Lawsuit: Adjourned Commonwealth of Redmont v. Sofia2750 [2026] SCR 2

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Case Filing


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CRIMINAL ACTION


Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

Sofia2750
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Prosecution alleges criminal actions committed by the Defendant as follows:

PROSECUTING AUTHORITY REPORT

Sofia2750 was found distributing named flowers advertising her and Ameslap's Mayoral ticket within 50 blocks of the Town Hall.
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I. PARTIES
1. Commonwealth of Redmont
2. Sofia2750

II. FACTS
1. In response to a report received by the Department of Justice, Lead investigator Rookieblue14 filed a search warrant for drop logs of named flowers advertising Sofia2750 and Ameslap's mayoral ticket. (P-001)
2. Sofia2570 distributed 10 such flowers within 50 blocks of the Town Hall. (P-002, P-003, P-004, P-005, P-006, P-007)
3. According to the restrictions set out in §11(2) of the Electoral Act, campaign-related advertising including physical propaganda is prohibited within 50 blocks of a building where a polling place is located.

III. CHARGES
The Prosecution hereby alleges the following charges against the Defendant:
1. One count of Harassment of a Polling Place, per Part II, Section 8 of the Criminal Code Act. This offence is committed when a person
"Engages in any conduct inside a building containing a polling place or within 50 blocks of a building where a polling place is located that:
(i) interferes with the freedom of voters to vote; or
(ii) disrupts the administration of the polling place; or
(iii) violates the restrictions set out in §11(2) of the Electoral Act".
According to §11(2) of the Electoral Act, the restrictions set are:
"campaign-related advertising (Includes, but is not limited to, physical campaign propaganda and person-to-person campaigning) is prohibited within:
(a) within 50 blocks of a building where a polling place is located; or
(b) inside a building containing a polling place."
The Defendant had distributed physical campaigning material in the form of named flowers advertising her and Ameslap's mayoral ticket, and was thus in direct violation of this statute.

IV. SENTENCING
The Prosecution hereby recommends the following sentence for the Defendant:
1. A 100 Penalty Unit Fine, and 10 minutes of imprisonment, with respect to one count of first offence of Harassment of a Polling Place.

NOTE: While the Commonwealth does not recommend the maximum CCA sentence for this crime, the maximum sentence does include two months disqualification from office. Following the SCR 21 verdict wherein the court stated that the sentencing recommendation given by the commonwealth need not be followed by a presiding Judicial officer, the jurisdiction in this case must be to the Supreme Court as it involves disqualification from office.
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V. WITNESS LIST
Rookieblue14 - Investigator
Multiman155 - Witnessed the event

VI. EVIDENCE
Warrant Transcript.pdf (attached at the end)
Staff Ticket Transcript.pdf (attached at the end)
Oakridge_Townhall.png
Warrant_Return_1.png
Warrant_Return_2.png
Warrant_Return_3.png
Warrant_Return_4.png


By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 19th day of January, 2026

 

Attachments

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Writ of Summons



@Sofia2750 is required to appear before the Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth of Redmont v. Sofia2750 [2026] SCR 2.

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 
Noting for the record that it was a 2-1 decision to accept jurisdiction. With Associate Justice Matthew100x & Chief Justice Aladeen22 accepting jurisdiction, with Associate Justice Smallfries4 concurring/dissenting on jurisdiction.
 
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Im present
 
Your honor, we have reached a plea deal:

Sofia2750 agrees to plea no contest and we are dropping the imprisonment sentencing.
 
_budo said:
Your honor, we have reached a plea deal:

Sofia2750 agrees to plea no contest and we are dropping the imprisonment sentencing.
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Plea


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
PLEA

Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

Sofia2750
Defendant

I. ENTRY OF PLEA​

1. Defendant pleads NO CONTEST to the charge of Harassment of a Polling Place.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 26th day of January 2026


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The court is taking notice that a plea deal has been given by the prosecution and accepted by the defendant. For future cases, @ToadKing while we appreciate you confirming that your client is accepting the plea deal by pleading no contest, please wait for us to ask for confirmation.

In a 2-0-1 decision signed by Associate Justice Matthew100x and Associate Justice Smallfries4, the Court issues a writ of mandamus ordering the DHS to give Sofia's criminal record in accordinace to § 5(2)(d) of the Act of Congress - Criminal Code Act so that the Court may do the Anthony factors. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Anthony_Org [2025] SCR 21).
 
