Appeal: Accepted In re [2025] FCR 123 | [2026] SCR 5

[Dogeington]

Username: Sir_Dogeington

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: The Commonwealth of Redmont

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025]FCR 123

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Inknet [2025] FCR 123

Basis for Appeal: Basis for Appeal:

The Court has misinterpreted the law and the Commonwealth's position, and seeks to nullify part of the Criminal Code Act over a perceived lack of sufficient legislative intent.

1. The verdict in FCR 123 states that “In order for the Commonwealth to succeed in its prosecution, it must withstand two components: 1) Defendant sold the items and 2) The act of sale in itself was unlawful; In this instance, Defendant sold the items in question. On the 2nd point, the Court is not convinced.” It is the opinion of the federal court that, although the defendant committed the alleged action, the law itself does not deem that action illegal. The Criminal Code Act Part VI § 6 states “A person commits an offence if the person: (a) distributes, sells, or traffics any health treatment item restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists, or sells in a pharmacy not approved.” Restricted health treatment items in this context refers to treatments that can only be crafted by citizens with the Doctor or Pharmacist professions. The Court further states that “The Criminal Code Act does not expressly forbid a licensed doctor from selling health treatment items outside a hospital, nor does it establish a distinction whereby such sales are lawful in a hospital setting but criminal elsewhere.” This is categorically false – the CCA, without any room for interpretation, categorizes the sale, distribution, and trafficking of restricted health treatment items as illegal, regardless of location, and regardless of profession.

In defense of this interpretation, the Court provides the following legal test: “doctors are authorized to create and provide health treatment items as part of medical care. When such treatment is provided, a sale occurs.” This test demonstrates a severe misunderstanding of DOH procedure, which is even betrayed in the terminology used by the Court. When a citizen goes to the hospital to be treated, a doctor crafts and then administers a cure. What a citizen receives therefore is a treatment, or in other words, a service. No health treatment item is given to a patient in any illness scenario. Should we follow the Court’s logic and conceptualize this interaction as a sale, then the object being purchased is a service by the doctor and not the purchase of a health treatment item.

2. The Court further states that “The Commonwealth’s argument that the Department of Health may be exempt from criminal prohibition under its statutory mandate, while individual doctors are not, does not cure this deficiency.” This interpretation of the Commonwealth’s argument is not accurate to what was being claimed by the Commonwealth in this case. The Department of Health is charged by the Executive Standards Act with the following responsibilities: “(a) Maintenance and upkeep of the national health system. (2) The Department is considered an 'emergency services' provider.” In keeping with these duties, the Department provides medical care for Redmontian citizens through the employment of doctors and various other healthcare professionals. The DOH, recognizing that doctors may not be available at all times, offers cures through the Medishop (P-001). The cures at this shop, notably, are not sold by citizen doctors, but rather by the GovHealth account itself, which is not a person, but rather a minecraft account solely used for DOH administrative purposes (P-002). The DOH’s Employment Policy & Code of Conduct states under Code of Conduct for Doctors: “You (doctors) MUST never sell, gift, nor traffic doctor-crafted cures.” This Code of Conduct was updated by DOH Secretary gwiis on December 3, 2025. However, when referencing the DemocracyCraft Wiki page for the Doctor profession, we similarly find under the Rules section: “Do not sell doctor-only cures outside the hospital,” with the rules section further stating: “If you need to report a Doctor violating these rules or have complaints, report them to a Medical Specialist (MS) or Health Secretary. These rules are enforceable.” While an edit was made to this Wiki page on December 31st, this rule was not added in that edit, meaning that it has existed as a commonly known DOH policy since at least February of 2025, which was the last time this page was edited. DOH policy strictly prohibits doctors from selling health treatment items, meaning that Inknet was not acting in an official DOH capacity when selling those items. Regardless, even if Inkent was acting in an official capacity, as already established, the sale of health treatment items is illegal for anyone to do, regardless of profession.

3. Finally, the court was very clear in its ruling that this case was lost to legal interpretation. The court determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sold the items in question. The court stated in its closing remarks that “Although the law clearly is meant to prohibit the unregulated sale of relevant items, the Court can't apply legislative intent so broadly in the context of a criminal prosecution. TLDR: Congress wrote a law that relied on DoH policy whilst also requiring the Court to only consider the law itself. Congress should fix this.” The verdict admitted that the intent of the law is to ban the conduct exhibited by the defendant, and yet refused to apply this known intent to the case seemingly due to its status as a criminal prosecution. While the core content of the verdict already exhibits a misunderstanding of the Commonwealth’s position, which has already been addressed in this appeal, this choice made regarding standards of interpretation deserves especial scrutiny. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an evidentiary standard referring to the evidence required to prove the defendant’s guilt. The Court, in pursuit of its duties, is charged with interpreting the law – this duty is independent of the burden of proof in any particular trial. The presiding officer had found that the defendant sold those items beyond a reasonable doubt, but seemingly applied a harsher lens in interpreting the law due to the criminal nature of the trial. This inconsistent application of the law led to a verdict in favour of the defendant.

