Lawsuit: Pending Commonwealth of Redmont v. Yeet_Boy [2026] FCR 11

[Novakerbal]

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


Commonwealth of Redmont
Plaintiff

v.

Yeet_Boy
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF

On November 17th, 2025, Talion77, in their capacity as Oakridge Head of Residence, opened a ticket with the DCT in order to action the eviction of the plot or-brewery. During this ticket, Yeet_Boy, acting in their capacity as the Mayor of Oakridge, discouraged the creation of the ticket, and claimed that they had other means of actioning the eviction. On November 19th, 2025 player Bardiya_King was the owner of or-brewery(P-009), whereas on November 22nd, 2025 or-brewery was owned by Yeet_Boy(P-010). The DCT was not responsible for this eviction. The Commonwealth actioned a warrant on the transfer history, and staff ticket history, and discovered that Yeet_Boy directly petitioned staff using their position to transfer ownership of the property to them, bypassing the lawful DCT eviction process. This action violated both the Constitution of Oakridge as well as Executive Order 21/25 - Towns' Rights, as the Mayor bypassed the Department of Construction and Transportation in lobbying staff to process the illegitimate eviction.

I. PARTIES
1. Yeet_Boy (Defendant)
2. Commonwealth of Redmont (Plaintiff)


II. FACTS
1. On November 17th, 2025, Talion77(in their capacity as Oakridge Head of Residence) created a DCT ticket to request the eviction of or-brewery (P-001).
2. During the aforementioned ticket, Yeet_Boy (in their capacity as Mayor) discouraged the creation of similar tickets, and claimed to have their own methods of transferring plots that bypassed the DCT (P-002) (P-003).
3. Search warrants actioned by the Commonwealth revealed that staff had transferred the plot from the previous owner(Bardiya_King) to Yeet_Boy upon the request of the latter. (P-004), (P-005), (P-006), (P-007), (P-008).
4. ElysiaCrynn(in their capacity as a member of Server Staff) asked Yeet_Boy to verify the legality of the transfer they were requesting, which Yeet_Boy subsequently claimed to be legitimate (P-008).
5. At the time of the actions undertaken by Yeet_Boy, Oakridge derived all jurisdiction from Executive Order 21/25 - Towns' Rights.
6. § 4 of Executive Order 21/25 - Towns' Rights states: "Evictions and transfers of property within Town limits (Facilitated by Town government, actioned by the DCT);".
7. The Preamble of the Oakridge Town Constitution lists eviction jurisdiction in the Town as "Department of Construction and Transportation to action evictions".
8. Article II, § (e)(4) of the Oakridge Town Constitution states that the Office of Residence is responsible for "Management of evicted plot auctions within Oakridge".


III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. The Defendant, Yeet_Boy, knowingly or negligently violated both the Oakridge Town Constitution, as well as Executive Order 21/25 - Towns' Rights, by directly petitioning staff to transfer the plot to him, rather than going through lawful DCT Channels.
2. The Defendant was asked to verify that the actions would be legal, and affirmed that to be the case. As the elected mayor of Oakridge, Yeet_Boy is well aware of the Town Constitution and the Executive Order responsible for giving it any degree of autonomy. Therefore Yeet_Boy knowingly acted in violation of established Federal and local policy, such actions must be prevented from occurring.
3. While the Redmontian Constitution has since been amended under the Town Rights Expansion Act, the actions still occurred under prior frameworks where it was a violation of Executive Order. Furthermore, as newly established in Part V 32. (3) towns are explicitly given jurisdiction over "land use, zoning, building standards, and property administration;". This clause is equivalent with a prior clause present in Executive Order 21/25 - Towns' Rights which states: "Land use, zoning, plot pricing, building regulations, and building standards;". Notably however, Executive Order 21/25 - Towns' Rights explicitly carves out the handling of evictions under a separate section, specifically clarifying that evictions will be facilitated by the Town government and actioned by the DCT. As no such constitution clause exists that explicitly delegates the facilitation or actioning of any evictions to any Town jurisdiction, it remains within the jurisdiction of the DCT. Therefore a permanent injunction is necessary to prevent any further abuses of any Constitution, Town or Redmontian.
4. The DCT suffered harm to its lawfully mandated authority to action evictions, by bypassing this jurisdiction Yeet_Boy undermined the authority of the DCT. A local government leader took direct action to undermine the lawful authority of a Federal Department, something which runs directly counter to Executive Order 21/25 - Towns' Rights, the legal framework at the time of the actions undertaken by the Defendant.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Defendant:
1. A declaratory judgement that the actions undertaken by Mayor Yeet_Boy were illegal.
2. A permanent injunction preventing all current and future Mayors and other members of any Town Council from actioning the eviction of plots within their jurisdiction through methods inconsistent with the Constitution of Redmont or the respective town Constitution.

