Lawsuit: Adjourned Superwoops v. Trentrick_Lamar [2026] DCR 18

[Superwoops]

Case Filing

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


Superwoops
Plaintiff

v.

Trentrick_Lamar
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

Trentrick_Lamar, in an auction, sold three villagers to Superwoops for the sum of $5,000. Superwoops was not able to collect the villagers before being permanently deported.


I. PARTIES

1. Superwoops (Plaintiff)
2. Trentrick_Lamar (Defendant)

II. FACTS

1. On December 7th, 2025, the Defendant posted an auction titled "Three Villagers".
2. Following a number of bids, Superwoops won the auction with his bid of $5,000 on December 9th.
3. The Defendant recognised the legitimate winning bid by replying to the $5,000 bid and saying "A winner is you!"
4. The DOC Secretary sent a message in the auction thread and did not raise any issues with the way it was handled.
5. After asking for the delivery of the villagers on December 14th, the Defendant provided rough instructions on how to pick them up by checking the game map.
6. The Defendant was temporarily deported on December 19th, then permanently deported on December 28th. (P-001)
7. The Defendant's deportation made the Plaintiff unable to collect on their contractually agreed upon villagers.
8. The current value of three villagers is $24,000. (P-002 and P-003)​

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. The auction was a valid contract between both parties. Superwoops fulfilled his end by paying $5,000 to the Defendant. In turn, the Defendant has not fulfilled their contractual obligations. The Plaintiff asks the Court to assist the Defendant in fulfilling his contractual obligations. This is upheld in Lawsuit: Adjourned - GraprielJuice V. Aesyr [2025] DCR 100.
2. The deprivation of the three villagers harmed the Plaintiff's future earning capacity from December 9th to the present day, over two months.​

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Defendant:
1. $24,000 in compensatory damages for the current value of three villagers. In a recent (January 24th) marketplace thread buying villager eggs opened by IamJeb_, Alfie Dug acknowledged villager eggs sell for as much as $10,000. Another citizen, ZxRiptide, offered to sell IamJeb_ an egg for $10,000, then lowering his offer to $8,000, described by him as "8 firm" (relating to his offer not going lower than $8,000). IamJeb_ accepted this offer by replying "fine". Therefore, the value of three villagers is calculated to be $24,000. (See P-002 and P-003)
2. $7,500 in nominal damages for the harm of the Plaintiff's future earning capacity had the Plaintiff come into possession of the three villagers back in December. Additionally, this can also be seen as compensation for harmed earning capacity from the deprivation of $5,000 with nothing in return for over two months, a sum of money that could have been better invested elsewhere.
2. $9,450 in legal fees (30% of case value) payable to Superwoops.​

V. EVIDENCE

Spoiler: P-001

Spoiler: P-002

Spoiler: P-003

Spoiler: P-004

Spoiler: P-005

Spoiler: P-006

Spoiler: P-007

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 15th day of February 2026.

 

[dearev]

defendant perm deported, case in recess pending default.

 

[Superwoops]

View attachment 74504
defendant perm deported, case in recess pending default.

Your honour, I just wanted to ask about the status of this case

 

[Superwoops]

Sorry to disturb again, just want to make sure this case doesn’t become buried

@dearev

 

[dearev]

Sorry to disturb again, just want to make sure this case doesn’t become buried

@dearev

ill begin working on a verdict, my sincere apologies i have had so much going on irl.

 

[Franciscus]

Hello,

I am the new presiding officer on this case.

 

[Franciscus]

Court Order

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ORDER - WRIT OF MANDAMUS

The Court, in conducting research for the verdict on this case, requires an explanation on legislative history from the Office of Congressional Affairs.

Upon review of legislative history while writing this verdict, the Court found reference to "Unlawful Killing of a Protected Entity", as if it were in the Criminal Code Act. Such a crime is present on the Laws thread and in public archives of the CCA, so the Court indeed sees that such a crime was once present in the Act. Upon review now, however, the crime appears to be missing from the Act, having been removed on or after January 18 and on or before February 25.

The Court, upon looking through legislation, is unable to find a law passed that would have removed this outright, and seeks clarity from the Office in charge of "[m]aking all necessary changes to documents of law" (Legislative Standards Act, Section 6(3)(a)).

1. Does the Office of Congressional Affairs believe that the crime "Unlawful Killing of a Protected Entity" has been removed from the Criminal Code Act by action of law?
2. If so, can you point the Court to this law? If not, can you explain to the Court why this was so changed?

This information is necessary for clarifying legislative history in the verdict of this case, and this Writ is thus issued in line with Part V, Section 2(1) of the Judicial Standards Act. I am summonsing both presiding officers, as well as the Attorney General.

So Ordered,
Judge Multi

Writ of Summons

@Darklander @Talion77 and @Dogeington are required to appear before the District Court in the case of Superwoops v. Trentrick_Lamar [2026] DCR 18 within the next 72 hours

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

[Dogeington]

Present, your honor

 

[Franciscus]

Present, your honor

Thank you, Mr. Attorney General, for your prompt presence. Are you prepared and authorized to represent the Office of Congressional Affairs on this subject?

 

[Talion77]

Present, your Honour.

 

[Darklander]

Present Your Honor

 

[Franciscus]

Seeing as all are present, the Office of Congressional Affairs shall have 72 hours to respond to provide the Court an explanation on the two questions in the Writ of Mandamus.

For sake of clarity, the two questions are:

1. Does the Office of Congressional Affairs believe that the crime "Unlawful Killing of a Protected Entity" has been removed from the Criminal Code Act by action of law?
2. If so, can you point the Court to this law? If not, can you explain to the Court why this was so changed?

