Lawsuit: In Session Yeet_Boy v. Town of Oakridge and Commonwealth of Redmont [2026] SCR 13

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Case Filing


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


Yeet_Boy (Helix Law Group representing)
Plaintiff

v.

Town of Oakridge and Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

The Defendants have improperly disqualified the Plaintiff from the May 2026 Oakridge Mayor election.

STATEMENT ON COURT JURISDICTION
Because this case disputes an election, it belongs in the Court of Disputed Returns, which according to the Redmontian Constitution, Part II, Section 20, Subsection 1, is the Supreme Court.

STATEMENT ON JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS
Because we allege the Oakridge Constitution illegally disqualifies Yeet_Boy from this election, the Town of Oakridge is a Defendant as the Town established this law.

Because we allege the Department of State failed to uphold the Redmontian Constitution over the Oakridge Constitution and illegally carried out the disqualification of Yeet_Boy from this election, the Commonwealth of Redmont is a Defendant.

I. PARTIES
1. Yeet_Boy (Plaintiff)
2. Town of Oakridge (Co-Defendant)
3. Commonwealth of Redmont (Co-Defendant)

II. FACTS
Note: All times are Central Time as that is my time zone.

1. On May 15, 2026 at 4:00pm, the Department of State opened declarations for the May 2026 Oakridge Mayor elections [Exhibit P-001].
2. On May 15, 2026 at 6:16pm, Yeet_Boy declared his candidacy for Mayor of Oakridge [Exhibit P-001].
3. On May 18, 2026 at 4:01pm, the Department of State announced the end of the declaration period and declared Yeet_Boy was disqualified for the following reason: “Candidate has served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms” [Exhibit P-001]
4. While the Oakridge Constitution states that one of the requirements to run for Mayor is “Has not served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms,” (Act of Council - New Constitution Act), the Redmontian Constitution states:

  • “The Town Constitution and all Town bylaws must be consistent with this Constitution and federal law.” (Part IV, Section 32, Subsection 3 – emphasis added)
  • “Town elections shall be free and fair, facilitated by Federal departments as provided by law. Towns may set reasonable candidacy and voting requirements consistent with Commonwealth law.” (Part IV, Section 33 – emphasis added)
  • All citizens have the “right to participate in, and run for elected office, unless as punishment for a crime.” (Part V, Section 35, Subsection 1)
  • “Every citizen is equal before and under the law” (Part V, Section 35, Subsection 13)
5. Oakridge is part of the Commonwealth of Redmont (common knowledge).
6. Yeet_Boy is a citizen of Redmont (common knowledge).

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. The Redmontian Constitution does not allow the disqualification of Mayoral candidates based on political history.
2. The Department of State failed to uphold the Redmontian Constitution in its disqualification of Yeet_Boy.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks the following from Co-Defendant Town of Oakridge:
1. The New Constitution Act be struck as unconstitutional under the Redmontian Constitution
2. $12,000 in Legal Fees payable to the business HelixLaw or the player Dartanboy.

The Plaintiff seeks the following from Co-Defendant Commonwealth of Redmont:
1. The May 2026 Oakridge Mayoral Election be annulled and rerun
2. If the election cannot be annulled: $50,000 for Loss of Enjoyment (precedent: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Snowy_Heart v Commonwealth [2023] FCR 76)
3. A public apology letter from the Department of State in #government-announcements for failing to uphold the Constitution (precedent: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Snowy_Heart v Commonwealth [2023] FCR 76)
4. $15,000 in Legal Fees payable to the business HelixLaw or the player Dartanboy.

EVIDENCE
Election - Mayor Election - MAY 2026

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 4th day of June 2026.



Consent to Represent:
1780614048698.png
 

Writ of Summons


@Superwoops and @Sofia2750 are required to appear before the Supreme Court in the case of Yeet_Boy v. Town of Oakridge and Commonwealth of Redmont [2026] SCR 13.

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.


Further, I shall be the presiding officer in this case.
 
The Commonwealth is present.

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO STAY COMMONWEALTH LIABILITY

The Commonwealth respectfully notifies the Court of the approved appeal In re [2026] FCR 20 | [2026] SCR 12 and moves that a limited stay of the claims for damages, a public apology, and legal fees against the Commonwealth in this proceeding be granted.

SCR 12 presents a question of law directly relevant to the claims asserted against the Commonwealth in this case. The Commonwealth has appeal the Federal Court's ruling that the Department of State may incur civil liability where it faithfully applies enacted law that is later held unconstitutional. In this case, the Plaintiff similarly alleges that the Department of State should be held liable because it applied enacted candidacy restrictions and disqualified the Plaintiff from an election.

The validity of Oakridge's local candidacy restriction may continue without deciding whether the Commonwealth incurs damages for administering the enacted law. A limited stay would not prevent the Court from deciding whether the Oakridge law is constitutional.

Therefore, the Commonwealth requests the following:

  • Stay the Plaintiff's requests for damages against the Commonwealth until SCR 12 is resolved;
  • Permit the constitutional claim against the Town of Oakridge to proceed.
  • Additionally, the Commonwealth requests that the Court expedites SCR 12 so liability can be determined here.

