Appeal: Denied In re [2026] FCR 26 | [2026] SCR 10

[ameslap]

Client Name: Ameslap
Counsel Name: Ameslap (self-representing)
Were you originally the plaintiff or the defendant: Plaintiff
Reason for Appeal:
The Federal Court erred in dismissing [2026] FCR 26 for lack of standing by applying an overly narrow definition of injury. The Court concluded that no injury exists because the treaty has not been formally enforced. However, this conclusion fails to account for the actual effects arising from the treaty's existence and implementation framework.

The treaty, by its own terms, purports to establish a legal structure governing diplomatic relations, including embassy authority, sovereignty, and conduct. Since its signing, that framework has already influenced behavior within Redmont. Embassy property has been marked and treated as subject to foreign authority, access has been restricted or controlled by foreign representatives, and government officials have deferred inquiries regarding the embassy to foreign officials.

Even where officials assert that the treaty is not yet formally in force, the conduct of Redmontian and Alexandrian officials shows that the treaty is being used as the basis for organizing authority and regulating interactions. This creates a present legal effect and alters the conditions under which citizens operate. Satisfying the requirement that a plaintiff be "affected by an application of law".

Additionally, the existence of the treaty has already resulted in conflicting and unclear assertions of legal authority within Redmont, including public representations that foreign law applies within the Embassy despite the ratification of the treaty not taking place. This ambiguity itself constitutes a concrete injury, as it affects citizens' understanding of their rights, obligations, and access in Redmont.

The Federal Court improperly treated the treaty as inactive nd required completed enforcement to establish standing. The Supreme Court precedent cited in [2025] FCR 11 Appeal does not impose that requirement, and instead recognized that even minimal effects or benefits conferred by a legal framework are sufficient to establish injury. By failing to consider the treaty's current influence on conduct and authority, the Court misapplied the standing rule.

Are you requesting oral arguments: Yes.

Additional Information:
The Appellant will demonstrate that the treaty conflicts with the law that existed at the time of its signing and the current law. Under the International Treaties Act, treaties require legislative approval to have legal force, yet the treaty at issue states an immediate effect upon signature, creating a clear inconsistency between executive action and law.

This conflict has already produced real effects. Embassy property was marked with signage asserting foreign law, access is controlled by foreign representatives, and Redmont officials have deferred inquiries to foreign ones. While the government claims the treaty is not formally in force, these practices show that it is already influencing conduct and perception of authority within Redmont.

The Appellant will further argue that there is no clear statutory basis for these asserted powers, creating legal ambiguity that affects citizens' understanding of their rights and access. This present effect, combined with the treaty's claimed authority, satisfies the injury requirement and warrants judicial review.

 

[Smallfries]

Renamed and moved in compliance with Supreme Court operations.

 

[Kaiserin_]

Verdict

Associate Justice Anthropy writes the majority opinion of the Court. Associate Justice Matthew100x dissents.

Appellant Ameslap appeals the sua sponte dismissal of Ameslap v. Commonwealth [2026] FCR 36. In so pursuing, Appellant argues on point of law that the trial court erred in applying the precedent of [2025] FCR 117 - Appeal, citing alleged application of law suffered from the supposed signature of the SC-DC Treaty (“the treaty”) without prior Senatorial approval. Specifically, Appellant argues that the marking of Redmontian territory as subject to foreign authority, and the enforcement thereof, constitute an application of law sufficient to fulfill the standing application required for a case to be heard.

In a 2-1 decision, the Supreme Court refuses to grant certiorari in this appeal.

I. The Nature of Treaties​

One fact is immediately obvious to the Court: treaties are not law. They are distinct from law in both the process by which they come into effect and the nature of the effect that they can confer. In the first place, a treaty does not meet the procedural requirements outlined by the Constitution for the creation of legislation. A law must first arise as a bill in the House of Representatives, be passed by the Senate, and then be signed by the President. Const. Part I. The passage of a treaty, in contrast, requires only ratification by the Senate and presidential signature (or that of a delegate), cutting out the House entirely. Further, the creation of treaties is noted separately from that of legislation in the Constitution. Const. Part I § 2(1) & (8); Part III § 24(3) & (11). Because of this fact, a treaty cannot, under any circumstance, create a unique legislative effect. A treaty can only be construed as an agreement between the Commonwealth of Redmont and another nation to carry out certain obligations. In other words, a treaty cannot confer any new power upon the government which it could not already exercise, and does not have force of law - it can only create the responsibility to exercise such a power. Perhaps if such an obligation is conferred and subsequently goes unfollowed, this could give rise to a legal claim; though the Court does not delve any further into this issue at this time.

