Lawsuit: Pending Inknet v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 86

[Muggy21]

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


Inknet [Represented by the Redmont Civil Liberties Union]
Plaintiff

v.

The Commonwealth of Redmont
Respondent

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Respondent as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF

On August 11th, 2025 at 11:50pm EST, a prosecutor of the Commonwealth filed an academic criminal complaint against the Plaintiff. This case filing was devoid of constitutionally mandated component, thus violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Constitution. The Commonwealth did retract its criminal prosecution, stating due to “a
a reconsideration of the actual evidence gathered by the DOJ, the Commonwealth no longer wishes to pursue criminal action.” This retraction is wholly insufficient, and has caused actual monetary damages.

I. PARTIES
Inknet (Plaintiff)
The Commonwealth of Redmont (Respondent)

II. FACTS

1. On August 11th, 2025 at 23:50 EST, the Commonwealth initiated a prosecution against Plaintiff on a single charge of “Conspiracy of Exploitation of New Players” (Commonwealth v. Inknet [2025] DCR 59).
2. On August 13th, 2025 at 10:29 EST, the Honourable AmityBlamity summoned the defendant, with the Plaintiff’s appearance being made on August 14th, 2025 at 1:25pm by his learned counsel, Multiman155.
3. On August 15th, 2025, at 19:52 EST, the Solicitor General Sir_Dogeington filed a motion to nolle prosequi. This is less than 72 hours after the initial criminal complaint.
4. The Plaintiff pleaded not guilty and is presumed innocent.
5. Conspiracy to Commit a Crime is defined as a person who “intends to commit a crime.”
6. The Complaint in the underlying prosecution states “Since the Defendant never made an attempt to say that the demand was a joke, nor did it have any indication of humour, Inknet’s statement can only be interpreted as a real request” and that “Inknet has surpassed the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.”
7. The Complaint relies on the Commonwealth’s magical ability to dictate and perfectly categorize the speech of its citizens. (The Commonwealth does not have such ability nor authority). Under said reliance, the Commonwealth attempted to indict a citizen for Conspiracy using a self-certified definition of intent.
8. Self-certification is akin to definition by fiat, which is arbitrary in nature; The Government can’t act arbitrarily, see (MrFluffy2U94 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 58)

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. CRIMINAL CODE ACT Part 9 (22) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
   1. As previously proffered, the Commonwealth may not act arbitrarily in the exercise of its discretionary powers, under which prosecutions fall.
   2. For the purposes of the offending CCA section, the Courts generally accept “intent” in part to be “a clear intention” (Dimitre977 v. kesballo [2025] FCR 6)
   3. A clear intention is the conscious objective that motivates an act, reflecting a mental state that distinguishes deliberate conduct from arbitrary behavior. The term “clear” is operative, as it implies that the reasoning behind the action is plain and readily discernible.
   4. For purposes of prosecution, intent is assessed independently of the forum in which the conduct manifests; whether the underlying act occurs through physical theft, harassment in general chat, or robbery, the prosecutable intent remains defined by the actor’s conscious objective rather than the medium of its expression.
   5. For the underlying prosecution, the Commonwealth alleges that the failure to specify intent on the part of the Plaintiff is in itself proof of malicious intent. This is nonsensical. The absence of a stated intent cannot, by operation of logic or law, be transmuted into evidence of a culpable intent. (see Plaintiff’s Fact 6)
   6. For the Commonwealth to sustain intent for written speech, it must presume to read the citizen’s mind, a practice that is arbitrary and constitutionally impermissible.
   7. This difficulty is unique to written speech, for in other mediums such as robbery or harassment, the intent is evidenced by the surrounding conduct, whereas in text the Commonwealth must invent intent beyond what is plainly expressed.
   8. Therefore, since the Commonwealth must invent intent beyond what is expressed, the underlying statute is unconstitutional on its face, as it violates Const. Part IV § 32 (13), which requires that all citizens be treated equally; equality cannot exist where the government reserves the power to define criminality arbitrarily.
2. THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL ACTION WAS FRIVILOUS
   1. Frivolity is defined as “lodging a legal case that has no serious purpose or value.” A prosecution is frivolous where it is initiated without a reasonable factual basis or legal foundation
   2. On admission of the Solicitor General, the Commonwealth had reviewed the “actual evidence” and determined that the prosecution will drop charges.
   3. At the time of submitting the action, the Commonwealth had to assert that its prosecution was with merit; to do otherwise would make the case academic, see my prior analysis (Commonwealth v. Inknet [2025] DCR 59)
   4. Accordingly, the action was frivolous from inception. The Commonwealth’s failure to conduct even minimal review before filing caused the Plaintiff to suffer actual monetary damages in the form of legal fees.
   5. Given this frivolity, the Criminal Code Act Part III (4) - Frivolous Court Case, fully applies. The Commonwealth filed a legal case void of any reasonable serious purpose or value. The Commonwealth’s criminality avails the Plaintiff to collect an award based on CCA Part 1 (6) - Legal Principles.
3. STANDING
   1. The Plaintiff incurred legal fees in his defense of the frivolous claim against him, which is an application of law by the Commonwealth.
   2. The Legal Damages Act, as noted in § (3)(1), applies in criminal actions, insofar that only Legal Fees are permitted.
   3. Facing prosecution, frivolously or otherwise, entitles the Respondent to an award.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Respondent:

1. A monetary judgment of no less than $6,000, as permitted under the Legal Damages Act § 9 (c), for legal fees.
2. As a constituent power of this Honourable Court, a declaratory judgment that settles the question of the constitutionality of the Criminal Code Act Part 9 (22). Plaintiff asserts that this provision is unconstitutional.
3. A monetary judgement under any other theory of damage, be it compensatory, punitive, consequential, liquidated, or in the alternative, nominal damages.

Witnesses:
None.

Evidence:
Lawsuit: Dismissed - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Inknet [2025] DCR 59


By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.


DATED: This 17th day of August, 2025.

 

[Muggy21]

 

[Muggy21]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff petitions for the immediate enjoinment of prosecutions for CRIMINAL CODE ACT Part 9 (22) - Conspiracy.

As contended in Plantiff's complaint, the likelihood that this statute is unconstitutional is significant; Further, if ongoing prosecutions or new prosecutions are filed under this statute, Plaintiff worries that additional citizen's may be subjected to unlawful government overreach.

 

[ko531]

Writ of Summons

@juniperfig is required to appear before the Federal Court in the case of Inknet v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 86

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

[ko531]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff petitions for the immediate enjoinment of prosecutions for CRIMINAL CODE ACT Part 9 (22) - Conspiracy.

As contended in Plantiff's complaint, the likelihood that this statute is unconstitutional is significant; Further, if ongoing prosecutions or new prosecutions are filed under this statute, Plaintiff worries that additional citizen's may be subjected to unlawful government overreach.

A Modified Emergency Injunction will be granted.

All Conspiracy prosecutions based only on statements made by the defendant will be enjoined. Any Conspiracy prosecution with additional evidence besides statements by the defendant will be allowed.

 

[juniperfig]

Commonwealth is present, your honour.

 

[ko531]

Commonwealth has 48 hours to provide an answer to complaint

 

[juniperfig]

Answer to Complaint

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Inknet
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. Affirm that on August 11th, 2025 at 23:50 EST, the Commonwealth initiated a prosecution against Plaintiff on a single charge of “Conspiracy of Exploitation of New Players” (Commonwealth v. Inknet [2025] DCR 59).
2. Affirm that on August 13th, 2025 at 10:29 EST, the Honourable AmityBlamity summoned the defendant, with the Plaintiff’s appearance being made on August 14th, 2025 at 1:25pm by his learned counsel, Multiman155.
3. Affirm that on August 15th, 2025, at 19:52 EST, the Solicitor General Sir_Dogeington filed a motion to nolle prosequi. Deny that it was less than 72 hours after the initial complaint: it was 92 hours and 2 minutes after the initial criminal complaint (D-001).
4. Affirm that the Plaintiff pleaded not guilty and is presumed innocent.
5. Deny that Conspiracy to Commit a Crime is defined as a person who “intends to commit a crime.” It is defined as the following: "A person commits an offence if the person: (a) intends to commit a crime, even if it has not yet been carried out."
6. Affirm that the Complaint in the underlying prosecution states “Since the Defendant never made an attempt to say that the demand was a joke, nor did it have any indication of humour, Inknet’s statement can only be interpreted as a real request” and that “Inknet has surpassed the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.”
7. Deny that the Complaint relies on the Commonwealth’s magical ability to dictate and perfectly categorize the speech of its citizens. (The Commonwealth does not have such ability nor authority). Under said reliance, the Commonwealth attempted to indict a citizen for Conspiracy using a self-certified definition of intent. This claim is not a fact, but a legal argument, and is addressed below.
8. Deny that self-certification is akin to definition by fiat, which is arbitrary in nature, and that the Government can't act arbitrarily. This claim is not a fact, but a legal argument, and is addressed below.