Thank you,
Ameslap

 
  • Wow
Reactions: MJL
ameslap said:
The Commonwealth is present.

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO STAY COMMONWEALTH LIABILITY

The Commonwealth respectfully notifies the Court of the approved appeal In re [2026] FCR 20 | [2026] SCR 12 and moves that a limited stay of the claims for damages, a public apology, and legal fees against the Commonwealth in this proceeding be granted.

SCR 12 presents a question of law directly relevant to the claims asserted against the Commonwealth in this case. The Commonwealth has appeal the Federal Court's ruling that the Department of State may incur civil liability where it faithfully applies enacted law that is later held unconstitutional. In this case, the Plaintiff similarly alleges that the Department of State should be held liable because it applied enacted candidacy restrictions and disqualified the Plaintiff from an election.

The validity of Oakridge's local candidacy restriction may continue without deciding whether the Commonwealth incurs damages for administering the enacted law. A limited stay would not prevent the Court from deciding whether the Oakridge law is constitutional.

Therefore, the Commonwealth requests the following:

  • Stay the Plaintiff's requests for damages against the Commonwealth until SCR 12 is resolved;
  • Permit the constitutional claim against the Town of Oakridge to proceed.
  • Additionally, the Commonwealth requests that the Court expedites SCR 12 so liability can be determined here.

Thank you,
Ameslap

Click to expand...
May the Plaintiff respond, your honors?
 
ameslap said:
The Commonwealth is present.

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO STAY COMMONWEALTH LIABILITY

The Commonwealth respectfully notifies the Court of the approved appeal In re [2026] FCR 20 | [2026] SCR 12 and moves that a limited stay of the claims for damages, a public apology, and legal fees against the Commonwealth in this proceeding be granted.

SCR 12 presents a question of law directly relevant to the claims asserted against the Commonwealth in this case. The Commonwealth has appeal the Federal Court's ruling that the Department of State may incur civil liability where it faithfully applies enacted law that is later held unconstitutional. In this case, the Plaintiff similarly alleges that the Department of State should be held liable because it applied enacted candidacy restrictions and disqualified the Plaintiff from an election.

The validity of Oakridge's local candidacy restriction may continue without deciding whether the Commonwealth incurs damages for administering the enacted law. A limited stay would not prevent the Court from deciding whether the Oakridge law is constitutional.

Therefore, the Commonwealth requests the following:

  • Stay the Plaintiff's requests for damages against the Commonwealth until SCR 12 is resolved;
  • Permit the constitutional claim against the Town of Oakridge to proceed.
  • Additionally, the Commonwealth requests that the Court expedites SCR 12 so liability can be determined here.

Thank you,
Ameslap

Click to expand...

Response


This case is fundamentally different than [2026] FCR 20, as in FCR 20, the legislating body which created the statute which was later declared unconstitutional was the Congress. In this case, however, the legislating body is the Oakridge Town Council.

The Department of State - and in fact the entire Executive Branch - is subservient to the power of Congress, as the Congress is granted Legislative power by the Redmontian Constitution (Part I, Section 1). As such, until otherwise determined by a body with Judicial power (the courts), the Department of State is required to execute the properly-ratified, Congress-passed, statutory law as written (" The Executive branch ... administers and enforces the law ... as written by the legislature ..." [Constitution, Part III, Section 23]).

Towns, however, are subservient to the Department of State - not the other way around, as defined in the Executive Standards Act (Section 6(d)). As such, the Department of State, holding authority over the Towns, is expected to uphold the Federal Laws, and the Constitution, over the laws of the Town.

If Towns ran their elections internally, perhaps this would be different, but because the hierarchy defined by law clearly places Towns below the Federal Executive Branch, the Commonwealth is still liable if it is determined that they executed an unconstitutional Town law.

 

Court Order


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ORDER - ENJOINMENT

Defendant Commonwealth of Redmont requests a stay on "Commonwealth liability", which - seeing as no actual liability has been determined yet - we interpret as a request to halt that party's portion of proceedings until such a time as [2026] SCR 12 is resolved.

The Court agrees that a relevant and as-of-yet-unresolved question of law is posed in SCR 12 that may significantly affect the outcome and necessary argumentation of this case. This should by no means be considered a judgment on the exact nature of the applicability of that case to the present one, or a statement that the two are identical - we merely find enough similarity that it would be undue to require argumentation here without settling the question of law posed in SCR 12. We further find that this would not be the first time such a stay has occurred. See [2025] FCR 107.

While acknowledging that the movant only requests their part of proceedings be halted, we are concerned about procedural difficulties that may arise from such a scenario. There is no particular timeline for the conclusion of SCR 12, and we cannot know how far along this case will be once that verdict is reached. It is not as simple as "adding back" a Defendant once a case has moved to trial, and we would find it unsatisfactory to privilege one Co-Defendant over another by removing them in full from a case solely on procedural grounds.

