Appeal: Accepted [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal

[End]

Username: xEndeavour

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: Commonwealth

File(s) attached

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] FCR 78

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Department of construction and transportation [2025] FCR 78

Basis for Appeal: Error of Law - Misapplication of Res Judica

Res judicata applies only where the same cause of action is litigated under substantially the same law. The 2025 policy introduced new definitions of 'basic materials' and expressly included quartz as a limited block, thereby creating a materially different regulatory framework (the inclusion of a new material in the definition of basic materials). By disregarding these substantive changes, the Court improperly extended res judicata beyond its settled scope (which was that this material was not reasonably assumed to be a basic material).

The DCT reported this plot years ago for using just quartz as a basic block. The court ruled that quartz could not be reasonably be assumed as a basic block. As such, the DCT updated it's policy to expressly provide that quartz was a basic block. This is applied equally to all people being reported for the same reason. The plots were re-reported for the same reason, with policy changes made in accordance with the court verdict on quartz now included expressly in the definition. The court ruled that this was targeted, when the DCT's position has been unchanged for years and that the necessary policy changes and warning was provided.

Courts may review constitutionality and legality, but they cannot strike down policies merely on suspicions of motive unless it violates a constitutional or statutory law. That oversteps judicial review. This change is broad, is a long-standing position of the DCT, and applies equally to every citizen.

The court erred in law by applying res judicata where it acknowledged that there was a material change to policy.

Error of Law: Misapplication of the Constitutional Test for Freedom of Political Communication

The Court erred by applying a heightened standard of review to regulations affecting political communication. The correct test is whether the regulation is reasonably appropriate to serve a legitimate governmental purpose. Instead, the Court introduced a novel requirement of 'objective clarity' and invalidated the 'eyesore' provisions on grounds of vagueness. This constitutes a departure from the DCTs ability to regulate and expands constitutional protection beyond precedent. In fact, it inhibits the DCT to carry out it's core constitutional and statutory functions of administration and infrastructure regulation.


Jurisdictional Error: Improper Invalidation of Administrative Policy

The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the 'eyesore' policy invalid on the basis of subjectivity. The Property Standards Act confers on the DCT express authority to define eviction criteria. Administrative regulations of this character are not subject to judicial invalidation merely for being broad or discretionary. The Court thereby intruded into the legislative and executive jurisdiction.

It effectively elevates political builds into a special category where subjective standards, which are supported by policy, won’t survive review if they are an eyesore. This is a free ticket to build a dirt shack which breaks regulations and then to tie it to a political party to prevent eviction. We now can't regulate any political building for eyesore.

There is a practical necessity for there to have discretion or subjectivity in the application of policy:

1. No statute or regulation can anticipate every possible situation.
2. The eviction policy sets out a set of broad principles which are reviewed by a number of individuals before any adverse action is taken for breaching them.
3. Discretion avoids overregulation and keeps the system manageable. Strict rules would require endless, hyper-specific regulations (e.g. banning each possible eyesore block type or design).
4. It encourages creativity.
5. Applying judgment on a case-by-case basis ensures that unique factors are taken into account.
6. Courts generally recognise that some degree of subjectivity is inevitable and lawful in such delegated powers.
7. The DCT is given broad regulatory power. There must be an expectation that we, as administrators, need to exercise judgment.


Relief Granted Ultra Vires

The Court erred in law by directing the Department to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards.' Judicial review permits a court to strike down unlawful provisions, but it does not empower the judiciary to prescribe the content of future regulations. This order exceeds the proper limits of judicial relief and constitutes an impermissible intrusion into executive policymaking.

Courts can quash unlawful provisions, but they cannot draft or compel drafting of executive policy. That is a textbook breach of separation of powers.


In General

The court's role in executive policy making is to interpret policy and process. In this case, they have overstepped in overturning legal, long-standing executive policy and then directing updates to policy.

The reported plots are part of approximately 1000 reports made over the past several months. The court incorrectly ruled that it was targeted.

Aesthetic standards are inherently subjective - zoning, planning, and our heritage laws/policy often use terms like 'in character' or 'reasonable.' These terms cannot reasonably be objective.

The Department has consistently applied its policies with fairness, restraint, and reason. The verdict under appeal does not reflect those same principles. Instead, it creates a precedent that is inconsistent with law and inhibits our ability to regulate.


Prayer for Relief

1. Appeal Granted

2. Federal Court verdict vacated

Supporting Evidence: 1. Constitution
2. Property Standards Act

 

[CoolChacha97]

Your honor,
As a lawyer who worked on the case for the plaintiff and am no longer employed by MZLD I would like to file an amicus brief with the court relating to the following facts
1. The DCT's addition of quartz into the building policy
2. How the relationship between the judiciary and the DCT works
3. How res judicata works with DCT policy and law
I would also like to include in the amicus brief my general thoughts and opinions on the case

 

[End]

Your honor,
As a lawyer who worked on the case for the plaintiff and am no longer employed by MZLD I would like to file an amicus brief with the court relating to the following facts
1. The DCT's addition of quartz into the building policy
2. How the relationship between the judiciary and the DCT works
3. How res judicata works with DCT policy and law
I would also like to include in the amicus brief my general thoughts and opinions on the case

Your honour,

1. Amicus briefs are statements of fact, not opinion on interpretation in Redmont.

2. Appeals aren’t adversarial in Redmont, they are a claim to an error of law and a singular submission.

 

[lucaaaaMC]

Free Yeet

 

[Aladeen]

In a 2-0 decision, the Supreme Court has decided to grant this appeal.

The Appellant, has seventy-two hours to post their Appellant Brief.

Apologies for not posting this on the forums as well.

 

[End]

In a 2-0 decision, the Supreme Court has decided to grant this appeal.

The Appellant, has seventy-two hours to post their Appellant Brief.

Apologies for not posting this on the forums as well.

Is there a procedure for this? This is new.

 

[Aladeen]

Is there a procedure for this? This is new.

Yes there is, you can find it here

Information Thread 'Appealing a Federal Court Decision'

Jun 10, 2021

INTRODUCTION

After a court case has been decided in favor of one party in the Federal Court, the losing party may decide that they would like to appeal the court's decision within one month. If an appeal is accepted, the case will be heard by the Supreme Court, where the verdict may or may not be overturned. In the event that the verdict is overturned, appropriate actions will be taken to ensure that the compensatory actions of the original verdict are overturned or that new compensatory actions are issued. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal, and...

• Courts
• Replies: 0
• Forum: Appeals

 

[End]

Opening Statement

The Commonwealth appeals the judgment of the Federal Court invalidating key provisions of DCT’s eviction policy, vacating the DCT's eviction notices on the GER's plots, and issuing direction to the DCT to revise its policy.

The Commonwealth provides that the verdict should be set aside noting the following errors, and asks the court to consider the listed issues.

COURT ERRORS

Error of Law - Misapplication of Res Judica

Res judicata applies only where the same cause of action is litigated under substantially the same law. The 2025 policy introduced new definitions of 'basic materials' and expressly included quartz as a limited block, thereby creating a materially different regulatory framework (the inclusion of a new material in the definition of basic materials). By disregarding these substantive changes, the Court improperly extended res judicata beyond its settled scope (which was that this material was not reasonably assumed to be a basic material).

The DCT reported this plot years ago for using just quartz as a basic block. The court ruled that quartz could not be reasonably be assumed as a basic block. As such, the DCT updated it's policy to expressly provide that quartz was a basic block. This is applied equally to all people being reported for the same reason. The plots were re-reported for the same reason, with policy changes made in accordance with the court verdict on quartz now included expressly in the definition. The court ruled that this was targeted, when the DCT's position has been unchanged for years and that the necessary policy changes and warning was provided.

Courts may review constitutionality and legality, but they cannot strike down policies merely on suspicions of motive unless it violates a constitutional or statutory law. That oversteps judicial review. This change is broad, is a long-standing position of the DCT, and applies equally to every citizen.

The court erred in law by applying res judicata where it acknowledged that there was a material change to policy.

Issue 1: Whether the lower court erred in applying res judicata to bar reconsideration of DCT’s policy on quartz when DCT had materially amended its policy definition of 'basic materials' to expressly include quartz, following Galactic Empire of Redmont v Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 27.

Error of Law: Misapplication of the Constitutional Test for Freedom of Political Communication

The Court erred by applying a heightened standard of review to regulations affecting political communication. The correct test is whether the regulation is reasonably appropriate to serve a legitimate governmental purpose. Instead, the Court introduced a novel requirement of 'objective clarity' and invalidated the 'eyesore' provisions on grounds of vagueness. This constitutes a departure from the DCTs ability to regulate and expands constitutional protection beyond precedent. In fact, it inhibits the DCT to carry out it's core constitutional and statutory functions of administration and infrastructure regulation.

In doing so, the court has inferred that the DCT targeted the GER on political grounds. The reality is that the GER's plots were reported in accordance with policy, along with 100s of plots throughout this administration. All plots were given extensive feedback and generous timelines to be able to correct the faults, well beyond normal timelines.