Seeing that treaties do not carry the force of law, it is therefore clear that whatever actions taken that fulfill the obligations required by treaties must arise from statutory or constitutional powers that the government already holds. Any treaty that attempts to create a new power must be implemented through legislation by Congress. The exercise of an obligation given rise to by a treaty may, of course, be challenged as unconstitutional itself. However, because implementation of those powers requires Congressional action, the mere signature of the treaty cannot be construed as having force of law.

II. Application & Standing​

In the instant case, Appellant presents the argument that the SC-DC Treaty affected the actions of the government, thereby creating an application of law that gives way to standing. It is clear to this Court that this is not the case. It is true that the Plaintiff need not have been personally affected by the alleged application of law in order to challenge it, and that the bar for standing regarding government actions is exceedingly low. See [2025] FCR 117 Appeal, Part I. However, we do not believe that this bar is sufficiently met here. Even setting aside whether or not any action did occur in response to the Vice President’s signature of the treaty alone, we do not see a way in which this could be construed as an application of law arising itself from the treaty. As discussed supra, any action taken by the government in response to a treaty must be one that it already holds the power to exercise. If indeed the government holds the authority to treat Redmontian property as Alexandrian, it would be able to do so with or without the treaty. Whether or not the government does in fact hold that power is irrelevant to the case, and we do not rule on it at this time. Appellant does not argue that the underlying actions were unconstitutional in and of themselves - only that their exercise in response to the mere signature of the treaty was illegitimate. This is plainly not true. Again, perhaps if the treaty was signed and ratified, and the government failed to take the required actions, a claim would arise. The opposite, however - that the government took action without a treaty requiring it - cannot give rise to such a claim. If it could, any interaction with the international community not required by a signed and ratified treaty would be illegitimate. This Court finds that interpretation highly improbable. Instead, we must conclude that the government may interact with other nations in any way it so chooses, treaty or not, within the bounds of its typical authority. That the underlying actions may have been influenced by the as-of-then-unsigned treaty does not add complication. It is typical that upcoming obligations affect the current actions of government officials, such as when the Executive prepares to implement obligations required by legislation soon to come into effect. That preparation, while influenced by obligations that the government does not yet have to follow, cannot be construed as illegitimate.

In sum, the trial court’s application of [2025] FCR 117 - Appeal is correct. The signature, or lack thereof, of the treaty did not cause any specific application of law, because the actions allegedly taken in response to it lack a sufficient legal relation to the treaty, regardless of whether or not its existence spurred the government to take those actions. While Appellant has cause to sue - specifically arising from the alleged illegitimacy of the treaty - no harm or benefit has been conferred by that treaty that did not already exist. While FCR 117 does cite “obligation” as a potential harm or benefit that can give rise to standing, it is clear that the presence or absence here of any obligation does not affect whether or not the government actions cited by Appellant could take place. Thus, there is no practical effect to that unimplemented obligation that could confer a material harm or benefit.

III. Dissent​

The majority finds the dissenting opinion unconvincing. We believe the aforementioned precedent makes very clear that the trial court did not err in its dismissal of the underlying case, given the specifics of Appellant’s arguments. To briefly address the points made by the dissent in turn: the dissent correctly points out that there is a legal framework in place for the signature of treaties and their effects. This does not mean that an actual effect occurred as a result of an application of law. We discuss supra how the complaint fails to allege a specific effect felt by any party as a result of the mere signature of the treaty. We likewise dismiss discussion of the specifics of the International Community Framework Act as irrelevant - what specific polity Alexandria is classified as and how the treaty interacts with the Act does not affect the analysis of whether it carried direct legal effect. If we were to accept that the mere existence of a framework for an action created an application of law, the Constitution would suffice for our analysis here. The dissent further ventures into discussion about whether the underlying actions allegedly influenced by the treaty should be reviewed. We uphold that they should not, in the instant case. It is not the job of the Court to conduct review where doing so is not specifically required by the content of the case’s arguments. See [2026] SCR 7.

The dissent raises significant concern regarding the supposed consequences of this verdict for the application of the standing rule, and posits that it will have greater effects on the legal scene at large, making argumentation more difficult. The majority asserts that no such concern should exist - this verdict does nothing but uphold existing precedent. The dissent’s claims regarding the supposed burden placed on practitioners and the disregarding of precedent lack merit in that this verdict merely upholds the status quo firmly established months ago. To disregard that in favour of case precedent dating to 2021 would be to rattle the state of the legal scene far more than the dissent alleges is occurring here.