 

[Talion77]

Your Honour —

1. The crime "Unlawful Killing of a Protected Entity", as now codified in Part IV, Section 7 of the Criminal Code Act has been removed from the CCA on February 25th, not by action of law, but as a result of a clerical error.
2. The named error occurred as the crime was accidentally overridden during implementation of the Animal Assault Act.

@Franciscus

 

[Franciscus]

Your Honour —

1. The crime "Unlawful Killing of a Protected Entity", as now codified in Part IV, Section 7 of the Criminal Code Act has been removed from the CCA on February 25th, not by action of law, but as a result of a clerical error.
2. The named error occurred as the crime was accidentally overridden during implementation of the Animal Assault Act.

@Franciscus

Very well. @Talion77 @Darklander and @Dogeington are dismissed from this case and are free to leave.

Court is in recess pending verdict in the next 12 hours.

 

[Franciscus]

Verdict

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
VERDICT - Superwoops v. Trentrick_Lamar [2026] DCR 18

​

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I. Summary of Controversy​

Plaintiff Superwoops approaches the District Court seeking equitable relief from Trentrick_Lamar's alleged breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff won an auction for three villagers that had been hosted by the Defendant, paid the Defendant for the villagers, and that the Secretary of the Department of Commerce made no objection while being aware of this. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant gave vague instructions as to how to pick up the villagers, and that following the Defendant's temporary and subsequent permanent deportations in Advent and Christmastide, Plaintiff was unable to collect the three villagers in boats.

Plaintiff separately alleges that the current value of three villagers is $24,000.

Defendant, for his part, is permanently deported. As such, he has neither appeared nor made representations in his defense.

II. Findings of Fact​

II.I A contract was formed between Plaintiff Superwoops and Defendant Trentrick_Lamar, which was frustrated by Defendant's deportation(s)​

II.I.I Discord user "SantaDenier" is Trentrick_Lamar, and Superwoops is Superwoops​

The identity of both parties is also established in evidence. At first glance, a discord user with the name "SantaDenier" is shown as having created the auction (compl., Exhibit P-004). This alone would not be sufficient for the Court to conclude that the individual who created the auction was Trentrick_Lamar. Upon full review of the evidence, the inclusion of the payment message from Superwoops to Trentrick_Lamar (id., Exhibits P-006 and P-007), coupled with the behavior of the parties both before and after the message was sent, leads this Court to conclude on balance of probabilities that the Discord user with the nickname "SantaDenier" is deported individual Trentrick_Lamar, and that the discord user with the nickname of "Superwoops" is Redmont citizen Superwoops.

II.I.II An auction for 3 live villagers then-located in the wild took place in #marketplace, was hosted by Trentrick_Lamar, and was won by Superwoops​

Upon review of the evidence, Trentrick_Lamar created an auction in a thread within the #marketplace as confirmed by a screenshotted post by the Utilities bot (id., Exhibit P-004). The opening post in the thread contained an image of three villagers and stated that these villagers were "just northeast of Sandy Shores" (ibid). (Sandy Shores is well-known to be a particular location in the wild.)

Superwoops won this auction at a price of $5,000 and paid the Defendant that amount of money (id., Exhibit P-006).

II.I.III A contract was formed via the marketplace auction​

A contract in Redmont is defined by the formula given in the Contracts Act:

4 - Contract Formation
(1) A contract is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties that creates an obligation to do or not do a particular thing.
(2) A valid contract is formed when the following legal test is met:
(a) Offer. An offer is a clear and unequivocal communication expressing a party's willingness to enter into a contract, either explicitly stated or reasonably inferred from the circumstances.
(b) Acceptance. Acceptance is the positive and unambiguous response to an offer communicated to the offeror, mirroring the terms of the offer and conveyed through various means.
(c) Consideration. Consideration, an essential element, involves the exchange of something of value between parties, with sufficiency though not necessarily adequacy. Consideration can be tangible or intanglbie.
(d) Intent. Parties must demonstrate a clear intention to create legal obligations for the contract to be valid.
(e) Capacity. Parties entering into a contract must possess the legal capacity to do so. Players with low playtime may lack the capacity to fairly enter a contract.

(Contracts Act, Section 4).

The District Court has previously recognized accepted auction bids as binding Contracts (see: Sir_Dogeington v. Lolerdabest69 [2025] DCR 77). Rather than rely solely upon precedent, however, this Court now goes piece-by-piece regarding how each condition of the contract was met:

• An offer was present. As found in Bombaz2005 v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 78 "An auction is an offer - a proposal for contract formation". Plaintiff has brought forth uncontested evidence that the Defendant created an auction for three villagers and that Plaintiff bid in this auction (compl., Exhibits P-004 through P-007). The offer, in this case, is the Plaintiff's bid to purchase the villagers.
  • That Plaintiff would have to pick the villagers up himself was clear. The Defendant, before any bids had been placed in this villager auction, stated that the villagers were "just northeast of Sandy Shores", that transporting the villagers "is on the buyer", and posted a screenshot of the villagers in boats in the auction post (id. Exhibit P-004).
• The offer was accepted. Defendant accepted the Plaintiff's winning bid (compl., Exhibit P-006). Defendant repeatedly contacted Plaintiff with pings in order to alert Plaintiff to this, and to ask for payment (ibid.).
• There was mutual consideration. In exchange for three villagers, Plaintiff agreed to pay $5,000 (id., Exhibit P-004, Exhibit P-006). Three villagers provides tangible value as property (see Section III.I of this Verdict), as do Redmont Dollars, so mutual consideration was present.
• There was intent to enter into a contract. Each party clearly intended to create legal obligations of the other. The Defendant repeatedly sought to compel the Plaintiff into paying him $5,000, even pinging the DoC Secretary to attempt to enforce payment (id., Exhibit P-006), indicating that Defendant understood that legal obligations would be created. The Plaintiff, for his part, made the payment and inquired about logistics of transportation (id., Exhibit P-006).
• Each party had capacity. The Defendant had participated in business lawsuits as far back as 2021 (see: Galavance v. Trentrick_Lamar, ShinHeYing, & Hong_Kong_101 [2021] FCR 76), while the Plaintiff has been employed as a public defender (see: Muggy21 v. Riverardd [2025] DCR 96, Post No. 23). Both parties to this case, therefore, have more than enough knowledge and experience in order to enter into a contract.