Therefore, in the interest of fairness on all fronts, the Court opts for the full enjoinment of this case until such a time as SCR 12 has been adjourned in full. We decline, however, to "expedite" SCR 12. No such thing is possible for this Court to order - the verdict will be reached when it is reached.

So ordered.

 
I will take over as presiding officer in this case.

Following the verdict in in re [2026] FCR 20 | [2026] SCR 12, proceedings here shall resume and the enjoinment is dissolved. The Commonwealth and the Town of Oakridge are ordered to submit their answers to the complaint within seventy-two hours (@ameslap, @AmityBlamity; @Johnes).

No further orders are made at this time.
 

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

The Commonwealth respectfully requests to be dismissed from this case.

The Plaintiff's complaint is about Oakridge's mayoral candidacy law. Oakridge created that rule, not the Commonwealth. The Department of State only helped administer the election using the requirements Oakridge had in place.

SCR 12 is now completed and in it, the Court held that a government department is not automatically liable due to the department carrying out an enacted law and should be viewed at an even higher analysis. That principal applies here. Even if the Court later finds that Oakridge's law is unconstitutional, the DOS should not be liable for damages simply because it followed the law as written.Additionally, the Plaintiff has not alleged that the DOS acted in bad faith, or any other grievance than the rule that Oakridge itself created.

For those reasons, the Commonwealth requests that the Commonwealth be dismissed as a party to this case.

Thank you.
Ameslap

 
ameslap said:

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

The Commonwealth respectfully requests to be dismissed from this case.

The Plaintiff's complaint is about Oakridge's mayoral candidacy law. Oakridge created that rule, not the Commonwealth. The Department of State only helped administer the election using the requirements Oakridge had in place.

SCR 12 is now completed and in it, the Court held that a government department is not automatically liable due to the department carrying out an enacted law and should be viewed at an even higher analysis. That principal applies here. Even if the Court later finds that Oakridge's law is unconstitutional, the DOS should not be liable for damages simply because it followed the law as written.Additionally, the Plaintiff has not alleged that the DOS acted in bad faith, or any other grievance than the rule that Oakridge itself created.

For those reasons, the Commonwealth requests that the Commonwealth be dismissed as a party to this case.

Thank you.
Ameslap

Click to expand...
I deny this.

Commonwealth does not specify what rule they are asking for dismissal under, nor do they fully and correctly elaborate on their proposed reading of the cited authority. Without obvious authority to back the Commonwealth's arguments, we move on.
 
Smallfries said:
I deny this.

Commonwealth does not specify what rule they are asking for dismissal under, nor do they fully and correctly elaborate on their proposed reading of the cited authority. Without obvious authority to back the Commonwealth's arguments, we move on.
Click to expand...
Your honor, the Commonwealth will also need an extension due to the IRL holiday weekend.
 
Johnes said:
Your Honour,
can the Defendant get a 12 hour extension? It's close to midnight and I don't want to post a half-baked product. Thank you.
Click to expand...
ameslap said:
Your honor, the Commonwealth will also need an extension due to the IRL holiday weekend.
Click to expand...
Forty-eight hours for both.
 

Answer to Complaint


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Yeet_Boy
Plaintiff

v.

Town of Oakridge and Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant(s)

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. AFFIRM, that on May 15, 2026 at 4:00pm, the Department of State opened declarations for the May 2026 Oakridge Mayor elections.
2. AFFIRM, that on May 15, 2026 at 6:16pm, Yeet_Boy declared his candidacy for Mayor of Oakridge.
3. AFFIRM, that on May 18, 2026 at 4:01pm, the Department of State announced the end of the declaration period and declared Yeet_Boy was disqualified for the following reason: “Candidate has served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms.”
4. AFFIRM, that while the Oakridge Constitution states that one of the requirements to run for Mayor is “Has not served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms,” (Act of Council - New Constitution Act), the Redmontian Constitution states:

  • “The Town Constitution and all Town bylaws must be consistent with this Constitution and federal law.” (Part IV, Section 32, Subsection 3 – emphasis added)
  • “Town elections shall be free and fair, facilitated by Federal departments as provided by law. Towns may set reasonable candidacy and voting requirements consistent with Commonwealth law.” (Part IV, Section 33 – emphasis added)
  • All citizens have the “right to participate in, and run for elected office, unless as punishment for a crime.” (Part V, Section 35, Subsection 1)
  • “Every citizen is equal before and under the law” (Part V, Section 35, Subsection 13)
5. AFFIRM, that Oakridge is part of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
6. AFFIRM, that Yeet_Boy is a citizen of Redmont.

II. DEFENCES

1. The Constitution of Oakridge is Consistent with Federal Law​

Plaintiff is alleging that by setting a two term limit on Oakridge mayoral candidates, the Town’s constitution is breaching Plaintiff’s rights to run for office.

Defendant disagrees entirely. Defendant, by setting a reasonable term–limit to keep the political scene of Oakridge fresh and not stagnant, could not have reasonably breached the Federal Constitution.

A. Issue​

The issue of this case is whether term limits for Oakridge Mayor provided by Article VI § 1 of the Oakridge Constitution constitute “reasonable candidacy and voting requirements” provided by § 33 of the Federal Constitution.