We ask that the prosecution please submit a brief in the next 72 hours on the sentencing factors explaining why it seeks only a 100 penalty unit fine from the defendant. After the prosecution posts their brief, the defendant will have 72 hours to rebut or affirm the prosecution's argument by submitting their own brief on the sentencing factors.
 

Brief


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Brief -

Your Honour,
The prosecution seeks only a 100 penalty unit fine from the Defendant due to the following reasons

  • Other Spawn locations, like the ones in Reville or Aventura are not located within 50 blocks of the polling place. So, the defendant most likely didn't realise that Oakridge spawn was within 50 blocks of the polling place.
  • More likely than not, the defendant had no malicious intention and distributing campaign materials within 50 blocks of the polling place was a genuine mistake.
  • The maximum imprisonment sentence available for this crime is a mere 10 minutes. It wouldn't serve any meaningful purpose in this case especially since it is highly likely that this was a genuine mistake from the defendant's side.
  • Regardless of these mitigating factors, the defendant was in direct violation of the statute and should face some sort of punishment so this conduct isn't repeated.

 

Brief


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
SENTENCING BRIEF

The Defendant affirms all points made by the Prosecution and offers no rebuttal.

 
The court is now in recess pending verdict.
 
We release today an opinion of two parts. The first part is the unanimous opinion of the Court regarding sentencing of Defendant, authored by Associate Justice Smallfries4. The second opinion, originally withheld for brevity of proceedings, details the decision to grant standing and is authored by Associate Justice Matthew100x. Associate Justice Smallfries4 dissents.

Verdict


Issue I: Pardon​

The sentencing for Defendant today is cut short, as the former President utilized his constitutionally given powers to pardon Sofia. See Executive Order No. 5/26. The case comes now to an anti-climactic close. The President holds unilateral authority to pardon any person, for any crime, convicted at any time, and for any reason under the Constitution. C.R. Const. Part III, § 48(2). To validly execute a pardon, a guilty verdict must have already been entered against a defendant, as pardons cannot be given pre-emptively. Id. Here, the verdict was already entered. Therefore, despite no sentence having been given yet, the guilt itself was established and there was a charge to pardon, making the pardon itself valid. This essentially commuted any future sentence.

The former President justified his assertion of his power here by declaring that the charges alleged by the prosecution here include a reference to §11(2) [sic] of the Electoral Act, while alleging that at the time of the crime committed the reference was properly §13(2). The former President, in his executive order, implied he spoke with the Department of Justice on this matter and attempted to direct them to inform us about this textual discrepancy. The Department did not do so, and thus (or at least the argument goes) “violated its moral duty to disclose [exculpatory] information.”

We find this odd for several reasons. First, Defendant had already reached a plea deal and pleaded no contest to the charge of her crime, which we subsequently found she was guilty of. There was nothing exculpatory to be had. No trial was underway, no argumentation was completed. Exculpatory evidence is that evidence which may prove to us, the finder of fact and law, that the Defendant is innocent. With Defendant having surrendered, there was no question as to their guilt, especially none that could be overcome by a mere error in writing as discussed infra.

Second, looking at the history of the legislation we can see that if an issue existed it was miniscule at best. The text of the Criminal Code Act (“CCA”) on the forums was last edited on January 18, 2026, as alleged by the former President. See Criminal Code Act. Let us suppose that the former President is correct, and the language at issue did indeed reference section thirteen of the Electoral Act, and not section eleven as it does now. Would our reading of the charged crime change? We may be confused at first, but the intent by Congress is obvious, and we are confident our analysis would be unburdened.

Under the listed charge in the CCA, one of the three potential hooks for levying that crime is “violat[ing] the restrictions set out in §11(2) [sic] of the Electoral Act.” The section under that act sets restrictions regarding activity around or within a polling place. It is clear that Congress intended for the crime charged to be satisfied if someone broke one of these external restrictions. Section thirteen, likewise, regards the registration of voters. There is no subsection two of that section, and thus nothing to violate.

The former President seems to indicate that had we gone to trial in this matter, the fact that the text in the CCA referred to section thirteen could itself have exonerated Defendant. This is not true and is a patently odd contention. Were the allegation correct, we would see the charge referring “violating the restrictions set out” under the registration section to simply not exist. Given that the charge is harassment of a polling place, we would look for where polling places were discussed in this bill. There is one section that discusses polling places, and that section is both titled “Polling Places” and also has a subsection titled “restrictions.” There is no ambiguity here.