As each prong of the five-part test has been met, the District Court thus finds that a contract was formed.

II.I.IV Plaintiff actually paid the Defendant, who then attempted to show Plaintiff where the purchased villagers were​

Plaintiff provided screenshots containing timestamps depicting conversation in the auction thread following Plaintiff's payment of $5,000 to defendant (Compl., Exhibit P-007). The conversation shows that the Plaintiff asked Defendant about the logistics of transportation, and Defendant responded "Check the dynmap and you'll find my head near sandy shores \ I have all three villagers in boats so you can just drop them into the ocean and ship them wherever needed" (ibid.).

II.I.V The contract was frustrated by defendant's deportation​

"'Frustration' means the occurrence of an event that makes the performance of a contract impossible or radically different from what was initially contemplated" (Contracts Act, Section 14(1)).

Plaintiff claims as fact that "[t]he Defendant's deportation made the Plaintiff unable to collect on their contractually agreed upon villagers" (Compl., factual allegation No. 7). On balance of probabilities, this Court agrees; Defendant's ability to perform their obligations of the contract was impossible, or at least radically different, than had initially been contemplated at the time of the contract's formation.

As such, this Court finds that Frustration occurred within the meaning of Section 14(1) of the Contracts Act.

II.IV In late January 2026, third party IamJeb_ was offered the opportunity to purchase a villager egg for $8,000​

Plaintiff presents the court with uncontested screenshots of a marketplace thread in which IamJeb_ sought to purchase a single villager egg (Compl., Exhibits P-002 and P-003). The thread was opened on 24 January 2026 and persisted through at least 27 January 2026. While offered the opportunity to purchase a villager egg for $8,000, IamJeb_ initially had sought to purchase a villager egg at the price of $1,000.

II.V While events relevant to the alleged breach occurred in December, Plaintiff filed this case on 15 February 2026, after the signing into law of the RCCA and RCCAA​

This case was filed on 15 February 2026 (compl.). The Redmont Civil Code Act and the Redmont Civil Code Amendments Act were signed into law on 7 February 2026. The events relevant to the alleged breach itself, however, took place in December; the contract became effective that month, and the defendant was finally deported that same month.

III. Opinion of the Court​

This case verdict is the result of a default judgement - a judgement borne against a party who has no lawful right to defend themself (such are deported players; see: UnityMaster v. lcn [2025] SCR 2), players who have forfeited their ability to do so through failure to respond (The Commonwealth of Redmont v. ReinausPrinzzip [2021] SCR 20) or sanctions by the Court (see, for example, Court Rule 3.6). In Redmont, default judgment does not mean that the full prayer in the complaint is granted and all claims affirmed (The Commonwealth of Redmont v. ReinausPrinzzip [2021] SCR 20, granting prayers partially; Vernicia v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 51, granting a default judgement for the Plaintiff and ruling for the Defense). Instead, upon granting default judgement, a "presiding officer still has the ability to evaluate the case and ultimately rule for either party" ([2025] FCR 51 - Appeal).

Thus, this Court chooses to examine this case, its evidence, and the underlying law in evaluating the Plaintiff's claims and prayers.

III.I The sale of villagers for money constitutes mutual consideration under the law​

A Court may declare a portion of a contract "invalid, illegal, or unenforceable" and may sever such portion from the remainder of the contract without affecting the validity of other text in the contract (Contracts Act, Section 10(2)). However, if severance were to strip the entire consideration given by one party, this Court may conclude that the agreement was "stripped of its essential terms" (KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104, Opinion of the Court, Section 1, Par. 3) and, consequently, that "the agreement ceases to possess the mutual obligations necessary to sustain a valid and enforceable contract under §4(2) of the Contracts Act" (ibid). As the Federal Court has noted, when a Court strikes elements that "comprise the very core" of a contract, "the agreement is rendered entirely without substance", and would be "void ab initio". (id., Par. 4-5).

Therefore, this Court must examine the question: Can the three live villagers located in the wild, as sold at auction by the Defendant, constitute consideration for purposes of a contract?

III.I.I The Federal Court has implicitly recognized that non-player characters have rights to represent themselves before the courts​

The Federal Court and District Court have previously granted a non-player character ability to defend themself in Court (see: Commonwealth of Redmont v. Gregg [2025] FCR 64; Dartanboy v. Robert [2024] DCR 9). One might think that this constitutes an implicit acknowledgement of certain unenumerated rights of non-player characters, including a right to participate in Court proceedings involving them. The agency is remarkably strong; the Supreme Court has even denied similar agency to deported citizens (see: UnityMaster v. lcn [2025] SCR 2).

Why, then, would villagers be different? Can villagers sue and be sued in Court? Do villagers possess unenumerated rights that would prevent them from being sold as chattel? Are Villagers merely a sort of NPC with rights to representation in the same way as Gregg may be? Or are they mere animals, like livestock?

In thinking through these questions, this Court must weave a thread through the history and traditions of Redmont, its statutory laws, and its customs. This Court thus traces developments of the treatment of villagers from the Original Law - that is, the "the body of law that existed when the nation first started" ([2025] FCR 119 - Contempt of Court Charge - Appeal, Section II, Par. 2) - through the present day.