B. Rule​

As Plaintiff in fact no. 4 stated, the Federal Constitution provides several clauses concerning Town elections.

§§ 32(2–3), § 33, and § 35 of the Constitution state the following:
32. Local Governments
[...]
(2) Structure
Each Town shall have a Constitution that establishes its basic representative and democratic system of local government. Executive authority may be assigned to a Mayor or another local office as determined by the Town’s Constitution. Legislative authority over local matters rests with the Town’s legislature.

(3) Jurisdiction
The Town Constitution and all Town bylaws must be consistent with this Constitution and federal law. The Town Constitution and bylaws shall apply within the Town's jurisdiction, which shall be the following applicable only within the territory of a Town or the residents of that Town:
[...]

33. Elections
Town elections shall be free and fair, facilitated by Federal departments as provided by law. Towns may set reasonable candidacy and voting requirements consistent with Commonwealth law.

35. Rights & Freedoms
The Redmont Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it, subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law that are justified in a free and democratic society.
Click to expand...

Defendant will also cite a very recent Supreme Court Case, and that is [2026] SCR 12.

In [2026] SCR 12, the Court examined whether imposing candidacy requirements to facilitate better administration of elections was unconstitutional due to limiting the right to participate in and run for elected office provided under § 35 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the lower courts erred by declaring said candidacy requirements unconstitutional and upheld that reasonable requirements to facilitate elections are constitutional.

While the facts here are different, Defendant feels like it’s important to point out the similarities between this case and the one in SCR 12.

C. Analysis​

I. Defendant Set a Reasonable Requirement​

The Town’s Constitution’s two-term limit is a reasonable requirement to keep the race competitive. It does not unfairly discriminate or stop anyone from running for the office apart from long-term Mayors (8 months).

As provided by the Federal Constitution, each town shall have a basic representative and democratic society consistent with federal law. It gives Towns the right to set reasonable limits prescribed by law. Term limits trace their roots back to the source of democracy itself, Ancient Greece and it is only reasonable for the Town to ensure its executive doesn’t stay stagnant.

II. What About the President?​

The Federal Constitution itself provides a term limit, and that for the head of the executive branch, the President. It provides a stricter, one term limit to keep the race for the top job competitive every election.

The Mayor of Oakridge is analogous to the head of state: both head their respective jurisdictions, both appoint their respective cabinets and both are elected directly by the electorate. Oakridge was consistent with Federal Law by applying a term limit in their mayoral elections.

III. SCR 12​

In the aforementioned case, the Court vacated a Federal Court verdict declaring § 8(6) of the Electoral Act unconstitutional. In its verdict, it has stated that “Section 8(6) was a reasonable limitation prescribed by law and justified in a free and democratic society.” (In re [2026] FCR 20 | [2026] SCR 12)

Defendant believes that the Court should follow a similar logic here. Facts are the same:
1. Plaintiff ran for an elected position;
2. Plaintiff was disqualified based on a properly ratified Town Constitution’s two term limit, and
3. Instituting a term limit is a reasonable limitation justified in a free and democratic society.

Plaintiff was not unilaterally disallowed to run and be elected for political office, as he had served the last two terms (albeit one was cut short) and has had the opportunity to push for the changes he wishes. Furthermore, Defendant’s two term limit is not absolute but relative, insofar as it allows a person to run for Mayor again after a one term gap.

D. Conclusion​

Considering the reasonable two term limit being consistent with the Federal Constitution’s own term limit on the presidency, it being a reasonable candidacy requirement (Id. at § 33), the Court should rule in favor of the Defense.


By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 5th day of July 2026.


Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Your Honour,
Defendant moves for summary judgment, as there is no dispute of facts in this case.

 
Last edited:
Johnes said:

Answer to Complaint


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Yeet_Boy
Plaintiff

v.

Town of Oakridge and Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant(s)

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. AFFIRM, that on May 15, 2026 at 4:00pm, the Department of State opened declarations for the May 2026 Oakridge Mayor elections.
2. AFFIRM, that on May 15, 2026 at 6:16pm, Yeet_Boy declared his candidacy for Mayor of Oakridge.
3. AFFIRM, that on May 18, 2026 at 4:01pm, the Department of State announced the end of the declaration period and declared Yeet_Boy was disqualified for the following reason: “Candidate has served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms.”
4. AFFIRM, that while the Oakridge Constitution states that one of the requirements to run for Mayor is “Has not served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms,” (Act of Council - New Constitution Act), the Redmontian Constitution states:

  • “The Town Constitution and all Town bylaws must be consistent with this Constitution and federal law.” (Part IV, Section 32, Subsection 3 – emphasis added)
  • “Town elections shall be free and fair, facilitated by Federal departments as provided by law. Towns may set reasonable candidacy and voting requirements consistent with Commonwealth law.” (Part IV, Section 33 – emphasis added)
  • All citizens have the “right to participate in, and run for elected office, unless as punishment for a crime.” (Part V, Section 35, Subsection 1)
  • “Every citizen is equal before and under the law” (Part V, Section 35, Subsection 13)
5. AFFIRM, that Oakridge is part of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
6. AFFIRM, that Yeet_Boy is a citizen of Redmont.

