Appeal: Accepted In re [2025] FCR 123 | [2026] SCR 5

[Dogeington]

Username: Sir_Dogeington

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: The Commonwealth of Redmont

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025]FCR 123

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Inknet [2025] FCR 123

Basis for Appeal: Basis for Appeal:

The Court has misinterpreted the law and the Commonwealth's position, and seeks to nullify part of the Criminal Code Act over a perceived lack of sufficient legislative intent.

1. The verdict in FCR 123 states that “In order for the Commonwealth to succeed in its prosecution, it must withstand two components: 1) Defendant sold the items and 2) The act of sale in itself was unlawful; In this instance, Defendant sold the items in question. On the 2nd point, the Court is not convinced.” It is the opinion of the federal court that, although the defendant committed the alleged action, the law itself does not deem that action illegal. The Criminal Code Act Part VI § 6 states “A person commits an offence if the person: (a) distributes, sells, or traffics any health treatment item restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists, or sells in a pharmacy not approved.” Restricted health treatment items in this context refers to treatments that can only be crafted by citizens with the Doctor or Pharmacist professions. The Court further states that “The Criminal Code Act does not expressly forbid a licensed doctor from selling health treatment items outside a hospital, nor does it establish a distinction whereby such sales are lawful in a hospital setting but criminal elsewhere.” This is categorically false – the CCA, without any room for interpretation, categorizes the sale, distribution, and trafficking of restricted health treatment items as illegal, regardless of location, and regardless of profession.

In defense of this interpretation, the Court provides the following legal test: “doctors are authorized to create and provide health treatment items as part of medical care. When such treatment is provided, a sale occurs.” This test demonstrates a severe misunderstanding of DOH procedure, which is even betrayed in the terminology used by the Court. When a citizen goes to the hospital to be treated, a doctor crafts and then administers a cure. What a citizen receives therefore is a treatment, or in other words, a service. No health treatment item is given to a patient in any illness scenario. Should we follow the Court’s logic and conceptualize this interaction as a sale, then the object being purchased is a service by the doctor and not the purchase of a health treatment item.

2. The Court further states that “The Commonwealth’s argument that the Department of Health may be exempt from criminal prohibition under its statutory mandate, while individual doctors are not, does not cure this deficiency.” This interpretation of the Commonwealth’s argument is not accurate to what was being claimed by the Commonwealth in this case. The Department of Health is charged by the Executive Standards Act with the following responsibilities: “(a) Maintenance and upkeep of the national health system. (2) The Department is considered an 'emergency services' provider.” In keeping with these duties, the Department provides medical care for Redmontian citizens through the employment of doctors and various other healthcare professionals. The DOH, recognizing that doctors may not be available at all times, offers cures through the Medishop (P-001). The cures at this shop, notably, are not sold by citizen doctors, but rather by the GovHealth account itself, which is not a person, but rather a minecraft account solely used for DOH administrative purposes (P-002). The DOH’s Employment Policy & Code of Conduct states under Code of Conduct for Doctors: “You (doctors) MUST never sell, gift, nor traffic doctor-crafted cures.” This Code of Conduct was updated by DOH Secretary gwiis on December 3, 2025. However, when referencing the DemocracyCraft Wiki page for the Doctor profession, we similarly find under the Rules section: “Do not sell doctor-only cures outside the hospital,” with the rules section further stating: “If you need to report a Doctor violating these rules or have complaints, report them to a Medical Specialist (MS) or Health Secretary. These rules are enforceable.” While an edit was made to this Wiki page on December 31st, this rule was not added in that edit, meaning that it has existed as a commonly known DOH policy since at least February of 2025, which was the last time this page was edited. DOH policy strictly prohibits doctors from selling health treatment items, meaning that Inknet was not acting in an official DOH capacity when selling those items. Regardless, even if Inkent was acting in an official capacity, as already established, the sale of health treatment items is illegal for anyone to do, regardless of profession.

