Appeal: Pending [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal

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Username: xEndeavour

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: Commonwealth

File(s) attached

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] FCR 78

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Department of construction and transportation [2025] FCR 78

Basis for Appeal: Error of Law - Misapplication of Res Judica

Res judicata applies only where the same cause of action is litigated under substantially the same law. The 2025 policy introduced new definitions of 'basic materials' and expressly included quartz as a limited block, thereby creating a materially different regulatory framework (the inclusion of a new material in the definition of basic materials). By disregarding these substantive changes, the Court improperly extended res judicata beyond its settled scope (which was that this material was not reasonably assumed to be a basic material).

The DCT reported this plot years ago for using just quartz as a basic block. The court ruled that quartz could not be reasonably be assumed as a basic block. As such, the DCT updated it's policy to expressly provide that quartz was a basic block. This is applied equally to all people being reported for the same reason. The plots were re-reported for the same reason, with policy changes made in accordance with the court verdict on quartz now included expressly in the definition. The court ruled that this was targeted, when the DCT's position has been unchanged for years and that the necessary policy changes and warning was provided.

Courts may review constitutionality and legality, but they cannot strike down policies merely on suspicions of motive unless it violates a constitutional or statutory law. That oversteps judicial review. This change is broad, is a long-standing position of the DCT, and applies equally to every citizen.

The court erred in law by applying res judicata where it acknowledged that there was a material change to policy.

Error of Law: Misapplication of the Constitutional Test for Freedom of Political Communication

The Court erred by applying a heightened standard of review to regulations affecting political communication. The correct test is whether the regulation is reasonably appropriate to serve a legitimate governmental purpose. Instead, the Court introduced a novel requirement of 'objective clarity' and invalidated the 'eyesore' provisions on grounds of vagueness. This constitutes a departure from the DCTs ability to regulate and expands constitutional protection beyond precedent. In fact, it inhibits the DCT to carry out it's core constitutional and statutory functions of administration and infrastructure regulation.


Jurisdictional Error: Improper Invalidation of Administrative Policy

The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the 'eyesore' policy invalid on the basis of subjectivity. The Property Standards Act confers on the DCT express authority to define eviction criteria. Administrative regulations of this character are not subject to judicial invalidation merely for being broad or discretionary. The Court thereby intruded into the legislative and executive jurisdiction.

It effectively elevates political builds into a special category where subjective standards, which are supported by policy, won’t survive review if they are an eyesore. This is a free ticket to build a dirt shack which breaks regulations and then to tie it to a political party to prevent eviction. We now can't regulate any political building for eyesore.

There is a practical necessity for there to have discretion or subjectivity in the application of policy:

1. No statute or regulation can anticipate every possible situation.
2. The eviction policy sets out a set of broad principles which are reviewed by a number of individuals before any adverse action is taken for breaching them.
3. Discretion avoids overregulation and keeps the system manageable. Strict rules would require endless, hyper-specific regulations (e.g. banning each possible eyesore block type or design).
4. It encourages creativity.
5. Applying judgment on a case-by-case basis ensures that unique factors are taken into account.
6. Courts generally recognise that some degree of subjectivity is inevitable and lawful in such delegated powers.
7. The DCT is given broad regulatory power. There must be an expectation that we, as administrators, need to exercise judgment.


Relief Granted Ultra Vires

The Court erred in law by directing the Department to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards.' Judicial review permits a court to strike down unlawful provisions, but it does not empower the judiciary to prescribe the content of future regulations. This order exceeds the proper limits of judicial relief and constitutes an impermissible intrusion into executive policymaking.

Courts can quash unlawful provisions, but they cannot draft or compel drafting of executive policy. That is a textbook breach of separation of powers.


In General

The court's role in executive policy making is to interpret policy and process. In this case, they have overstepped in overturning legal, long-standing executive policy and then directing updates to policy.

The reported plots are part of approximately 1000 reports made over the past several months. The court incorrectly ruled that it was targeted.

Aesthetic standards are inherently subjective - zoning, planning, and our heritage laws/policy often use terms like 'in character' or 'reasonable.' These terms cannot reasonably be objective.

The Department has consistently applied its policies with fairness, restraint, and reason. The verdict under appeal does not reflect those same principles. Instead, it creates a precedent that is inconsistent with law and inhibits our ability to regulate.


Prayer for Relief

1. Appeal Granted

2. Federal Court verdict vacated

Supporting Evidence: 1. Constitution
2. Property Standards Act

 

[CoolChacha97]

Your honor,
As a lawyer who worked on the case for the plaintiff and am no longer employed by MZLD I would like to file an amicus brief with the court relating to the following facts
1. The DCT's addition of quartz into the building policy
2. How the relationship between the judiciary and the DCT works
3. How res judicata works with DCT policy and law
I would also like to include in the amicus brief my general thoughts and opinions on the case

 

[End]

Your honor,
As a lawyer who worked on the case for the plaintiff and am no longer employed by MZLD I would like to file an amicus brief with the court relating to the following facts
1. The DCT's addition of quartz into the building policy
2. How the relationship between the judiciary and the DCT works
3. How res judicata works with DCT policy and law
I would also like to include in the amicus brief my general thoughts and opinions on the case

Your honour,

1. Amicus briefs are statements of fact, not opinion on interpretation in Redmont.

2. Appeals aren’t adversarial in Redmont, they are a claim to an error of law and a singular submission.

 

[lucaaaaMC]

Free Yeet

 

[Aladeen]

In a 2-0 decision, the Supreme Court has decided to grant this appeal.