II. DEFENCES

1. The Constitution of Oakridge is Consistent with Federal Law​

Plaintiff is alleging that by setting a two term limit on Oakridge mayoral candidates, the Town’s constitution is breaching Plaintiff’s rights to run for office.

Defendant disagrees entirely. Defendant, by setting a reasonable term–limit to keep the political scene of Oakridge fresh and not stagnant, could not have reasonably breached the Federal Constitution.

A. Issue​

The issue of this case is whether term limits for Oakridge Mayor provided by Article VI § 1 of the Oakridge Constitution constitute “reasonable candidacy and voting requirements” provided by § 33 of the Federal Constitution.

B. Rule​

As Plaintiff in fact no. 4 stated, the Federal Constitution provides several clauses concerning Town elections.

§§ 32(2–3), § 33, and § 35 of the Constitution state the following:


Defendant will also cite a very recent Supreme Court Case, and that is [2026] SCR 12.

In [2026] SCR 12, the Court examined whether imposing candidacy requirements to facilitate better administration of elections was unconstitutional due to limiting the right to participate in and run for elected office provided under § 35 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the lower courts erred by declaring said candidacy requirements unconstitutional and upheld that reasonable requirements to facilitate elections are constitutional.

While the facts here are different, Defendant feels like it’s important to point out the similarities between this case and the one in SCR 12.

C. Analysis​

I. Defendant Set a Reasonable Requirement​

The Town’s Constitution’s two-term limit is a reasonable requirement to keep the race competitive. It does not unfairly discriminate or stop anyone from running for the office apart from long-term Mayors (8 months).

As provided by the Federal Constitution, each town shall have a basic representative and democratic society consistent with federal law. It gives Towns the right to set reasonable limits prescribed by law. Term limits trace their roots back to the source of democracy itself, Ancient Greece and it is only reasonable for the Town to ensure its executive doesn’t stay stagnant.

II. What About the President?​

The Federal Constitution itself provides a term limit, and that for the head of the executive branch, the President. It provides a stricter, one term limit to keep the race for the top job competitive every election.

The Mayor of Oakridge is analogous to the head of state: both head their respective jurisdictions, both appoint their respective cabinets and both are elected directly by the electorate. Oakridge was consistent with Federal Law by applying a term limit in their mayoral elections.

III. SCR 12​

In the aforementioned case, the Court vacated a Federal Court verdict declaring § 8(6) of the Electoral Act unconstitutional. In its verdict, it has stated that “Section 8(6) was a reasonable limitation prescribed by law and justified in a free and democratic society.” (In re [2026] FCR 20 | [2026] SCR 12)

Defendant believes that the Court should follow a similar logic here. Facts are the same:
1. Plaintiff ran for an elected position;
2. Plaintiff was disqualified based on a properly ratified Town Constitution’s two term limit, and
3. Instituting a term limit is a reasonable limitation justified in a free and democratic society.

Plaintiff was not unilaterally disallowed to run and be elected for political office, as he had served the last two terms (albeit one was cut short) and has had the opportunity to push for the changes he wishes. Furthermore, Defendant’s two term limit is not absolute but relative, insofar as it allows a person to run for Mayor again after a one term gap.

D. Conclusion​

Considering the reasonable two term limit being consistent with the Federal Constitution’s own term limit on the presidency, it being a reasonable candidacy requirement (Id. at § 33), the Court should rule in favor of the Defense.


By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 4th day of July 2026.


Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Your Honour,
Defendant moves for summary judgment, as there is no dispute of facts in this case.

Click to expand...
Pardon, counselor; is this meant to be the reply of the Commonwealth as well, or just Oakridge?
 
Johnes said:
Both
Click to expand...
Thank you, I was not sure what was going on.
Johnes said:

Motion​


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Your Honour,
Defendant moves for summary judgment, as there is no dispute of facts in this case.
Click to expand...
Does Plaintiff (@YeetBoy1872325) have anything to say regarding this?
 
Johnes said:

Answer to Complaint


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Yeet_Boy
Plaintiff

v.

Town of Oakridge and Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant(s)

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. AFFIRM, that on May 15, 2026 at 4:00pm, the Department of State opened declarations for the May 2026 Oakridge Mayor elections.
2. AFFIRM, that on May 15, 2026 at 6:16pm, Yeet_Boy declared his candidacy for Mayor of Oakridge.
3. AFFIRM, that on May 18, 2026 at 4:01pm, the Department of State announced the end of the declaration period and declared Yeet_Boy was disqualified for the following reason: “Candidate has served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms.”
4. AFFIRM, that while the Oakridge Constitution states that one of the requirements to run for Mayor is “Has not served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms,” (Act of Council - New Constitution Act), the Redmontian Constitution states:

  • “The Town Constitution and all Town bylaws must be consistent with this Constitution and federal law.” (Part IV, Section 32, Subsection 3 – emphasis added)
  • “Town elections shall be free and fair, facilitated by Federal departments as provided by law. Towns may set reasonable candidacy and voting requirements consistent with Commonwealth law.” (Part IV, Section 33 – emphasis added)
  • All citizens have the “right to participate in, and run for elected office, unless as punishment for a crime.” (Part V, Section 35, Subsection 1)
  • “Every citizen is equal before and under the law” (Part V, Section 35, Subsection 13)
5. AFFIRM, that Oakridge is part of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
6. AFFIRM, that Yeet_Boy is a citizen of Redmont.