Supporting Evidence: [see reply]

 

[Dogeington]

Username: Sir_Dogeington

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: The Commonwealth of Redmont

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025]FCR 123

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Inknet [2025] FCR 123

Basis for Appeal: Basis for Appeal:

The Court has misinterpreted the law and the Commonwealth's position, and seeks to nullify part of the Criminal Code Act over a perceived lack of sufficient legislative intent.

1. The verdict in FCR 123 states that “In order for the Commonwealth to succeed in its prosecution, it must withstand two components: 1) Defendant sold the items and 2) The act of sale in itself was unlawful; In this instance, Defendant sold the items in question. On the 2nd point, the Court is not convinced.” It is the opinion of the federal court that, although the defendant committed the alleged action, the law itself does not deem that action illegal. The Criminal Code Act Part VI § 6 states “A person commits an offence if the person: (a) distributes, sells, or traffics any health treatment item restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists, or sells in a pharmacy not approved.” Restricted health treatment items in this context refers to treatments that can only be crafted by citizens with the Doctor or Pharmacist professions. The Court further states that “The Criminal Code Act does not expressly forbid a licensed doctor from selling health treatment items outside a hospital, nor does it establish a distinction whereby such sales are lawful in a hospital setting but criminal elsewhere.” This is categorically false – the CCA, without any room for interpretation, categorizes the sale, distribution, and trafficking of restricted health treatment items as illegal, regardless of location, and regardless of profession.

In defense of this interpretation, the Court provides the following legal test: “doctors are authorized to create and provide health treatment items as part of medical care. When such treatment is provided, a sale occurs.” This test demonstrates a severe misunderstanding of DOH procedure, which is even betrayed in the terminology used by the Court. When a citizen goes to the hospital to be treated, a doctor crafts and then administers a cure. What a citizen receives therefore is a treatment, or in other words, a service. No health treatment item is given to a patient in any illness scenario. Should we follow the Court’s logic and conceptualize this interaction as a sale, then the object being purchased is a service by the doctor and not the purchase of a health treatment item.

2. The Court further states that “The Commonwealth’s argument that the Department of Health may be exempt from criminal prohibition under its statutory mandate, while individual doctors are not, does not cure this deficiency.” This interpretation of the Commonwealth’s argument is not accurate to what was being claimed by the Commonwealth in this case. The Department of Health is charged by the Executive Standards Act with the following responsibilities: “(a) Maintenance and upkeep of the national health system. (2) The Department is considered an 'emergency services' provider.” In keeping with these duties, the Department provides medical care for Redmontian citizens through the employment of doctors and various other healthcare professionals. The DOH, recognizing that doctors may not be available at all times, offers cures through the Medishop (P-001). The cures at this shop, notably, are not sold by citizen doctors, but rather by the GovHealth account itself, which is not a person, but rather a minecraft account solely used for DOH administrative purposes (P-002). The DOH’s Employment Policy & Code of Conduct states under Code of Conduct for Doctors: “You (doctors) MUST never sell, gift, nor traffic doctor-crafted cures.” This Code of Conduct was updated by DOH Secretary gwiis on December 3, 2025. However, when referencing the DemocracyCraft Wiki page for the Doctor profession, we similarly find under the Rules section: “Do not sell doctor-only cures outside the hospital,” with the rules section further stating: “If you need to report a Doctor violating these rules or have complaints, report them to a Medical Specialist (MS) or Health Secretary. These rules are enforceable.” While an edit was made to this Wiki page on December 31st, this rule was not added in that edit, meaning that it has existed as a commonly known DOH policy since at least February of 2025, which was the last time this page was edited. DOH policy strictly prohibits doctors from selling health treatment items, meaning that Inknet was not acting in an official DOH capacity when selling those items. Regardless, even if Inkent was acting in an official capacity, as already established, the sale of health treatment items is illegal for anyone to do, regardless of profession.