The Appellant, has seventy-two hours to post their Appellant Brief.

Apologies for not posting this on the forums as well.

 

[End]

In a 2-0 decision, the Supreme Court has decided to grant this appeal.

The Appellant, has seventy-two hours to post their Appellant Brief.

Apologies for not posting this on the forums as well.

Is there a procedure for this? This is new.

 

[Aladeen]

Is there a procedure for this? This is new.

Yes there is, you can find it here

Information Thread 'Appealing a Federal Court Decision'

Jun 10, 2021

INTRODUCTION

After a court case has been decided in favor of one party in the Federal Court, the losing party may decide that they would like to appeal the court's decision within one month. If an appeal is accepted, the case will be heard by the Supreme Court, where the verdict may or may not be overturned. In the event that the verdict is overturned, appropriate actions will be taken to ensure that the compensatory actions of the original verdict are overturned or that new compensatory actions are issued. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal, and...

• Courts
• Replies: 0
• Forum: Appeals

 

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Opening Statement

The Commonwealth appeals the judgment of the Federal Court invalidating key provisions of DCT’s eviction policy, vacating the DCT's eviction notices on the GER's plots, and issuing direction to the DCT to revise its policy.

The Commonwealth provides that the verdict should be set aside noting the following errors, and asks the court to consider the listed issues.

COURT ERRORS

Error of Law - Misapplication of Res Judica

Res judicata applies only where the same cause of action is litigated under substantially the same law. The 2025 policy introduced new definitions of 'basic materials' and expressly included quartz as a limited block, thereby creating a materially different regulatory framework (the inclusion of a new material in the definition of basic materials). By disregarding these substantive changes, the Court improperly extended res judicata beyond its settled scope (which was that this material was not reasonably assumed to be a basic material).

The DCT reported this plot years ago for using just quartz as a basic block. The court ruled that quartz could not be reasonably be assumed as a basic block. As such, the DCT updated it's policy to expressly provide that quartz was a basic block. This is applied equally to all people being reported for the same reason. The plots were re-reported for the same reason, with policy changes made in accordance with the court verdict on quartz now included expressly in the definition. The court ruled that this was targeted, when the DCT's position has been unchanged for years and that the necessary policy changes and warning was provided.

Courts may review constitutionality and legality, but they cannot strike down policies merely on suspicions of motive unless it violates a constitutional or statutory law. That oversteps judicial review. This change is broad, is a long-standing position of the DCT, and applies equally to every citizen.

The court erred in law by applying res judicata where it acknowledged that there was a material change to policy.

Issue 1: Whether the lower court erred in applying res judicata to bar reconsideration of DCT’s policy on quartz when DCT had materially amended its policy definition of 'basic materials' to expressly include quartz, following Galactic Empire of Redmont v Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 27.

Error of Law: Misapplication of the Constitutional Test for Freedom of Political Communication

The Court erred by applying a heightened standard of review to regulations affecting political communication. The correct test is whether the regulation is reasonably appropriate to serve a legitimate governmental purpose. Instead, the Court introduced a novel requirement of 'objective clarity' and invalidated the 'eyesore' provisions on grounds of vagueness. This constitutes a departure from the DCTs ability to regulate and expands constitutional protection beyond precedent. In fact, it inhibits the DCT to carry out it's core constitutional and statutory functions of administration and infrastructure regulation.

In doing so, the court has inferred that the DCT targeted the GER on political grounds. The reality is that the GER's plots were reported in accordance with policy, along with 100s of plots throughout this administration. All plots were given extensive feedback and generous timelines to be able to correct the faults, well beyond normal timelines.

Issue 2: Whether the court misapplied the constitutional test for freedom of political communication by ruling that the DCT cannot evict based on subjective standards for political buildings.

Issue 3: Whether the Court erred in concluding that the reported plots were targeted, when they were part of a large number of enforcement actions (approximately 1,000 reports) applied consistently over several months.

Issue 4: Whether the Court erred in concluding that the reported plots were targeted, when the GER was given ample opportunity and feedback to rectify the issues, well beyond normal timelines and advice provided.

Issue 5: Whether the Court’s invalidation of subjective standards in the eyesore policy effectively creates anomalous protection for politically-affiliated structures, undermining the DCT’s ability to enforce regulations uniformly.