III.I.II Villagers have a long history of statutory protection​

In June 2020, the Congress of DemocracyCraft voted 4-1 in support of the Villages and Villagers Protection Act 2020. The act passed into law, providing the following protection for villagers and their villages:

3 - Protection of Villages
(1) Villages can not be destroyed by an entity . The player who destroyed a village, will be punished with a $500 fee and will have to rebuild what they have destroyed.
(2) There’s an exception, and that is to improve the village. If a player wants to rebuild the village to improve it, they are allowed to, but first, they will have to ask the government via an application on the forums (Department of Construction and Transport).

4 - Protection of Villagers
(1)It will be illegal to murder villagers .
(2)Everyone will be allowed to use villagers as long as they provide them a minimum space of 3x3.

This law aimed to protect villages and villagers from destruction by players, establishing in law certain welfare standards, a protection against killing of villagers, and a protection of villagers' abodes. The law also implicitly recognized that the Commonwealth was sovereign over those abodes, allowing the Department of Construction and Transport to receive applications for improving existing villages.

The Congress, in subsequent votes in 2020, legalized the trafficking of villagers (Freedom of Villagers Act), which had previously been illegal under what appears to have been the Original Law, and declined to extend protections against neglect to villagers (Neglect Amendment Act).

In January 2021, the Congress considered whether to move "neglect" from a server rule to a law, rejecting it at that time (Neglect Act). Neglect, at that time, was "[t]he keeping of a villager in less than a 3x3 area" (see: Tougher Neglect Act, quoting the then-existing rule). The congress pivoted positions the following month, passing a law establishing punishments for violations of the welfare standards for failure to keep villagers in at least a 3x3 area (Tougher Neglect Act). The crime of "neglect" was then removed from the law shortly thereafter (Reformed Defense of Villagers Act), and a crime for "villager murder" was added to the laws under the "PvP & Trespassing" category. In April, the Congress designated "villager murder" as an "indictable crime" (Crime Severity Act, as amended by the Criminal Classification Revision Act).

Laws affecting villagers remained largely unchanged through the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though fines were increased for villager murder (A Cool Villager Murder Fine Amendment Act). Laws, generally, underwent restructuring and standardization at the end of 2022 and beginning of 2023. Villager murder was incorporated into the Animal & Pet Offences Act, which was signed into law on 1 January 2023, and the Standardized Criminal Code Act repealed both the Reformed Defense of Villagers Act and the Crime Severity Act.

Not much more has developed in statute regarding villagers. In March 2023, fines for villager murder were increased (Villager Murder Fine Amendment 2.0 Act). In March 2024, the Congress affirmed that Villager Murder was legal in the wild, with the exception of claimed plots (Wilderness Laws Clarification 3.0 Act). In July 2024, the Serial Crime Removal Act was proposed and rescinded; the law would have (re-)established scaling punishments for villager murders. The Criminal Code Act, signed into law in June 2025, rendered all prior criminal laws on-the-books to be unenforceable (except, perhaps, those in the old Judicial Standards Act; see generally In re [2023] SCR 5 | [2026] SCR 4 and In re [2026] FCR 4 | [2026] SCR 6), and instituted a crime of "unlawful killing of a protected villager", which at the time of the CCA's passage read as follows:

Unlawful Killing of Protected Villager
Offence Type: Summary
Penalty: 10 Penalty Units; 10 min imprisonment
A person commits an offence if the person:
(a) kills a villager; and
(b) the villager is owned by, or in the care of another person, business, or government entity.

(see: More Villager Protections Act, which contains the CCA's original text in this regard).

Further developments in Villager law included a change in standards for responsibility of death of a villager (More Villager Protections Act), reforming the Wilderness Laws Clarification 3.0 Act to refer to "Unlawful Killing of a Protected Villager" (Theft Criminalization Act), and the extra-legal veto of the Wilderness Laws Clarification 3.0 Act in December 2025 as a part of an extra-legal effort to transition certain laws to server rules.

Throughout this entire record, there has been an acknowledgement that villagers can be regulated by the Commonwealth's statutes, can be granted welfare protections, and that some protection of villagers exists. But is this protection the same as is granted to other kinds of non-player entities?

III.I.III Villagers, in the context of the law and customs of Redmont, are distinct from mere animals​

Now that we have traced through the law of villagers, we shall also trace through the law of animals as it pertains to villagers, comparing and contrasting this with those laws which have applied to villagers.

III.I.III.I Examining the Original Law
Animal overcrowding restrictions pre-date the passage of the Freedom of Villagers Act, which subjected villagers "to the animal overcrowding restrictions". A copy of the Original Law, as it pertains to overcrowding restrictions, is found in the rejected Bubbarc's Law Revision act 2020, which contains the original law's text regarding overcrowding as follows:

"Any animal farm, regioned or not, must have no less than four blocks per animal. (Chickens require a minimum of two blocks). An individual can not have over 300 animals/mobs in total".
-First Offence: Verbal Warning + 24 hours to fix issues.
-Second Offence: $500 fine + 10 Minutes Jail + Excess animals euthanised.
-Third Offence: $1000 fine + 15 Minutes Jail + All animals euthanised.

The Original Law thus referred to "animals/mobs" in its overcrowding limit. What did the law mean when it included both animals and mobs explicitly?

The District Court seeks thus to understand the meaning of this Original Law, and does so through a textual basis. We then trace a historical path from this Original Law to the present through an examination of legislative history.

III.I.III.II On a textual basis, the Original Law distinguished animals and certain other mobs
Supreme Court has endorsed an anti-surplusage canon (see: In re [2025] FCR 123 | [2026] SCR 5, "Not wanting to render Congress’s language redundant or relegate statutory text to mere surplusage, we interpret the first part of the provision to avoid redundancy"), and the District Court here interprets the phrase in line with the principles of verba cum effectu sunt accipienda. Thus, the word "animals" and the word "mobs" must each give rise to unique meaning; neither are redundant, and neither can mean quite the same thing.