3. Finally, the court was very clear in its ruling that this case was lost to legal interpretation. The court determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sold the items in question. The court stated in its closing remarks that “Although the law clearly is meant to prohibit the unregulated sale of relevant items, the Court can't apply legislative intent so broadly in the context of a criminal prosecution. TLDR: Congress wrote a law that relied on DoH policy whilst also requiring the Court to only consider the law itself. Congress should fix this.” The verdict admitted that the intent of the law is to ban the conduct exhibited by the defendant, and yet refused to apply this known intent to the case seemingly due to its status as a criminal prosecution. While the core content of the verdict already exhibits a misunderstanding of the Commonwealth’s position, which has already been addressed in this appeal, this choice made regarding standards of interpretation deserves especial scrutiny. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an evidentiary standard referring to the evidence required to prove the defendant’s guilt. The Court, in pursuit of its duties, is charged with interpreting the law – this duty is independent of the burden of proof in any particular trial. The presiding officer had found that the defendant sold those items beyond a reasonable doubt, but seemingly applied a harsher lens in interpreting the law due to the criminal nature of the trial. This inconsistent application of the law led to a verdict in favour of the defendant.

Supporting Evidence: [see reply]

 

[Dogeington]

Username: Sir_Dogeington

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: The Commonwealth of Redmont

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025]FCR 123

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Inknet [2025] FCR 123

Basis for Appeal: Basis for Appeal:

The Court has misinterpreted the law and the Commonwealth's position, and seeks to nullify part of the Criminal Code Act over a perceived lack of sufficient legislative intent.

1. The verdict in FCR 123 states that “In order for the Commonwealth to succeed in its prosecution, it must withstand two components: 1) Defendant sold the items and 2) The act of sale in itself was unlawful; In this instance, Defendant sold the items in question. On the 2nd point, the Court is not convinced.” It is the opinion of the federal court that, although the defendant committed the alleged action, the law itself does not deem that action illegal. The Criminal Code Act Part VI § 6 states “A person commits an offence if the person: (a) distributes, sells, or traffics any health treatment item restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists, or sells in a pharmacy not approved.” Restricted health treatment items in this context refers to treatments that can only be crafted by citizens with the Doctor or Pharmacist professions. The Court further states that “The Criminal Code Act does not expressly forbid a licensed doctor from selling health treatment items outside a hospital, nor does it establish a distinction whereby such sales are lawful in a hospital setting but criminal elsewhere.” This is categorically false – the CCA, without any room for interpretation, categorizes the sale, distribution, and trafficking of restricted health treatment items as illegal, regardless of location, and regardless of profession.

In defense of this interpretation, the Court provides the following legal test: “doctors are authorized to create and provide health treatment items as part of medical care. When such treatment is provided, a sale occurs.” This test demonstrates a severe misunderstanding of DOH procedure, which is even betrayed in the terminology used by the Court. When a citizen goes to the hospital to be treated, a doctor crafts and then administers a cure. What a citizen receives therefore is a treatment, or in other words, a service. No health treatment item is given to a patient in any illness scenario. Should we follow the Court’s logic and conceptualize this interaction as a sale, then the object being purchased is a service by the doctor and not the purchase of a health treatment item.

2. The Court further states that “The Commonwealth’s argument that the Department of Health may be exempt from criminal prohibition under its statutory mandate, while individual doctors are not, does not cure this deficiency.” This interpretation of the Commonwealth’s argument is not accurate to what was being claimed by the Commonwealth in this case. The Department of Health is charged by the Executive Standards Act with the following responsibilities: “(a) Maintenance and upkeep of the national health system. (2) The Department is considered an 'emergency services' provider.” In keeping with these duties, the Department provides medical care for Redmontian citizens through the employment of doctors and various other healthcare professionals. The DOH, recognizing that doctors may not be available at all times, offers cures through the Medishop (P-001). The cures at this shop, notably, are not sold by citizen doctors, but rather by the GovHealth account itself, which is not a person, but rather a minecraft account solely used for DOH administrative purposes (P-002). The DOH’s Employment Policy & Code of Conduct states under Code of Conduct for Doctors: “You (doctors) MUST never sell, gift, nor traffic doctor-crafted cures.” This Code of Conduct was updated by DOH Secretary gwiis on December 3, 2025. However, when referencing the DemocracyCraft Wiki page for the Doctor profession, we similarly find under the Rules section: “Do not sell doctor-only cures outside the hospital,” with the rules section further stating: “If you need to report a Doctor violating these rules or have complaints, report them to a Medical Specialist (MS) or Health Secretary. These rules are enforceable.” While an edit was made to this Wiki page on December 31st, this rule was not added in that edit, meaning that it has existed as a commonly known DOH policy since at least February of 2025, which was the last time this page was edited. DOH policy strictly prohibits doctors from selling health treatment items, meaning that Inknet was not acting in an official DOH capacity when selling those items. Regardless, even if Inkent was acting in an official capacity, as already established, the sale of health treatment items is illegal for anyone to do, regardless of profession.