Jurisdictional Error: Improper Invalidation of Administrative Policy

The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the 'eyesore' policy invalid on the basis of subjectivity. The Property Standards Act confers on the DCT express authority to define eviction criteria. Administrative regulations of this character are not subject to judicial invalidation merely for being broad or discretionary. The Court thereby intruded into the legislative and executive jurisdiction.

It effectively elevates political builds into a special category where subjective standards, which are supported by policy, won’t survive review if they are an eyesore. This is a free ticket to build a dirt shack which breaks regulations and then to tie it to a political party to prevent eviction. We now can't regulate any political building for eyesore.

There is a practical necessity for there to have discretion or subjectivity in the application of policy:

1. No statute or regulation can anticipate every possible situation.
2. The eviction policy sets out a set of broad principles which are reviewed by a number of individuals before any adverse action is taken for breaching them.
3. Discretion avoids overregulation and keeps the system manageable. Strict rules would require endless, hyper-specific regulations (e.g. banning each possible eyesore block type or design).
4. It encourages creativity.
5. Applying judgment on a case-by-case basis ensures that unique factors are taken into account.
6. Courts generally recognise that some degree of subjectivity is inevitable and lawful in such delegated powers.
7. The DCT is given broad regulatory power. There must be an expectation that we, as administrators, need to exercise judgment.

Issue 6: Whether the exercise of professional judgment and discretionary authority by the DCT in applying broad eviction standards is lawful and necessary to achieve practical, fair, and manageable enforcement.

Issue 7: Whether aesthetic can be measured absolutely objectively, without any level of professional judgement, and in a standard form policy applicable to all properties and circumstances.

Relief Granted Ultra Vires

The Court erred in law by directing the Department to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards.' Judicial review permits a court to strike down unlawful provisions, but it does not empower the judiciary to prescribe the content of future regulations. This order exceeds the proper limits of judicial relief and constitutes an impermissible intrusion into executive policymaking.

Courts can quash unlawful provisions, but they cannot draft or compel drafting of executive policy. That is a textbook breach of separation of powers.

Issue 8: Whether the Court erred by directing the DCT to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards,' thereby exceeding the proper limits of judicial relief and impermissibly intruding into executive policymaking.

Issue 9: Whether the Court exceeded its proper role by overturning long-standing executive policy and directing the DCT to revise it, rather than limiting its judgment to interpreting and reviewing the lawful application of that policy.

In General

The court's role in executive policy making is to interpret policy and process. In this case, they have overstepped in overturning legal, long-standing executive policy and then directing updates to policy.

The reported plots are part of approximately 1000 reports made over the past several months. The court incorrectly ruled that it was targeted.

Aesthetic standards are inherently subjective - zoning, planning, and our heritage laws/policy often use terms like 'in character' or 'reasonable.' These terms cannot reasonably be objective.

The Department has consistently applied its policies with fairness, restraint, and reason. The verdict under appeal does not reflect those same principles. Instead, it creates a precedent that is inconsistent with law and inhibits our ability to regulate.

Issue 10: Whether the Court’s verdict under appeal improperly establishes a precedent inconsistent with law, undermining the DCT’s ability to administer its policies fairly, reasonably, and with appropriate discretion.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1. Appeal Granted

2. Federal Court verdict vacated.

In these circumstances, the DCT will not immediately evict the properties, rather, the GER will be given a further 7 day deferral from the vacation to rectify the outstanding reports.

Further, the DCT will afford a single free paste should the GER wish to replace any one of the evicted buildings.

The DCT is not here to target any individual or entity. The DCT serves to perform it's constitutional function and it has done routinely over 100s of reports in the past term. The DCT has afforded the GER an exceptional level of grace to resolve their reports, to which would not normally be afforded to a regular player. The DCT recognises the importance of these buildings to the organisation, but also has legal requirement to improve aesthetic and enforce non-compliance.

 

[Aladeen]

The Appellee will have 72 hours to present their brief.

 

[Franciscus]

Your Honor,

The Appellee will have 72 hours to present their brief.

The appellee's counsel respectfully requests a 42-hour extension on this. I will be traveling over the weekend and will be presiding over an in-game House session tomorrow, and I worry that I may not have time to provide this reply.

 

[Aladeen]

Extension granted.

 

[Franciscus]

Brief

Introduction​

The Federal Court’s decision in [2025] FCR 78 should be affirmed in full. The trial judge correctly (i) applied res judicata to bar a renewed “basic materials”/“eyesore” eviction against the same GER property already litigated in [2023] FCR 27; (ii) enforced the Constitution’s Freedom of Political Communication by requiring clear, neutral, objective standards when government limits political speech; (iii) exercised the court’s constitutional jurisdiction to reject as unconstitutional an as-applied use of amorphous “eyesore” criteria to suppress political expression; and (iv) fashioned a modest, prospective remedy directing the DCT to conform future policy to constitutional limits. None of the Commonwealth’s asserted “errors of law” carries its appellate burden.