This ignores the many months of development in the legal field since early 2025, and would be an unwarranted and completely illogical return to old precedent - long since overturned and no longer the law - merely for the sake of returning to something familiar. See In Re [2023] SCR 5 | [2026] SCR 4 (Smallfries4, J., dissenting) (“This archaic legal construction of how our law works, rooted deeply in their minds, entirely derailed our deliberative process and led us to what we have now.”) Even if that were not the case, it remains true that it is well outside the Court’s jurisdiction to conjure arguments to consider from thin air only because we desire more work. Any apparent change in the law or suggestion thereof is nothing more than mere dicta, and should not be relied upon in future settings. Any questions posed here beyond the issue of Appellant’s standing are not answered and should not be considered as such.

IV. Conclusion​

To review, we uphold the precedent set in [2025] FCR 117 - Appeal by affirming in full the sua sponte dismissal without prejudice of [2026] FCR 26. In reviewing solely the arguments raised by Appellant, and disregarding any questions regarding the validity of the SC-DC Treaty or the constitutionality of the actions that may have been influenced by it pre-ratification, we find no potential cause for recourse. The first element of the standing application, that there is a clear application of law, has definitively failed to be met. Thus, the standing requirement is unfulfilled, and the case cannot be allowed to continue in its present form.

So ordered.

Spoiler: Associate Justice Matthew100x's Dissent

Today, I respectfully dissent.

This appeal arises from 2026 FCR 26, where Judge Ko531 dismissed the case for lack of standing. The dismissal was without prejudice, permitting the appellant to amend the pleading if additional allegations could establish standing. The appellant instead brought the issue before this Court, arguing that amendment was unnecessary because the existing allegations were sufficient to establish standing.

I understand the majority’s concern. But I fear today’s decision takes an unnecessarily restrictive approach to standing and further weakens the application of law doctrine. At this stage, the question is not whether the appellant has proven the merits. Nor is the question whether the treaty itself independently carries its own application of law. The question is whether the allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to show that government action occurred through some application of legal authority, or that a legally cognizable harm exists. In my view, the answer is yes such that the Appellant should be allowed to make their case before the Supreme Court of Redmont.

The majority’s central error is that it collapses the application-of-law doctrine into something more akin to a harm-based standing requirement. That approach misunderstands the historical function of the doctrine.

The application-of-law doctrine was not designed merely to duplicate ordinary injury-based standing. As I explained in my dissent in [2025] FCR 117 - Appeal, standing was historically treated as part of the ordinary course of judicial review. (see Matthew100x, J., Dissenting Opinion; Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 117 - Appeal). It existed because courts historically conducted judicial review of government action and legal applications even where a plaintiff could not always show individualized harm. When the Court rules were first written in 2023, the doctrine reflected that prior practice that was done from 2020 through 2023. The doctrine allowed courts to review whether law had been applied unlawfully, rather than requiring every plaintiff to first prove damages or concrete harm.

Today’s decision continues the backsliding of that doctrine. When a court allows a case to proceed, it does not declare that the plaintiff must win. It simply recognizes that the alleged facts, if true, are at least sufficient to support a legal conclusion requiring adjudication. Now, we tell litigants that, to bring a case before any court, there must be at least some level of harm beyond the challenged application of law itself. For a Court Rule 5.5 dismissal, the Court should ask only whether the pleaded facts, if true, support a viable legal conclusion. The appellant did not need to prove the entire legal mechanism behind the government’s conduct, they just needed to allege facts showing that the government acted pursuant to some asserted legal authority.

I. The Majority’s Treaty Analysis Misunderstands the Application of Law Doctrine.​

The majority begins with the nature of treaties. It explains that treaties are not legislation and are distinct from the constitutional process by which legislation comes into effect. A treaty does not need to satisfy the procedural requirements outlined in the Constitution for the creation of statutes. The majority then surveys the constitutional provisions that treat treaties separately from legislation and concludes that a treaty cannot, under any circumstance, create a unique legislative effect. In the majority’s view, a treaty can only be construed as an agreement between two entities to carry out certain obligations; it cannot confer new legal power. And that because there is no legal power, there is thus no application of law. That conclusion is too broad.