Evidence List:

Spoiler: P-001

Spoiler: P-002

Spoiler: P-003

Spoiler: P-004

See Attached PDF P-004 (2)

Spoiler: P-005

See Attached PDF P-005

Spoiler: P-006

Spoiler: P-007

Spoiler: P-008

Spoiler: P-009

Spoiler: P-010

Witness List:
1. Talion77 (Former Oakridge Head of Residence)
2. Staff
By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 23rd day of February, 2026

 

[Muggy21]

@Novakerbal Just to be clear, you rep the Dept of Justice? The Federal Govt, not Oakridge?

 

[Muggy21]

Writ of Summons

@YeetBoy1872325 is required to appear before the Federal Court in the case of Commonwealth of Redmont v. Yeet_Boy [2026] FCR 11

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

[YeetGlazer]

He’s innocent case dismissed

 

[Muggy21]

He’s innocent case dismissed

Hmm, when were you made Judge?

You weren't, please refrain from making such comments in my court, I will contempt you.

 

[zLost]

Hmm, when were you made Judge?

You weren't, please refrain from making such comments in my court, I will contempt you.

ts not tuff gng

 

[YeetGlazer]

ts not tuff gng

It was tuff. Please do not interrupt my court or I will find you in contempt. This is your first and final warning.

 

[Muggy21]

It was tuff. Please do not interrupt my court or I will find you in contempt. This is your first and final warning.

I find you in Contempt of Court, you shall be imprisoned for 600 seconds.

 

[zLost]

It was tuff. Please do not interrupt my court or I will find you in contempt. This is your first and final warning.

I apologise for my mistake, Your Honor. I realize now that ts was indeed tuff.

 

[Novakerbal]

@Novakerbal Just to be clear, you rep the Dept of Justice? The Federal Govt, not Oakridge?

Yes correct, the DOJ is bringing this case, not Oakridge.

 

[Franciscus]

Your Honor,

I am present on behalf of the defendant:

Spoiler: Evidence of consent to represent

Additionally,

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

Your Honor,

This is an unusual suit, in which the Commonwealth is civilly suing a citizen in their private capacity. This is not prohibited (indeed, this is possible), but we believe that this specific case is not supported under Court Rules nor the law. The Defense seeks dismissal of this case under Rule 5.7 (Failure to Include Party) and Rule 5.5 (Lack of Claim). In support thereof, we respectfully allege as follows:

1. The Plaintiff fails to include relevant parties as co-defendants.​

This case is one filed by the Commonwealth of Redmont against Yeet_Boy as a private person. One might think that the Commonwealth is seeking to hold Yeet_Boy personally liable for something he did as a private citizen.

Then one turns to the prayers for relief. The first is an ask for declaratory judgement that actions Yeet_Boy allegedly took as mayor were illegal. The second is possibly the most sweeping ask I have ever seen in a case involving a private party defendant:

A permanent injunction preventing all current and future Mayors and other members of any Town Council from actioning the eviction of plots within their jurisdiction through methods inconsistent with the Constitution of Redmont or the respective town Constitution.