Statement of Jurisdiction and Standard of Review​

The Supreme Court is the appellate court for Federal Court verdicts and reviews errors of law and findings “which could not be supported by the evidence.” It also recognizes the Federal Court’s original jurisdiction over constitutional questions. On appeal, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; factual determinations are disturbed only where untenable on this record. No new evidence may be introduced on appeal absent the narrow Rule 1.7 exception.

Questions Presented​

While the appellant has broken this down further, the court here is presented with the following essential questions:

1. Whether the trial court misapplied res judicata in holding that the DCT could not re-litigate an eviction of the same GER plot on a repackaged “basic materials” theory after [2023] FCR 27.
2. Whether the court erred in its Freedom of Political Communication analysis by requiring clear, objective, and neutral standards before restricting political expression.
3. Whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction by invalidating, as applied to political builds, the DCT’s subjective “eyesore” policy.
4. Whether the court’s remedial directive to revise policy toward objective, neutral standards was ultra vires.

Procedural and Factual Background​

In [2023] FCR 27, the court addressed the DCT’s “limited basic materials” rubric, expressly noting: “According to the DCT, limited basic materials are blocks such as dirt, cobblestone, and anything similar. A reasonable person would not put quartz in the same category as dirt and cobblestone.”

In [2025] FCR 78, the DCT again sought to evict GER plots—including the exact same plot—under “eyesore”/“basic materials” theories, after updating its internal policy to expressly add quartz. The trial court held the DCT could not resurrect the same controversy by altering internal policy language post-judgment; it reaffirmed that quartz cannot be shoehorned into “basic materials” for this property consistent with prior adjudication. The court also found that subjective “eyesore” enforcement—particularly against clearly identified political properties—would unconstitutionally restrict Freedom of Political Communication absent clear, objective, neutrally applicable standards. While the Court did not find that intentionally targeted enforcement of the rules occurred here, it found that the rules themselves were non-neutral after reviewing the evidence and testimony presented in this case. The court enjoined the pending evictions of political properties on that basis and awarded the statutory minimum legal fees.

Summary of the Argument​

The judgment should be affirmed. First, res judicata bars re-litigation of the very “basic materials” issue decided in 2023 for the same plot; an agency cannot avoid issue preclusion by unilaterally rewriting its policy to contradict the court’s earlier reasoning. Second, the sixth charter right explicitly protects political communication, and the trial court correctly required objective limits on DCT discretion when speech is burdened; subjective, non-neutral burdens on political communication would violate the Constitution. Third, the Federal Court had constitutional jurisdiction to deem the as-applied policy unconstitutional; nothing in statute immunizes vague executive criteria from judicial scrutiny. Fourth, the remedy—prospective direction to conform policy to constitutional requirements—is a routine, restrained form of declaratory/injunctive relief, not an improper assumption of executive drafting. The remedy is akin to striking a policy and requiring that it be re-written for it to be enforceable, not a hijacking of the executive.

Argument​

I. The trial court correctly applied res judicata; the DCT cannot relitigate the same eviction theory by targeted post-hoc policy edits.​

Res judicata/issue preclusion prevents parties from relitigating issues actually decided and essential to a prior judgment. In 2023, the court resolved the core classification question against the DCT: a “reasonable person would not put quartz with dirt/cobblestone” within “limited basic materials.” That reasoning was central to rejecting the earlier eviction of the same GER plot. The 2025 attempt re-urged the same “basic/eyesore” theory against the same property, simply after the DCT edited its internal policy to “expressly include quartz.” The trial court properly held that “a new policy created at some later date cannot and will not change the court’s precedent and interpretation” and re-applied the 2023 classification. That is classic issue preclusion.

The Commonwealth’s contrary position concedes the DCT updated its policy to expressly provide that quartz was a basic block, which is the very maneuver the court rejected: agencies cannot erase judicial holdings by redrafting internal definitions. The Property Standards Act allows the DCT to make policy, but not to overrule prior judicial interpretation, nor to contravene constitutional protections.

II. The court’s Freedom of Political Communication analysis is faithful to the Constitution, not an unduly “heightened” standard.​

The Constitution expressly guarantees Freedom of Political Communication within §32(6), and the court in [2025] FCR 78 has essentially explained that when government restricts political speech, only "[n]eutral policies... remain fully enforceable". Accordingly, the Court treated with a high degree of skepticism the amorphous “eyesore” judgments used to silence a party’s political messaging after finding as a matter of fact that “The 'eye-sore' policy is deemed to not be a bona fide update but was rather a targeted response to that ruling. The timing and narrow scope of the policy change raise concerns of selective regulation”. That articulation is a straightforward application of our Constitution; the Commonwealth’s framing (“reasonably appropriate to serve a legitimate purpose”) ignores the basic demand that government not suppress political expression through subjective aesthetic discretion in the form of post-hoc targeted regulation.