Issue 2: Whether the court misapplied the constitutional test for freedom of political communication by ruling that the DCT cannot evict based on subjective standards for political buildings.

Issue 3: Whether the Court erred in concluding that the reported plots were targeted, when they were part of a large number of enforcement actions (approximately 1,000 reports) applied consistently over several months.

Issue 4: Whether the Court erred in concluding that the reported plots were targeted, when the GER was given ample opportunity and feedback to rectify the issues, well beyond normal timelines and advice provided.

Issue 5: Whether the Court’s invalidation of subjective standards in the eyesore policy effectively creates anomalous protection for politically-affiliated structures, undermining the DCT’s ability to enforce regulations uniformly.

Jurisdictional Error: Improper Invalidation of Administrative Policy

The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the 'eyesore' policy invalid on the basis of subjectivity. The Property Standards Act confers on the DCT express authority to define eviction criteria. Administrative regulations of this character are not subject to judicial invalidation merely for being broad or discretionary. The Court thereby intruded into the legislative and executive jurisdiction.

It effectively elevates political builds into a special category where subjective standards, which are supported by policy, won’t survive review if they are an eyesore. This is a free ticket to build a dirt shack which breaks regulations and then to tie it to a political party to prevent eviction. We now can't regulate any political building for eyesore.

There is a practical necessity for there to have discretion or subjectivity in the application of policy:

1. No statute or regulation can anticipate every possible situation.
2. The eviction policy sets out a set of broad principles which are reviewed by a number of individuals before any adverse action is taken for breaching them.
3. Discretion avoids overregulation and keeps the system manageable. Strict rules would require endless, hyper-specific regulations (e.g. banning each possible eyesore block type or design).
4. It encourages creativity.
5. Applying judgment on a case-by-case basis ensures that unique factors are taken into account.
6. Courts generally recognise that some degree of subjectivity is inevitable and lawful in such delegated powers.
7. The DCT is given broad regulatory power. There must be an expectation that we, as administrators, need to exercise judgment.

Issue 6: Whether the exercise of professional judgment and discretionary authority by the DCT in applying broad eviction standards is lawful and necessary to achieve practical, fair, and manageable enforcement.

Issue 7: Whether aesthetic can be measured absolutely objectively, without any level of professional judgement, and in a standard form policy applicable to all properties and circumstances.

Relief Granted Ultra Vires

The Court erred in law by directing the Department to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards.' Judicial review permits a court to strike down unlawful provisions, but it does not empower the judiciary to prescribe the content of future regulations. This order exceeds the proper limits of judicial relief and constitutes an impermissible intrusion into executive policymaking.

Courts can quash unlawful provisions, but they cannot draft or compel drafting of executive policy. That is a textbook breach of separation of powers.

Issue 8: Whether the Court erred by directing the DCT to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards,' thereby exceeding the proper limits of judicial relief and impermissibly intruding into executive policymaking.

Issue 9: Whether the Court exceeded its proper role by overturning long-standing executive policy and directing the DCT to revise it, rather than limiting its judgment to interpreting and reviewing the lawful application of that policy.

In General

The court's role in executive policy making is to interpret policy and process. In this case, they have overstepped in overturning legal, long-standing executive policy and then directing updates to policy.

The reported plots are part of approximately 1000 reports made over the past several months. The court incorrectly ruled that it was targeted.

Aesthetic standards are inherently subjective - zoning, planning, and our heritage laws/policy often use terms like 'in character' or 'reasonable.' These terms cannot reasonably be objective.

The Department has consistently applied its policies with fairness, restraint, and reason. The verdict under appeal does not reflect those same principles. Instead, it creates a precedent that is inconsistent with law and inhibits our ability to regulate.

Issue 10: Whether the Court’s verdict under appeal improperly establishes a precedent inconsistent with law, undermining the DCT’s ability to administer its policies fairly, reasonably, and with appropriate discretion.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1. Appeal Granted

2. Federal Court verdict vacated.

In these circumstances, the DCT will not immediately evict the properties, rather, the GER will be given a further 7 day deferral from the vacation to rectify the outstanding reports.

Further, the DCT will afford a single free paste should the GER wish to replace any one of the evicted buildings.

The DCT is not here to target any individual or entity. The DCT serves to perform it's constitutional function and it has done routinely over 100s of reports in the past term. The DCT has afforded the GER an exceptional level of grace to resolve their reports, to which would not normally be afforded to a regular player. The DCT recognises the importance of these buildings to the organisation, but also has legal requirement to improve aesthetic and enforce non-compliance.

 

[Aladeen]

The Appellee will have 72 hours to present their brief.

 

[Franciscus]

Your Honor,

The Appellee will have 72 hours to present their brief.

The appellee's counsel respectfully requests a 42-hour extension on this. I will be traveling over the weekend and will be presiding over an in-game House session tomorrow, and I worry that I may not have time to provide this reply.

 

[Aladeen]

Extension granted.

 

[Franciscus]

Brief

Introduction​

The Federal Court’s decision in [2025] FCR 78 should be affirmed in full. The trial judge correctly (i) applied res judicata to bar a renewed “basic materials”/“eyesore” eviction against the same GER property already litigated in [2023] FCR 27; (ii) enforced the Constitution’s Freedom of Political Communication by requiring clear, neutral, objective standards when government limits political speech; (iii) exercised the court’s constitutional jurisdiction to reject as unconstitutional an as-applied use of amorphous “eyesore” criteria to suppress political expression; and (iv) fashioned a modest, prospective remedy directing the DCT to conform future policy to constitutional limits. None of the Commonwealth’s asserted “errors of law” carries its appellate burden.

Statement of Jurisdiction and Standard of Review​

The Supreme Court is the appellate court for Federal Court verdicts and reviews errors of law and findings “which could not be supported by the evidence.” It also recognizes the Federal Court’s original jurisdiction over constitutional questions. On appeal, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; factual determinations are disturbed only where untenable on this record. No new evidence may be introduced on appeal absent the narrow Rule 1.7 exception.

Questions Presented​

While the appellant has broken this down further, the court here is presented with the following essential questions:

1. Whether the trial court misapplied res judicata in holding that the DCT could not re-litigate an eviction of the same GER plot on a repackaged “basic materials” theory after [2023] FCR 27.
2. Whether the court erred in its Freedom of Political Communication analysis by requiring clear, objective, and neutral standards before restricting political expression.
3. Whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction by invalidating, as applied to political builds, the DCT’s subjective “eyesore” policy.
4. Whether the court’s remedial directive to revise policy toward objective, neutral standards was ultra vires.

Procedural and Factual Background​

In [2023] FCR 27, the court addressed the DCT’s “limited basic materials” rubric, expressly noting: “According to the DCT, limited basic materials are blocks such as dirt, cobblestone, and anything similar. A reasonable person would not put quartz in the same category as dirt and cobblestone.”

In [2025] FCR 78, the DCT again sought to evict GER plots—including the exact same plot—under “eyesore”/“basic materials” theories, after updating its internal policy to expressly add quartz. The trial court held the DCT could not resurrect the same controversy by altering internal policy language post-judgment; it reaffirmed that quartz cannot be shoehorned into “basic materials” for this property consistent with prior adjudication. The court also found that subjective “eyesore” enforcement—particularly against clearly identified political properties—would unconstitutionally restrict Freedom of Political Communication absent clear, objective, neutrally applicable standards. While the Court did not find that intentionally targeted enforcement of the rules occurred here, it found that the rules themselves were non-neutral after reviewing the evidence and testimony presented in this case. The court enjoined the pending evictions of political properties on that basis and awarded the statutory minimum legal fees.

Summary of the Argument​

The judgment should be affirmed. First, res judicata bars re-litigation of the very “basic materials” issue decided in 2023 for the same plot; an agency cannot avoid issue preclusion by unilaterally rewriting its policy to contradict the court’s earlier reasoning. Second, the sixth charter right explicitly protects political communication, and the trial court correctly required objective limits on DCT discretion when speech is burdened; subjective, non-neutral burdens on political communication would violate the Constitution. Third, the Federal Court had constitutional jurisdiction to deem the as-applied policy unconstitutional; nothing in statute immunizes vague executive criteria from judicial scrutiny. Fourth, the remedy—prospective direction to conform policy to constitutional requirements—is a routine, restrained form of declaratory/injunctive relief, not an improper assumption of executive drafting. The remedy is akin to striking a policy and requiring that it be re-written for it to be enforceable, not a hijacking of the executive.