In that light, the District Court reads the Original Law to have distinguished between "animals" and "mobs" generally. Certain mobs were considered to be animals under the law, but there were other non-animal mobs in existence.

III.I.III.III Legislative history, likewise, points to a distinction in status between animals and villagers
Reading statutes passed early in Redmont's history confirms that "animal" and "villager" are treated as separate categories under the law.

• The Freedom of Villagers Act, proposed in July 2021, made a change from a prior state in order to subject villagers "to the animal overcrowding restrictions". Villagers were thus likely not presumed to be mere animals prior to the passage of the law.
• Villager overcrowding (or, "Neglect"; see Tougher Neglect Act) was treated differently than the contemporaneous penalties for animals (see Bubbarc's Law Revision act 2020, quoting the Original Law).
• Pet Murder was a crime by February 2021 (LDV Pet Murder Act), and was subsequently amended to Animal Murder so as to include "livestock and other animals someone may own" (Pet Murder Amendment Act).
• By April 2021, the Crime Severity Act (as amended by the Criminal Classification Revision Act) had separate crimes for "Animal Murder" and "Villager Murder".
• An April 2021 law seeking to combat mass killing of farm animals simply used the term "animals" in defining essential elements of the crime (Mass Animal Murder Act).
• Another April 2021 law prohibited drugging of "an animal (pet, livestock, etc.) without the owner’s consent" (Drugging Criminalization Act), clarifying that "animal" was intended to refer to pets, livestock, and other similar mobs.
• The Animal and Pet Offenses Act distinguished "animal murder" and "villager murder".
• The Criminal Code Act, from its passage through the present day distinguishes between "Unlawful Killing of a Protected Entity" and "Unlawful Killing of a Protected Villager".

This continuity from the Original Law to the present day of a distinction allows the Court to conclude that, in the context of Redmont, villagers are not mere "animals" at plain meaning.

III.I.IV Villagers, in the law and customs of Redmont, are distinct from other kinds of non-player characters​

Having concluded that Villagers are not mere animals, we must ask whether Villagers are similarly distinct from other sorts of non-player characters.

The statutory history of NPCs in Redmont is of less volume than that of Villagers and that of Animals. The NPC Robbery Act, signed in December 2022, created a law protecting non-player characters from robbery. The crime of NPC Robbery was incorporated into the Trespassing and Theft Offenses Act straightaway shortly thereafter, and was substantially incorporated into the Criminal Code Act under the same name.

This Court, however, concludes that Villagers are not ordinary NPCs. Congress has repeatedly singled villagers out since 2020, and the current criminal code still gives villagers dedicated protections against killing. But villagers are also not treated like rights-bearing persons: the old anti-trafficking rule was repealed, the old welfare-style neglect language was abandoned, and the present offense is framed around villagers being "owned by" or "in the care of" a person, business, or government entity. Through the thread of history, villagers have not been granted the same level of rights as ordinary NPCs, such as representing themselves in Court. The District Court declines to expand this here.

III.I.V Villagers possess a sui generis status under the law, but remain property that can be bought and sold​

Villagers, being neither animals, nor citizens, nor other NPCs, thus possess a sui generis status under Redmont law. The status has been explored above in the context of statutes, and this Court seeks to describe the parameters of this status in more plain language.

III.I.V.I Legal Disputes involving villagers have treated villagers as assets, as does present law

Villager-related civil claims dating as far back as 2021 already assumed that villagers are something that can be possessed, and whose loss supports damages for a player.

• In byeSprite v. SonalDonal [2021] DCR 7, the Plaintiff alleged that the defendant's killing of plaintiff's villagers interrupted the business operations, and was granted default judgement.
• In funyolk v. Rossallina [2021] DCR 16, Plaintiff alleged that defendant had killed Plaintiff's animals and villagers in the wild. The Court dismissed the case largely on jurisdictional and procedural grounds, but acknowledged the claim as plausibly regarding damage to property.
• In ChAkselsn v. AcilousS [2021] FCR 83, Plaintiff alleged that defendant had killed 94 of Plaintiff's villagers, stated that villagers were counted as assets on their balance sheet at $5000 per head, and sought compensation for both the book value of villagers and the opportunity cost caused by their loss. The Court, in default judgement, granted all claims and prayers.
• In Milqy v. gad78 [2022] FCR 25, Plaintiff alleged that defendant came onto Plaintiff's wild base and killed Plaintiff's villager. Plaintiff asked for cash in exchange for the value of the villager, and Court granted this in Default judgement.
• In dimitre977 v. Freeze28 [2023] FCR 35, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had threatened Plaintiff's wild base and threatened to kill Plaintiff's villagers there, collecting extortion payments to not do so. The Court found that the law did not prevent these threats in the wild, that there was no evidence of the payments, and found for the Defendant.
• In ANDREASP15 v. LucaaaaMC [2023] FCR 52, Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had killed Plaintiff's villagers in the wild. The Court declined to assert jurisdiction and dismissed the case, saying that the wild was outside of laws.
• In Andreasp15 v. SecuroservYT [2024] FCR 36, Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had killed Plaintiff's villagers at Plaintiff's claimed wild base, causing loss of enjoyment, consequential damages, emotional damages, and warranting punitive damages. The Court granted a default judgement.

The Court did not always assert jurisdiction over claims. But, when it did, the substantial questions of damages awarded to citizens were answered by treating villagers as if they were property, plant, or equipment that had been irreparably damaged. It also acknowledges that live villagers could be owned.
The Criminal Code Act, likewise, acknowledges the possibility that a villager "is owned by" a person. As we have arrived at the present law, we thus have completed our task of weaving a thread through history: live villagers are a kind of chattel that can be lawfully owned.