The majority’s error is that it treats the agreement at issue as the only possible source of legal authority. But the treaty need not itself be legislation to create an application-of-law issue. A treaty may serve as the factual predicate for executive action taken under an existing statutory or constitutional framework. The relevant inquiry is therefore not whether the agreement independently enacted law, but whether Redmont officials acted pursuant to legal authority at all.

This analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the majority wrongly treats the treaty’s lack of legislative force as dispositive. Second, the majority fails to consider whether the International Community Framework Act supplied legal authority for the government’s conduct. Third, even if the Act does not apply, the alleged government conduct still required some legal basis, and that basis is itself sufficient to create an application-of-law question.

A. The Treaty Need Not Be Legislation to Trigger an Application of Law.

The majority’s analysis conflates the source of legal authority with the factual predicate that triggers the use of that authority. The majority does correctly point that a treaty not properly ratified and, with no legislation passed under the non-existent treaty’s framework, is essentially non-law. However, then that means that the law being applied is not the agreement itself. The law being applied is a statute, executive authority, property-control authority, recognition framework, or other legal source that authorizes the government to act in response to Alexandria/Redmont agreement.

The appellant alleges that conduct between Redmont and Alexandria shows that the treaty was used as a basis for organizing governmental authority and regulating interactions. The appellant points to changes in embassy property, access being granted, controlled, or restricted, and government officials deferring inquiries regarding the embassy. Those allegations describe, at some level, an application of law. The Appellant suggests that officials treated the treaty as operative in some legal or administrative sense. The question is therefore not whether the treaty itself created an application-of-law, but instead should be what legal authority allowed the government to make those changes. The majority avoids that inquiry. It reasons that because the treaty itself lacks legislative force, no application of law occurred.

B. The International Community Framework Act May Supply the Relevant Legal Framework.​

The majority treats the treaty as if it exists in a legal vacuum. But the International Community Framework Act was enacted “to formalize relations with towns in the wild,” to permit Redmont to “exercise soft power in territories outside of Redmont’s jurisdiction,” and to replace the prior International Treaties Act (see Act of Congress - International Community Framework Act). The Court refuses to consider whether the treaty here could have legal significance under the International Community Framework Act. That Act came into effect on April 6, 2026. This lawsuit was filed on April 8, 2026. The only way the Court could avoid the Act entirely would be to conclude that the relevant facts occurred before the Act was signed into law. Of course, a law is not law until signed. And operating under that principle, the Court could have concluded that the pleaded facts do not fall under the International Community Framework Act because they arose before the Act took legal effect. Prior case law has recognized that facts must be adjudicated under the law in effect when those facts occurred. (see Appeal: Denied - In re [2026] FCR 8 | [2026] SCR 8). That said, the majority failed to even consider whether or not this issue could have fallen under this law.

If the Court were to have engaged with the International Community Framework Act, the majority’s conclusion becomes much harder to sustain. The Act defines multiple recognition classifications and distinguishes between classes of international communities. The situation here may involve a 3(b) polity, because the relevant community is beyond the server’s reach and is a foreign community (see 4(3)(b), Id.). That means that we’re dealing with a Foreign Community. Polity recognition classification could, under the facts provided, mean that this agreement could be a 6(c) classification. (see 4(6)(c), Id.). A polity recognised under a 6(c) classification may involve a less developed local government than a registered community with full criminal control, and may operate under a loose agreement with the executive requesting limited services from Redmont executive departments within Redmont’s capabilities and staff policy. More importantly, a polity operating under this recognition only needs an executive agreement may include the coordination of services, including entity registration, associated policies, activities, and/or eviction.

The majority’s conclusion rests on a narrow proposition: treaties do not carry force of law, and because they do not carry force of law, there was no application of law. But the appellant alleges more than the bare existence of a treaty. The appellant argues that the conduct between Redmont and Alexandria shows that the treaty was used as a basis for organizing governmental authority and regulating interactions. The appellant points to changes in embassy property, access being granted, controlled, or restricted, and government officials deferring inquiries regarding the embassy.

C. If the Agreement Does not Create Law, What Power did the Government Use?​

Even if those actions did not fall under the International Community Framework Act, one must still ask whether those decisions implicated some other legal authority. That is the central defect in the majority’s reasoning. The majority hand-waves decisions made by the government and concludes that because the Constitution treats treaties as distinct from legislation, and because no statute was enacted through the treaty itself, no application of law occurred. That is simplistic and wrong.