Argument​

I. The trial court correctly applied res judicata; the DCT cannot relitigate the same eviction theory by targeted post-hoc policy edits.​

Res judicata/issue preclusion prevents parties from relitigating issues actually decided and essential to a prior judgment. In 2023, the court resolved the core classification question against the DCT: a “reasonable person would not put quartz with dirt/cobblestone” within “limited basic materials.” That reasoning was central to rejecting the earlier eviction of the same GER plot. The 2025 attempt re-urged the same “basic/eyesore” theory against the same property, simply after the DCT edited its internal policy to “expressly include quartz.” The trial court properly held that “a new policy created at some later date cannot and will not change the court’s precedent and interpretation” and re-applied the 2023 classification. That is classic issue preclusion.

The Commonwealth’s contrary position concedes the DCT updated its policy to expressly provide that quartz was a basic block, which is the very maneuver the court rejected: agencies cannot erase judicial holdings by redrafting internal definitions. The Property Standards Act allows the DCT to make policy, but not to overrule prior judicial interpretation, nor to contravene constitutional protections.

II. The court’s Freedom of Political Communication analysis is faithful to the Constitution, not an unduly “heightened” standard.​

The Constitution expressly guarantees Freedom of Political Communication within §32(6), and the court in [2025] FCR 78 has essentially explained that when government restricts political speech, only "[n]eutral policies... remain fully enforceable". Accordingly, the Court treated with a high degree of skepticism the amorphous “eyesore” judgments used to silence a party’s political messaging after finding as a matter of fact that “The 'eye-sore' policy is deemed to not be a bona fide update but was rather a targeted response to that ruling. The timing and narrow scope of the policy change raise concerns of selective regulation”. That articulation is a straightforward application of our Constitution; the Commonwealth’s framing (“reasonably appropriate to serve a legitimate purpose”) ignores the basic demand that government not suppress political expression through subjective aesthetic discretion in the form of post-hoc targeted regulation.

The Court found that "clear, neutral, and consistently applied policies" are what is required of the Commonwealth. Unclear, non-neutral, and inconsistently applied policies with respect to political communication are contrary to the Charter's guarantees, and should not be entertained here,

III. No “jurisdictional error”: the Federal Court has authority to adjudicate constitutionality and to set aside unconstitutional,​

Under Section 18(1)(a) of the Constitution, the Federal Court has original jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality. That the DCT’s policy is housed in “administrative” text does not insulate its application from constitutional review—particularly where it burdens political communication. The Property Standards Act allows the DCT to “establish regulations,” but that grant is bounded by the Constitution and judicial oversight. The trial court’s judgment respected those boundaries.

IV. The remedial order was not ultra vires; directing policy to be clear, objective, neutral is standard constitutional relief.​

The court did not “write policy.” It declared the challenged enforcement unconstitutional as applied to political builds and prospectively directed the Department to revise policy to meet constitutional minimums—clarity, objectivity, neutrality—before enforcing similar restrictions on political communication. Courts may routinely issue declaratory and injunctive relief that requires agencies to conform future action to constitutional constraints; that is not “intruding” into executive policymaking, it is the basic premise behind judicial review. The trial court’s narrow, forward-looking remedy falls squarely within that equitable lane.

V. The Commonwealth misstates the record in contravention of Court Rules.​

Appeals are confined to errors of law and unsupported findings; attempts to re-argue facts or introduce new materials contravene Rule 1.7 and should be disregarded. For example, the Appellant has repeatedly claimed that one thousand eviction reports have taken place over the past several months, but the trial record's evidence does not reflect this; such retorical points should be stricken here and not given consideration by the Court in this review.

Conclusion​

The Appellant has not shown that the Federal Court applied an incorrect principle of law, nor that any material factual finding was unsupported. The judgment reflects a careful application of res judicata, a faithful enforcement of the Constitution’s protection for political communication, a proper exercise of constitutional review, and a restrained remedy.

The judgment of the Federal Court in [2025] FCR 78 should be AFFIRMED in full.

 

[Aladeen]

The Appellant has 72 hours to post their response brief.

 

[Matthew100x]

I am recusing from this appeal due to my representation in a different appeal stemming from the same case.

 

[Smallfries]

The Appellant has 72 hours to post their response brief.

Appellant @End

 

[End]

Brief

Response

In [2023] FCR 27, the court addressed the DCT’s “limited basic materials” rubric, expressly noting: “According to the DCT, limited basic materials are blocks such as dirt, cobblestone, and anything similar. A reasonable person would not put quartz in the same category as dirt and cobblestone.”

In [2025] FCR 78, the DCT again sought to evict GER plots—including the exact same plot—under “eyesore”/“basic materials” theories, after updating its internal policy to expressly add quartz. The trial court held the DCT could not resurrect the same controversy by altering internal policy language post-judgment; it reaffirmed that quartz cannot be shoehorned into “basic materials” for this property consistent with prior adjudication. The court also found that subjective “eyesore” enforcement—particularly against clearly identified political properties—would unconstitutionally restrict Freedom of Political Communication absent clear, objective, neutrally applicable standards. While the Court did not find that intentionally targeted enforcement of the rules occurred here, it found that the rules themselves were non-neutral after reviewing the evidence and testimony presented in this case. The court enjoined the pending evictions of political properties on that basis and awarded the statutory minimum legal fees.

In [2023] FCR 27, the court ruled on policy as it existed. The policy was:

Constructed from limited, basic materials. (e.g. dirt, cobblestone, etc.)

The court found that a reasonable person would not consider quartz to be included in etc.

In response, the DCT has now included it in it's policy so that there is no ambiguity in the policy's application.

Basic matierals (e.g. dirt, cobble; use of limited blocks i.e. building a structure out of just quartz.

The court held that: It's too ambiguous.
The DCT responded by: updating policy to make it an example and unambiguous.

It's that simple.

The Court in [2025] FCR 78 held that the DCT could not revise its policy, could not apply it because of res judicata, and deemed the report 'targeted.'

The report from 2025 is practically identical to the 2023 report that was ruled as “questionable at best”. Furthermore the Secretary testified that the policy was updated due to the ruling in [2023] FCR 27. The “eye-sore” policy is deemed to not be a bona fide update but was rather a targeted response to that ruling. The timing and narrow scope of the policy change raise concerns of selective regulation. As such, res judicata applies to C279, and the eviction cannot stand. The Court affirms that while Congress and Departments retain the authority to amend their policies, such amendments should be general, prospective, and substantively distinct from prior rules. Policies enacted to target prior litigants or litigate settled matters will be struck down under res judicata.

The DCT acknowledges the verdict in [2023] FCR 27, whereby it's policy was not unambiguous on the inclusion of quartz as a basic material.

The DCT, however, has held the position that quartz is a basic material for years, and has applied it as such in many evictions beyond yeetboy. There is material evidence of this rule being applied to primarily all-quartz buildings dating back to October 2020.

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c097-mar-9-2023.16335/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c193-mar-9-2023.16342/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/r023-nov-2-2022.14876/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c-083-evict-9-nov-2020.1845/

And similarly, there is application of this policy applying in similar circumstances to yeetboy in over 300 cases in 5.5 years.

DemocracyCraft

www.democracycraft.net

If the Court finds a policy ambiguous, it can interpret the existing text for the purpose of the specific dispute before it. The Court cannot, however, prohibit the executive from amending or clarifying that policy afterwards.
In doing so, it amounts to interfering with an executive function, which is outside the judiciary’s remit and in breach of the separation of powers.

The Court’s role is the adjudication of interpretation. It does not carry out administration. Therefore, it may:

1. Interpret what a policy meant at a point in time; and

2. Determine whether enforcement was lawful under the policy then in effect.

It may not:

1. Direct how a policy should be written or updated; and

2. Forbid executive departments from clarifying their own rules; and

3. Substitute its own view of what materials, designs, or standards are permissible.

When the court tells the DCT that quartz cannot be a basic block, it ceases to interpret and begins to dictate executive policy, which is ultra vires.

The principle of res judicata applies only when:

1. The same issue between the same parties is re-litigated;

2. There has been no material change in facts or law.

The DCT updated the policy after the Court’s ruling to remove ambiguity which materially alters the legal context. The prior decision cannot bind enforcement under the new, clarified policy, because the facts have changed.

Allegations of targeting fail on both procedural and substantive grounds:

The DCT applied a long-standing policy, clarified it transparently, and allowed full remediation time;

The decision was part of a broad and ongoing enforcement program, not an isolated or selective action.

A finding of targeting would require evidence of differential treatment motivated by bias or bad faith. The same standards are applied consistently to many similar cases as discussed above. If the DCT was bias, it would not have afforded the opportunities for yeetboy to correct the building and the feedback to enable that.

Basic Block

The Court never said that quartz can’t be a basic block. What it said, in effect, was that it couldn’t be reasonably inferred from the examples in the policy that quartz was part of that list. That’s an interpretation, not a prohibition. The DCT then did what any department should do and clarified the wording so the policy was clear going forward. The Court’s role is to interpret what’s written, not to stop the executive from fixing an ambiguity it identified.

Neutral Enforcement

The Court drew a line between neutral enforcement and targeted suppression. The DCT’s actions are consistent with neutral enforcement.

