Appeal: Pending In re [2026] FCR 65 | [2026] SCR 23

[Dartanboy]

Client and Counsel Name: Dartanboy

I am representing myself

Appealed Case Name & Style: [2026] FCR 65

Were you originally the plaintiff or defendant: Plaintiff

Reason for Appeal: The Federal Court made one error of fact and one error of law:

(Error of Fact)
1. The Court incorrectly decided that "JO" must mean "Judicial Officer."

Other well-known meanings of "JO" include the country code for the foreign nation of Jordan, an abbreviation for "Job Offer", and abbreviation for "Junior Olympics." It is also in the lyrics of Nicki Minaj's famous song "Tusa" (KAROL G & Nicki Minaj – Tusa). To determine that it must mean "Judicial Officer" is simply unjust.

(Error of Law)
2. The court found that "Breaching of the JO" means "a violation of Part II Section 21 of the Constitution."

This is a blatant misreading of the Article of Impeachment.

In no way was there any specification in the Article of Impeachment what Constitutional Provisions were allegedly violated. The impeachment stated only "to impeach Dartanboy from his position of Federal Judge due to breaches of the JO."

"Breaches of the JO" is far too vague, even if we do pretend that "JO" must exclusively mean "Judicial Officer." What provision was allegedly violated? How was it specified? If it is (somehow) Part II Section 21 that was alleged in the Impeachment, which provision within that entire section was allegedly violated?

Such specification is required by Constitution Part VIII Section 48.

Are you requesting oral arguments? No, I have too much happening IRL at the moment.

Additional Evidence/Information: Constitution Part VIII Section 48:

48. Impeachment
Impeachment is a constitutional remedy to address serious constitutional offenses.

(1) The House will lay charges against an official or an ex-official, specifying what constitutional provisions were violated.

(2) Any impeached official or ex-official will be subject to a trial that will be conducted by the Senate. If found guilty of any alleged constitutional offence by the Senate, the official or ex-official in question may be subject to:

(a) Immediate removal from office.

(b) Ban from elected office for a period of no longer than 2 months.

(c) Ban from judicial office for a period of no longer than 2 months.

(d) Ban from executive office for a period of no longer than 2 months.

 

[Muggy21]

@Dartanboy

As per for the Appeal Format, you must indicate whether or not you seek oral argument.

 

[Dartanboy]

@Dartanboy

As per for the Appeal Format, you must indicate whether or not you seek oral argument.

My apologies, your honor.

I suppose yes, I seek oral argument. Unless this must take place in VC or in-game (I'm currently dealing with a lot IRL). Then no. It's not perfectly clear what this means. It is not defined in the appeal format post.

 

[Smallfries]

My apologies, your honor.

I suppose yes, I seek oral argument. Unless this must take place in VC or in-game (I'm currently dealing with a lot IRL). Then no. It's not perfectly clear what this means. It is not defined in the appeal format post.

Oral means in a VC, and typically in-game. Everything not done in a VC is textual, not oral. I understand that the click-to-appeal button is not up to date, but please update your initial filing to the listed format.

 

[Dartanboy]

Oral means in a VC, and typically in-game. Everything not done in a VC is textual, not oral. I understand that the click-to-appeal button is not up to date, but please update your initial filing to the listed format.

I have changed the OP as requested.

 

[Muggy21]

I'll be the presiding officer in this matter.

The Supreme Court grants review to this appeal. The Attorney General shall be summoned to represent the Appellee.

@Dartanboy Do you wish to make an Appellate Brief beyond your original submission?

 

[Dartanboy]

@Dartanboy Do you wish to make an Appellate Brief beyond your original submission?

I don't suppose so.

 

[Muggy21]

Writ of Summons

@Matthew100x is commanded to appear in the Supreme Court in the appeal of In re [2026] FCR 65 | [2026] SCR 23. You're advised to respond with you Respondent's Brief on arrival within 72 Hours.