3. Finally, the court was very clear in its ruling that this case was lost to legal interpretation. The court determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sold the items in question. The court stated in its closing remarks that “Although the law clearly is meant to prohibit the unregulated sale of relevant items, the Court can't apply legislative intent so broadly in the context of a criminal prosecution. TLDR: Congress wrote a law that relied on DoH policy whilst also requiring the Court to only consider the law itself. Congress should fix this.” The verdict admitted that the intent of the law is to ban the conduct exhibited by the defendant, and yet refused to apply this known intent to the case seemingly due to its status as a criminal prosecution. While the core content of the verdict already exhibits a misunderstanding of the Commonwealth’s position, which has already been addressed in this appeal, this choice made regarding standards of interpretation deserves especial scrutiny. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an evidentiary standard referring to the evidence required to prove the defendant’s guilt. The Court, in pursuit of its duties, is charged with interpreting the law – this duty is independent of the burden of proof in any particular trial. The presiding officer had found that the defendant sold those items beyond a reasonable doubt, but seemingly applied a harsher lens in interpreting the law due to the criminal nature of the trial. This inconsistent application of the law led to a verdict in favour of the defendant.

Supporting Evidence: [see reply]

Spoiler: P-001

Spoiler: P-002

 

[Smallfries]

In a 3-0 decision, the Supreme Court grants this appeal. The Commonwealth shall have seventy-two hours to post their appellant brief.

 

[Dogeington]

In a 3-0 decision, the Supreme Court grants this appeal. The Commonwealth shall have seventy-two hours to post their appellant brief.

Your Honor,
I was perhaps overzealous in my initial filing for this case. What further information is the court looking for in an appellant brief that wouldn’t just be a restating of the already posted appeal?

 

[Smallfries]

I was perhaps overzealous in my initial filing for this case. What further information is the court looking for in an appellant brief that wouldn’t just be a restating of the already posted appeal?

You tell me. If you think your initial filing covers what you would discuss in your brief, we can simply move on. The point is to allow appellants to not have to post their entire brief, and then do all that work just to get denied. Nothing stopping appellants from doing as you have done, however.

 

[Dogeington]

You tell me. If you think your initial filing covers what you would discuss in your brief, we can simply move on. The point is to allow appellants to not have to post their entire brief, and then do all that work just to get denied. Nothing stopping appellants from doing as you have done, however.

In that case, Your Honor, the Commonwealth waives its appellant brief.

 

[Smallfries]

In that case, Your Honor, the Commonwealth waives its appellant brief.

Very well. As laid out, the appellee (@Inknet & @Franciscus) shall have seventy-two hours to submit their brief.

 

[Franciscus]

Very well. As laid out, the appellee (@Inknet & @Franciscus) shall have seventy-two hours to submit their brief.

Your Honor,

I am dealing with a personal situation and I am not going to be able to provide representation in line with the expectations of this Court. I would respectfully ask that Inknet be assigned a public defender for this case, and that deadlines be tolled.

 

[Smallfries]

Your Honor,

I am dealing with a personal situation and I am not going to be able to provide representation in line with the expectations of this Court. I would respectfully ask that Inknet be assigned a public defender for this case, and that deadlines be tolled.