III.I.V.II Historical protections against slavery did not extend to villagers, and do not extend to villagers in the present

Between the first quarter of 2021 and April of 2025, the law prohibited enslavement of individuals (see: Enslavement Definition Overhaul Act). The Federal Court, in considering the application of the law, wrote as follows:

Slavery, under the Miscellaneous Offences Act, is defined as the following:
The act of subjecting an individual to slavery, in all cases, or involuntary servitude, unless as a punishment for crime.

Slavery, according to the Oxford Dictionary, is defined as the following:
The state of being a slave.

Slave, according to the Oxford Dictionary, is defined as the following:
A person who is forced to work for and obey another and is considered to be their property; an enslaved person.

(lcn v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 35, Order of Dismissal).

The Congress could have included villagers in this, but did not. Villagers do not constitute legal persons, and are referred to as "villagers" under the law rather than "individuals". These protections against slavery and involuntary servitude did not apply to villagers at the time of the FCR's quoted ruling. They likewise do not appear in successor laws, such as in the Criminal Code Act's prohibition on involuntary servitude.

III.I.V.III Villagers can be freely sold and traded

At present, the Criminal Code Act contains no provisions particularly prohibiting, regulating, or restricting the sale or transfer of villagers. While the Original Law prohibited the trafficking of Villagers (see: Section III.I.II of this Verdict), this prohibition was removed by the Congress in 2020. A prohibition on trafficking villagers, having been repealed in 2020, cannot be read back into the law.

Trafficking of villagers, thus, is not merely praeter legem. The history and tradition of the server affirms it as a practice intentionally established by the Congress, which continues through this present day.

III.I.VI Transfer of owned property from oneself to another constitutes consideration under the Contracts Act, even when that property is in the wild​

The Court, having concluded that live villagers are indeed property one can own, must now consider the implications of the villagers at issue in this case having been in the wild at all times relevant to this case (See: Section II.I.II). Does the continued presence of the assets in the wild somehow erase the ability of those assets to be used in consideration for a contract?

We answer in the negative.

While Redmont is "an archipelagic nation consisting of the Reveille Isles" (National Borders Act, Section 4(1)(a)), the Federal Court has recognized that contracts that involve the exchange Redmont Dollars for items or other obligations that exist outside of the Isles themselves are nonetheless valid contracts under Redmont Law.

In Krisztie v. zko0 [2025] FCR 13, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had auctioned a supporter rank in the #marketplace channel on the DemocracyCraft discord server, only to later skimp out on delivery of the rank. The Plaintiff won the auction and paid $47,000 to the defendant. The Court found that, in failing to deliver the supporter rank, the Defendant did breach the contract and granted (among other prayers) the full $47,000 in compensatory damage for breach of contract.

A rank is not a physical good present in the Commonwealth. It is an add-on purchased with real-life currency through the DemocracyCraft store, which applies to a benefit to a player even when that player is in the wild, nether, end, or other areas outside our national borders as defined in the National Borders Act.

This is not the only case to do so. In A__C et al v. Cheapscape [2021] FCR 121, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant, alleging embezzlement. The Defendant had created a cryptocurrency, listed it on the Onyx Exchange, and accepted in-game currency as payment for the currency. The Plaintiff alleged that the cryptocurrency was swiftly pulled from the market, and the Federal Court found that "While pulling a cryptocurrency from a trading platform shortly after it has been floated is not overtly illegal, it could be rightly regarded as an intentionally dishonest scheme" (A__C et al v. Cheapscape [2021] FCR 121, Section III(1)). Even after the coin was removed from the Onyx Exchange, the Federal Court did not find it worthless; "The Federal Court does not agree that the value of the cryptocurrency is $0. The cryptocurrency is still in existence and therefore it has the capacity to still be of value" (id. Section III(3)). And, in light of the swift rug pulling, the Federal Court "determine[d] that a misrepresentation at contract formation took place, causing the Plaintiff a loss" (id., Section III(4)).

Cryptocurrency is plainly not a physical good that exists in the national borders of Redmont. It has no representation in-game, and simply cannot ever be within Redmont. And, yet, the Federal Court appears to have considered such cryptocurrency as sufficient consideration for a contract, its value to be non-zero in terms of Redmont Dollars, and even ordered recission as a contract-related remedy (id., Section IV).

In short, while "[a] contract is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties that creates an obligation to do or not do a particular thing" (Contracts Act, Section 4(1)), that obligation to do or not do a particular thing does not have to be within the national borders of Redmont. Foreign currency (GraprielJuice V. Aesyr [2025] DCR 100), cryptocurrency (A__C et al v. Cheapscape [2021] FCR 12), and even things requiring a party to make a purchase with real money (Krisztie v. zko0 [2025] FCR 13) have been held to be consideration.

Applying these principles to this case, even the villagers being in the wild at the time of the contract's agreement, and the pickup instructions being in a wild location, do not abrogate the consideration. The obligation on the defendant to provide the villagers to the Plaintiff remain binding, in line with well-established Court precedent.

III.II On what the applicable law is for each claim​

Plaintiff provided two claims for relief, which are quoted below:

1. The auction was a valid contract between both parties. Superwoops fulfilled his end by paying $5,000 to the Defendant. In turn, the Defendant has not fulfilled their contractual obligations. The Plaintiff asks the Court to assist the Defendant in fulfilling his contractual obligations. This is upheld in Lawsuit: Adjourned - GraprielJuice V. Aesyr [2025] DCR 100.
2. The deprivation of the three villagers harmed the Plaintiff's future earning capacity from December 9th to the present day, over two months.