This proposed injunction would affect a number of parties not present to this suit. This presently includes the Town of Oakridge, the Town of Aventure, Aventura Mayor AnimeIInc, every member of Oakridge's Town Council, and every member of Aventura's Town Council. None of these individuals are party to this case.

Under Rule 5.7 (Failure to Include Party), dismissal may be warranted "for the plaintiff’s failure to join all appropriate parties to the case". While a Court may order joinder where "(a) Complete relief cannot be granted without the additional party; or (b) The additional party claims an interest in the subject matter such that disposing of the case without them may impair their ability to protect that interest" (RCCA, Part IV, Section 6(1)), it nonetheless remains on the Plaintiff to actually list all relevant parties to be summoned to this case.

The Defense asks that the Court dismiss this case with prejudice against this private party. The Commonwealth cannot sue a single private citizen and demand a sweeping injunction involving multiple governmental entities including ones (like Aventura and its councillors) that have not been shown to have any plausible relation to the facts this case.

2. Plaintiff's purported claims for relief are incoherent under the law; plaintiff plainly lacks claim.​

The Plaintiff has presented four purported claims for relief. The first claim alleges that Yeet_Boy violated the Oakridge Town Constitution as well as an Executive Order. The second claim cites no statutes but alleges that Yeet_Boy "knowingly acted in violation of established Federal and local policy". The third claim rambles long about interceding constitutional amendments, but essentially is a restatement that an executive order was allegedly violated. The Fourth claim is, once again, a restatement that an executive order was allegedly violated, but this time asserting that the DCT was "undermined".

This case is brought by the Department of Justice, rather than the Town of Oakridge (Docket Entry No. 10).

None of these are plausible claims for relief, and each should be dismissed under Rule 5.5 (Lack of Claim). The analysis is discussed in the subsections below, though many later subsections return to analysis on the first claim due to what we believe are a duplication of errors by the Plaintiff across several claims.

2.1 The first claim for relief does not have a basis in law.​

The first claim for relief is as follows:

1. The Defendant, Yeet_Boy, knowingly or negligently violated both the Oakridge Town Constitution, as well as Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights, by directly petitioning staff to transfer the plot to him, rather than going through lawful DCT Channels.

There are essentially two parts to this (1) an alleged violation of the Oakridge Town Constitution; and (2) an alleged violation of an executive order. As discussed below, neither of these may grant relief against Yeet_Boy personally.

2.1.1 The Department of Justice lacks legal authority to bring civil suit against private individuals for violations of the Oakridge Town Constitution.​

First, we must examine whether or not the Department of Justice even has the authority to bring suit against private parties for alleged violations of the Oakridge Town Constitution. As this Court has previously obesrved, "the most important question needing to answered first is what law applies and where" (End v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 31). So we must ask: what is the relevant law here?

This suit was filed on 23 February 2025. This means that, at the time of filing, the current Legal Entity Act, the constitutional amendments pursuant to the Town Rights Expansion Act (TREA), and the current Oakridge Town Constitution and bylaws were in effect. The Redmont Civil Code Act, as well as its companion (the Redmont Civil Code Amendments Act, which is erroneously merged into a thread with the RCCA despite not modifying that law) were also signed and in effect. As any authority to represent must be consistent with the law at the time, we must examine what the law says about Town Constitutions.

2.1.1.1 The Department of Justice cannot be presumed to represent Oakridge.

Under the current legal entity act, Towns are distinct legal entities (LEA, Part II, Section 1(5)(b)). While the Department of Justice is the legal representative of executive departments (LEA, Part II, Section 2(1)), they are not presumed to be the legal representative of a particular town (LEA, Part II, Section 2(2)(c)). In the case of Oakridge, the Town has chosen to appoint its legal representative through a method specified in its Town Constitution: "The Mayor of Oakridge shall represent the Town in court, or may appoint another player to do so" (Oak Const., Article III, Section 1). As such, this Court must reject any representation or reliance that the Department of Justice may implicitly or explicitly make that it has authority to represent Oakridge.