Very well.

 

[Superwoops]

I have assigned myself to this case. My duties as PD will begin on Sunday, apologies for any minor delays.

 

[Smallfries]

I have assigned myself to this case. My duties as PD will begin on Sunday, apologies for any minor delays.

Ill grant an extension until Wednesday at 7:30 PM, CST.

 

[Superwoops]

Your honour,
Appellee's counsel acknowledges the importance of meeting the Court's deadlines; however I am struggling to do so as I am currently on holiday with little cell service. I respectfully ask the Court for a 24-hour extension on the deadline to submit my brief.
@Smallfries

 

[Superwoops]

Brief

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
APPELLEE BRIEF

Appellee's counsel thanks the Attorney General for his structured brief. This countering brief will follow the same structure.


Argument A

The Prosecution's definition of restricted health treatment items as:​

treatments that can only be crafted by citizens with the Doctor or Pharmacist professions.​

is unfounded and unsupported by evidence submitted in the trial. During FCR 123, the Defense painstakingly affirmed that the Prosecution offered no evidence to support this claim. To infer restricted health treatment as such would require concrete proof allowing the Court to take such a wide leap and as to not infer Congressional intent, but know it. This is not the case. The Prosecution fails to show to the Court why it should take its definition as the only reasonable inference; if Congress wanted to convey restricted health treatment items as ones only craftable by doctors or pharmacists, why not simply say so?

Additionally, Appellee's counsel will demonstrate that the definition presented by the Appellant is not the only definition that can reasonably be inferred by the Court. Let us take a look at the word restricted. The Appellee believes that another perspective of the crime in question can involve another meaning of this word: controlled or prohibited by rules or laws. This is not an unreasonable definition, and as such falls outside the purview of the Act of Congress - No More Clarity Act.
In support of this argument, we bring to the Court's attention the following: if the CCA, in the definition of unauthorised possession, mentions health treatments craftable by Doctors but not Pharmacists, why doesn't it use the term craftable for unauthorised medical sale? Could this be a flaw in the law? Yes. But there is a chance that another statute, or maybe even DOH policy, was meant to list some health treatment items as restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists.
Another reasonable meaning of unauthorised medical sale could be "distributes, sells, or traffics any health treatment item restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists, or sells in a pharmacy not approved", restricted meaning that the health treatment item's lawful sale and distribution is limited to licensed Doctors or Pharmacists. Any individuals not holding these licenses would be committing Unauthorised Medical Sale. This is further supported by the Appellant's second main argument stating that the Commonwealth's doctors have a duty to provide treatment and shouldn't be guilty of Unauthorised Medical Sale. Even Judge Muggy's argument that doctors are still "selling" these treatments inside hospitals when providing treatment is supported by this reasonable definition. In defense of Judge Muggy's claim that these count as sales, we would only like to state that when going to the hospital, the sick and injured opt into a treatment package, receiving both a service (the administration of the cure) and a good (the item being applied to them).
The Appellee calls this into question because a citizen's (Inknet's) rights are at stake. We do not wish to force these as the only reasonable meanings of the clause, nor convey they are the most probable outcome in order to show that due to the circumstances of the law, the crime is not prosecutable in this instance. Rather, it is a possible outcome, and therefore the Appellant's argument falls apart as, in the trial court, they failed to meet their burden of proof and show to the Court why it should accept the Commonwealth's proposed definition when statute clearly doesn't mention it.

​

Argument 2

This Code of Conduct was updated by DOH Secretary gwiis on December 3, 2025.

The Commonwealth's concession that this Code was edited ex post facto to my client's actions render this evidence inadmissible. The Court has no way of knowing what was put in or taken out since my client's actions.

when referencing the DemocracyCraft Wiki page for the Doctor profession, we similarly find under the Rules section: “Do not sell doctor-only cures outside the hospital,” with the rules section further stating: “If you need to report a Doctor violating these rules or have complaints, report them to a Medical Specialist (MS) or Health Secretary. These rules are enforceable.” While an edit was made to this Wiki page on December 31st, this rule was not added in that edit, meaning that it has existed as a commonly known DOH policy since at least February of 2025

Appellant affirms an edit has been made, and yet has not provided a shred of evidence to suggest that the rule was not added in within that edit, similar to my argument above. The Wiki page is inadmissible as well.