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

[Matthew100x]

Brief

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT​

In re [2026] FCR 65 | [2026] SCR 23

Dartanboy
Appellant

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Respondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF​

May it please the Court:

Attorney General Matthew100x, appearing on behalf of the Commonwealth of Redmont, respectfully submits this Respondent's Brief and requests that the Supreme Court affirm the judgment of the Federal Court.

I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED​

The Appellant raises two alleged errors:

1. Whether the Federal Court committed an error of fact when it determined that, in the context of an impeachment of a Federal Judge, the abbreviation "JO" referred to "Judicial Officer."
2. Whether the Federal Court committed an error of law when it determined that the impeachment language "breaches of the JO" sufficiently identified Part II, § 21 of the Constitution for purposes of the House's constitutional obligation to specify the constitutional provision allegedly violated.

The answer to both questions is no.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY​

The Appellant commenced the underlying civil action seeking to invalidate a House impeachment motion stating that he was being impeached from his position as a Federal Judge "due to breaches of the JO."

The Commonwealth answered the Complaint and moved for summary judgment. The Appellant subsequently expressly agreed to summary judgment. The Federal Court granted the motion and ultimately entered judgment for the Commonwealth. The Court determined that "JO," when read in context, referred to "Judicial Officer" and that "breaches of the JO" could reasonably be read as alleging a breach of Part II, § 21 of the Constitution. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Dartanboy v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2026] FCR 65. See also Government - Constitution).

Summary judgment is appropriate when no real disagreement exists concerning a material fact. (see Rule 9.1, Information - Court Rules and Procedures). Here, the Appellant expressly agreed to summary judgment, leaving the Federal Court to resolve the legal consequences flowing from the established record.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW​

Questions of law are reviewed de novo. (see Rule 8.2 (de novo), Information - Court Rules and Procedures).

To the extent the Appellant challenges the Federal Court's factual determination concerning the meaning of "JO," the Appellant must demonstrate clear or plain error. Under that standard, the alleged error must be clear or plain, affect constitutional rights, and impact the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. (see Rule 8.2 (clear error), Information - Court Rules and Procedures).

Furthermore, reviewing courts must resolve an appeal on the arguments presented in the appellate briefing, subject to the limited constitutional and manifest-injustice exceptions provided by rule. (see § 8.5, Information - Court Rules and Procedures).

IV. ARGUMENT​

A. The Federal Court Did Not Commit Clear Error by Determining that "JO" Meant "Judicial Officer."​

The Appellant first argues that the Federal Court committed an error of fact because "JO" can theoretically carry meanings other than "Judicial Officer." The Appellant proposes examples including Jordan, "Job Offer," "Junior Olympics," and references to popular music. Those alternative meanings do not establish error because words and abbreviations are interpreted in their context.

The impeachment motion concerned removing the Appellant specifically from his position as a Federal Judge. The Constitution expressly identifies Judges as Judicial Officers and contains an entire constitutional provision entitled "Judicial Officers." (see Part II, § 21; Part VIII, § 40, Government - Constitution).

Likewise, the Judicial Standards Act defines a "Judicial Officer" as including a Judge. (see Part I, § 3(1)(c), Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act).

Thus, when the House moved "to impeach Dartanboy from his position of Federal Judge due to breaches of the JO," the Federal Court reasonably interpreted "JO" as "Judicial Officer." The surrounding language directly concerned the Appellant's judicial office.

The Appellant's proposed alternative definitions do not become reasonable simply because those letters can carry different meanings in entirely unrelated contexts. Nothing in the record reasonably suggests that Congress sought to impeach a Federal Judge for a breach involving Jordan, a job offer, the Junior Olympics, or a song lyric.

The Appellant also bore the burden as Plaintiff in the underlying civil action to establish his claim on a balance of probabilities. (see Part II, § 2(1)(a), § 3(1)(a), Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act). He did not establish that "JO" referred to anything other than Judicial Officer, and he ultimately agreed that the dispute could be resolved through summary judgment.

Accordingly, the first asserted error provides no basis for reversal.

B. The Federal Court Correctly Determined that the House Identified a Constitutional Provision Capable of Supporting Impeachment.​

The Appellant next argues that, even assuming "JO" means "Judicial Officer," the House failed to satisfy the Constitution because the impeachment motion did not expressly identify "Part II, § 21."