II. DEFENCES

Regarding 1. Criminal Code Act Part 9 (22) is Unconstitutional:​

Plaintiff relies on a misinterpretation of precedent and statute.

Plaintiff asserts that the Commonwealth “may not act arbitrarily,” but the case they cite does not establish such a rule. Judge Ko531’s opinion stated that "Unfair discrimination is the exclusion or limitation to the same opportunies as others based on arbitraty [sic] reasons"; it did not create a free-standing constitutional prohibition against arbitrariness. Filing charges pursuant to the law as written is not arbitrary; it is application of the law. Alleging intent based on speech acts is a core judicial function. Established Redmont law (see the I Admit Act) provides that speech may be taken at face value absent contrary evidence. Plaintiff fails to show that this framework is unconstitutional.

The cited verdict in Dimitre977 v. kesballo [2025] FCR 6 concerns intent in the context of contracts, not criminal law. It’s not even words from the Judicial Officer. The Honourable and Learned Matthew100x was quoting the Contracts Act. The relevant language was: “Parties must demonstrate a clear intention to create legal obligations for the contract to be valid” (Contracts Act 4.e) Plaintiff selectively quoted words, which were not even the Court’s own, without context. This precedent does not bind or apply to criminal prosecutions.

Plaintiff’s argument that the Commonwealth was “reading minds” to prove intent is a mischaracterization of the prosecution’s filing. The charge was based on the Defendant’s own written statement in chat — “Metalicus if you hate ngs do /pay Inknet 1200” — directed at a player with less than 40 minutes of playtime. In criminal law, mens rea is almost always inferred from circumstances, statements, and conduct. Courts do not require an explicit declaration of intent (“I intend to commit a crime”) in order to sustain a prosecution (The Commonwealth of Redmont v. Aveke [2024] FCR 126). Were Plaintiff’s theory correct, nearly every criminal statute would be unenforceable, since intent is often required to convict of crimes (See Commonwealth v. Bardiya King [2023] SCR 23, The Commonwealth of Redmont v. Alexanderlove [2024] FCR 102), and no rational criminal would announce their motives before acting.

Written speech is admissible evidence, not mind-reading. The only defect in the initial filing was a procedural error–the failure to attach the supporting evidence–which was corrected by withdrawing the case. Plaintiff’s attempt to inflate that clerical mistake into a constitutional doctrine is meritless.

As established in the verdict that Plaintiff quoted, as long as actions by the commonwealth apply to all citizens equally, are allowed under the law, and are taken without unfair discrimination, they are not in violation of the 13th right (MrFluffy2U94 v. Commonwealth). All citizens are subject to the same definition of Conspiracy to Commit a Crime. Prosecuting someone for a crime is allowed under the law. Plaintiff was not unfairly discriminated against. Equality is preserved. Plaintiff’s suggestion that words are being defined “by fiat” or “arbitrarily” is unsupported and inconsistent with both precedent and statutory practice.

In short, Plaintiff’s constitutional claim collapses on its misunderstanding of intent. Criminal prosecutions virtually never rely on an explicit admission of motive. The law has always treated intent as a matter to be inferred from words, conduct, and circumstances. Written speech is no different from physical acts in this regard; telling a new player to transfer money is evidence of intent just as surely as taking money from their hand. Plaintiff wrongly assumes that unless a defendant openly declares “my intent is X,” no prosecution may proceed. That is not the law, and has never been the law.

The Commonwealth did not “invent” intent; it applied the same evidentiary reasoning that governs all criminal trials. Plaintiff’s reliance on a misread contracts case to argue otherwise only underscores that his objection is not a constitutional argument but a fundamental misapprehension of how intent functions in criminal law.

Regarding 2. The Underlying Criminal Action was Frivolous:​

The Criminal Code Act defines a frivolous court case as one “lodg[ed] … with no serious purpose or value.” This is an objective standard: the case must be entirely lacking in a legitimate legal foundation or purpose at the time of filing.

Here, the only alleged defect in the Commonwealth’s filing was a clerical error: the failure to attach supporting evidence. A clerical mistake does not negate the underlying legal basis of the prosecution. The charges were valid under the Criminal Code Act Part 9 (22), and the statutory elements of Conspiracy of Exploitation of New Players were properly alleged.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth retained the ability to submit supporting evidence during the discovery phase. The fact that evidence was not attached at the initial filing does not mean the case lacked serious purpose or value; it simply meant the case was procedurally incomplete at that moment. The Solicitor General’s prompt withdrawal corrected this and prevented unnecessary court resources from being spent, demonstrating responsible prosecutorial conduct, not frivolity.