Without these two pieces of evidence, the Commonwealth's second argument has no merit in this Court.


Argument 3

Firstly, the Appellee would like to state that it disagrees with the statement that Inknet sold these items beyond reasonable doubt. As pointed out by Multiman in his Opening Agreement, all pieces of evidence submitted by the Prosecution had significant flaws.

Secondly, the only counterargument we can really offer is that the Court cannot create law where it doesn't exist. It can only interpret it.

All other arguments the Appellee would like to make have already been pointed out thoroughly by Defense counsel in the trial.


Respectfully submitted,
Public Defender Director Superwoops

 

[Superwoops]

Your honour,
I am very tired. In my severe lack of sleep, I forgot that today is in fact not Wednesday, but Tuesday.

Therefore, I retract my request to extend the deadline and ask that I have until the original deadline to continue editing my message.

 

[Smallfries]

Your honour,
I am very tired. In my severe lack of sleep, I forgot that today is in fact not Wednesday, but Tuesday.

Therefore, I retract my request to extend the deadline and ask that I have until the original deadline to continue editing my message.

The deadline was for 7:30 PM today, but you do not get an unlimited right to edit filings. Filings must be ready to send when they are sent for the interest of opposing parties. The only exception is the original complaint.

I understand you have things going on, and that is okay, but we do need to keep some semblance of order and fairness here.

 

[Smallfries]

The Commonwealth (@Dogeington) shall have seventy-two hours to file their response brief, if they so choose.

 

[Smallfries]

Seeing as how no reply brief has been filed, we will be in recess pending verdict.

 

[Smallfries]

Verdict

Associate Justice Smallfries4 writes the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The Commonwealth appeals the acquittal of Defendant-Appellee Inknet on two charges of unauthorized medical sale. Commonwealth of Redmont v. Inknet [2025] FCR 123. At issue, the Commonwealth alleges the trial court erred when it found that Defendant’s sale of a restricted medical item was not illegal. Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred when it found no location prohibition, and a possible profession carve-out for the offense.

Unauthorized medical sale was an indictable offense under the CCA committed when a person “distribute[d, sold, or trafficked] any health treatment item restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists, or sells in a Pharmacy not approved.” See CCA Part VI § 6 (repealed).

In the appealed case, the Commonwealth alleged that Defendant owned two chestshops, each selling a different health treatment item (wrist and leg splints). One piece of evidence shows an individual purchasing a wrist splint from a chest shop. The message in chat and the name on the chest shop both match the name of the defendant. The plot identifier at the top of the screen lists the same plot as alleged in the complaint.

In its finding of fact, the trial court held that Defendant did indeed sell the alleged items “outside of the Hospital in a manner generally not permitted under law.” Accepting that Defendant did distribute, sell, or traffick a health item, the trial court then made the determination that doing so was not against the law. In support of this finding, the trial court stated that the “[CCA] does not expressly forbid a licensed doctor from selling health treatment items outside a hospital, nor does it [say] sales are lawful in a hospital setting but criminal elsewhere. Where the legislature has chosen not to articulate a location-based prohibition, the Court may not infer one.” Further, the trial court noted that “doctors are authorized to create and provide health treatment items . . . when [they do so,] a sale occurs. The [CCA] does not characterize such transactions as unlawful.”

The trial court’s holding, then, is three-fold. First, because the CCA does not expressly and directly ban licensed doctors from selling health treatment items outside a hospital, there is no presumption that what Defendant did was unlawful. Second, there is no location-relevant piece of the inquiry as to whether Defendant committed a crime. Third, the nature of treatment as a Doctor includes a direct sale to a player. Because this is surely not unlawful, and the CCA draws no distinctions as to this point, the trial court concluded that a sale was not per se illegal by virtue of it being outside of a hospital or through a chestshop.