2.1.1.2 The Town of Oakridge, and the Town alone, has executive authority to enforce its Constitution.

"Towns are autonomous local governments of the Commonwealth" (Const. 32). In line with the Federal Constitution, town legislatures post-TREA are given true legislative authority and town executives (such as the Mayor and various town offices) are given true executive authority (Const. 32(2)). As "[t]he Town Constitution and bylaws shall apply within the Town's jurisdiction" (Const. 32(3)), and a town's constitution surely constitutes a "matter[] predominantly internal to the Town’s jurisdiction" (Const. 32(3)) we must conclude that the Towns themselves have proper jurisdiction over their constitutions.

Oakridge, like all towns has its own constitution that lays out its governance structure. The Oakridge Constitution delegates enforcement of local laws to the Oakridge Police Department, whose job is to "enforce the laws of the Town of Oakridge" (Oak. Const., Article II, Section 1(g)). As the Constitution of Oakridge is inded a local law (see: Oakridge Constitution Act), this means that enforcement of the Oakridge Constitution is delegated to the Oakridge Police Department (who, through the Mayor or Mayor's designee, may bring suits in Court).

Intrusion by the federal executive into this matter is not authorized by the Federal Constituion; indeed, a central point of the TREA was to prevent this sort of creep into a town's proper domain. The Federal Court must refuse the Department of Justice's attempt to usurp the constitutional authoritity of Oakridge here, and we pray that Your Honor rule that the Department of Justice lacks legal authority to bring civil suits for violations of Oakridge's Constitution without the consent of Oakridge.

2.1.1.3 Conclusion: The Department of Justice may not bring civil suits for violation of the Oakridge Constitution

The Department of Justice has no legal authority to bring civil suits for violations of the Oakridge Constitution. The Town Constitution establishes local processes and local authorities responsible for handling these, the Legal Entity Act provides the Town with a right to its own representation, and the Federal Constitution confirms that the Town has jurisdiction to handle matters predominantly internal to itself (as a Town Constitution would be). Thus, the Federal government lacks claim here; it has no legal authority to pursue a claim of violation of a Town constitution.

2.1.2 Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights does not apply to alleged actions dated in November 2025.​

The second issue posed by the first purported claim for relief is an alleged violation of Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights. This is extremely confusing to the Defense, as that executive order was enacted on 27 December 2025, and the only dated factual allegation is 17 November 2025.

The Federal Court has ruled that ex post facto civil legislation is generally restricted (Vendeka Inc. and Pepecuu v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 107, Opinion of the Court, No. 4). While an Executive Order is not legislation, the general constitutional analysis carries through. The Federal Court cannot apply an Executive Order issued on 27 December to actions on 17 November; ex post facto application of an Executive Order to create civil liability is an affront to our Common Law and constitutional principles of justice.

2.1.3 An alleged violation of an executive order fails to create a claim against a private individual under the law.​

Holding aside ex-post facto considerations, we also choose to examine whether or not an executive order may generate civil liability for a private individual.

We must ask ourselves, what is an Executive Order? Under the Federal Constitution, "Executive Orders must only be used as a mechanism by which the President can exert powers expressly granted to the Executive within the Constitution" (Const. 45; emphasis mine).

This then makes us ask the question: Does the Constitution expressly grant the Federal Executive unilateral authority to create civil liability for private citizens? The answer is clear: no. It is the legislative authority invested in the Congress that is responsible for lawmaking (Const. 2); the Executive cannot by decree create civil liability for individuals.

As such, even if Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights were accepted to be the relevant EO at the time of the alleged incidents described in this case, it would not plausibly cause civil liability for a private individual.