II. DEFENCES

1. The Constitution of Oakridge is Consistent with Federal Law​

Plaintiff is alleging that by setting a two term limit on Oakridge mayoral candidates, the Town’s constitution is breaching Plaintiff’s rights to run for office.

Defendant disagrees entirely. Defendant, by setting a reasonable term–limit to keep the political scene of Oakridge fresh and not stagnant, could not have reasonably breached the Federal Constitution.

A. Issue​

The issue of this case is whether term limits for Oakridge Mayor provided by Article VI § 1 of the Oakridge Constitution constitute “reasonable candidacy and voting requirements” provided by § 33 of the Federal Constitution.

B. Rule​

As Plaintiff in fact no. 4 stated, the Federal Constitution provides several clauses concerning Town elections.

§§ 32(2–3), § 33, and § 35 of the Constitution state the following:


Defendant will also cite a very recent Supreme Court Case, and that is [2026] SCR 12.

In [2026] SCR 12, the Court examined whether imposing candidacy requirements to facilitate better administration of elections was unconstitutional due to limiting the right to participate in and run for elected office provided under § 35 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the lower courts erred by declaring said candidacy requirements unconstitutional and upheld that reasonable requirements to facilitate elections are constitutional.

While the facts here are different, Defendant feels like it’s important to point out the similarities between this case and the one in SCR 12.

C. Analysis​

I. Defendant Set a Reasonable Requirement​

The Town’s Constitution’s two-term limit is a reasonable requirement to keep the race competitive. It does not unfairly discriminate or stop anyone from running for the office apart from long-term Mayors (8 months).

As provided by the Federal Constitution, each town shall have a basic representative and democratic society consistent with federal law. It gives Towns the right to set reasonable limits prescribed by law. Term limits trace their roots back to the source of democracy itself, Ancient Greece and it is only reasonable for the Town to ensure its executive doesn’t stay stagnant.

II. What About the President?​

The Federal Constitution itself provides a term limit, and that for the head of the executive branch, the President. It provides a stricter, one term limit to keep the race for the top job competitive every election.

The Mayor of Oakridge is analogous to the head of state: both head their respective jurisdictions, both appoint their respective cabinets and both are elected directly by the electorate. Oakridge was consistent with Federal Law by applying a term limit in their mayoral elections.

III. SCR 12​

In the aforementioned case, the Court vacated a Federal Court verdict declaring § 8(6) of the Electoral Act unconstitutional. In its verdict, it has stated that “Section 8(6) was a reasonable limitation prescribed by law and justified in a free and democratic society.” (In re [2026] FCR 20 | [2026] SCR 12)

Defendant believes that the Court should follow a similar logic here. Facts are the same:
1. Plaintiff ran for an elected position;
2. Plaintiff was disqualified based on a properly ratified Town Constitution’s two term limit, and
3. Instituting a term limit is a reasonable limitation justified in a free and democratic society.

Plaintiff was not unilaterally disallowed to run and be elected for political office, as he had served the last two terms (albeit one was cut short) and has had the opportunity to push for the changes he wishes. Furthermore, Defendant’s two term limit is not absolute but relative, insofar as it allows a person to run for Mayor again after a one term gap.

D. Conclusion​

Considering the reasonable two term limit being consistent with the Federal Constitution’s own term limit on the presidency, it being a reasonable candidacy requirement (Id. at § 33), the Court should rule in favor of the Defense.


By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 5th day of July 2026.


Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Your Honour,
Defendant moves for summary judgment, as there is no dispute of facts in this case.

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Response

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

RESPONSE

The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny the above Motion for Summary Judgement for the following reasons:

Chronological Facts vs Substantive Facts

The defense moves for summary judgment on the sole ground that “there is no dispute of facts in this case.” While the plaintiff does agree that the chronological facts surrounding the declarative period and disqualification are largely undisputed, this motion must be denied due to a dispute of substantive fact. Summary judgment is inappropriate where as here, the central issues are pure questions of constitutional law; specifically whether Oakridge’s New Constitution Act term limit provision constitutes a “reasonable candidacy requirement” under Redmont Constitution Part IV § 33, whether it is consistent with Part IV § 32(3) and Part V § 35, and whether it violates the fundamental right to run for elected office (It does). The dispute comes from the fact that if Oakridge's New Constitution Act violates any one of the above listed sections, it must be found unlawful and is therefore a direct infringement upon the protected rights of its citizens

The Core Dispute Is Legal, Not Factual

The Defense's Answer to Complaint and Motion confirm that the parties agree on the timeline, the text and language of the Oakridge provision, the text of the Redmont Constitution, and the reason given for disqualification. The disagreement is entirely over legal conclusions. These legal conclusions are the very cornerstone of substantive law. The defense is attempting to argue that their two-term restriction is somehow not an absolute and direct violation of Redmont Constitution Part V § 35 (1) , "The right to participate in, and run for elected office, unless as punishment for a crime". The defense agrees with the plaintiff (as do we) that this fact is not in dispute. What is in dispute is their complete disregard for, and refusal of, their comprehension of this law.