On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court’s interpretation is unreasonable and erred beyond what is permissible when it found that the CCA neither forbids a doctor from selling health treatment items outside a hospital, nor creates a location-based distinction at all.

We granted certiorari to review the alleged errors of law. We do not seek to disturb the trial court’s findings of fact or review the case de novo, meaning we review the entire case from the beginning on our own. See Boykisse v. Musclebound [2026] DCR 19 | [2026] FCR 11; [2025] FCR 128 - Contempt appeal. Instead, we review the reasonableness of the interpretation of the law and the facts as applied. We take each of the arguments in turn.

To understand the meaning of the charge, we first turn to its language. The statutory language at the time states that the crime would occur in one of two situations: (1) If a person distributed, sold, or trafficked any health item restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists, or (2) sold [presumably a restricted health item] in an unapproved pharmacy. CCA Part IV § 6. Taking the statute literally, it would seem difficult to violate the second part without violating the first. Not wanting to use Congress’s language to contradict and make redundant where it clearly is meant to expand, we look for a separate meaning.

The trial court found that the language did not imply or create a “location-based prohibition” in any way, nor did it create a distinction as to “where the transaction occur[ed].” At first glance, it seems somewhat obvious that Congress did not only imply a location-based prohibition, but explicitly commanded one. There are two reasons we believe this.

First, the language of the statute states that it is an offense to sell a restricted health treatment item “in a pharmacy not approved.” It is implied, then, that Congress wished to stamp out unregistered or unapproved pharmacies from selling healthcare items. A pharmacy, in the common understanding, is a building or location that operates to sell medical equipment, resources, and perhaps care. It is obvious, then, that this language alone creates a location-based prohibition on the sale of medical items.

Second, this interpretation is supported by the previous text. The CCA prohibits the distribution, sale, or trafficking of health items generally. Id. As mentioned supra, it would seem difficult indeed to commit this crime through the location-based language identified above while not violating through the apparently general language. Not wanting to render Congress’s language redundant or relegate statutory text to mere surplusage, we interpret the first part of the provision to avoid redundancy. Thus, by removing location based sales (those that are inexorably fixed and unmoving in their location) from all sales, we get the first clause prohibiting sales that are mobile, unrooted, and unfixed. Simply put, the first part of the provision is a prohibition on selling health items through personal interactions.

Taken together, we see a completed statutory mosaic. The first section of the provision prohibits direct player-to-player sales (likely through the seller dropping the item from their inventory to the purchaser), and the second section prohibiting indirect container-to-player sales (likely through chestshops or hoppers/dispensers giving an item to a purchaser). When we arrange the pieces in this way, it is clear that not only is a location-based prohibition plausible, and indeed directly authorized by the statute, but also is indirectly supported by the structural build of the provision. We find this to show that the text was meant to hold a direct, non-location-based prohibition, and an indirect, location-based prohibition.

How should we apply this interpretation to the instant case? It is clear that no direct sales were made, so we look then to the second clause of the provision: “. . . sells in a pharmacy not approved.” The record is clear in its showing that Defendant-Appellee owned and operated at least two chestshops that sold medical items. The record is also clear in that Defendant-Appellee sold at least one wrist splint item to a consumer. The trial court, as a result, held that all that was left to secure a conviction was to prove the sale itself was unlawful.

The trial court did not do so, citing the lack of an express prohibition from Congress against a licensed doctor from selling items outside the hospital and that sales are lawful in a hospital setting but unlawful otherwise. As explained above, this holding is in clear error. If nothing else, there clearly is a distinction between lawful sales in the hospital and lawful sales outside of it. The indirect prong of the provision clearly notes that a sale of medical items in an unapproved pharmacy is unlawful. As noted, pharmacies are location-based. Pharmacies are not defined in the CCA as-is, but can generally be understood to mean any area, building, or location that sells some amount of health items. The Defendant’s chest shop clearly meets this criteria.