The Eyesore Policy wasn’t cooked up to silence yeetboy's political expression. It’s a longstanding solution that guides the aesthetic standards that apply to everyone - regardless of what they’re saying, who they are, or what political party they associate with. The Department clarified the wording only after the Court found ambiguity.

The policy applies to everyone, political or not. It regulates how things look, not what they say. [2025] FCR 78 calls for: clear, neutral, consistently enforced rules. The DCT’s policy fits that description. What the Constitution forbids is weaponising discretion to shut people up.

Yeet was issued with an eviction notice to correct the problem, had an updated policy to follow which was unambiguous, and was given secretarial review upon request. He had the same rules applied as hundreds of others, the same time (and extensions that he didnt ask for in some cases).

Jurisdiction
No one disputes that the Federal Court is the constitutional court. The issue is how far that jurisdiction reaches. Judicial review exists to keep executive power within lawful bounds, not to let the judiciary substitute its own policy preferences for those of the executive.

The DCT’s policy sits comfortably within the scope of the Property Standards Act. The Department was expressly empowered to make and clarify regulations of this kind, and it did so lawfully, and has done so for years - including evicting people for the same reason as yeet (use of just quartz). The fact that the policy touches an area where political expression might occur does not make every enforcement action a constitutional matter. If that were true, no zoning rule, aesthetic rule, or otherwise could ever operate.

The court crossed from review into administration. It didn’t just interpret the policy, it directed the department rewrite its policy - and at the same time, barred the Department from correcting an ambiguity the Court itself identified. That’s not constitutional oversight; that’s executive interference. The Constitution draws a line between interpretation and execution, and here the Court stepped over it.

Discretion

Aesthetic regulation necessarily involves professional judgment and discretion. Determinations of what is in character and consistent with the policy cannot be reduced to rigid absolutes. Expecting uniform, literal rules is neither reasonable nor enforceable. The DCT clarified its policy to remove ambiguity and ensure fair application, which is within its lawful executive authority. The Constitution demands neutrality, clarity, and consistency, not the elimination of informed discretion. The court’s directive intrudes upon executive prerogative under the guise of equality - not equitability.

The Court has set an impossible standard and, in doing so, elevated property associated with political parties above all others. The court has prevented the Department from including quartz as a basic block in line with longstanding policy and precedent, forcing significant policy changes onto the Department and imposed an unworkable benchmark. Just how do you objectively quantify aesthetic standards for all builds ranging the political spectrum without creating absurdities? You can't - there must be professional discretion.

In Yeetboy's case, an inspector applied department policy and used professional discretion to determine some of his builds unsatisfactory. Some of these assessments were quashed by the Secretary (showing departmental restraint, self-governance, and a non-biased approach to the application of policy). Others were co-sponsored by other inspectors to be posted and this was upheld by the department.

Court Rules

Appeals are confined to errors of law and unsupported findings; attempts to re-argue facts or introduce new materials contravene Rule 1.7 and should be disregarded. For example, the Appellant has repeatedly claimed that one thousand eviction reports have taken place over the past several months, but the trial record's evidence does not reflect this; such retorical points should be stricken here and not given consideration by the Court in this review.

The Supreme court has already accepted to hear the appeal based on the points of law raised.

This issue you reference was addressed throughout the trial, including in the Commonwealth’s closing submissions, which referenced the hundreds of reports filed over the several months.

2. The constitutional guarantee of political communication does not override reasonable land-use, aesthetic, or thematic rules. The plot was evicted for the reasons in the report and the report is one of 100s in an uptick in inspection activity. Nobody was targeted as an individual or organisation for their beliefs - if anything, the whole country was targeted in an inspection blitz.

These reports are publicly available, referenced throughout FCR 78, and verifiable. They show that enforcement was routine and applied across all plots.

We have raised 10 issues for the court to consider in the Commonwealth's appeal:

Issue 1: Whether the lower court erred in applying res judicata to bar reconsideration of DCT’s policy on quartz when DCT had materially amended its policy definition of 'basic materials' to expressly include quartz, following Galactic Empire of Redmont v Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 27.

Issue 2: Whether the court misapplied the constitutional test for freedom of political communication by ruling that the DCT cannot evict based on subjective standards for political buildings.

Issue 3: Whether the Court erred in concluding that the reported plots were targeted, when they were part of a large number of enforcement actions (approximately 1,000 reports) applied consistently over several months.

Issue 4: Whether the Court erred in concluding that the reported plots were targeted, when the GER was given ample opportunity and feedback to rectify the issues, well beyond normal timelines and advice provided.

Issue 5: Whether the Court’s invalidation of subjective standards in the eyesore policy effectively creates anomalous protection for politically-affiliated structures, undermining the DCT’s ability to enforce regulations uniformly.

Issue 6: Whether the exercise of professional judgment and discretionary authority by the DCT in applying broad eviction standards is lawful and necessary to achieve practical, fair, and manageable enforcement.

Issue 7: Whether aesthetic can be measured absolutely objectively, without any level of professional judgement, and in a standard form policy applicable to all properties and circumstances.

Issue 8: Whether the Court erred by directing the DCT to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards,' thereby exceeding the proper limits of judicial relief and impermissibly intruding into executive policymaking.

Issue 9: Whether the Court exceeded its proper role by overturning long-standing executive policy and directing the DCT to revise it, rather than limiting its judgment to interpreting and reviewing the lawful application of that policy.

Issue 10: Whether the Court’s verdict under appeal improperly establishes a precedent inconsistent with law, undermining the DCT’s ability to administer its policies fairly, reasonably, and with appropriate discretion.

This appeal was brought on out of multiple errors of law:

Error of Law - Misapplication of Res Judica

Res judicata applies only where the same cause of action is litigated under substantially the same law. The 2025 policy introduced new definitions of 'basic materials' and expressly included quartz as a limited block, thereby creating a materially different regulatory framework (the inclusion of a new material in the definition of basic materials). By disregarding these substantive changes, the Court improperly extended res judicata beyond its settled scope (which was that this material was not reasonably assumed to be a basic material).

The DCT reported this plot years ago for using just quartz as a basic block. The court ruled that quartz could not be reasonably be assumed as a basic block. As such, the DCT updated it's policy to expressly provide that quartz was a basic block. This is applied equally to all people being reported for the same reason. The plots were re-reported for the same reason, with policy changes made in accordance with the court verdict on quartz now included expressly in the definition. The court ruled that this was targeted, when the DCT's position has been unchanged for years and that the necessary policy changes and warning was provided.

Courts may review constitutionality and legality, but they cannot strike down policies merely on suspicions of motive unless it violates a constitutional or statutory law. That oversteps judicial review. This change is broad, is a long-standing position of the DCT, and applies equally to every citizen.

The court erred in law by applying res judicata where it acknowledged that there was a material change to policy.

Error of Law: Misapplication of the Constitutional Test for Freedom of Political Communication

The Court erred by applying a heightened standard of review to regulations affecting political communication. The correct test is whether the regulation is reasonably appropriate to serve a legitimate governmental purpose. Instead, the Court introduced a novel requirement of 'objective clarity' and invalidated the 'eyesore' provisions on grounds of vagueness. This constitutes a departure from the DCTs ability to regulate and expands constitutional protection beyond precedent. In fact, it inhibits the DCT to carry out it's core constitutional and statutory functions of administration and infrastructure regulation.

Jurisdictional Error: Improper Invalidation of Administrative Policy

The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the 'eyesore' policy invalid on the basis of subjectivity. The Property Standards Act confers on the DCT express authority to define eviction criteria. Administrative regulations of this character are not subject to judicial invalidation merely for being broad or discretionary. The Court thereby intruded into the legislative and executive jurisdiction.

It effectively elevates political builds into a special category where subjective standards, which are supported by policy, won’t survive review if they are an eyesore. This is a free ticket to build a dirt shack which breaks regulations and then to tie it to a political party to prevent eviction. We now can't regulate any political building for eyesore.

There is a practical necessity for there to have discretion or subjectivity in the application of policy:

1. No statute or regulation can anticipate every possible situation.
2. The eviction policy sets out a set of broad principles which are reviewed by a number of individuals before any adverse action is taken for breaching them.
3. Discretion avoids overregulation and keeps the system manageable. Strict rules would require endless, hyper-specific regulations (e.g. banning each possible eyesore block type or design).
4. It encourages creativity.
5. Applying judgment on a case-by-case basis ensures that unique factors are taken into account.
6. Courts generally recognise that some degree of subjectivity is inevitable and lawful in such delegated powers.
7. The DCT is given broad regulatory power. There must be an expectation that we, as administrators, need to exercise judgment.

Relief Granted Ultra Vires

The Court erred in law by directing the Department to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards.' Judicial review permits a court to strike down unlawful provisions, but it does not empower the judiciary to prescribe the content of future regulations. This order exceeds the proper limits of judicial relief and constitutes an impermissible intrusion into executive policymaking.