Had the case proceeded, the Commonwealth could have provided evidence to substantiate its allegations. A case cannot be deemed frivolous merely because it initially lacked attachments or exhibits. It was a valid criminal prosecution, affected by an unfortunate oversight. The statutory definition of frivolity is not satisfied.

Regarding Standing:​

Plaintiff argues standing based on alleged legal fees incurred. No evidence of such fees has been provided. Even if fees existed, the Legal Damages Act § 9(2)(c) guarantees recovery in criminal actions only after verdict. No verdict was entered here. Any award of fees would therefore have been discretionary, and none was made.

Plaintiff’s claim of standing is misconceived. He argues that “facing prosecution, frivolously or otherwise, entitles the Respondent to an award.” That is flatly contradicted by the plain text of the Legal Damages Act. Section 9(2)(c) makes clear that in cases that reach a verdict, fees are automatically awarded to the prevailing party. However, in cases that do not reach a verdict — like the matter at hand, which was voluntarily withdrawn before adjudication — fees are awarded only “at the discretion of the presiding judicial officer.” There is no entitlement.

The court in the original criminal action exercised that discretion and awarded no fees. That was an ordinary, lawful outcome under § 9(2)(c). Even if the case proceeded to verdict, Plaintiff was never guaranteed to prevail in that action in the first place. Had the case proceeded to discovery, the Commonwealth could have introduced further evidence to support its claims. Plaintiff cannot bootstrap a speculative assumption of victory into an entitlement to fees.

Plaintiff therefore has no standing to re-litigate the issue here. To treat a discretionary, denied request as a guaranteed entitlement is to ignore the statute’s text. Indeed, § 9(3) confirms that in non-verdict cases there is no minimum, meaning the court is perfectly within its rights to award nothing.

What Plaintiff is attempting here is effectively an appeal without jurisdiction: dissatisfied with the discretionary denial of fees in the underlying case, he is attempting to smuggle that issue into a new cause of action. The Legal Damages Act provides no basis for such a maneuver, and standing cannot be manufactured by relitigating a closed issue under a different name.

III. EVIDENCE

Spoiler: D-001

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

IV. WITNESSES
1. xEndeavour, author of the Criminal Code Act

DATED: This 27th day of August 2025.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

7. The Complaint relies on the Commonwealth’s magical ability to dictate and perfectly categorize the speech of its citizens. (The Commonwealth does not have such ability nor authority). Under said reliance, the Commonwealth attempted to indict a citizen for Conspiracy using a self-certified definition of intent.

This is a legal argument and not a fact. It should be struck and moved to Plaintiff's claims for relief.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

8. Self-certification is akin to definition by fiat, which is arbitrary in nature; The Government can’t act arbitrarily, see (MrFluffy2U94 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 58)

This is a legal argument and not a fact. It should be struck and moved to Plaintiff's claims for relief.

 

[Muggy21]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - Speculation

The Commonwealth responds stating "

Had the case proceeded, the Commonwealth could have provided evidence to substantiate its allegations.

This is purely speculative and has no factual basis, this should be struck.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - Relevance

IV. WITNESSES
1. xEndeavour, author of the Criminal Code Act

The Courts interpret laws, not the authors of said acts. xEndeavour is a citizen with no standing nor relevance in this case and should be disallowed as a witness.

 

[Muggy21]

I do not contest the Commonwealth's objections regarding Plaintiffs Fact 7 and 8.

 

[ko531]

Answer to Complaint

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Inket
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. Affirm that on August 11th, 2025 at 23:50 EST, the Commonwealth initiated a prosecution against Plaintiff on a single charge of “Conspiracy of Exploitation of New Players” (Commonwealth v. Inknet [2025] DCR 59).
2. Affirm that on August 13th, 2025 at 10:29 EST, the Honourable AmityBlamity summoned the defendant, with the Plaintiff’s appearance being made on August 14th, 2025 at 1:25pm by his learned counsel, Multiman155.
3. Affirm that on August 15th, 2025, at 19:52 EST, the Solicitor General Sir_Dogeington filed a motion to nolle prosequi. Deny that it was less than 72 hours after the initial complaint: it was 92 hours and 2 minutes after the initial criminal complaint (D-001).
4. Affirm that the Plaintiff pleaded not guilty and is presumed innocent.
5. Deny that Conspiracy to Commit a Crime is defined as a person who “intends to commit a crime.” It is defined as the following: "A person commits an offence if the person: (a) intends to commit a crime, even if it has not yet been carried out."
6. Affirm that the Complaint in the underlying prosecution states “Since the Defendant never made an attempt to say that the demand was a joke, nor did it have any indication of humour, Inknet’s statement can only be interpreted as a real request” and that “Inknet has surpassed the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.”
7. Deny that the Complaint relies on the Commonwealth’s magical ability to dictate and perfectly categorize the speech of its citizens. (The Commonwealth does not have such ability nor authority). Under said reliance, the Commonwealth attempted to indict a citizen for Conspiracy using a self-certified definition of intent. This claim is not a fact, but a legal argument, and is addressed below.
8. Deny that self-certification is akin to definition by fiat, which is arbitrary in nature, and that the Government can't act arbitrarily. This claim is not a fact, but a legal argument, and is addressed below.