The Court found that "clear, neutral, and consistently applied policies" are what is required of the Commonwealth. Unclear, non-neutral, and inconsistently applied policies with respect to political communication are contrary to the Charter's guarantees, and should not be entertained here,

III. No “jurisdictional error”: the Federal Court has authority to adjudicate constitutionality and to set aside unconstitutional,​

Under Section 18(1)(a) of the Constitution, the Federal Court has original jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality. That the DCT’s policy is housed in “administrative” text does not insulate its application from constitutional review—particularly where it burdens political communication. The Property Standards Act allows the DCT to “establish regulations,” but that grant is bounded by the Constitution and judicial oversight. The trial court’s judgment respected those boundaries.

IV. The remedial order was not ultra vires; directing policy to be clear, objective, neutral is standard constitutional relief.​

The court did not “write policy.” It declared the challenged enforcement unconstitutional as applied to political builds and prospectively directed the Department to revise policy to meet constitutional minimums—clarity, objectivity, neutrality—before enforcing similar restrictions on political communication. Courts may routinely issue declaratory and injunctive relief that requires agencies to conform future action to constitutional constraints; that is not “intruding” into executive policymaking, it is the basic premise behind judicial review. The trial court’s narrow, forward-looking remedy falls squarely within that equitable lane.

V. The Commonwealth misstates the record in contravention of Court Rules.​

Appeals are confined to errors of law and unsupported findings; attempts to re-argue facts or introduce new materials contravene Rule 1.7 and should be disregarded. For example, the Appellant has repeatedly claimed that one thousand eviction reports have taken place over the past several months, but the trial record's evidence does not reflect this; such retorical points should be stricken here and not given consideration by the Court in this review.

Conclusion​

The Appellant has not shown that the Federal Court applied an incorrect principle of law, nor that any material factual finding was unsupported. The judgment reflects a careful application of res judicata, a faithful enforcement of the Constitution’s protection for political communication, a proper exercise of constitutional review, and a restrained remedy.

The judgment of the Federal Court in [2025] FCR 78 should be AFFIRMED in full.

 

[Aladeen]

The Appellant has 72 hours to post their response brief.

 

[Matthew100x]

I am recusing from this appeal due to my representation in a different appeal stemming from the same case.

 

[Smallfries]

The Appellant has 72 hours to post their response brief.

Appellant @End

 

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Brief

Response

In [2023] FCR 27, the court addressed the DCT’s “limited basic materials” rubric, expressly noting: “According to the DCT, limited basic materials are blocks such as dirt, cobblestone, and anything similar. A reasonable person would not put quartz in the same category as dirt and cobblestone.”

In [2025] FCR 78, the DCT again sought to evict GER plots—including the exact same plot—under “eyesore”/“basic materials” theories, after updating its internal policy to expressly add quartz. The trial court held the DCT could not resurrect the same controversy by altering internal policy language post-judgment; it reaffirmed that quartz cannot be shoehorned into “basic materials” for this property consistent with prior adjudication. The court also found that subjective “eyesore” enforcement—particularly against clearly identified political properties—would unconstitutionally restrict Freedom of Political Communication absent clear, objective, neutrally applicable standards. While the Court did not find that intentionally targeted enforcement of the rules occurred here, it found that the rules themselves were non-neutral after reviewing the evidence and testimony presented in this case. The court enjoined the pending evictions of political properties on that basis and awarded the statutory minimum legal fees.

In [2023] FCR 27, the court ruled on policy as it existed. The policy was:

Constructed from limited, basic materials. (e.g. dirt, cobblestone, etc.)

The court found that a reasonable person would not consider quartz to be included in etc.

In response, the DCT has now included it in it's policy so that there is no ambiguity in the policy's application.

Basic matierals (e.g. dirt, cobble; use of limited blocks i.e. building a structure out of just quartz.

The court held that: It's too ambiguous.
The DCT responded by: updating policy to make it an example and unambiguous.

It's that simple.

The Court in [2025] FCR 78 held that the DCT could not revise its policy, could not apply it because of res judicata, and deemed the report 'targeted.'

The report from 2025 is practically identical to the 2023 report that was ruled as “questionable at best”. Furthermore the Secretary testified that the policy was updated due to the ruling in [2023] FCR 27. The “eye-sore” policy is deemed to not be a bona fide update but was rather a targeted response to that ruling. The timing and narrow scope of the policy change raise concerns of selective regulation. As such, res judicata applies to C279, and the eviction cannot stand. The Court affirms that while Congress and Departments retain the authority to amend their policies, such amendments should be general, prospective, and substantively distinct from prior rules. Policies enacted to target prior litigants or litigate settled matters will be struck down under res judicata.

The DCT acknowledges the verdict in [2023] FCR 27, whereby it's policy was not unambiguous on the inclusion of quartz as a basic material.

The DCT, however, has held the position that quartz is a basic material for years, and has applied it as such in many evictions beyond yeetboy. There is material evidence of this rule being applied to primarily all-quartz buildings dating back to October 2020.