Courts can quash unlawful provisions, but they cannot draft or compel drafting of executive policy. That is a textbook breach of separation of powers.

In General

The court's role in executive policy making is to interpret policy and process. In this case, they have overstepped in overturning legal, long-standing executive policy and then directing updates to policy.

The reported plots are part of approximately 1000 reports made over the past several months. The court incorrectly ruled that it was targeted.

Aesthetic standards are inherently subjective - zoning, planning, and our heritage laws/policy often use terms like 'in character' or 'reasonable.' These terms cannot reasonably be objective.

The Department has consistently applied its policies with fairness, restraint, and reason. The verdict under appeal does not reflect those same principles. Instead, it creates a precedent that is inconsistent with law and inhibits our ability to regulate.

In Closing

1. Litigant's plots reported.
This was in-line with precedent of quartz and the blitz this term that included 100s of other landowners.

2. Litigant given extensive feedback and time to fix it.
Secretary provided extensive review to the litigants properties and quashed two reports, demonstrating fairness and the absence of bias.

3. Litigant failed to resolve the matter.
Litigant was provided generous extensions beyond normal timeframes without asking for many of them, demonstrating the Department's willingness to have the issue solved by owner.

4. Litigant files case in the courts.
Litigant wins in FCR 78, limiting Departmental power to evict - stripping the department of professional judgement and forcing the department to rewrite its policy to set objective, mechanical standards for all properties associated with politics. An impossible standard to make policy for and to enact.

5. Commonwealth appeals to SCR on points of law
Asks for 10 issues to be reviewed, the errors of law, and to have the FCR 78 verdict set aside.

6. Commonwealth rewrites the eviction policy, expanding on the definitions, but still relies on a level of professional discretion.

7. Commonwealth intends to afford the litigant further time to resolve the issue at hand in prayer for relief.

This verdict cannot stand in-part or in full. The Court must restore the Department’s ability to enforce its clarified, neutral, and longstanding policies without interference.

 

[Franciscus]

The DCT, however, has held the position that quartz is a basic material for years, and has applied it as such in many evictions beyond yeetboy. There is material evidence of this rule being applied to primarily all-quartz buildings dating back to October 2020.

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c097-mar-9-2023.16335/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c193-mar-9-2023.16342/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/r023-nov-2-2022.14876/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c-083-evict-9-nov-2020.1845/

And similarly, there is application of this policy applying in similar circumstances to yeetboy in over 300 cases in 5.5 years.

DemocracyCraft

www.democracycraft.net

Objection

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION — BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Your Honor:

Under Rule 1.7, “No new evidence or witness testimony may be submitted during an appellate trial”. Very narrow exceptions apply and, whenever one applies, the rule notes that “[t]he evidence or proposal for a new witness should be included in the movant's initial brief”. As such, no new evidence is permitted in the closing brief from the appellant.

I raise this because I am unable to find both the dynamic search query included above and the list of evictions linked within any exhibit in the original trial. If xEndeavour is attempting to introduce new evidence, it would be both against Court rules also after the appellee would be able to respond to it in their sole brief. At this juncture, introducing new evidence would be unduly prejudicial.

If these links and queries were included as evidence in the initial trial, I would ask that xEndeavour provide the exact exhibit number in a response to this objection—I cannot find it myself. If he can’t provide this, then the Court should strike the quoted portion as breaching procedure for failure to adhere to rule 1.7.

 

[Aladeen]

Objection sustained. The evidence was not part of the original case so it will be struck from the record.

 

[End]

Objection sustained. The evidence was not part of the original case so it will be struck from the record.

Your honour, can I request a departure from ordinary proceedings to allow it's inclusion and the defence the opportunity to respond to this information? This would enable the appellant to use the information and the defence to have a fair opportunity to respond.

The information provided is public information and is key in proving the DCT's longstanding position on the matter and disproving the claim that the defendant was targeted.

This information supports claims raised in the initial appeal:

The reported plots are part of approximately 1000 reports made over the past several months.

The court ruled that this was targeted, when the DCT's position has been unchanged for years and that the necessary policy changes and warning was provided.

 

[Franciscus]

Your honour, can I request a departure from ordinary proceedings to allow it's inclusion and the defence the opportunity to respond to this information? This would enable the appellant to use the information and the defence to have a fair opportunity to respond.

The information provided is public information and is key in proving the DCT's longstanding position on the matter and disproving the claim that the defendant was targeted.

This information supports claims raised in the initial appeal:

Motion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO STRIKE

xEndeavour has, as he does in so many cases, chosen to speak out of turn rather than adhering to court rules and procedures. He could have done many things to have been heard, such as responding to the objection in a timely manner (he had a right of automatic response and then neglected to use it), or even filing a motion to reconsider. But he has done neither here and as a result he's (once again) shouted into the forums void in an impermissible way.

The Court should strike his improperly filed comment, as it breaches procedure here. And, as a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, xEndeavour should simply know better than to do this.

 

[End]

Motion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO STRIKE

xEndeavour has, as he does in so many cases, chosen to speak out of turn rather than adhering to court rules and procedures. He could have done many things to have been heard, such as responding to the objection in a timely manner (he had a right of automatic response and then neglected to use it), or even filing a motion to reconsider. But he has done neither here and as a result he's (once again) shouted into the forums void in an impermissible way.

The Court should strike his improperly filed comment, as it breaches procedure here. And, as a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, xEndeavour should simply know better than to do this.

I'm not asking for the court to reconsider - hence why a motion was not filed.

It may come as a surprise to the Defence, but you can talk to the Judicial Officer and make requests outside of motions and objections in a respectful and appropriate manner.

 

[Aladeen]

We will follow the standard procedure and the evidence will not be admitted since it was not part of the original case. However, the motion to strike is overruled given that the appellant made a request, and not something which has disrupted this courts proceedings.

 

[Smallfries]

This appeal is now in recess pending verdict.

 

[Smallfries]

Just as an update: The verdict for this case is in the process of being written. We hope to publish within a week or so.

 

[Smallfries]

Verdict

Associate Justice Smallfries4 writes the unanimous opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Aladeen22. Associate Justice Matthew100x did not participate in discussion or voting.

Note to the reader: Due to the length of this verdict, pagination has been introduced to assist in future citations. Page breaks are identified by a green [*'x'], where 'x' is the page number. You may cite to page one of this opinion as: Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78, 1 (appeal).


[*1] The Department of Construction & Transportation (DCT) appeals the decision by the Federal Court to vacate the DCT’s decision to evict four properties belonging to the Galactic Empire of Redmont (GER). Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (hereafter “GER 78”). The DCT raises four issues. In turn, these are:

(1) That the trial court erred in applying res judicata in its verdict,
(2) That the trial court erred when it demanded “objective clarity” from the DCT’s policies,
(3) That the trial court is precluded from invalidating the DCT eviction standards, and
(4) That the trial court exceeded its discretion when it directed the DCT to amend its policy to include certain “objective” standards.
​

I. Facts​

Between June 26, 2025, and July 1, 2025, the DCT posted eviction reports for five properties belonging to the GER: C-Plot no.’s 226, 279, 364, 454, and 607. Four of these plots (plot 364 was later relieved of its eviction report) faced impending evictions at the filing of this suit. After filing, an emergency injunction was granted, staying further proceedings in the reports for some time.

The plots at issue are visibly noticeable as GER plots, and contain motifs consistent with the GER and Star Wars broadly. Plot no. 226 contains a military-style establishment made out of dark stoney materials and iron. It has the letters “GER” printed in large boldface on one side of the second story, and grey flags of the GER in several locations noticeable from the street. Plot no. 279 is another large plot with several military-themed features, such as an iron fence topped with cobwebs, which are meant to represent barbed wire. This plot also contains mock-up recreations of TIE fighters from Star Wars. There also exists a large animal head in the center of the plot, with a flag on top of the largest building on the plot bearing “GER” lettering laid in prismarine. The plot is made in large part of andesite and other stoney blocks, and the buildings themselves seem to be nearly entirely quartz-material.

Plot no. 454 is a large mock-up of a hangar, containing one replica of a TIE fighter and one replica of an AT-ST walker vehicle. The entrance to the building is outlined in [*2] prismarine, and on top of the building the letters “GER” are spelled out with stone. At least two GER flags can be spotted from the street. Plot no. 607 is a very large plot containing a military-style compound composed mainly of stone-related materials colored grey, red, and black. At least two instances of “GER” lettering on banners can be seen, and at least a dozen GER flags aside.

Plot no. 279 was the center of a case two years ago, where the plot was reported for being an eyesore. One of the main critiques was that it was made out of primarily basic materials. The court in that case reversed the DCT’s action, believing that quartz did not fit within the category of “other similar materials” listed in the DCT’s policy.

In the instant case, the trial court held that the report against plot no. 279 could not stand. The court recognized that while the DCT had changed its eviction policy to include quartz as a basic material, res judicata meant that this specific claim could not be litigated.