The majority’s position depends on three assumptions. First, it assumes that no other law could have been implicated in the government’s decision-making process. Second, it assumes that even if there were material changes to property structures, access, control, and governmental operations, there could have been no legal basis for those actions. Third, it assumes that government action may occur without any basis in law at all. All three assumptions are necessary to conclude that no application of law occurred. All three are deeply problematic.

The majority also fails to explain what role the International Community Framework Act plays. If agreements made pursuant to that Act are simply ignored because no laws were passed, then the result of today’s decision is that the Redmont government may begin organizing a treaty via an executive agreement or loose governmental arrangement and act upon it, while avoiding judicial review unless a plaintiff can show traditional harm. Under the majority’s reasoning, because the agreement has not been formally processed as legislation, it is treated as a non-application of law.

The majority’s reasoning effectively concludes that no government action occurred here. That cannot be right. If no government action occurred, why were material changes being made to how Redmont conducted its relationship with Alexandria? If the government acted based on no law, then the action should be void because the government acted without lawful authority. If the government can point to a law authorizing its conduct, then an application of law occurred. The government cannot have it both ways.

II. What Standard Does This Court Want Regarding Standing & Pleadings?​

The second issue is the pleading standard. The Court appears to require these issues to be pleaded with such precision that it can surgically isolate the exact legal theory at the standing stage. That imposes a pleading burden higher than normal. Standing based on harm requires more than showing that the government acted unlawfully, but that is separate from requiring proof of damages or some concrete injury. (see Court Rule 2.1, Information - Court Rules and Procedures). This is the application-of-law doctrine. Its roots go back to Prodigium v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 1. That case mattered because the plaintiff would not ordinarily have had standing under a traditional harm-based analysis. The plaintiff challenged a constitutional amendment on the ground that it had been passed without the referendum required for constitutional amendment. Because the amendment was allegedly invalid, its application changed how representatives and senators were elected by class. When the decision came down, it removed representatives and senators from the Congress. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Prodigium & Partners at Law v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 1).

There, an application of law plainly occurred. Even under today’s narrowed doctrine, that case would likely satisfy application-of-law standing because the challenged amendment directly affected the election of officials. But the deeper point of the doctrine was not limited to election mechanics. The doctrine exists to preserve governmental accountability by empowering citizens, and the lawyers who represent them, to challenge unlawful government activity.

That said, The Redmont Civil Code allows for nominal damages where a legal wrong is proven. (Part III § 4, Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). Applied here to this case, if the only path to review is to repackage unlawful government action as nominal damages, then the application-of-law doctrine has been reduced to a pleading trap where failing to plead nominal damages for a wrong that the government has done can result in your case being dismissed. Plaintiffs would be forced to argue that they were harmed by the mere fact of governmental illegality, only for courts to then scrutinize the relationship between the alleged harm and the challenged government action. That approach will further erode the ability of citizens to challenge unlawful governmental conduct. It also further erodes the application-of-law doctrine, as now we’re establishing a requirement of harm through proving your legal rights in exchange for money, which is essentially a harm requirement on the application-of-law.

Judge Ko531 dismissed the case without prejudice so that the pleading could be fixed. The appellant could have amended the complaint and returned to the lower court. Instead, the appellant brought the issue to this Court, arguing that no amendment was necessary because the pleading already alleged enough to establish standing. The majority’s decision affirms Judge Ko531 and continues pushing litigants toward a standard where plaintiffs are punished for failing to identify, at the outset, the precise legal authority being challenged.

That is not how standing should operate, especially where the alleged facts describe governmental conduct, property changes, access restrictions, official deferrals, and an asserted treaty-based framework for governmental authority. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, those allegations should be enough to permit the case to proceed. The plaintiff need not prove the entire legal mechanism before discovery. It is enough to allege facts that, if true, plausibly show that the government acted pursuant to some asserted legal authority.

In this day-and-age where the Supreme Court has a dearth of cases and where we want and plead for the public to give us work, such an exacting standard makes little sense to me. It begs the question, if a former Judge and current Attorney that has been playing for years is unable to figure out and navigate the legal issues here, how do we expect newer Attorneys to bring cases before us? If we continue down this path, who could blame the citizens of this country for not appealing their case? When appealing opens a can of worms that ultimately make it harder for Plaintiffs to bring their cases in the first place, why risk an appeal?

III. Conclusion​

The majority’s decision therefore does more than affirm a dismissal. It narrows the application-of-law doctrine, strengthens a harm-based standing requirement, and creates a route by which government action connected to treaties or executive arrangements may evade review unless a plaintiff can plead individualized injury with unnecessary precision.

For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.