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c097-mar-9-2023.16335/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c193-mar-9-2023.16342/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/r023-nov-2-2022.14876/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c-083-evict-9-nov-2020.1845/

And similarly, there is application of this policy applying in similar circumstances to yeetboy in over 300 cases in 5.5 years.

DemocracyCraft

www.democracycraft.net

If the Court finds a policy ambiguous, it can interpret the existing text for the purpose of the specific dispute before it. The Court cannot, however, prohibit the executive from amending or clarifying that policy afterwards.
In doing so, it amounts to interfering with an executive function, which is outside the judiciary’s remit and in breach of the separation of powers.

The Court’s role is the adjudication of interpretation. It does not carry out administration. Therefore, it may:

1. Interpret what a policy meant at a point in time; and

2. Determine whether enforcement was lawful under the policy then in effect.

It may not:

1. Direct how a policy should be written or updated; and

2. Forbid executive departments from clarifying their own rules; and

3. Substitute its own view of what materials, designs, or standards are permissible.

When the court tells the DCT that quartz cannot be a basic block, it ceases to interpret and begins to dictate executive policy, which is ultra vires.

The principle of res judicata applies only when:

1. The same issue between the same parties is re-litigated;

2. There has been no material change in facts or law.

The DCT updated the policy after the Court’s ruling to remove ambiguity which materially alters the legal context. The prior decision cannot bind enforcement under the new, clarified policy, because the facts have changed.

Allegations of targeting fail on both procedural and substantive grounds:

The DCT applied a long-standing policy, clarified it transparently, and allowed full remediation time;

The decision was part of a broad and ongoing enforcement program, not an isolated or selective action.

A finding of targeting would require evidence of differential treatment motivated by bias or bad faith. The same standards are applied consistently to many similar cases as discussed above. If the DCT was bias, it would not have afforded the opportunities for yeetboy to correct the building and the feedback to enable that.

Basic Block

The Court never said that quartz can’t be a basic block. What it said, in effect, was that it couldn’t be reasonably inferred from the examples in the policy that quartz was part of that list. That’s an interpretation, not a prohibition. The DCT then did what any department should do and clarified the wording so the policy was clear going forward. The Court’s role is to interpret what’s written, not to stop the executive from fixing an ambiguity it identified.

Neutral Enforcement

The Court drew a line between neutral enforcement and targeted suppression. The DCT’s actions are consistent with neutral enforcement.

The Eyesore Policy wasn’t cooked up to silence yeetboy's political expression. It’s a longstanding solution that guides the aesthetic standards that apply to everyone - regardless of what they’re saying, who they are, or what political party they associate with. The Department clarified the wording only after the Court found ambiguity.

The policy applies to everyone, political or not. It regulates how things look, not what they say. [2025] FCR 78 calls for: clear, neutral, consistently enforced rules. The DCT’s policy fits that description. What the Constitution forbids is weaponising discretion to shut people up.

Yeet was issued with an eviction notice to correct the problem, had an updated policy to follow which was unambiguous, and was given secretarial review upon request. He had the same rules applied as hundreds of others, the same time (and extensions that he didnt ask for in some cases).

Jurisdiction
No one disputes that the Federal Court is the constitutional court. The issue is how far that jurisdiction reaches. Judicial review exists to keep executive power within lawful bounds, not to let the judiciary substitute its own policy preferences for those of the executive.

The DCT’s policy sits comfortably within the scope of the Property Standards Act. The Department was expressly empowered to make and clarify regulations of this kind, and it did so lawfully, and has done so for years - including evicting people for the same reason as yeet (use of just quartz). The fact that the policy touches an area where political expression might occur does not make every enforcement action a constitutional matter. If that were true, no zoning rule, aesthetic rule, or otherwise could ever operate.

The court crossed from review into administration. It didn’t just interpret the policy, it directed the department rewrite its policy - and at the same time, barred the Department from correcting an ambiguity the Court itself identified. That’s not constitutional oversight; that’s executive interference. The Constitution draws a line between interpretation and execution, and here the Court stepped over it.

Discretion

Aesthetic regulation necessarily involves professional judgment and discretion. Determinations of what is in character and consistent with the policy cannot be reduced to rigid absolutes. Expecting uniform, literal rules is neither reasonable nor enforceable. The DCT clarified its policy to remove ambiguity and ensure fair application, which is within its lawful executive authority. The Constitution demands neutrality, clarity, and consistency, not the elimination of informed discretion. The court’s directive intrudes upon executive prerogative under the guise of equality - not equitability.

The Court has set an impossible standard and, in doing so, elevated property associated with political parties above all others. The court has prevented the Department from including quartz as a basic block in line with longstanding policy and precedent, forcing significant policy changes onto the Department and imposed an unworkable benchmark. Just how do you objectively quantify aesthetic standards for all builds ranging the political spectrum without creating absurdities? You can't - there must be professional discretion.