Further, the eyesore regulation in question could not stand. The trial court found it to be too broad, vague, and subjective in nature, lacking “the objective clarity needed to justify restrictions . . . [on buildings that] aim to be political communication.” The trial court found that the plots themselves constituted protected political communication due to the visual elements “representing the GER’s identity, ideology, and messaging.”

However, the trial court did not find that the DCT specifically targeted the GER, including for political reasons. The trial court was satisfied that the DCT had conducted itself neutrally and fairly in this instance. Similarly, the trial court found that the DCT could establish “neutral” regulatory schemes so long as they did not suppress or target political expression.

In a 2-0 vote, the Supreme Court grants certiorari. We review this appeal as a foundational cornerstone of modern Redmontian Administrative law.
​

II. Analysis​

The issues in this case are four-fold. First, does res judicata apply in this case, and can it be used anywhere besides in a motion to dismiss. Second, was the test for political [*3] communication applied in error. Third, are courts able to review DCT standards and strike them. Fourth, did the trial court exceed its discretion when it directed the DCT to implement certain standards as policy.
​

a. Applicable Law​

Government departments are explicitly written into the Redmontian Constitution, as are the duties of the secretaries that lead them. R.C. Const. Part III, §§ 29–30. Secretaries are charged with, inter alia, the efficient operations of, creating and amending policy for, and the impartial administration of their departments. Id. § 29(1). Departments were formally created in April 2021 with the passage of the Executive Standards Act (EXSA). EXSA. The DCT was one of these departments, and was given the task of creating government infrastructure, maintenance of building regulation compliance, and managing public transportation. Id. § 11(1).

To aid the DCT in these tasks, Congress passed the Property Standards Act (PSA), which sought to “[empower] the DCT to regulate in a more flexible arrangement.” PSA § 2(2). Among these new delegated powers was “jurisdiction to establish regulations outside of this law and to evict properties [following relevant law and regulations.]” Id. § 4(1). Further, the DCT is empowered to issue and revoke exemptions and extensions for compliance so long as one of several criteria are met. Id. at 20(1). However, the DCT may not act arbitrarily or without legal backing in the enforcement of policies or goals. See Partypig678 v. Department of Constr. and Trans.[2021] SCR 14; Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth [2023] FCR 27 (no pet.) (hereafter “GER 27”); see also zLost v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 10 (Smallfries4, J., dissenting).

Res Judicata is handled under Court Rule 5.8, where a motion to dismiss can be filed if “a case on the same issue has already been decided on.” Redmont Judiciary, Court Rules and Procedures, Rule 5.8 (Res Judicata) (emphasis added).

All citizens are granted the right to freedom of political communication. R.C. Const. Part IV, § 32(6). All citizens are equal before the law and have equal protections without unfair discrimination based on political beliefs. Id. § 32(13).
​

b. Discussion​

1. Misapplication of res judicata

Res judicata as it currently stands is a poorly explained (and perhaps unsurprisingly, poorly understood) judicial theory which seeks to preserve justice and judicial resources. These twin aims are accomplished by not allowing claimants to get a “second bite at the apple,” or try to re-litigate their case when they have lost. [*4] A classic example of res judicata is a businessman suing his partner, and then suing her again before a different judge on the same exact issue if he loses. Without res judicata, this new judge could perhaps issue a judgment against the defendant. Instead, the case will be dismissed out of hand.

Res judicata in Redmont has a very limited history, and only one case appears to have a judicial ruling on it. In 2024, then President xLayzur was impeached, convicted, and scheduled to be removed from office by February 1, 2024. Krix v. Commonwealth of Redmont[2024] SCR 9. The Senate—not content with this deadline—later voted to impose an immediate removal from office. Id. That suit followed. However, another suit had previously been filed regarding the initial impeachment itself. Krix v. Commonwealth [2024] SCR 8. Upon that suit’s adjournment, the court next dismissed SCR 9, citing res judicata due to the issues being “mostly decided” in SCR 8. Krix [2024] SCR 9.

Upon inspection, it seems clear that the court there applied the incorrect rule for dismissal. The plaintiff in SCR 9 claimed that the Senate was improperly re-punishing the President when he had already been issued a punishment. Id. This contention was not dealt with in SCR 8 (and indeed not mentioned at all). Krix [2024] SCR 8. The court in that case sided with the President, and overturned the impeachment. Id. Therefore, though the same issues were not litigated by the same parties between the two cases and did not receive a final judgment, the claims in SCR 9 no longer had a valid claim. As a result, the case should have been dismissed under rule 2, as the plaintiff no longer had standing.

This leaves us in something of a quagmire, as we have absolutely no proper precedent to work with. Breathing a deep sigh, we tighten our belts and plunge into the icy depths of legal analysis.

[*5] It is clear that res judicata is meant to prevent the same parties from litigating the same issue over and over again, forever. It is unfair to the non-moving party, and it ties up judicial resources which could be better spent elsewhere. However, there is some nuance to be discussed.

First, what is an “issue?” Is an “issue” merely a topic that one may sue on? Clearly not. If an individual were to sue another based on a business deal gone bad, then regardless of the outcome of that case neither party could sue the other over a business deal ever again. An “issue” must be more specific than that.

Is an “issue” the extraordinarily specific combination of facts, allegations, and dealings that give rise to a suit? This seems more plausible, but still insufficient. An individual could sue another for $10,000 worth of lost inventory due to a specific incident last Tuesday, and then lose. If, after that loss, the plaintiff sued again for $20,000 due to loss of enjoyment related to that same incident last Tuesday, we clearly would want to quickly dismiss that case. Issues must not be held so narrowly as specific facts and allegations or claims that arise in a case, but instead all facts and allegations or claims that could arise out of that case. Here, any potential fact, allegation, or claim that could arise in suit out of that case connected to the incident last Tuesday is barred from ever being presented if it is not presented in the initial case. Plaintiffs must bring all claims arising out of one situation in one singular case.

There is a clear and correct middle ground. When a case is given a final and valid judgment by a competent court of law, any claims that were (or could have been) raised by the same facts, situation, and parties in that previous case are barred from further litigation. To go back to our previous example, after the businessman loses his case, he will be forever prevented from raising any claim relating to that incident on Tuesday, regardless of whether or not those claims were actually brought up. This preserves judicial resources, encourages plaintiffs to present all their claims in one go, and protects justice for parties that prevail in suits.

Turning to the instant case, we can see that some issues arise. To begin with, res judicata is explicitly stated to be a reason to dismiss a case. Given that it was the Plaintiff here who raised res judicata, they should have motioned for summary judgment as to their res judicata claim. However, even if they had done so, that claim should have been denied.

[*6] The GER makes reference to a prior court case which dealt with an eviction report for plot no. 279. GER 27. In that case, plot no. 279 was under eviction for being an eyesore. Id. The reasoning given for being an eyesore was because that plot used “limited, basic materials,” such as “dirt, cobblestone, or other similar blocks.” Id. The trial court in that case ruled that because a reasonable person would not hold quartz similarly in stature to dirt and cobblestone, it did not fall under “other similar blocks.” Id. Thus, the plot did not break any DCT regulations as they existed. The trial court did not explain how it came to the conclusion that quartz was not in the same category as dirt and cobblestone. See id.

As a result, the trial court in the instant case ruled that as to plot no. 279, res judicata applied and the DCT could not take action against it for the same issues presented in GER 27. In the instant case, it was determined that the DCT updated its eyesore policy—specifically in regards to “basic materials”—specifically in regards to the DCT’s loss in GER 27. The court found that the DCT’s policy change to include quartz as a basic material was not a “bona-fide update,” but rather a targeted attempt to invalidate their previous loss.

The trial court notes that Congress and Departments can still amend law as long as those amendments are “general, prospective, and substantially distinct from prior rules.” However, the trial court’s application of res judicata here says otherwise. It is clear there is some tension as to the twin concerns between allowing government entities to amend the law, and protecting judgments that were reached under prior law.

The trial court found that the change to the DCT policy (adding quartz as a “basic material”) was not “general, prospective, and substantially distinct” from the prior policy without it. The trial court did not explain where this standard came from, nor what portion of that standard the DCT failed to meet.

Instead of attempting to solve this riddle, we discard it entirely. Statutory interpretation is an important consideration in this matter, as Congress’s will must be deferred to. To begin with, the EXSA creates the DCT, giving them the responsibility (among others) of managing the compliance with building regulations.

The PSA alters this power by giving the DCT sweeping powers with very little oversight or regulation. The text of the act gives the DCT jurisdiction to “establish [*7] regulations outside of this law and to evict properties in accordance with these laws and regulations.” There are no further limits to relevant regulations within the PSA or EXSA, and neither law contains any standards of review for courts to give oversight to agency policies. Further, one legislative reason for the PSA was the “[loss of] regulatory powers [of the DCT]. This bill empowers the DCT to regulate in a more flexible [manner].”