(Compl., Section 3).

The Court is a bit puzzled. Neither claim cites any statute, so this Court shall attempt to fill in the gaps to determine whether either claim is cognizable.

The Redmont Civil Code Act codified the civil code in one law; other statutes, by themselves, no longer could be brought as civil causes of action following its passage. As to previous claims at Common law, the RCCA preserved pre-existing common law torts as actionable, though identified that its text would take precedence over old Common Law torts to the extent of inconsistency:

3. Codification of Civil Law
(1) This Code constitutes a non-exhaustive listing of civil violations within the jurisdiction of Redmont.
(a) Nothing in this Code prevents a plaintiff from seeking remedy for harm not explicitly codified, where common law principles or judicial precedent support such a claim.
(b) Existing common law torts already established shall remain actionable unless expressly abolished by this Code.
(c) Where this Code addresses the same subject matter as a common law tort, the provisions of this Code shall take precedence to the extent of any inconsistency.

(2) Any civil violation purportedly created by another Act of Congress shall be null and void unless incorporated as an amendment to this Code.

(RCCA, Part II, Section 3).

What's more, when another law conflicts with the RCCA, the RCCA prevails with limited exceptions not applicable to this case:

4. Conflict of Laws
(1) Where any other Act, regulation, directive, or rule conflicts with a provision of this Code, this Code shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency,

(RCCA, Part II, Section 4).

The question posed to this Court becomes what law to apply to the claims in this case. Does the RCCA apply, or do civil causes of action available prior to the RCCA remain available to the facts of this case?

III.II.I The law must be applied as it was at the time of the contract's formation​

The Federal Court has held that ex post facto application of civil legislation is generally restricted:

The Constitution does not contain an express ex post facto clause, yet retroactive civil legislation of that kind is generally constitutionally impermissible by reference to several foundational provisions. The analysis begins with R. Const § 35(14), which guarantees every citizen the right to liberty and security of the person, not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Fundamental justice is not a hollow phrase. It imports the principle that law must be knowable and certain at the time a citizen acts upon it. A person who enters into a bond contract, purchases a financial security, or litigates a dispute to judgment does so in reliance on the legal framework as it exists at that moment. Retroactive legislation that alters, extinguishes, or restructures those rights after the fact deprives that citizen of something they lawfully acquired without affording them any opportunity to conform their conduct to the new legal reality. This is the essential constitutional injury of ex post facto civil law, and it is squarely captured by the fundamental justice guarantee of Section 35(14).

(Vendeka Inc. and Pepecuu v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 107, Opinion of the Court, No. 4).

The Federal Court, in other words, found that retroactive application of law to contracts, financial instruments, and litigation causes constitutional injury. As that Court has original jurisdiction over "questions of constitutionality" (Const., Section 18(1)(a)), the District Court will follow in this precedent.

The law applicable to this contractual dispute, therefore, is the law as it was at the time that the contract became legally binding upon the parties thereto. As the relevant factual events referred to (directly or indirectly) in the claims for relief all essentially pre-date the entrance of the RCCA and RCCAA into law, this Court will evaluate the law as it was prior to the RCCA and RCCAA.

III.II.II The plaintiff's first claim asserts breach of contract​

The first claim cites GraprielJuice V. Aesyr [2025] DCR 100, a case which went to default judgement and in which the Plaintiff's statement contained in the complaint alleged "breach of contract" (GraprielJuice V. Aesyr [2025] DCR 100, Compl., Written Statement from the Plaintiff). The Court thus evaluates this as a claim for breach of contract.

Under the law at all times relevant to this case, "breach of contract occurs when a party fails to fulfill its contractual obligations" (Contracts Act, Section 7(1)). Under that law prior to the passage of the RCCAA, "Remedies for breach may include damages, specific performance, or other equitable relief" (Id.., Section 7(a), see Redmont Civil Code Amendments Act for amendment removing this from the Contracts Act).

The Court, in assessing liability and relief, will thus apply this law in our analysis.

III.II.III The plaintiff's second claim for relief is not separately cognizable from the first​

The second claim cites no precedent, no statutes, and does not sufficiently identify to the Court what tort is alleged if that tort is separate from the breach of contract. The Plaintiff, in essence, alleges that the breach of contract in the first claim for relief allegedly "harmed the Plaintiff's future earning capacity".

In the absence of a statute, any references to prior cases, or other discernable hints in the Plaintiff's filing, the Court finds that the legal harm here is not sufficiently pleaded to be handled separately from that of the first claim - the breach of contract itself - and does not find a separate cognizable claim for relief. The two claims, thus, are consolidated into one for our analysis on liability and damages below.

III.III On Liability​

"This Court deals with actionable harms borne of a legal fault" (Maxib02 v. NovaKerbal [2026] DCR 11, Post No. 115, Order of Dismissal). Thus, the Court now examines: what legal faults, if any, have occurred?

III.III.I Defendant's deportation caused frustration as to the consummation of the contract, and rendered the contract voidable, but neither party sought to void the contract for frustration​

As the Federal Court has noted, "Under the Contracts Act, A contract may be terminated by frustration, which is defined as 'the occurrence of an event that makes the performance of a contract impossible or radically different from what was initially contemplated'" (MegaMinerM v. Blazora Corporation [2025] FCR 27).

That language of "may be terminated" (Contracts Act, Section 9(1)) is permissive, not mandatory. The law does not say that a contract must be terminated for frustration, nor that it shall be terminated in case of frustration. The Congress, thus, provided flexibility: while a contract may be terminated for the reasons given in 9(1), it needn't necessarily be.

In other words: merely because a contract is voidable does not make that contract void. Whereas a void contract is considered void ab initio, meaning it never had legal validity, a voidable contract is valid and enforceable upon creation but can be invalidated at a subsequent point.