2.1.4 Conclusion: The first claim for relief should be dismissed with prejudice.​

The Department of Justice has brought a claim against defendant Yeet_Boy for violations of a Town Constitution as well as violations of an Executive Order that was published over 1 month after the dated factual allegations in the Complaint. The Department of Justice lacks legal authority to bring suit against a private party for violation of Oakridge's constitution, the application of Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights to the factual allegations here would raise extreme ex-post facto concerns, and Executive Orders cannot create causes of actions against private citizens to begin with.

This claim for relief cannot survive. It must be dismissed with prejudice.

2.2 The second claim for relief is a generalized grievance rather than a legal claim.​

The second claim for relief presented by the Plaintiff is as follows:

The Defendant was asked to verify that the actions would be legal, and affirmed that to be the case. As the elected mayor of Oakridge, Yeet_Boy is well aware of the Town Constitution and the Executive Order responsible for giving it any degree of autonomy. Therefore Yeet_Boy knowingly acted in violation of established Federal and local policy, such actions must be prevented from occurring.

The claim quotes no statutes nor clauses of any law nor executive order. The claim is a generalized grievance that "federal and local policy" was violated, but fails to specify what federal policy or local policy was violated. If these are the same federal and local policies as referred in the first claim, the analysis in 2.1 and subsections should apply, and dismissal with prejudice would be warranted. If this is meant to refer to anything else, it is plainly not cognizable.

Dismissal with prejudice is warranted.

2.3 The third claim for relief has no basis in law.​

The third claim for relief presented by the Plaintiff is as follows:

While the Redmontian Constitution has since been amended under the Town Rights Expansion Act, the actions still occurred under prior frameworks where it was a violation of Executive Order. Furthermore, as newly established in Part V 32. (3) towns are explicitly given jurisdiction over "land use, zoning, building standards, and property administration;". This clause is equivalent with a prior clause present in Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights which states: "Land use, zoning, plot pricing, building regulations, and building standards;". Notably however, Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights explicitly carves out the handling of evictions under a separate section, specifically clarifying that evictions will be facilitated by the Town government and actioned by the DCT. As no such constitution clause exists that explicitly delegates the facilitation or actioning of any evictions to any Town jurisdiction, it remains within the jurisdiction of the DCT. Therefore a permanent injunction is necessary to prevent any further abuses of any Constitution, Town or Redmontian.

As discussed infra in 2.1 (and subsections), violations of an Executive Order (particularly, an executive order that was signed over 1 month after the date of alleged actions in this case) do not plausibly create civil liability against a private party.

The Department of Justice appears to separately assert that Yeet_Boy is personally liable as a private party for a violation of the Constitution. This is nonsense, and borderline frivolous:

• In ToadKing v. Culls [2025] DCR 82, the District Court found that "[a]s a general principle, rights enumerated in the Charter bind government actors and governmental authority. They do not extend horizontally to disputes between private persons".
• The Federal Court endorsed this finding in 12700k v. ToadKing__ [2026] FCR 9, and issued an Order to Show Cause regarding the attempt to bind a private citizen to constitutional obligations in a civil suit.

The Defense understands that the Commonwealth is attempting to seek a permanent injunction that is so sweeping that it binds all towns and town officials everywhere (see also: Complaint, second prayer for relief). That does not mean that it can sue a private party to do so; no legal basis for claim against a citizen in his private capacity has been plausibly alleged.

This claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

2.4 The Fourth Claim for Relief does not have a basis in law.​

The fourth claim for relief presented by the Plaintiff is as follows:

The DCT suffered harm to its lawfully mandated authority to action evictions, by bypassing this jurisdiction Yeet_Boy undermined the authority of the DCT. A local government leader took direct action to undermine the lawful authority of a Federal Department, something which runs directly counter to Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights, the legal framework at the time of the actions undertaken by the Defendant.

The claim alleges that the Defendant "undermined the authority of the DCT" because the defendant allegedly violated Executive Order 46/25. As discussed infra, application of an Executive Order signed in December to facts alleged in November creates extreme concerns around ex post facto and the application of an Executive Order to create civil liability for private parties is constitutionally incoherent.

This claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

3. This case should be dismissed with prejudice, and legal fees should be awarded​

As has been demonstrated above, each claim fails as a matter of law, and the Plaintiff has failed to properly join relevant parties to this case. When each claim fails as a matter of law, dismissal with prejudice is warranted to prevent a repeat of the same legal filings being made anew.

What's more, the Plaintiff is seeking to enjoin a vast swath of government entities, but has only attempted to sue one individual in a private capacity. The Federal Court should send a strong message that these sorts of filings are not welcome.

The Defense also requests that, should Your Honor grant dismissal, that legal fees be paid in the amount of $6,000, in line with the Redmont Civil Code Act.

Further, we respectfully ask that any deadline on an answer to complaint be tolled until after the MTD is ruled upon.

 

[Novakerbal]

Your Honor,

I am present on behalf of the defendant:

Spoiler: Evidence of consent to represent

View attachment 75106

Additionally,

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

Your Honor,

This is an unusual suit, in which the Commonwealth is civilly suing a citizen in their private capacity. This is not prohibited (indeed, this is possible), but we believe that this specific case is not supported under Court Rules nor the law. The Defense seeks dismissal of this case under Rule 5.7 (Failure to Include Party) and Rule 5.5 (Lack of Claim). In support thereof, we respectfully allege as follows:

1. The Plaintiff fails to include relevant parties as co-defendants.​

This case is one filed by the Commonwealth of Redmont against Yeet_Boy as a private person. One might think that the Commonwealth is seeking to hold Yeet_Boy personally liable for something he did as a private citizen.

Then one turns to the prayers for relief. The first is an ask for declaratory judgement that actions Yeet_Boy allegedly took as mayor were illegal. The second is possibly the most sweeping ask I have ever seen in a case involving a private party defendant:


This proposed injunction would affect a number of parties not present to this suit. This presently includes the Town of Oakridge, the Town of Aventure, Aventura Mayor AnimeIInc, every member of Oakridge's Town Council, and every member of Aventura's Town Council. None of these individuals are party to this case.

Under Rule 5.7 (Failure to Include Party), dismissal may be warranted "for the plaintiff’s failure to join all appropriate parties to the case". While a Court may order joinder where "(a) Complete relief cannot be granted without the additional party; or (b) The additional party claims an interest in the subject matter such that disposing of the case without them may impair their ability to protect that interest" (RCCA, Part IV, Section 6(1)), it nonetheless remains on the Plaintiff to actually list all relevant parties to be summoned to this case.

The Defense asks that the Court dismiss this case with prejudice against this private party. The Commonwealth cannot sue a single private citizen and demand a sweeping injunction involving multiple governmental entities including ones (like Aventura and its councillors) that have not been shown to have any plausible relation to the facts this case.

2. Plaintiff's purported claims for relief are incoherent under the law; plaintiff plainly lacks claim.​

The Plaintiff has presented four purported claims for relief. The first claim alleges that Yeet_Boy violated the Oakridge Town Constitution as well as an Executive Order. The second claim cites no statutes but alleges that Yeet_Boy "knowingly acted in violation of established Federal and local policy". The third claim rambles long about interceding constitutional amendments, but essentially is a restatement that an executive order was allegedly violated. The Fourth claim is, once again, a restatement that an executive order was allegedly violated, but this time asserting that the DCT was "undermined".

This case is brought by the Department of Justice, rather than the Town of Oakridge (Docket Entry No. 10).

None of these are plausible claims for relief, and each should be dismissed under Rule 5.5 (Lack of Claim). The analysis is discussed in the subsections below, though many later subsections return to analysis on the first claim due to what we believe are a duplication of errors by the Plaintiff across several claims.

2.1 The first claim for relief does not have a basis in law.​

The first claim for relief is as follows:

There are essentially two parts to this (1) an alleged violation of the Oakridge Town Constitution; and (2) an alleged violation of an executive order. As discussed below, neither of these may grant relief against Yeet_Boy personally.