In Yeetboy's case, an inspector applied department policy and used professional discretion to determine some of his builds unsatisfactory. Some of these assessments were quashed by the Secretary (showing departmental restraint, self-governance, and a non-biased approach to the application of policy). Others were co-sponsored by other inspectors to be posted and this was upheld by the department.

Court Rules

Appeals are confined to errors of law and unsupported findings; attempts to re-argue facts or introduce new materials contravene Rule 1.7 and should be disregarded. For example, the Appellant has repeatedly claimed that one thousand eviction reports have taken place over the past several months, but the trial record's evidence does not reflect this; such retorical points should be stricken here and not given consideration by the Court in this review.

The Supreme court has already accepted to hear the appeal based on the points of law raised.

This issue you reference was addressed throughout the trial, including in the Commonwealth’s closing submissions, which referenced the hundreds of reports filed over the several months.

2. The constitutional guarantee of political communication does not override reasonable land-use, aesthetic, or thematic rules. The plot was evicted for the reasons in the report and the report is one of 100s in an uptick in inspection activity. Nobody was targeted as an individual or organisation for their beliefs - if anything, the whole country was targeted in an inspection blitz.

These reports are publicly available, referenced throughout FCR 78, and verifiable. They show that enforcement was routine and applied across all plots.

We have raised 10 issues for the court to consider in the Commonwealth's appeal:

Issue 1: Whether the lower court erred in applying res judicata to bar reconsideration of DCT’s policy on quartz when DCT had materially amended its policy definition of 'basic materials' to expressly include quartz, following Galactic Empire of Redmont v Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 27.

Issue 2: Whether the court misapplied the constitutional test for freedom of political communication by ruling that the DCT cannot evict based on subjective standards for political buildings.

Issue 3: Whether the Court erred in concluding that the reported plots were targeted, when they were part of a large number of enforcement actions (approximately 1,000 reports) applied consistently over several months.

Issue 4: Whether the Court erred in concluding that the reported plots were targeted, when the GER was given ample opportunity and feedback to rectify the issues, well beyond normal timelines and advice provided.

Issue 5: Whether the Court’s invalidation of subjective standards in the eyesore policy effectively creates anomalous protection for politically-affiliated structures, undermining the DCT’s ability to enforce regulations uniformly.

Issue 6: Whether the exercise of professional judgment and discretionary authority by the DCT in applying broad eviction standards is lawful and necessary to achieve practical, fair, and manageable enforcement.

Issue 7: Whether aesthetic can be measured absolutely objectively, without any level of professional judgement, and in a standard form policy applicable to all properties and circumstances.

Issue 8: Whether the Court erred by directing the DCT to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards,' thereby exceeding the proper limits of judicial relief and impermissibly intruding into executive policymaking.

Issue 9: Whether the Court exceeded its proper role by overturning long-standing executive policy and directing the DCT to revise it, rather than limiting its judgment to interpreting and reviewing the lawful application of that policy.

Issue 10: Whether the Court’s verdict under appeal improperly establishes a precedent inconsistent with law, undermining the DCT’s ability to administer its policies fairly, reasonably, and with appropriate discretion.

This appeal was brought on out of multiple errors of law:

Error of Law - Misapplication of Res Judica

Res judicata applies only where the same cause of action is litigated under substantially the same law. The 2025 policy introduced new definitions of 'basic materials' and expressly included quartz as a limited block, thereby creating a materially different regulatory framework (the inclusion of a new material in the definition of basic materials). By disregarding these substantive changes, the Court improperly extended res judicata beyond its settled scope (which was that this material was not reasonably assumed to be a basic material).

The DCT reported this plot years ago for using just quartz as a basic block. The court ruled that quartz could not be reasonably be assumed as a basic block. As such, the DCT updated it's policy to expressly provide that quartz was a basic block. This is applied equally to all people being reported for the same reason. The plots were re-reported for the same reason, with policy changes made in accordance with the court verdict on quartz now included expressly in the definition. The court ruled that this was targeted, when the DCT's position has been unchanged for years and that the necessary policy changes and warning was provided.

Courts may review constitutionality and legality, but they cannot strike down policies merely on suspicions of motive unless it violates a constitutional or statutory law. That oversteps judicial review. This change is broad, is a long-standing position of the DCT, and applies equally to every citizen.

The court erred in law by applying res judicata where it acknowledged that there was a material change to policy.

Error of Law: Misapplication of the Constitutional Test for Freedom of Political Communication

The Court erred by applying a heightened standard of review to regulations affecting political communication. The correct test is whether the regulation is reasonably appropriate to serve a legitimate governmental purpose. Instead, the Court introduced a novel requirement of 'objective clarity' and invalidated the 'eyesore' provisions on grounds of vagueness. This constitutes a departure from the DCTs ability to regulate and expands constitutional protection beyond precedent. In fact, it inhibits the DCT to carry out it's core constitutional and statutory functions of administration and infrastructure regulation.