The question then becomes: when this permissive language is used, towards whom is the permission? In the greater context of the law, and as "[a] contract is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties" (id. Section 4(1)), the District Court reads the permissive language as granting this flexibility to each party to the contract.

The Court record is silent as to whether either party has attempted to terminate the contract for frustration. As such, this Court does not find that frustration has abrogated the liability of the defendant, as the record does not reflect that defendant has voided the contract and, being deported, he lacks rights to do so.

III.III.II The Court cannot conclude that Force Majeure, under Contracts Act §13, would apply to the Defendant​

In certain cases, a contract party may temporarily suspend contractual obligations for a force majeure event:

13 - Force Majeure
(1) Notification and Mitigation. The party affected by a force majeure event must promptly inform the other party and diligently take steps to minimise its impact on the contract.
(2) Temporary Suspension. During a force majeure event, the affected party may temporarily suspend contractual duties to the extent that the situation significantly hinders their ability to fulfill obligations.
(3) Termination Right. Should the force majeure event persist, either party retains the right to terminate the contract without incurring liability.
(4) Bankruptcy and other events where there has been negligence, acceptance of unnecessary risk, or mismanagement are not considered force majeure events.

(Contracts Act, Section 13).

The Court Record does not contain any information suggesting that the Defendant informed the Plaintiff of a force majeure event, nor that the Defendant took steps to minimize the impact of such event on the contract. As such, this Court cannot conclude that Defendant was temporarily relieved from contractual obligations due to force majeure.

III.III.III Defendant breached contract with the Plaintiff​

Having discarded that this contract was voided for frustration, or temporarily suspended for force majeure, the Court now turns to whether Defendant materially breached the terms of the contract.

The contract's core terms were simple: the Plaintiff would pay $5,000, and the Defendant would make 3 villagers available for the Plaintiff to transport away from a location northeast of Sandy Shores (Section II.I.III). Plaintiff upheld his end of the deal and, while Defendant attempted to complete his end of the deal (Section II.I.IV), Defendant's untimely deportation prevented him from ultimately completing his end of the deal (Section II.I.V).

A "breach of contract occurs when a party fails to fulfill its contractual obligations" (Contracts Act, Section 7(1)). In this case, by failing to complete the transaction with the Plaintiff, the Defendant failed to fulfill his contractual obligations.

III.IV On Damages​

III.IV.I Compensatory Damages are granted in part​

As has been found above, the Defendant has failed to provide the Plaintiff with property lawfully owed to the Plaintiff. This property, in this case, was the three villagers. When assessing compensatory damages for loss of property, "compensation should be limited to the current market value of the property" (YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76, Order of the Court, "II. RETURN OF PROPERTY AND RESTITUTION", Par. 2, internal quotation marks omitted).

The Plaintiff provided evidence that a single villager spawn egg was offered for sale in January 2026 at a price of $8,000 (Section II.IV). Plaintiff uses this as evidence to argue that "The current value of three villagers is $24,000" (Compl., factual allegation No. 8).

The Court finds that there are differences between a live villager and a villager egg. As reflected in the record, transportation and re-sale of live villagers may pose logistical issues (see: Section II.I.IV; Compl., Exhibits P-006 and P-007). A villager egg, on the other hand, can simply be placed in one's inventory and carried around. Differences in utility of ease-of-transport would cut against the value of a villager relative to a villager egg.

Thus, while live villagers are similar goods to villager eggs, using the price of a single sale of a villager egg as a proxy for the market price of a live villager would seem likely to overstate the price of a villager.

The Court therefore declines to use the price of a villager egg as a proxy for the cost of a live villager. Rather, the Court shall use the actual sale price of the three live villagers as a measure of their worth. And, with that measuring stick, the market value of the three live villagers is $5,000.

A sum of $5,000 shall be awarded to the Plaintiff in compensatory damages.

III.IV.II Nominal Damages are insufficiently pleaded to be granted​

The nominal damages prayer essentially appears to be a prayer to provide the Plaintiff with compensation for opportunity cost, including (a) "harm of the Plaintiff's future earning capacity had the Plaintiff come into possession of the three villagers back in December" and (b) compensation for the opportunity cost of $5,000 of the Plaintiff's rightful assets being held by the Defendant pending verdict.

Under the Legal Damages Act, nominal damages may not be awarded when other damages are granted; "'Nominal damages' are a trivial sum of money awarded to a party who has established a cause of action but has not established that they are entitled to any other damages listed in this act" (Legal Damages Act, Section 6(1)(a), emphasis mine). As Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to compensatory damages in this case, and such damages are awarded, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded why nominal damages would be available under the law.

As such, nominal damages are not granted.

III.IV.III Legal Fees are warranted commensurate with the actual award​

An award of $5,000 has been given for Breach of Contract, but not for the unnamed Common Law tort alleged by the Plaintiff. In assessing legal fees, we must apply the law at the time of the breach, which was the Legal Damages Act. Under that law, a minimum of $2,000 in legal fees for victors of cases in the District Court would be awarded (Legal Damages Act, Section 9(3)(c)); legal fees were ordinarily at 30% of actual award otherwise (id., Section 9(2)(c)). As "legal fees should be measured against the actual recovery" (YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76, Opinion of the Court, Section VI, Par. 2), and 30% of $5,000 is less than $2,000, this Court awards the statutory minimum of $2,000 in legal fees.

IV. Order of the Court​

The Court finds in favor of the Plaintiff and grants a modified prayer for relief:

1. Defendant Trentrick_Lamar is liable to Plaintiff Superwoops in the amount of $5,000 in compensatory damages, plus legal fees of $2,000, for a total of $7,000.

So Ordered,
Judge Multi