II. DEFENCES

Regarding 1. Criminal Code Act Part 9 (22) is Unconstitutional:​

Plaintiff relies on a misinterpretation of precedent and statute.

Plaintiff asserts that the Commonwealth “may not act arbitrarily,” but the case they cite does not establish such a rule. Judge Ko531’s opinion stated that "Unfair discrimination is the exclusion or limitation to the same opportunies as others based on arbitraty [sic] reasons"; it did not create a free-standing constitutional prohibition against arbitrariness. Filing charges pursuant to the law as written is not arbitrary; it is application of the law. Alleging intent based on speech acts is a core judicial function. Established Redmont law (see the I Admit Act) provides that speech may be taken at face value absent contrary evidence. Plaintiff fails to show that this framework is unconstitutional.

The cited verdict in Dimitre977 v. kesballo [2025] FCR 6 concerns intent in the context of contracts, not criminal law. It’s not even words from the Judicial Officer. The Honourable and Learned Matthew100x was quoting the Contracts Act. The relevant language was: “Parties must demonstrate a clear intention to create legal obligations for the contract to be valid” (Contracts Act 4.e) Plaintiff selectively quoted words, which were not even the Court’s own, without context. This precedent does not bind or apply to criminal prosecutions.

Plaintiff’s argument that the Commonwealth was “reading minds” to prove intent is a mischaracterization of the prosecution’s filing. The charge was based on the Defendant’s own written statement in chat — “Metalicus if you hate ngs do /pay Inknet 1200” — directed at a player with less than 40 minutes of playtime. In criminal law, mens rea is almost always inferred from circumstances, statements, and conduct. Courts do not require an explicit declaration of intent (“I intend to commit a crime”) in order to sustain a prosecution (The Commonwealth of Redmont v. Aveke [2024] FCR 126). Were Plaintiff’s theory correct, nearly every criminal statute would be unenforceable, since intent is often required to convict of crimes (See Commonwealth v. Bardiya King [2023] SCR 23, The Commonwealth of Redmont v. Alexanderlove [2024] FCR 102), and no rational criminal would announce their motives before acting.

Written speech is admissible evidence, not mind-reading. The only defect in the initial filing was a procedural error–the failure to attach the supporting evidence–which was corrected by withdrawing the case. Plaintiff’s attempt to inflate that clerical mistake into a constitutional doctrine is meritless.

As established in the verdict that Plaintiff quoted, as long as actions by the commonwealth apply to all citizens equally, are allowed under the law, and are taken without unfair discrimination, they are not in violation of the 13th right (MrFluffy2U94 v. Commonwealth). All citizens are subject to the same definition of Conspiracy to Commit a Crime. Prosecuting someone for a crime is allowed under the law. Plaintiff was not unfairly discriminated against. Equality is preserved. Plaintiff’s suggestion that words are being defined “by fiat” or “arbitrarily” is unsupported and inconsistent with both precedent and statutory practice.

In short, Plaintiff’s constitutional claim collapses on its misunderstanding of intent. Criminal prosecutions virtually never rely on an explicit admission of motive. The law has always treated intent as a matter to be inferred from words, conduct, and circumstances. Written speech is no different from physical acts in this regard; telling a new player to transfer money is evidence of intent just as surely as taking money from their hand. Plaintiff wrongly assumes that unless a defendant openly declares “my intent is X,” no prosecution may proceed. That is not the law, and has never been the law.

The Commonwealth did not “invent” intent; it applied the same evidentiary reasoning that governs all criminal trials. Plaintiff’s reliance on a misread contracts case to argue otherwise only underscores that his objection is not a constitutional argument but a fundamental misapprehension of how intent functions in criminal law.

Regarding 2. The Underlying Criminal Action was Frivolous:​

The Criminal Code Act defines a frivolous court case as one “lodg[ed] … with no serious purpose or value.” This is an objective standard: the case must be entirely lacking in a legitimate legal foundation or purpose at the time of filing.