However, if we go into the legislative history we see that things are not so simple. Why, exactly, was the section improperly labelled as thirteen? Viewing the legislative history of the Electoral Act, we see that as of September 20, 2025, the polling places section was indeed properly at section thirteen. See generally Electoral Offence Act. With that amendment, the criminal language was removed from the Electoral Act and merged properly into the CCA. Notably, the criminal charge that was added mentioned section thirteen, which at the time was proper.

Where, then, was the change? It is difficult to see. The legislative history of the act is not fully complete in the forum post, and the next listed amendment that changes the sectioning of the Electoral Act was submitted on October 28, 2025. See Electoral Emergency Act. Notably, the sectioning change here changes the redundancy section to instead be titled Electoral Emergencies. The number of that section? Interestingly, section thirteen.

It is clear that at some point, some outside act (or perhaps an amendment that was not properly posted to the Electoral Act for posterity) amended the Electoral Act and changed the sectioning. It does not matter when, or where, or why this was done. It was done, and it was done some time ago.

Notably, section thirteen as it exists today has existed since at least before December 3, 2025. See Passport Act. This was a legitimate amendment passed properly into law, and the cards have fallen to where we can see them now. What did not happen, evidently, was Congress taking direct and explicit action to renumber the criminal law to properly reference the correct section of the Electoral Act.

The argument, then, is that Congress changed the law, and in not changing the numeration within the CCA intended to change the law as to how the CCA charge at issue is violated. This is ridiculous. The former President seems to have held an odd pseudo-legal view that must now and forever be dispelled as mere fantasy, totally inapplicable to how law is actually used in practice.

It is blindingly obvious that Congress intended for the criminal act of harassment of a polling place to be implicated by restrictions set out in another act. This was the clear intent and original text of those two sections of their respective acts. When Congress eventually amended one act but not the other, displacing the proper connection between them, did Congress substantially change the law?

No. Congress simply made a small and unintentional mistake. Even if section thirteen today referenced polling places at all (which it does not), or holds restrictions in it that can be violated (which it does not), or has a subsection two (which it does not), there is no clear statutory intent or drive to change the definition of what harassing a polling place is. We simply look to the history, find the proper language that Congress desired to implicate in the CCA charge, and then look up where that section is numbered to now. That section is eleven. Congress made a small and unintentional mistake.

Should we punish Congress for this mistake, as the former President seems to want to do, and hold literally the text as it stood? No, this is an absurd, illegitimate, and unjust view that would break down the very basic fabric of the law—an unproductive exercise in excessive textualism. The courts are not unfeeling black letter automatons that have no understanding of human instrumentality or context. Here, it is clear that basic scrivener’s error led to one amendment to one act forgetting the connection to another act, and a number went out of place. The argument that such a miniscule procedural error amounts to entirely changing the meaning of the specific charge at issue is absurd and obviously untrue.

The former President’s argument is without merit. Were this argument to be submitted before us in court, we would dismiss it almost out of hand and strongly consider summary punishment. It should be obvious that this argument absolutely fails each and every test, and would not succeed in open court. This is nothing more than a naked justification. But why? A pardon does not need justification. The President is within his full authority to pardon whomever, for whatever, and whenever (but not preemptively) he chooses, for any reason or no reason at all.

We do not know why the former President took such a literal issue with such a basic and obvious lapse of memory from Congress, but we shall not stand to have Congress’s will be so easily fractured. It is clear what their words mean, and how they intended them to be interpreted. Litigants do not have free will to exploit each minor and narrow inconsistency or discrepancy within the code to some absurd or illogical extent such as to render totally inept the entirety of Congress itself. Congress is the greatest single power within our Commonwealth, and we intend to always respect it.

Be on notice, practitioner: the law is not a weapon to be manipulated and bent to your will. The law, and Congress, shall be respected. No miniscule chinks of armor or clever tricks of the eye will win you an easy victory when clear interpretative canon reveals the uncontested truth. Should the forum post have been edited to say section eleven? Perhaps not. Should Congress be allowed to just ignore small procedural changes constantly? No, it is important to make a robust effort to make the law clear and readable at first blush. But that does not change the fact that neither Congress’s will nor our interpretation would have changed.​


​


Verdict


Issue II: Standing​

Earlier in this matter, in a 2–1 decision, the Supreme Court of Redmond determined that the case satisfied the requirements for standing and permitted the prosecution to proceed. Associate Justice Smallfries IV dissented on the standing question. The majority now clarifies its reasoning to articulate the doctrinal basis for jurisdiction and to address the concerns raised in dissent.