It is abundantly clear that Congress intended for the DCT to have broad powers that it could flexibly use in order to promote proper buildings and effectuate its legitimate property regulations. If Congress had wanted for the DCT to adhere to any standards outside of basic interests protected in the Constitution, Congress would have written them in. The lack of explicit restrictions on their power, combined with the lack of any standards of review for a court to rule on (see here for an example of a legislature giving a court guidelines on what standards to hold an agency’s action to) means that Congress intended for the courts to defer to DCT interpretations and regulations so long as they did not upset any Constitutional right or violate any previously-existing legal standard.

This conclusion is highly important in regards to the trial court’s finding on res judicata. The trial court’s determination that any updates to policy or law must be general, prospective, and “substantially distinct” all are incorrect and are Constitutionally baseless. This ruling would, in effect, bar any sort of specific remedy that Congress or any department were to make. It would also mean that any change below a certain arbitrary amount of “distinctiveness” is illegitimate. This is clearly wrong.

Congress is free to make whatever changes to rules, regulations, or statues they wish, so long as those changes are constitutional. There is no constitutional provision that states that changes made to law must be so much different from previously existing law, or must be applicable to so many people or else it is impermissible.

Similarly, if Congress delegates regulatory power to a department, that department has the same power to make whatever changes to rules or regulations they wish, so long as these changes are within the law and within the enabling statute provided by Congress. As there is no statutory or legal basis for a reviewing court to hold a department to a “general, prospective, and substantially distinct” standard, there is no reason to restrict the DCT—which is granted broad and sweeping regulatory powers—in that way. [*8] Accordingly, the trial court erred when it found that the DCT changed its policy solely as an attempt to avoid res judicata. As a result, the DCT’s policy should not be invalidated for that reason.

With this established, we can look at res judicata itself. As discussed supra, res judicata precludes the litigation of claims that were (or could have been) brought forwards in a previous case that was given a valid and final judgment, and had the same facts, situation, and parties in that case.

Here, most of the elements have been fulfilled. One critical difference stands tall, however. As pointed out during trial, DCT regulations had changed between the prior case and the instant. At the time of the second trial, quartz had been included as a “basic material.” As discussed supra, we have dismissed the trial court’s reversal of this policy change. As a result, the situation and facts of the matter were markedly different from the previous case. Quartz is a basic material, and the DCT reasonably changed the policy to regulate city builds as is their statutory prerogative.

The Constitution grants the right to equality before the law, and we do not see the mere fact of changing policy to include quartz as a basic material as being targeted towards the GER in any way—and neither did the trial court. Further, if we were to protect the plot at issue and allow quartz to be considered a basic material, we would in essence be legislating the concept of historical districts into law where we have no power to do so. Otherwise we would be protecting one plot against a specific regulation and not all others for no reason other than a specific court case happened with that plot some time ago.

There is clearly no reason to restrict their ability to regulate the inclusion of quartz in basic materials. Understanding this, we would be mandating an unequal enforcement of the law if we were to hold that res judicata precluded DCT action here. This is inappropriate, as Congress—and by extension the DCT as directed by Congress—may change the law. This does not implicate res judicata. The law has changed, and with it the facts and situation leading up to the instant case. The cases are substantially different, and res judicata does not apply here. The DCT is not enforcing their regulations as to how the plot in question was, but as to how it is now.

We understand the trial court’s concerns of fairness and government attempts to side-step judicial protections of the law. However, we do not think giving this plot [*9] essentially unlimited deference against an otherwise reasonable policy is warranted. As discussed infra, there are other means to regulate attempted litigative gamesmanship from agencies. If we were to uphold the trial court’s decision, the government could never regulate quartz as a building material or the plot at issue would unfairly be protected at the expense of all other plots nationwide. For the reasons above, we overturn the trial court as to the first issue, application of res judicata to plot no. 279.

2. Expression of political views or affiliation does not create an impenetrable shield around mundane interests

Each of the plots were reported for eviction under the pretense of being an eyesore. At trial, the Platiniff contended that each of the plots were carriers of political messages that made the builds in and of themselves political communication. Thus, the argument went, ejecting the alleged eyesores would serve to restrict the freedom of the GER to communicate politically. The buildings themselves were “expressions of political identity” and “communication” by the GER—presumably to the public at large—and were “vital platforms for political expression.”

The trial court was convinced by this argument, and found that the plots themselves constituted protected political communication: “The structures, design choices, and symbolic elements are intentionally expressive, representing the GER’s identity, ideology, and messaging.” The trial court found that subjective standards risked discrimination, including against political communication.

The trial court further went on to confirm that the DCT had legitimate rule-making power to regulate buildings in neutral, non-targeted ways. We agree. As the trial court wrote: “. . . height limits, safety codes, material restrictions, clear design requirements, or zoning requirements remain fully enforceable. A claim of political expression does not [nullify] these standards.” (emphasis added).

It is true that each of the plots at issue carried symbols and motifs that were at least potentially or tangentially political in nature. The GER is a political party in Redmont, and one of the plots at issue is their headquarters. Each of the plots at issue has at least one GER banner, and each has the letters “GER” somewhere publicly visible on the plot.

[*10] The trial court found that the protection they give only applies to “genuinely expressive” political communication. To fall under this protected umbrella, a build must demonstrate an intent to convey political ideas, party affiliation, or government feedback. This can be evidenced through political iconography, connection to a registered party, or historical/contextual use as messaging. Finally, the trial court notes that even the presence of all of these cannot invalidate a previously-mentioned neutral policy set to regulate plots.

We find the trial court’s position confusing and internally inconsistent. To begin with, the trial court firmly and explicitly states that material restrictions or clear design requirements are neutral policies. Is a forbidding of basic materials, including quartz, not a material restriction? Is a standard of a certain amount of windows not a clear design requirement? We believe they certainly are, and highly specific at that.

Are these criteria not neutral, then? If so, why? Is it because these policies directly implicate the plots at hand? There does not seem to be any specific or highly unique facet of the requirements themselves that somehow implicate the GER and their plots specifically or uniquely. If, for example, the addition of quartz to the list of basic materials implicated an already existing plot—and this plot happened to be a plot at issue here—does that necessarily mean that addition was non-neutral, and thus the policy illegitimate under this test?

We find this hard to square. Even among the trial court’s own doctrine, the addition of quartz to the list of basic materials is compatible with the law. Quartz is a highly versatile, popular, and cheap material that is widely used in many builds. Almost the entirety of the buildings on plot no. 279 are made of quartz. Nearly the entirety of the exterior of each of the court buildings (and surely most other government buildings, upon reflection) are quartz. The bottom half of the walls of the office in which these words are being typed is made out of quartz. Surely then quartz is not such a specific material that its inclusion as a basic material is targeted. How could it be? Clearly, the application of quartz to the new policies is broad, general, non-specific, and non-targeting.

Allowing individuals to have carte blanche so long as they could raise a claim of political communication would be a misstep. One must think of the consequences if we were to rule today that no regulation could be sustained against the defence of political communication. We do not find it necessary to explain in great depth that [*11] suddenly the Commonwealth, its departments, and its legislature would be totally toothless to regulate solutions to real and legitimate interests.

We would make a grave error indeed were we to say that regardless of broadness and applicability, this eviction violated the right to political communication. The trial court acknowledges this and agrees with this determination; we change nothing in the law here. All we do at this moment is make consistent this finding with the factual findings and determinations of the case at hand.

Here, we do not find a valid claim of political communication even implicated at all. Indeed, the trial court found in its ruling that it was “. . . not satisfied that the evidence show[ed] that the plots and the GER were targeted specifically or for political reasons . . . this court believes [the government has performed] neutrally and fairly.”

If the DCT had specifically targeted the plots because of the plots’ political messaging or affiliation, then that obviously would implicate a claim of rights for political communication. However, as the trial court notes, the DCT did not target these plots for political reasons. We do not second guess or otherwise supplant the factual findings of a trial court for our own upon review unless an error of law has been suggested, and none has been suggested upon appeal for whether the DCT acted neutrally. Therefore it is clear that the DCT has not specifically targeted the plots for political reasons, and thus cannot be the basis for any constitutional claim of political communication.

The only reasonable explanation remaining for the trial court’s finding of a violation of political freedom, then, is the fact that the eviction—which was conducted fairly, neutrally, and in a non-targeted manner—reduced the capacity for the GER to politically communicate. In evicting the GER from these plots, the GER loses its ability to politically communicate through these plots, and their banners, lettering, and aesthetics are destroyed.

To begin with, this is inconsistent with the trial court’s own views. The trial court (clearly sensing the sensitivity of this topic and potential for abuse through claiming political communication) explicitly stated that claims of political communication did not exempt plots from following neutral standards set by the DCT. However, as discussed, the trial court also did not find the DCT acted in any way targeting the plots at issue. Further, as discussed supra, the addition of quartz to basic materials was surely a “neutral policy” as described by the trial court.