The Constitution does not impose such a formalistic citation requirement.

Part VIII, § 48 provides that the House "will lay charges against an official or an ex-official, specifying what constitutional provisions were violated." (see Part VIII, § 48(1), Government - Constitution).

Section 48(1) requires the House to specify the constitutional provision allegedly violated. It does not require the House to state a part number, section number, subsection number, or provide a formal legal citation.

Here, the House alleged "breaches of the JO." Once "JO" is properly understood as "Judicial Officer," the constitutional provision being invoked becomes identifiable.

Part II, § 21 is expressly entitled "Judicial Officers." It establishes constitutional responsibilities applicable to members of the judiciary, including that Judicial Officers "are responsible for presiding over and delivering unbiased verdicts in all lawsuits." (see Part II, § 21, Government - Constitution).

The impeachment therefore alleged a breach of a constitutional provision that both exists and directly regulates the office from which the Appellant was being impeached.

Requiring Congress additionally to write "Part II, § 21" would impose a procedural requirement that § 48(1) itself does not contain. The constitutional inquiry is whether the charge specified a constitutional provision, not whether Congress used a preferred citation format.

The Federal Court therefore correctly concluded that "breaches of the JO" could reasonably be read as alleging a violation of Part II, § 21.

Accordingly, the second asserted error provides no basis for reversal.

C. Krix v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] SCR 8 Does Not Require Reversal.​

The Federal Court also correctly distinguished Krix v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] SCR 8.

Krix concerned an impeachment conviction that lacked a constitutional basis. The Supreme Court ultimately vacated that impeachment because the constitutional offense underlying the conviction had not legally occurred. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Krix v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] SCR 8). The present controversy is materially different.

Here, the challenged governmental action is the House's act of laying charges, not a Senate conviction based upon conduct that could not legally constitute the alleged offense. The House alleged a breach of obligations attached to Judicial Officers, and the Constitution contains an identifiable provision governing Judicial Officers and imposing duties upon them. Krix establishes that an impeachment conviction cannot stand without a constitutional basis. It does not require the House to prove the ultimate merits of an impeachment charge before the Senate conducts the constitutionally prescribed trial. The Federal Court therefore correctly declined to extend Krix beyond its holding.

V. CONCLUSION​

The Appellant has identified no reversible error.

The Federal Court reasonably determined from the context of the impeachment that "JO" meant "Judicial Officer." The Appellant's identification of unrelated alternative meanings does not demonstrate clear error.

On the question of law, the Federal Court also reached the correct conclusion. Part VIII, § 48(1) requires the House to specify the constitutional provision allegedly violated, but it does not mandate numerical citation to a particular part, section, or subsection. "Breaches of the JO," in an impeachment expressly removing the Appellant from his position as a Federal Judge, sufficiently identified the constitutional provision governing Judicial Officers—Part II, § 21.

Whether the Appellant actually breached that provision is a question for the Senate at an impeachment trial pursuant to Part VIII, § 48(2), not a condition precedent to the House laying charges.

For those reasons, the Commonwealth respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the judgment of the Federal Court and DENY the appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

Matthew100x
Attorney General
Counsel for the Commonwealth of Redmont

 

[Muggy21]

Thank you Attorney General,

@Dartanboy If you so desire, you have 72 Hours to present a Reply Brief.

 

[Dartanboy]

Thank you Attorney General,

@Dartanboy If you so desire, you have 72 Hours to present a Reply Brief.

Could I receive a 72 hour extension due to being out of town for a funeral?

 

[Muggy21]

Could I receive a 72 hour extension due to being out of town for a funeral?

You have until 8/21/26 at 9pm EDT.

 

[Dartanboy]

You have until 8/21/26 at 9pm EDT.

Your honor,

I deeply apologize but my car started overheating on the way back today and I'm currently passing a kidney stone.

Could I get a final 48 hour extension?