3. Finally, the court was very clear in its ruling that this case was lost to legal interpretation. The court determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sold the items in question. The court stated in its closing remarks that “Although the law clearly is meant to prohibit the unregulated sale of relevant items, the Court can't apply legislative intent so broadly in the context of a criminal prosecution. TLDR: Congress wrote a law that relied on DoH policy whilst also requiring the Court to only consider the law itself. Congress should fix this.” The verdict admitted that the intent of the law is to ban the conduct exhibited by the defendant, and yet refused to apply this known intent to the case seemingly due to its status as a criminal prosecution. While the core content of the verdict already exhibits a misunderstanding of the Commonwealth’s position, which has already been addressed in this appeal, this choice made regarding standards of interpretation deserves especial scrutiny. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an evidentiary standard referring to the evidence required to prove the defendant’s guilt. The Court, in pursuit of its duties, is charged with interpreting the law – this duty is independent of the burden of proof in any particular trial. The presiding officer had found that the defendant sold those items beyond a reasonable doubt, but seemingly applied a harsher lens in interpreting the law due to the criminal nature of the trial. This inconsistent application of the law led to a verdict in favour of the defendant.

Supporting Evidence: [see reply]

Spoiler: P-001

Spoiler: P-002

 

[Smallfries]

In a 3-0 decision, the Supreme Court grants this appeal. The Commonwealth shall have seventy-two hours to post their appellant brief.

 

[Dogeington]

In a 3-0 decision, the Supreme Court grants this appeal. The Commonwealth shall have seventy-two hours to post their appellant brief.

Your Honor,
I was perhaps overzealous in my initial filing for this case. What further information is the court looking for in an appellant brief that wouldn’t just be a restating of the already posted appeal?

 

[Smallfries]

I was perhaps overzealous in my initial filing for this case. What further information is the court looking for in an appellant brief that wouldn’t just be a restating of the already posted appeal?

You tell me. If you think your initial filing covers what you would discuss in your brief, we can simply move on. The point is to allow appellants to not have to post their entire brief, and then do all that work just to get denied. Nothing stopping appellants from doing as you have done, however.

 

[Dogeington]

You tell me. If you think your initial filing covers what you would discuss in your brief, we can simply move on. The point is to allow appellants to not have to post their entire brief, and then do all that work just to get denied. Nothing stopping appellants from doing as you have done, however.

In that case, Your Honor, the Commonwealth waives its appellant brief.

 

[Smallfries]

In that case, Your Honor, the Commonwealth waives its appellant brief.

Very well. As laid out, the appellee (@Inknet & @Franciscus) shall have seventy-two hours to submit their brief.

 

[Franciscus]

Very well. As laid out, the appellee (@Inknet & @Franciscus) shall have seventy-two hours to submit their brief.

Your Honor,

I am dealing with a personal situation and I am not going to be able to provide representation in line with the expectations of this Court. I would respectfully ask that Inknet be assigned a public defender for this case, and that deadlines be tolled.

 

[Smallfries]

Your Honor,

I am dealing with a personal situation and I am not going to be able to provide representation in line with the expectations of this Court. I would respectfully ask that Inknet be assigned a public defender for this case, and that deadlines be tolled.

Very well.

 

[Superwoops]

I have assigned myself to this case. My duties as PD will begin on Sunday, apologies for any minor delays.

 

[Smallfries]

I have assigned myself to this case. My duties as PD will begin on Sunday, apologies for any minor delays.

Ill grant an extension until Wednesday at 7:30 PM, CST.

 

[Superwoops]

Your honour,
Appellee's counsel acknowledges the importance of meeting the Court's deadlines; however I am struggling to do so as I am currently on holiday with little cell service. I respectfully ask the Court for a 24-hour extension on the deadline to submit my brief.
@Smallfries

 

[Superwoops]

Brief

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
APPELLEE BRIEF

Appellee's counsel thanks the Attorney General for his structured brief. This countering brief will follow the same structure.


Argument A

The Prosecution's definition of restricted health treatment items as:​

treatments that can only be crafted by citizens with the Doctor or Pharmacist professions.​

is unfounded and unsupported by evidence submitted in the trial. During FCR 123, the Defense painstakingly affirmed that the Prosecution offered no evidence to support this claim. To infer restricted health treatment as such would require concrete proof allowing the Court to take such a wide leap and as to not infer Congressional intent, but know it. This is not the case. The Prosecution fails to show to the Court why it should take its definition as the only reasonable inference; if Congress wanted to convey restricted health treatment items as ones only craftable by doctors or pharmacists, why not simply say so?