Standing analysis begins with Rule 2.1, Standing (see Information - Court Rules and Procedures). Under Rule 2.1, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: first, that they suffered an injury caused by a clearly identifiable second party or were adversely affected by the application of law; second, that the cause of the injury was unlawful; and third, that a remedy is available under relevant law that can be granted by a favorable judicial decision (see https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/2025-fcr-117-appeal.32897/post-130100; Lawsuit: Dismissed - ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 19).

The injury requirement is satisfied where the conduct of the defendant affronts the Commonwealth in a manner cognizable at law. In a criminal prosecution, the injury is the violation of statutory law itself. The Department of Justice derives its prosecutorial authority from the Executive Standards Act, Section 8(1)(a)–(c) (see Act of Congress - Executive Standards Act), and from Section 23 of the Constitution, which vests enforcement authority in the Executive Branch (see Government - Constitution). Because Congress has classified the conduct at issue—Harassment of Polling Places—as a criminal offense, the Department of Justice possesses standing to prosecute. The alleged commission of the crime constitutes the legally cognizable injury required under the first prong of standing.

The second prong is met because the injury arises directly from conduct prohibited by statute. The crime itself constitutes the unlawful act necessary to establish standing. Here, the crime is Harassment of a Polling Place (see Part II, § 8; https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/criminal-code-act.26344/). Therefore the second prong is fulfilled for standing.

The principal dispute concerns the third prong: whether a remedy exists under relevant law that may be granted by a favorable decision. The Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases that may result in the removal or banning of an individual from public office. (see § 20(1)(a), Powers of the Supreme Court; Government - Constitution). The alleged offense—Harassment of a Polling Place—carries the potential consequence of removal from office as prescribed punishment that Congress has designated. (see Part II, § 8; Act of Congress - Criminal Code Act). Where removal is statutorily authorized, the Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction consistent with Section 20. That is because under the Criminal Code Act, it is “within the discretion of the judicial officer to impose any part or the whole of the prescribed penalty.” (see Part I, § 5(1); Act of Congress - Criminal Code Act). The availability of that remedy satisfies the remedy requirement in prong three, as a favorable decision could result in removal of office, which constitutionally only the Supreme Court of Redmont may handle.

The Court does not assume jurisdiction merely because removal is requested. Standing cannot be created by styling relief as removal from office. Congress must have established removal as a permissible penalty, and the claim must be well-pled and legally coherent. Absent such statutory authorization, original jurisdiction lies in the federal courts for civil and criminal matters that do not implicate removal of a public official (see § 18(1)(a)–(d). Powers of The Federal Court,; https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/constitution.6/).In exceptional cases, such as those involving election fraud or comparable structural harms, the Supreme Court may exercise removal authority where the claim for relief is exceedingly clear and aligned with constitutional and statutory mandates, but will sua sponte dismiss cases that fail to meet this standard. (see https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/toadking-v-commonwealth-of-redmont-2025-scr-19.32386/post-121743; https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/plura72-v-realimza-2025-scr-17.32144/#post-120008).

Ultimately, the Court exercised jurisdiction in this instance because the Commonwealth demonstrated a cognizable injury, an unlawful cause grounded in criminal statute, and the availability of a constitutionally authorized remedy. Having satisfied Rule 2.1, the case properly proceeded to its current posture.

Standing on this case presented an interesting issue. The Commonwealth brought suit to the Supreme Court on the basis of the fact that the original jurisdiction of the Court as enumerated by the Constitution includes the removal or banning of individuals from office. C.R. Const. Part II, § 20(1)(a). In an addendum to their original charge, the Commonwealth noted that though they did not include either of those crucial punishments in their initial complaint, forum was proper because “the court [in another case] stated that the sentencing recommendation given by the [C]ommonwealth need not be followed by a presiding Judicial officer [sic].” I saw this statement as a trap, and an attempt to push the Supreme Court to make a decision as to an ambiguous constitutional question. Due to the fact that the charge at issue included the potential for disqualification from office, the Commonwealth alleged that the Supreme Court is the only just forum for this controversy.

The Majority agreed. I respectfully dissent.