 

[Muggy21]

Your honor,

I deeply apologize but my car started overheating on the way back today and I'm currently passing a kidney stone.

Could I get a final 48 hour extension?

Granted post hoc. Deadline is now 8/23/26 at 9pm EDT.

Your kidney stone is ordered to leave by 8/22/26 at 4pm EDT.

 

[Dartanboy]

Brief

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
IN RE [2026] FCR 65 | [2026] SCR 23

I apologize for the subpar formatting of this post. I am writing this on my phone due to my continued IRL circumstances.

Regrettably, my kidney stone has not moved on.

PART I - BURDEN OF PROOF / MEANING OF JO
The Commonwealth incorrectly places the burden of proof on me. As an Impeachment requires a charge made by the Commonwealth, the burden of proof falls on the Commonwealth.

Even so, they could have said "Breaches of the QWERTYUIOP" and certainly there is nothing I can do to prove that QWERTYUIOP doesn't mean "Qualified Warden of Evidence, Rules, and Trials, who Yields Unbiased Interpretations, Orders and Penalties." Is it somehow impossible to appeal that impeachment? It is important for the Congress to speak clearly and not use unknown or unofficial acronyms that could mean anything.

PART II - A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION VIOLATION MUST BE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED
The Commonwealth claims "The Appellant next argues that, even assuming "JO" means "Judicial Officer," the House failed to satisfy the Constitution because the impeachment motion did not expressly identify "Part II, § 21."

The Constitution does not impose such a formalistic citation requirement."

While it is true that no such formal citation is required, the Commonwealth's Penumbral Right to Due Process (explained in Part III) would require some sort of legible charge that indicates where in the Constitution I could find the provision I allegedly violated.

Again, claiming that "JO" must certainly mean "Judicial Officer" is not valid, but even if it is "Judicial Officer" is not itself a provision of the Constitution, and even if it somehow pointed to Part II, Section 21, that is far too broad to be considered a legible charge that could be understood, as it contains many, many clauses and fails to afford due process to me.

PART III - THE PENUMBRAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
The Constitution (see Constitution, Part V, Section 35) establishes a right to Due Process, not explicitly, but through the other rights which are explicitly established:

- All accused are entitled to appeal a charge made against them by the state (Right 4).
- Every citizen has the right to not produce self-incriminating evidence in any situation. In criminal matters, no adverse inferences may be made from this right being exercised, specifically such that the exercise of this right in itself shall not be weighted when determining a verdict in criminal Court (Right 5).
- Rights cannot be withheld on the basis of criminality, rights are inalienable (Right 7).
- Any citizen, criminal or otherwise will have the right to a speedy and fair trial presided over by an impartial Judicial Officer, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted with the evidence against them, and to have the assistance of legally qualified counsel for their defence (Right 9).
- Every citizen is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without unfair discrimination and, in particular, without unfair discrimination based on political belief or social status (Right 13).
- Every citizen has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure (Right 15).
- No citizen shall be tried or punished again for an offence regarding a single criminal act for which they have already been finally convicted or acquitted, in accordance with the law (Right 16).
- Every citizen has the right to be informed of the reason for a subpoena, detention, or arrest made against them (Right 17).

A penumbral right is a right which exists in the periphery of the explicitly stated rights of the Constitution, and all of these aforementioned rights create the penumbra in which the Right to Due Process resides.

The idea of penumbral rights originally came from examining various rights related to privacy in the USA which led to the US Supreme Court finding a penumbral right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) (see Griswold v. Connecticut | Constitution Center).

I wish to emphasize that I am not using  Griswold to establish any of its decision as Redmontian law, but to show the idea of a Penumbral Right is a very real legal theory that can apply to the rights in the Redmontian Constitution as well.

PART IV - KRIX
As the Commonwealth already stated: "The Supreme Court ultimately vacated that impeachment because the constitutional offense underlying the conviction had not legally occurred. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Krix v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] SCR 8)."

In the present case, there is simply no Constitutional Offense alleged whatsoever. It is even more egregious and illegal an Impeachment than what occurred in  Krix (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Krix v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] SCR 8).