Additionally, Appellee's counsel will demonstrate that the definition presented by the Appellant is not the only definition that can reasonably be inferred by the Court. Let us take a look at the word restricted. The Appellee believes that another perspective of the crime in question can involve another meaning of this word: controlled or prohibited by rules or laws. This is not an unreasonable definition, and as such falls outside the purview of the Act of Congress - No More Clarity Act.
In support of this argument, we bring to the Court's attention the following: if the CCA, in the definition of unauthorised possession, mentions health treatments craftable by Doctors but not Pharmacists, why doesn't it use the term craftable for unauthorised medical sale? Could this be a flaw in the law? Yes. But there is a chance that another statute, or maybe even DOH policy, was meant to list some health treatment items as restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists.
Another reasonable meaning of unauthorised medical sale could be "distributes, sells, or traffics any health treatment item restricted to Doctors or Pharmacists, or sells in a pharmacy not approved", restricted meaning that the health treatment item's lawful sale and distribution is limited to licensed Doctors or Pharmacists. Any individuals not holding these licenses would be committing Unauthorised Medical Sale. This is further supported by the Appellant's second main argument stating that the Commonwealth's doctors have a duty to provide treatment and shouldn't be guilty of Unauthorised Medical Sale. Even Judge Muggy's argument that doctors are still "selling" these treatments inside hospitals when providing treatment is supported by this reasonable definition. In defense of Judge Muggy's claim that these count as sales, we would only like to state that when going to the hospital, the sick and injured opt into a treatment package, receiving both a service (the administration of the cure) and a good (the item being applied to them).
The Appellee calls this into question because a citizen's (Inknet's) rights are at stake. We do not wish to force these as the only reasonable meanings of the clause, nor convey they are the most probable outcome in order to show that due to the circumstances of the law, the crime is not prosecutable in this instance. Rather, it is a possible outcome, and therefore the Appellant's argument falls apart as, in the trial court, they failed to meet their burden of proof and show to the Court why it should accept the Commonwealth's proposed definition when statute clearly doesn't mention it.

​

Argument 2

This Code of Conduct was updated by DOH Secretary gwiis on December 3, 2025.

The Commonwealth's concession that this Code was edited ex post facto to my client's actions render this evidence inadmissible. The Court has no way of knowing what was put in or taken out since my client's actions.

when referencing the DemocracyCraft Wiki page for the Doctor profession, we similarly find under the Rules section: “Do not sell doctor-only cures outside the hospital,” with the rules section further stating: “If you need to report a Doctor violating these rules or have complaints, report them to a Medical Specialist (MS) or Health Secretary. These rules are enforceable.” While an edit was made to this Wiki page on December 31st, this rule was not added in that edit, meaning that it has existed as a commonly known DOH policy since at least February of 2025

Appellant affirms an edit has been made, and yet has not provided a shred of evidence to suggest that the rule was not added in within that edit, similar to my argument above. The Wiki page is inadmissible as well.

Without these two pieces of evidence, the Commonwealth's second argument has no merit in this Court.


Argument 3

Firstly, the Appellee would like to state that it disagrees with the statement that Inknet sold these items beyond reasonable doubt. As pointed out by Multiman in his Opening Agreement, all pieces of evidence submitted by the Prosecution had significant flaws.

Secondly, the only counterargument we can really offer is that the Court cannot create law where it doesn't exist. It can only interpret it.

All other arguments the Appellee would like to make have already been pointed out thoroughly by Defense counsel in the trial.


Respectfully submitted,
Public Defender Director Superwoops

 

[Superwoops]

Your honour,
I am very tired. In my severe lack of sleep, I forgot that today is in fact not Wednesday, but Tuesday.

Therefore, I retract my request to extend the deadline and ask that I have until the original deadline to continue editing my message.

 

[Smallfries]

Your honour,
I am very tired. In my severe lack of sleep, I forgot that today is in fact not Wednesday, but Tuesday.

Therefore, I retract my request to extend the deadline and ask that I have until the original deadline to continue editing my message.

The deadline was for 7:30 PM today, but you do not get an unlimited right to edit filings. Filings must be ready to send when they are sent for the interest of opposing parties. The only exception is the original complaint.

I understand you have things going on, and that is okay, but we do need to keep some semblance of order and fairness here.

 

[Smallfries]

The Commonwealth (@Dogeington) shall have seventy-two hours to file their response brief, if they so choose.

 

[Smallfries]

Seeing as how no reply brief has been filed, we will be in recess pending verdict.