Here, the only alleged defect in the Commonwealth’s filing was a clerical error: the failure to attach supporting evidence. A clerical mistake does not negate the underlying legal basis of the prosecution. The charges were valid under the Criminal Code Act Part 9 (22), and the statutory elements of Conspiracy of Exploitation of New Players were properly alleged.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth retained the ability to submit supporting evidence during the discovery phase. The fact that evidence was not attached at the initial filing does not mean the case lacked serious purpose or value; it simply meant the case was procedurally incomplete at that moment. The Solicitor General’s prompt withdrawal corrected this and prevented unnecessary court resources from being spent, demonstrating responsible prosecutorial conduct, not frivolity.

Had the case proceeded, the Commonwealth could have provided evidence to substantiate its allegations. A case cannot be deemed frivolous merely because it initially lacked attachments or exhibits. It was a valid criminal prosecution, affected by an unfortunate oversight. The statutory definition of frivolity is not satisfied.

Regarding Standing:​

Plaintiff argues standing based on alleged legal fees incurred. No evidence of such fees has been provided. Even if fees existed, the Legal Damages Act § 9(2)(c) guarantees recovery in criminal actions only after verdict. No verdict was entered here. Any award of fees would therefore have been discretionary, and none was made.

Plaintiff’s claim of standing is misconceived. He argues that “facing prosecution, frivolously or otherwise, entitles the Respondent to an award.” That is flatly contradicted by the plain text of the Legal Damages Act. Section 9(2)(c) makes clear that in cases that reach a verdict, fees are automatically awarded to the prevailing party. However, in cases that do not reach a verdict — like the matter at hand, which was voluntarily withdrawn before adjudication — fees are awarded only “at the discretion of the presiding judicial officer.” There is no entitlement.

The court in the original criminal action exercised that discretion and awarded no fees. That was an ordinary, lawful outcome under § 9(2)(c). Even if the case proceeded to verdict, Plaintiff was never guaranteed to prevail in that action in the first place. Had the case proceeded to discovery, the Commonwealth could have introduced further evidence to support its claims. Plaintiff cannot bootstrap a speculative assumption of victory into an entitlement to fees.

Plaintiff therefore has no standing to re-litigate the issue here. To treat a discretionary, denied request as a guaranteed entitlement is to ignore the statute’s text. Indeed, § 9(3) confirms that in non-verdict cases there is no minimum, meaning the court is perfectly within its rights to award nothing.

What Plaintiff is attempting here is effectively an appeal without jurisdiction: dissatisfied with the discretionary denial of fees in the underlying case, he is attempting to smuggle that issue into a new cause of action. The Legal Damages Act provides no basis for such a maneuver, and standing cannot be manufactured by relitigating a closed issue under a different name.

III. EVIDENCE

Spoiler: D-001

View attachment 60801

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

IV. WITNESSES
1. xEndeavour, author of the Criminal Code Act

DATED: This 27th day of August 2025.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

This is a legal argument and not a fact. It should be struck and moved to Plaintiff's claims for relief.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

This is a legal argument and not a fact. It should be struck and moved to Plaintiff's claims for relief.

OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE
Sustained. Fact will be struck

OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE
Sustained. Fact will be struck

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - Speculation

The Commonwealth responds stating "


This is purely speculative and has no factual basis, this should be struck.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - Relevance


The Courts interpret laws, not the authors of said acts. xEndeavour is a citizen with no standing nor relevance in this case and should be disallowed as a witness.

OBJECTION - SPECULATION
Overruled. The commonwealth would know how the commonwealth would have acted.

OBJECTION - RELEVANCE
Sustained. Witness will be disallowed.

 

[ko531]

We will now be entering discovery. Discovery will last 5 days starting now.

 

[juniperfig]

Hello

I will be amending my Answer to Complaint.

Old:
Inket
Plaintiff

New:
Inknet
Plaintiff

 

[ko531]

Hello

I will be amending my Answer to Complaint.

Old:
Inket
Plaintiff

New:
Inknet
Plaintiff

In the future, you should motion for amendments but this will be granted as it is minor

 

[Muggy21]

Witness List:
1)pricelessAgrari (DoJ Prosecutor who filed case)
2) Sir_Dogeington (Solicitor General)
3) RBI Investigator Steve (this person is unknown to Plaintiff, if there was an investigator assigned to this case, Plaintiff requests the name of this Investigator)

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO COMPEL

Your Honour, as per Rule 4.7 of the Court Rules and Procedures, Plaintiffs move to obtain the following information from Defendant.