The plaintiff again, and very respectfully, asks that you deny this Motion.

 
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Your Honor, may I request to remove the formatting errors in our response? Namely the "<br>"s that didn't want to take.
 
Your honors. My apologies, for this post. Ebb is no longer a prosecutor at the DOJ and resigned two days ago. I cannot speak for him as to why he is making a post on this thread, but the DOJ is not requesting a status at this time.
 
Matthew100x said:
Your honors. My apologies, for this post. Ebb is no longer a prosecutor at the DOJ and resigned two days ago. I cannot speak for him as to why he is making a post on this thread, but the DOJ is not requesting a status at this time.
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Attorney General, last time I checked, the town of Oakridge is also in the name of this case, I am an oakridge town attorney.
 
Ebborsnam said:
Any update as to the status of this case, Your Honors? It has been one month.
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It has, thank you. Please don't talk out of turn. We aren't exactly overflowing with cases in the Supreme Court, we are well aware of what we have to do. We will finish when we finish. Be patient, please.
 

Verdict


Chief Justice Fries writes the unanimous opinion of the Court.

On May 21, 2026, the town of Oakridge held its regular election for the office of Mayor. The elections were free and fair, and there was only one alleged issue—two candidates were disqualified. One of them, Yeet_Boy (“Plaintiff”), was disqualified by the Department of State because he had “served as Mayor during both the previous two Mayoral terms.”

This suit followed. Plaintiff alleges complaints against both the Town of Oakridge and the Commonwealth. To the former, it is alleged that the Town acted illegally when its Constitution demanded Plaintiff’s disqualification from the election. As for the latter, Plaintiff alleges the Commonwealth erred when it acted and undertook the disqualification of Plaintiff, in violation of the Federal Constitution.

I. Facts

The facts here are simple and uncontested. On May 15, 2026, the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Redmont opened the declarations for the Mayoral elections of Oakridge. That same day, Plaintiff declared his intent to run for the same. Three days later, the State Department closed declarations and concurrently determined that Plaintiff was disqualified.

This disqualification arose from a provision in the Oakridge Constitution which states, inter alia, that any candidate for the office of Mayor must not have “served as Mayor during both [of] the previous two [terms.]” Oak. Const. Art. 6, § 1. While there does not seem to be evidence on record that Plaintiff was indeed Mayor for both terms besides a contention by the State Department of the same, no party contests this fact and we take it as true, given the Plaintiff’s lack of argumentation surrounding it.

II. Rule

Towns are autonomous local governments of the Commonwealth. C.R. Const. Part IV, § 32 (FriesLaw, 9/26). The governance, elections, and offices of a town are internal issues delegated to the town. Id. at § 32(3). Town elections must be free and fair, and though towns may set requirements for candidates, these must be reasonable and consistent with federal law. Id. at § 33. Likewise, a town’s constitution and any other laws it may make must be consistent with the federal Constitution. Id. at § 32(3). All citizens have a right to run for elected office. Id. at Part V, § 35(1).

The mayor of Oakridge is an elected position, and candidates for that office must pass certain requirements to stand for election. Oak. Const. Art. 6, § 1. Among these is a requirement for any candidate to not have served as mayor “during both of the previous two Mayoral terms.” Id.

III. Discussion

The issue here is whether a town’s law putting the incumbency restriction on candidacy for mayor is inconsistent with the federal Constitution. This issue disposes with both claims against both defendants, and so we take it as one.

The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is simple: the Constitution makes it clear both that any town law, but specifically any candidacy requirements for elected town office, must be consistent with the Constitution and federal law. In preventing Plaintiff from running due to his history of office-holding—a criteria not reflected in the Constitution—the governments are violating his right to be able to run for office.

In response, the governments argue that the requirement is a reasonable one, and is consistent with federal law. As to the latter point, they argue that the consistency arises from the fact that the president has a consecutive term limitation as well. Because of the similarities between the president of the Commonwealth and the mayor of Oakridge, the candidacy requirement is consistent.

We are favorable to the government’s argument here. To begin, there is nothing about the term limit that is unreasonable in fact or in law: a restriction on consecutive terms is a regular part of many democratic systems, and is easily observable in many jurisdictions. Further, the requirement is not overly burdensome or onerous; it does not permanently enjoin Plaintiff or any like prospective candidates from ever running for that office again, but only mandates a one-term break from that office.

The restriction further does not prevent Plaintiff from running for any office in Oakridge besides mayor, even for the one-term temporary stint. Candidates in Plaintiff’s position are simply asked to take a break from that specific office for one singular term. Though perhaps annoying to some, simply disagreeing with this restriction does not make it unreasonable, and we see no real reason to hold that a temporary and very narrow term limitation (itself extremely definite both in form and length) is unreasonable.