At discussion, the majority’s view was simply that the sentencing law requires the Supreme Court to review all possible punishments under a given criminal action. Their majority today elucidates somewhat, but I am still unsatisfied. The primary issues between our opinions are in three parts: (1) Constitutional interpretation of “removing and/or banning,” (2) statutory interpretation of punishment limits in the CCA, and (3) creation of valid jurisdiction by way of request. It should be noted first that the majority seems to think that the standing here is the standing discussed Rule 2.1. This is obviously incorrect. Standing is surely met there, but would not be implicated. Instead, the issue is standing as to which court is the correct jurisdiction. The correct term for this issue then would be forum, of which the Supreme Court is not proper.

The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is quite light, and falls under three circumstances. Of interest here is the first: “removing and/or banning individuals from public office.” Id. If nothing else, this statement means that no case which would have the full effect of removing and/or banning someone from office can be tried anywhere except the Supreme Court.

The majority mentions in passing that our jurisdiction is “cases that may result in the removal or banning of an individual from public office.” (emphasis added). I find this interpretation unfounded and a bit presumptive. The wording of the Constitution itself seems to imply that only cases that would have the active effect of “removing and/or banning individuals from public office” meet the criteria to lay before us. The majority takes a wide view of this language, holding that the gerund article (the -ing in “removing and/or banning”) implies a view of potentiality, where any case that may potentially remove someone from office has jurisdiction.

My view, as discussed infra, is narrower—to me, the gerund article means a discrete, active action being pursued. To me, the Constitution only grants jurisdiction when a prayer for relief or requested punishment of the defendant is “removing and/or banning” from office that defendant. The wider interpretation creates issues that are both burdensome, and quite odd when considering the construction of our government—if nothing else, the Supreme Court is the highest body of legal determination in the Commonwealth. We should not be trying petty offenses simply because in theory they could result in removal, though nobody involved seems to want it.

Under the CCA, harassment of a polling place is an indictable offense, the first offense for which includes a potential “2 month disqualification from office.” In the instant case, the Commonwealth did not seek any disqualification from office, but filed with the Supreme Court anyway. The justification, besides what is discussed supra, is simple: Only the Supreme Court of Redmont can remove individuals from office or disqualify them thereof, and therefore any case in which such a removal or disqualification may happen can only happen within the Supreme Court.

Therefore, because we have ruled in the past that we are not bound to the Commonwealth’s recommendations for a maximum sentence, any charge which could result in a disqualification or removal must appear before this court. See Commonwealth of Redmont v. Anthony_Org [2025] SCR 21. A mere moment’s reflection on this ruling brings up obvious repercussions. There are a few arguments to be made.

First, we should look at the effects of the ruling. Even adopting the majority’s reasoning that holds the expansion of our jurisdiction to the most narrow under this ruling, the effects are drastic. Should we continue to say that all criminal prosecutions or civil actions that have as a possible punishment or remedy disqualification or removal from office must be tried in the Supreme Court, several crimes become untriable outside of this court. These include: Corruption, political espionage, electoral fraud, treason, bribery, harassment of a polling place, conflict violation, false financial disclosure.

Make no mistake, this is not a legal theory or an attempt to raise alarm about a potential consequence in the future. Like the court’s decision to hold the Judicial Standards Act as constitutional law in a prior decision, this is law right now. See In re FCR 4 [2026] | SCR 6. As of this moment, the above eight crimes (and any other action which has as a specifically listed punishment or remedy removal or disqualification from office) are now triable in the Supreme Court due to them potentially being punished with removal or disqualification from office. Further, because that punishment is always possible, those crimes can only ever be tried in the SCR. Take a moment to reflect on this before continuing.

What if we were to take things a bit further? It should not be a stretch to say that we, or any court, may sentence individuals to punishments not explicitly mentioned or included in the textual “maximum” of the CCA. Indeed, in the sentencing section of the CCA, Congress makes it clear that we may impose “a combination of penalties, unless . . . the offence expressly prohibits alternatives to the maximum sentence.” CCA Part I, § 5 (3). The majority correctly identifies that we may apply any part of the whole of the prescribed penalty, but curiously seems to ignore the obviously implied (and stated) alternatives brought forward by Congress.

The reference to an alternative to a maximum sentence implies a type of punishment that does not involve a component already laid out in the black and white text of the statute. A component already laid out in the black and white text, almost without exception would be a monetary fine or time in prison punishment.

What then is an alternative to these punishments? Community service, restitution, or money damages are explicitly laid out. See id. Part I, § 5(4). The language preceding those mentions (“such as”) does not limit the alternatives to those mentioned, but instead expands the alternatives to those beyond the written text. “Such as” clearly indicates additional punishments that may be prescribed.