[*12] We are unsure what to make of this glaring inconsistency. We uphold the trial court’s determination that any policy that is broad and non-specific, or “neutral” (such as height limits, safety codes, material restrictions, etc.) are fully enforceable. We further uphold the determination that a claim of political communication does not exempt any plot from compliance with this neutrally designed, neutrally applied, and neutrally upheld determinations.

It is clear that plots may not be used in a way that flagrantly violates a law passed with lawful authority that possesses a reasonable government or public interest. The mere fact that political communication may be impacted by an eviction of a plot does not create a constitutional claim of political communication. For such a claim to exist, a government entity must be directly targeting political communication itself, or the restriction imposed on the communicator so egregious and widespread (regardless of government intent) that the restriction serves as to totally suppress the communicator. It is clear to us today that the mere fact of an individual being hurt because of a choice of the government (in a regulatory context) does not mean that action is necessarily illegal.

As discussed supra, the DCT did not directly target the GER or its plots for political purposes. Further, we find it unconvincing that the removal of some flags and Star Wars aesthetics restricts the GER’s ability to politically communicate to such an egregious extent that it rises to the level of a constitutional claim. Therefore, we overrule the trial court’s determination and hold that in the instant case the DCT’s actions were not precluded by a constitutionally protected claim of political communication.

3. The Judiciary clearly has the authority to review policies so long as an appropriate claim is implicated

In the instant case, the DCT alleges that the plots at issue were “eyesores” according to their internal regulations. The trial court found that this policy was unenforceable due to its vagueness, citing concerns such as the lack of objective clarity as well as subjectivity in enforcement. On appeal, the DCT contends that the importance of flexibility and functionality through executive discretion is a controlling interest to be given consideration.

[*13] As discussed supra, the DCT is given wide-reaching powers. The EXSA gives them the power to “[maintain] building regulation compliance.” The PSA gives them the power to “establish regulations outside of this law and to evict properties in accordance with these laws and regulations.” These two provisions, combined, serve to effectively delegate all legislative power from Congress to the DCT regarding property regulations. There are no statutory limits, no guardrails, no basis for decision-making. It is clear that Congress intended for the DCT’s power in this realm to be nigh-absolute.

Further, there is no legislation creating a framework for judicial review of agency action. There are no standards set to be applied, no requirements for rulemaking or adjudication, no necessity of a record to be produced per decision. This means that the reviewing power of the judiciary is no stronger than the common-law requirements of first ensuring that action taken by an agency is within the power delegated to them by Congress, and then ensuring that that action was constitutional and in line with other law or interests legally obtained. (To see an example of a system of judicial review for agency action, please see a very small portion of American administrative law here. This law lays out a number of reasons a court may find an agency’s action unlawful. Further, enabling statutes for various agencies contain guidelines, frameworks, and standards for that agency’s actions, allowing the reviewing court to properly weigh the legality and permissibility of that action.)

With this in mind, it is clear that the Appellant misstates the law. Upon appeal, the DCT argues that the trial court could not have reviewed the regulation at issue in the way it did at all because it was of a specific character. This specific character, the argument goes, protects the regulation from review due to any perceived broadness or subjectivity. The DCT alleges these qualities are in fact desirable and necessary for the good administration of the department, and thus the regulation cannot be overturned merely because it is subjective.

There is no real reason that a reviewing court could not invalidate such a policy. It is true that flexibility in governance is an important consideration for agency action—and indeed, flexibility is cited within the PSA’s reasoning section—but this desire does not overrule any and all possible claims. A regulation that is too broad or too discretionary could and should easily be overruled by a reviewing court if it exceeded the agency’s statutory authority or abridged the rights of the citizenry.

[*14] This ruling does not leave citizens without recourse should they be subject to an unjust agency determination. The Constitution grants the rights to equal protection before the law, and citizens believing that an agency was wielding a subjective policy to unfairly target them could bring evidence of such conduct to a court. If, in the instant case, the GER had proven that the DCT was biased or acting unequally in their treatment through specific instances of the DCT refusing to evict plots with buildings built entirely out of quartz, the GER would likely prevail in that battle.

It is important that agencies are granted proper discretion in their administration. Without any statutory framework in place for what this discretion is limited to, it is presumed that agencies act with full congressional power and authority. The only limits to agency authority and discretion are checks upon an agency’s action that lay outside of their enabling statutes, and protections specifically granted in law to regulated parties.

Here, the DCT is granted nearly unlimited power through the PSA, and it is unreasonable to say that any regulations discussed in this opinion fall outside of that unending authority. Next, the only protections granted to the GER by law is the freedom of political communication and the right to equality before the law. As discussed supra, we are not satisfied that the either have been violated. Thus, it is clear that neither the DCT policy, or the action taken in pursuit thereof, was in error. Therefore, no judicial intervention was necessary, and the trial court abused its discretion when it vacated the eyesore regulation.

Without statutory guidance, Congress does not restrict agencies through courts. However, without explicit statutory preclusion, Congress does not shield agencies from the courts either. Thus, individuals may raise claims in court for rights abridged or interests violated if those rights or interests are breached.

There is no further analysis needed in this section. As no constitutional rights have been implicated, nor wrongdoing by an agency detected, it is impossible to consider any standards with which to review the agency’s action. Agency action, absent a statute from Congress creating a framework for judicial review, may only be overturned if that agency acted outside of its granted powers, or if a constitutional or statutory right or interest was improperly abridged.

[*15] We overrule the trial court’s attempt to overturn the eyesore regulation and the eviction of the plots as an abuse of judicial discretion.

4. Courts should not supplant their own judgment for that of an agency

As discussed in the section above, the trial court acted improperly when it vacated the regulation and evictions at issue. Further comment on that matter is not necessary. However, it is important to note that in its holding, the trial court further directed the DCT to amend its policies to include “clear, objective, and neutrally applicable” standards.

On appeal, the DCT took issue with this. The DCT contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it directed the DCT to amend its policies towards a specific (and more “objective”) alternative. Because the court created new standards, it acted with legislative power and impermissibly breached the separation of powers.

A reviewing court may direct an agency to amend its policies to become in line with what the law states, and nothing more. As discussed supra, Congress has not given any reviewing frameworks or standards for the judiciary to follow when evaluating agency determinations. Thus, while we may still evaluate those determinations, we may only do so as long as they contradict the law or abridge statutory or constitutional rights or interests of the citizenry.

Reviewing courts should give reasonable deference to an agency acting within its own legal bounds. Without any statutory framework for properly reviewing agency determinations, it is not possible for a reviewing court to intervene in a final agency determination in any way if that determination does not either exceed its statutory boundaries or infringe on a right or interest of a regulated party. In matters where an agency action is legally valid, but there are reasonable differences as to different choices in policy, a court should not supplant an agency’s judgment for its own.

The outcome here then is clear. We hold that the trial court erred when it directed the DCT to amend its policies in the way that it did. The directive by the trial court was unnecessary, because (as discussed above) the policies of the DCT were not outside of their statutory bounds. Were the policies outside the bounds authorized by Congress, perhaps the trial court’s order would not have been in error. We do not rule as to the specifics of the directed rule changes.

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III. Dicta​

As a final note: the judiciary rules as to what the law is, not what it should be. We are sensitive to the fact that many may dislike the outcome of this ruling. Citizens should remember that the judiciary’s place within the law is interpretation, not implementation or inception. Those belong to the executive and legislative branches, respectively.

[*16] If citizens dislike the outcome of this case, it is because they do not like the law as it is implemented by the executive or how it was created by Congress. The solution, then, is to exercise the democratic rights which all citizens have. Citizens may lobby the executive to enjoin their department’s enforcement of a disputed regulation. They may create petitions to create exceptions or overturn a law entirely. They may, in the most obvious act of peaceful democratic power, vote out politicians who abide by policies the citizens dislike.

None of these are applicable to the judiciary. We rule merely as to what the law is. If the law had included provisions on exhaustion of remedies before coming before the court—so as to incentivize not wasting time and coming to a conclusion before suing—or created historical districts, or one of a thousand other remedies, the outcome here could have been different.

We do not exist to “fix” issues of policy or politics. The courts should, shall, and must be above such temptations. We uphold today, above all else, judicial independence from the other branches, and from public opinion. We shall—now and forever—protect the law as it stands. It is up to you, dear reader, to change it.
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IV. Conclusion​

The DCT raises four issues upon appeal: Misapplication of res judicata, the GER’s plots not being protected political communication, the trial court’s improper invalidation of [*17] agency regulations, and the trial court’s improper substitution of the agency’s regulations for its own determination of policy.

We overrule the trial court as to the first two and the fourth issues. As a result, the order enjoining the plots at issue from being evicted for reports filed is overturned. The trial court’s order for a change in DCT policy is overturned. Plaintiff is to be fined $1 (representing their surrender of the nominal damages awarded in court). Counsel for the GER is to be fined $6,000 (representing their surrender of the legal fees awarded in court).​