The more relevant argument is the requirement’s consistency with federal law. Plaintiff is correct in that the requirement is itself not spelled out in the Constitution as an acceptable restriction. Nor too does the specific restriction in question appear anywhere else in the Constitution. However, we believe both parties take too narrow an approach here.

What does “consistent” mean? As always, we begin with the text. The word appears in two places within the Constitution, both under part IV. In both uses, the Constitution is clear: any town law—including the town constitutions or any town bylaws, as well as any candidacy requirements—must be consistent with federal law. The meaning of the word “consistent” is not fully explained, but parties to this controversy supply their own meaning.

To the parties, the implied meaning of “consistent” is something to the tune of “similar to” or “following the example of.” Within this meaning, Plaintiff asserts that a requirement that a candidate not having been in the same role for the previous two terms is nowhere similar to or following the example of any part of the Constitution. In response, the governments contest that the requirement is similar to or following the example of the restriction on candidacy for the office of president. Where a candidate for president may not ever be the “previously elected president,” the mayor for Oakridge must likewise not be someone who was mayor in both of the previous two terms. The difference here is one of framing: Plaintiff discusses this requirement as a discrimination based on “political history,” while the governments see it closer to a temporary regulation on candidacy as an abstract.

We take a somewhat different approach. Again, the word consistent appears in two places, both related to town laws. The first deals with the jurisdiction of towns and their laws, and does not hold any language that would help us. However, the second mention (on elections) contains an interesting piece of language useful for our interpretation: “Towns may set reasonable candidacy and voting requirements consistent with Commonwealth law.”

Any candidacy requirements must be both reasonable and consistent. Why is this important? Imagine first that the previous construction of “consistent” was correct. If consistent meant “similar to” or otherwise being cut from the same cloth as a comparative item, how could a requirement be either unreasonable or inconsistent, but not the other? Consistency here would mean a requirement would have to be similar to the Constitution’s own, or cut from that same cloth. If that is true, how could such a requirement be unreasonable? This would have to insinuate that a requirement in the Constitution itself is unreasonable. This is illogical and a construction of law that is repulsive to the Constitution. The Constitution is constitutional.

We deny the afforded definition of “consistent” because it leads to surplusage in the text of the Constitution, and surplusage is a disfavored concept in the law. We generally assume all text in a legal document or act is unique and carries some force behind it not replicated elsewhere. In re [2025] FCR 123 | [2026] SCR 5. Thus, consistent with and reasonable must mean different things both in form and practice. For this to occur, consistent cannot mean related or similar to, and only one readily available definition remains applicable here: “not in contradiction to; agreeable.”

This means that so long as a requirement is not in contradiction to the Constitution and is generally agreeable to it, that requirement for town office is consistent. Our first test with this definition is a simple thought experiment: can a requirement be both inconsistent and unreasonable, consistent and reasonable, or either consistent and unreasonable or vice versa? The first two are clearly true on their face, as surely some requirement exists that is wholly acceptable and wholly unacceptable regardless of definitions.

As to the latter conditions, imagine a requirement that forbade a candidate from standing for town office if they were also a secretary in the executive branch of the federal government. This would surely be consistent with the Constitution, but could be considered unreasonable. See C.R. Const. Part III, § 28(2). As this test holds and avoids surplusage, and is still a natural reading of the word “consistent,” we find that this is the proper interpretation of the word.

With this in hand, we do not see any merit in Plaintiff’s argument. Term limits are not only a common and oft-used candidacy restriction for high political office within a polity, but do not seem in any way in contradiction to any part of the constitution. Indeed, how could they? After all, the highest elected office in the land—that of president of the Commonwealth—has an even more restrictive and onerous term limitation.

While Plaintiff’s contention regarding the first charter right has some facial value, it dissolves in-hand when you realize that the Constitution itself expressly abrogates this right for the most important elected office in the country. How can it be said that an office of this magnitude can have such a harsh restriction, but a lesser, regional office cannot have a lesser restriction? This argument devours itself on any serious inspection.

It is clear citizens have a right to run for office, and this cannot be taken away except for criminal offenses; but this right does not mean one has a right to run for any office, at any time. An impacted individual in this circumstance could run for another office. There are certainly plenty of them, even in the more localized and centralized towns. So long as a requirement does not ban an individual from all offices because of their previous officeholding for a time, or from a specific office permanently (or perhaps for a significant length of time), this requirement is not inconsistent with the Constitution.

IV. Conclusion

We hold that “consistent” in the Constitution means agreeable to or not in contradiction of, and therefore find that the requirement of candidates in the Oakridge constitution is consistent with federal law. As a result, we do not find that Plaintiff was unjustly or illegally disqualified, and find in favor of the Defendants in this matter. Given that the Defendants in this suit are both government actors and neither actor petitioned for any relief, we do not award any damages, fees, or fines. Redmont Civil Code Act Part III, § 7(g).

 
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