Names

1) The name of the RBI Investigator, if one was assigned, who handled any investigations into the underlying District Court case. If this person exists, Plaintiff requests he be added to the Witness List.


Documents

2) A copy of the DoJ Employee Handbook, if not the one publicly accessible at DoJ 2023 Policies.
3) All communications in the possession of the DoJ for the following:

1. Authorization from the Attorney General or Solicitor General, or whomever is considering management at the DoJ, to file the underlying action ([2025] DCR 59)
2. Any communications between any individual at the DoJ in the furtherance of the District Court filing.
3. Any internal guidance for Prosecutors regarding Criminal Code Act Part 9 (22) prosecutions.
4. Any internal communications concerning the Solicitor General’s decision to enter a nolle prosequi
5. Any earlier versions of the Complaint, that reflect revisions or edits made prior to filing. If this isn't maintained, a copy of the filing that was approved by the DoJ.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Purpose: Clarification. Plaintiff was attempting to make a doctrinal argument rather than attempting to apply contract law in a criminal setting. Inclusion of contract law in Plaintiff's complaint was intentional, but Plaintiff did not intend to purport that said law was controlling here.

Under Claims for Relief, CCA Part 9 is Unconstitutional, Plaintiff requests to amend his complaint as follows

+ (1a) In both civil and criminal law, the existence of intent is measured against the burden of proof. Civil law, which is primarily concerned with equity between parties, operates on a preponderance standard. Criminal law, by contrast, operates on the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
+(1b) In Civil law, the Courts generally accept “intent” in part to be “a clear intention” (Dimitre977 v. kesballo [2025] FCR 6). Since criminal law is held to a higher standard, criminal intent, mens rea, must be at minimum be held to the same or greater standard. To do otherwise would invert the hierarchy of standards guaranteed by due process.

 

[Muggy21]

P-002

P-003

P-004

P-002, P-003, P-004 is for impeachment (asking questions of the witnesses);

 

[asexualdinosaur]

OBJECTION - RELEVANCE
Sustained. Witness will be disallowed.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Gnomewhisperper & Gnomecorp v. Commonwealth

In a similar situation where Endeavour was also called to elaborate on the intent of the Act set forth, we as that they are allowed to provide their input on the intent of the law as it was written - A request you yourself had allowed. If your honor has changed their position on allowing authors to speak on their bills, the Commonwealth would ask they elaborate more on this thought process.

As End was the sole stated author of this Act, it is certainly within their capability to explain their intent behind the use of these sections. [Criminal Code Act - Authorship]

Additionally End has been called in the past to speak on the intent of their writings for bills as in the case of Ko531 v. Commonwealth

As such we ask that your honor reconsider their position and allow Endeavour to be called as a witness.

 

[Muggy21]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Gnomewhisperper & Gnomecorp v. Commonwealth

In a similar situation where Endeavour was also called to elaborate on the intent of the Act set forth, we as that they are allowed to provide their input on the intent of the law as it was written - A request you yourself had allowed. If your honor has changed their position on allowing authors to speak on their bills, the Commonwealth would ask they elaborate more on this thought process.

As End was the sole stated author of this Act, it is certainly within their capability to explain their intent behind the use of these sections. [Criminal Code Act - Authorship]

Additionally End has been called in the past to speak on the intent of their writings for bills as in the case of Ko531 v. Commonwealth

As such we ask that your honor reconsider their position and allow Endeavour to be called as a witness.

May I respond?

 

[asexualdinosaur]

Witness List:
1)pricelessAgrari (DoJ Prosecutor who filed case)
2) Sir_Dogeington (Solicitor General)
3) RBI Investigator Steve (this person is unknown to Plaintiff, if there was an investigator assigned to this case, Plaintiff requests the name of this Investigator)

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO COMPEL

Your Honour, as per Rule 4.7 of the Court Rules and Procedures, Plaintiffs move to obtain the following information from Defendant.

Names

1) The name of the RBI Investigator, if one was assigned, who handled any investigations into the underlying District Court case. If this person exists, Plaintiff requests he be added to the Witness List.


Documents

2) A copy of the DoJ Employee Handbook, if not the one publicly accessible at DoJ 2023 Policies.
3) All communications in the possession of the DoJ for the following:

1. Authorization from the Attorney General or Solicitor General, or whomever is considering management at the DoJ, to file the underlying action ([2025] DCR 59)
2. Any communications between any individual at the DoJ in the furtherance of the District Court filing.
3. Any internal guidance for Prosecutors regarding Criminal Code Act Part 9 (22) prosecutions.
4. Any internal communications concerning the Solicitor General’s decision to enter a nolle prosequi
5. Any earlier versions of the Complaint, that reflect revisions or edits made prior to filing. If this isn't maintained, a copy of the filing that was approved by the DoJ.