Further, there is no language in the provision that grants an exception (or calls to attention in any way) whether a defendant is a licensed doctor or pharmacist. Selling health items is always criminal, according to the text, regardless of what professions or licenses one holds. We are not sure why the trial court seemed to carve such an exception, but doing so is clearly far outside the scope of reasonable interpretation.

Our interpretation clearly works in the instant case. Congress intended with this criminal provision to prevent individuals from selling treatment items, and to prevent alternative markets of healthcare items from being sold. The record (not including the pieces of evidence struck by the trial court oddly in its verdict) indicates the acts committed by the Defendant clearly were not within the hospital, but inside some private property. The chest shops selling the healthcare items were in his name, and the money went to him. It is clear that he unlawfully sold the items. To say otherwise, especially by contending that no location-dependent prong exists in the provision, is beyond any reasonable scope of interpretation.

If it were not true that the actions alleged here were criminal, the only activity criminalized by the CCA here would be direct player-to-player sales of healthcare items; but even this is not certain, given the trial court’s holding that there is “no distinction [where sales of those items] are lawful in a [hospital but] criminal elsewhere.” If we were to take the trial court’s interpretation at face value, there would seem to be very few times the language in this provision could be used to prosecute unlawful activity—if ever.

We do not consider other arguments brought up during trial or in appeal proceedings, as they are not implicated by the trial court’s holding. If either party in an appeal—appellant or appellee—wishes to have a reviewing court weigh on a matter, the initiating party must allege an error of law relevant to that matter within the trial court’s ruling. As we do not wish to disturb the uncontested findings of the trial court, we do not rule on any matter raised during trial or appeal that is not discussed above.

Thus, because Defendant is not excepted from criminal proceedings because of profession, license, or status, and the CCA does include a location prohibition on the sale of medical items, the trial court’s interpretation is unreasonable and beyond the scope of judicial discretion. Consequently, we overturn the trial court’s holding in full.

From here, we could either remand proceedings to the trial court to re-adjudicate its findings consistent with our above holding, or decide for ourselves if the remaining facts and determinations of the case given said holding necessitate a guilty verdict. We find that even with our guidance as set out above, there are still reasonable differences in opinion that could be made as to the guilt of one or both counts alleged.

As a result, we remand this case to the Federal Court of Redmont to proceed with a verdict following the guidance in interpretation set out above, and to apply the law as we have set out here. No briefs or further party filings as to the guilt or innocence of Defendant are necessary or allowed. The Federal Court may carry out sentencing (if applicable) as it desires.

Dicta

Litigants should understand that it is perhaps improper and unwise to wait until a verdict to disqualify evidence from the record. One or both parties may rely upon evidence believed to be satisfactory by the court. For proper adjudication, parties in opposition should formally contest evidence during the course of trial—preferably during discovery—and a judicial officer should rule on the permissibility of evidence as soon as possible, but surely before the ultimate filings are made by the parties. This is necessary for the fair and equitable administration of justice.

Further, the trial court states that “criminal liability cannot rest on implication.” This is clearly false. Statutes may be vague and non-specific, and interpretation may be required. Absent such an issue, there may be a great lack of direct evidence against a defendant. It should be noted that circumstantial evidence is not only suitable to be used to convict a defendant of a criminal charge, but it is just as good as direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence, by its very nature, is evidence that is implicit. The implications derived from circumstantial evidence may very well prove controlling and convincing in a criminal case.

Finally, there has been a trend to use the de novo as the standard of review. The Supreme Court is adopting that standard. For clarity sake, we’re taking the time to explain what the de novo standard is and how it is applied. Where fact is left to the discretion of the trial court, law is left to the discretion of the appellate court. When a decision is reviewed de novo, the decision that is being reviewed is put aside. The judicial officer will then review—without disturbing—the facts, evidence, and arguments made. The goal is to see if the appellate court could reach the same conclusion as the lower court. If the appellate court can reach the same conclusion, that decision will get affirmed, but if the appellate court cannot reach the same conclusion, that decision may get reversed or otherwise changed.