Jurisdictional Error: Improper Invalidation of Administrative Policy

The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the 'eyesore' policy invalid on the basis of subjectivity. The Property Standards Act confers on the DCT express authority to define eviction criteria. Administrative regulations of this character are not subject to judicial invalidation merely for being broad or discretionary. The Court thereby intruded into the legislative and executive jurisdiction.

It effectively elevates political builds into a special category where subjective standards, which are supported by policy, won’t survive review if they are an eyesore. This is a free ticket to build a dirt shack which breaks regulations and then to tie it to a political party to prevent eviction. We now can't regulate any political building for eyesore.

There is a practical necessity for there to have discretion or subjectivity in the application of policy:

1. No statute or regulation can anticipate every possible situation.
2. The eviction policy sets out a set of broad principles which are reviewed by a number of individuals before any adverse action is taken for breaching them.
3. Discretion avoids overregulation and keeps the system manageable. Strict rules would require endless, hyper-specific regulations (e.g. banning each possible eyesore block type or design).
4. It encourages creativity.
5. Applying judgment on a case-by-case basis ensures that unique factors are taken into account.
6. Courts generally recognise that some degree of subjectivity is inevitable and lawful in such delegated powers.
7. The DCT is given broad regulatory power. There must be an expectation that we, as administrators, need to exercise judgment.

Relief Granted Ultra Vires

The Court erred in law by directing the Department to revise its policies to include 'clear, objective, and neutrally applicable standards.' Judicial review permits a court to strike down unlawful provisions, but it does not empower the judiciary to prescribe the content of future regulations. This order exceeds the proper limits of judicial relief and constitutes an impermissible intrusion into executive policymaking.

Courts can quash unlawful provisions, but they cannot draft or compel drafting of executive policy. That is a textbook breach of separation of powers.

In General

The court's role in executive policy making is to interpret policy and process. In this case, they have overstepped in overturning legal, long-standing executive policy and then directing updates to policy.

The reported plots are part of approximately 1000 reports made over the past several months. The court incorrectly ruled that it was targeted.

Aesthetic standards are inherently subjective - zoning, planning, and our heritage laws/policy often use terms like 'in character' or 'reasonable.' These terms cannot reasonably be objective.

The Department has consistently applied its policies with fairness, restraint, and reason. The verdict under appeal does not reflect those same principles. Instead, it creates a precedent that is inconsistent with law and inhibits our ability to regulate.

In Closing

1. Litigant's plots reported.
This was in-line with precedent of quartz and the blitz this term that included 100s of other landowners.

2. Litigant given extensive feedback and time to fix it.
Secretary provided extensive review to the litigants properties and quashed two reports, demonstrating fairness and the absence of bias.

3. Litigant failed to resolve the matter.
Litigant was provided generous extensions beyond normal timeframes without asking for many of them, demonstrating the Department's willingness to have the issue solved by owner.

4. Litigant files case in the courts.
Litigant wins in FCR 78, limiting Departmental power to evict - stripping the department of professional judgement and forcing the department to rewrite its policy to set objective, mechanical standards for all properties associated with politics. An impossible standard to make policy for and to enact.

5. Commonwealth appeals to SCR on points of law
Asks for 10 issues to be reviewed, the errors of law, and to have the FCR 78 verdict set aside.

6. Commonwealth rewrites the eviction policy, expanding on the definitions, but still relies on a level of professional discretion.

7. Commonwealth intends to afford the litigant further time to resolve the issue at hand in prayer for relief.

This verdict cannot stand in-part or in full. The Court must restore the Department’s ability to enforce its clarified, neutral, and longstanding policies without interference.

 

[Franciscus]

The DCT, however, has held the position that quartz is a basic material for years, and has applied it as such in many evictions beyond yeetboy. There is material evidence of this rule being applied to primarily all-quartz buildings dating back to October 2020.

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c097-mar-9-2023.16335/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c193-mar-9-2023.16342/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/r023-nov-2-2022.14876/

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/c-083-evict-9-nov-2020.1845/

And similarly, there is application of this policy applying in similar circumstances to yeetboy in over 300 cases in 5.5 years.

DemocracyCraft

www.democracycraft.net

Objection

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION — BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Your Honor:

Under Rule 1.7, “No new evidence or witness testimony may be submitted during an appellate trial”. Very narrow exceptions apply and, whenever one applies, the rule notes that “[t]he evidence or proposal for a new witness should be included in the movant's initial brief”. As such, no new evidence is permitted in the closing brief from the appellant.

I raise this because I am unable to find both the dynamic search query included above and the list of evictions linked within any exhibit in the original trial. If xEndeavour is attempting to introduce new evidence, it would be both against Court rules also after the appellee would be able to respond to it in their sole brief. At this juncture, introducing new evidence would be unduly prejudicial.

If these links and queries were included as evidence in the initial trial, I would ask that xEndeavour provide the exact exhibit number in a response to this objection—I cannot find it myself. If he can’t provide this, then the Court should strike the quoted portion as breaching procedure for failure to adhere to rule 1.7.