1. The investigator for this case was pricelessAgrari
2. That is the current handbook to my knowledge

3. The Commonwealth requests a 48 hour extension to discovery to gather and provide this information where applicable.

 

[Muggy21]

Plaintiff does not object to the extension of discovery. If I'm not mistaken, this should take us to Saturday Sept 6th @ 2:39PM EST.

 

[asexualdinosaur]

P-002 View attachment 61152




P-003
View attachment 61153

P-004
View attachment 61154

P-002, P-003, P-004 is for impeachment (asking questions of the witnesses);

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - RELEVANCE

It’s unclear how the uncontextualized comments of seemingly random people or groups of people is relevant to the case- While the plaintiff said “is for impeachment (asking questions of the witnesses)”, none of the listed people outside of Sir_Dogeington (P-003) have been called as a witness.

It’s even more unclear how P-002 is relevant at all given it contains no comments from anyone, just a picture of random people in a voice chat.

 

[Muggy21]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - RELEVANCE

It’s unclear how the uncontextualized comments of seemingly random people or groups of people is relevant to the case- While the plaintiff said “is for impeachment (asking questions of the witnesses)”, none of the listed people outside of Sir_Dogeington (P-003) have been called as a witness.

It’s even more unclear how P-002 is relevant at all given it contains no comments from anyone, just a picture of random people in a voice chat.

The Commonwealth's objection misunderstands the purpose of P-002, P-003, and P-004. These exhibits are not offered as substantive evidence in this case, but solely to impeach the witness's credibility.
For example,

P-002 shows Justice Ko and (then) AG Juniper talking about fixing cases, or may its something else entirely.
P-003 and P-004 shows other circumstances that I'd like the witnesses to remark on. Again, I'd like to impeach their credibility.

Since the Commonwealth can ascertain intent from an utterance of single line, I'd like the Commonwealth's prosecutors to do the same with my examples.

 

[asexualdinosaur]

Motion

3) All communications in the possession of the DoJ for the following:

1. Authorization from the Attorney General or Solicitor General, or whomever is considering management at the DoJ, to file the underlying action ([2025] DCR 59)
2. Any communications between any individual at the DoJ in the furtherance of the District Court filing.
3. Any internal guidance for Prosecutors regarding Criminal Code Act Part 9 (22) prosecutions.
4. Any internal communications concerning the Solicitor General’s decision to enter a nolle prosequi
5. Any earlier versions of the Complaint, that reflect revisions or edits made prior to filing. If this isn't maintained, a copy of the filing that was approved by the DoJ.

1. Authorization came from the Acting Attorney General at the time 'Dearev'
2. Objection Filed, see below.
3. There is no official documentation or policy concerning this segment of law.
4. Objection Filed, see below - Public information offered. Lawsuit: Dismissed - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Inknet [2025] DCR 59
5. Objection Filed, see below - Public information offered. Lawsuit: Dismissed - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Inknet [2025] DCR 59
   
   

   Objection

   
   IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
   OBJECTION - PRIVILEGE
   
   In addition to the information requested being classified the Commonwealth suggests that the release of this information would potentially hinder an active case and/or investigation against the Plaintiff in this case.
   
   As the case was dismissed without prejudice and the outcome of this case has not yet been resolved, it’s possible that the release of this information would hinder future investigation or prosecution in which Counsel may find themselves defending the plaintiff.
   
   The Commonwealth seeks to apply this objection on points 2, 4, & 5- though on points 4 & 5 we do offer the public information that was released in the case.
   
   

 

[Muggy21]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - Breach of Procedure

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - PRIVILEGE

In addition to the information requested being classified the Commonwealth suggests that the release of this information would potentially hinder an active case and/or investigation against the Plaintiff in this case.

As the case was dismissed without prejudice and the outcome of this case has not yet been resolved, it’s possible that the release of this information would hinder future investigation or prosecution in which Counsel may find themselves defending the plaintiff.

The Commonwealth seeks to apply this objection on points 2, 4, & 5- though on points 4 & 5 we do offer the public information that was released in the case.

Plaintiff's motion was not an objection. Responses to motions must be requested and are not automatic.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - Nonresponsive

1. Authorization came from the Acting Attorney General at the time 'Dearev'

Plaintiff requested communications, not the Attorney General's interpretation. Plaintiff wants a screenshot or log of what Dearev said.

Your Honour,

Plaintiff requests a side-bar to discuss the classified documents argument that the Commonwealth is raising.