The most obvious of these is removal and disqualification from office. In theory, this would mean that any crime could result in a request for an individual to be removed and/or banned from office. However, if we accept this argument and also accept the Majority’s contention that any action that could possibly include removal or disqualification must go to the Supreme Court, this would mean that all criminal prosecutions must appear here, and only here. This is clearly absurd, but would follow and be law should we accept those arguments.

The majority might say that those punishments can only be given when Congress explicitly authorizes them. Despite having no basis in the text, this would mean that the vast majority of crimes could never lead to someone being removed from office. It should be noted that there is no middle ground; either all crimes could mean someone could be removed from office unless specifically prohibited, or no crimes can remove someone from office unless specifically mandated. The majority, then, tacitly made two rulings: (1) any charge filed that could have removal or disqualification are triable in the SCR (and only in the SCR), and (2) only charges that explicitly mention removal or disqualification may have those punishments ascribed.

Indeed, of the eight crimes mentioned above, only one has removal from office listed in its punishments: conflict violation. Id. Part II, § 6. Does this mean that the only way a criminal act could result in someone being removed from office is if they commit conflict violation? The majority seems to think so. Take heed, everyone, you cannot be removed from office for any criminal violations of any kind, so long as you don’t take office while having a conflict of interest or failing to divest yourselves thereof. Personally I am not satisfied by this approach. I think it is clear Congress meant for us to have the ability to apply punishments alternative to the prescribed maximum, but in a cautious and measured manner. The majority today precludes entirely this possibility, in ignorance of the text.

The alternative to this approach, as described above, is that all crimes can result in removal or disqualification. Under the Majority’s approach, this would both mean that all crimes are originally triable in the Supreme Court, and as noted above, must be tried in the Supreme Court. This is obviously unacceptable. What then do we do?

Let us remind ourselves how we got here. The Commonwealth indicted Defendant on one count of harassment of a polling place. That crime carries a possible two month disqualification from office. The Commonwealth did not request disqualification as a punishment, but did include an addendum. There, they write that because disqualification was a written textual punishment for that charge, the SCR was the correct forum. The majority accepted this argument, despite disqualification from office not being requested.

There are two options discussed supra. First, all crimes can, in theory, result in removal, and therefore all crimes must be placed before the Supreme Court. Second, only crimes that specifically in text say the alleged offender can be removed or disqualified can be then removed or disqualified, but those crimes can only be tried before the Supreme Court (and, oddly, only one crime can result in removal at this moment). I am not satisfied by this arrangement, and I suspect others may similarly be unquenched in their thirst for the correct path. In the words of Grand Master of the Jedi Order Yoda: “There is another.” Star Wars: The Empire Strikes Back, Disney Plus, at 1:25:25 (Lucasfilm 1980).

What is this secret third option? Simply put, the answer is that according to the CCA alternative punishments can be considered, meaning any crime could in theory result in disqualification or removal if severe enough. The second prong makes this a reasonable option (and truthfully the only reasonable option discussed here). Oddly, the majority takes time to explain that jurisdiction is not created in this court “merely because removal is requested.” This is correct, but it is also a mischaracterization of the argument here. Original jurisdiction is implicated upon the request of removal, but the request must be valid in and of itself. Merely attaching “we want to remove this person from office” to a requested relief section is a very easy way to get a nice fat contempt and/or frivolous case charge.

The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is only implicated if the prosecution asks for banning/removal (and that ask is valid and sustained as described in the majority through rule 2.1). This would mean that the Supreme Court would only be a proper original jurisdiction court if a crime were severe enough for the Commonwealth to consider removal, and then actually ask for it.

This would indeed mean any crime could in theory get someone removed or disqualified from office. However, we surely would develop case law that slims down what is or isn’t eligible for removal, or we could temper the Commonwealth’s eagerness by dismissing cases with obviously trumped-up charges. Some may argue this is a bit vague. But the alternative is to do what the Court does now, and say that only one crime can get you removed from office, and only seven crimes can get you disqualified, and all eight of those crimes must always be tried within the Supreme Court. I am frankly not sure that is what Congress intended. Under today’s ruling, the majority chokes out reasonable discretion, and adheres to a strict black-letter interpretation of the law to the detriment of the future ability to remove or disqualify from office from a wide berth of behavior. Rather than respond to my concerns, the majority today raises more issues.

For the reasons above, I respectfully dissent as to the question of standing.​

 
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Note: Edited to put the Smallfries4 dissent as to Standing in the proper section for clarity.
 
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