Fees​

As has been noted in our Complaint:

The Plaintiff prays for an award of legal fees equal to 30% of the total monetary relief obtained (or sought, if the Defendant prevails on some claims) in accordance with this provision.Given the complexity of this case and the egregious nature of the Defendant’s conduct, the Plaintiff’s counsel has and will have expended significant time and resources to vindicate the Plaintiff’s rights. Thirty percent of the recovery is a fair and statutorily-supported measure of legal fees, and should be ordered against the Defendant if it is found liable. This not only compensates the Plaintiff’s costs but also encourages capable advocacy in cases where citizens challenge governmental abuse.

This case has taken a tremendous amount of time and resources, and counsel has competently and voraciously represented the Plaintiff over several months - full legal fees of 30% are warranted.

Conclusion​

Your Honor, this has been a long case with large volumes of evidence and witness testimony. And it points plainly in one direction: the Commonwealth caused damages to my client, did not swiftly move to correct it (despite a duty to do so) until we fired, and its agents have engaged in criminal actions that negatively affected my client. To put a stop to this sense of impunity, once and for all, and to deliver justice, the Court should take a bold step in its verdict to deter future malfeasance.

 

[Muggy21]

@End

The Court granted Plaintiff 10 days to submit a Closing Statement.
Please submit the CW's Closing Statement by 2/2/26 @ 9pm AEST

 

[Muggy21]

Absent an extension, the Court will enter recess for verdict on Feb 4th, 2026 at 9am EST.

I will prioritize this case and endeavor (yes an End pun) to have it done within a week. (Don't @ me if its longer)