2.1.1 The Department of Justice lacks legal authority to bring civil suit against private individuals for violations of the Oakridge Town Constitution.​

First, we must examine whether or not the Department of Justice even has the authority to bring suit against private parties for alleged violations of the Oakridge Town Constitution. As this Court has previously obesrved, "the most important question needing to answered first is what law applies and where" (End v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 31). So we must ask: what is the relevant law here?

This suit was filed on 23 February 2025. This means that, at the time of filing, the current Legal Entity Act, the constitutional amendments pursuant to the Town Rights Expansion Act (TREA), and the current Oakridge Town Constitution and bylaws were in effect. The Redmont Civil Code Act, as well as its companion (the Redmont Civil Code Amendments Act, which is erroneously merged into a thread with the RCCA despite not modifying that law) were also signed and in effect. As any authority to represent must be consistent with the law at the time, we must examine what the law says about Town Constitutions.

2.1.1.1 The Department of Justice cannot be presumed to represent Oakridge.

Under the current legal entity act, Towns are distinct legal entities (LEA, Part II, Section 1(5)(b)). While the Department of Justice is the legal representative of executive departments (LEA, Part II, Section 2(1)), they are not presumed to be the legal representative of a particular town (LEA, Part II, Section 2(2)(c)). In the case of Oakridge, the Town has chosen to appoint its legal representative through a method specified in its Town Constitution: "The Mayor of Oakridge shall represent the Town in court, or may appoint another player to do so" (Oak Const., Article III, Section 1). As such, this Court must reject any representation or reliance that the Department of Justice may implicitly or explicitly make that it has authority to represent Oakridge.

2.1.1.2 The Town of Oakridge, and the Town alone, has executive authority to enforce its Constitution.

"Towns are autonomous local governments of the Commonwealth" (Const. 32). In line with the Federal Constitution, town legislatures post-TREA are given true legislative authority and town executives (such as the Mayor and various town offices) are given true executive authority (Const. 32(2)). As "[t]he Town Constitution and bylaws shall apply within the Town's jurisdiction" (Const. 32(3)), and a town's constitution surely constitutes a "matter[] predominantly internal to the Town’s jurisdiction" (Const. 32(3)) we must conclude that the Towns themselves have proper jurisdiction over their constitutions.

Oakridge, like all towns has its own constitution that lays out its governance structure. The Oakridge Constitution delegates enforcement of local laws to the Oakridge Police Department, whose job is to "enforce the laws of the Town of Oakridge" (Oak. Const., Article II, Section 1(g)). As the Constitution of Oakridge is inded a local law (see: Oakridge Constitution Act), this means that enforcement of the Oakridge Constitution is delegated to the Oakridge Police Department (who, through the Mayor or Mayor's designee, may bring suits in Court).

Intrusion by the federal executive into this matter is not authorized by the Federal Constituion; indeed, a central point of the TREA was to prevent this sort of creep into a town's proper domain. The Federal Court must refuse the Department of Justice's attempt to usurp the constitutional authoritity of Oakridge here, and we pray that Your Honor rule that the Department of Justice lacks legal authority to bring civil suits for violations of Oakridge's Constitution without the consent of Oakridge.

2.1.1.3 Conclusion: The Department of Justice may not bring civil suits for violation of the Oakridge Constitution

The Department of Justice has no legal authority to bring civil suits for violations of the Oakridge Constitution. The Town Constitution establishes local processes and local authorities responsible for handling these, the Legal Entity Act provides the Town with a right to its own representation, and the Federal Constitution confirms that the Town has jurisdiction to handle matters predominantly internal to itself (as a Town Constitution would be). Thus, the Federal government lacks claim here; it has no legal authority to pursue a claim of violation of a Town constitution.

2.1.2 Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights does not apply to alleged actions dated in November 2025.​

The second issue posed by the first purported claim for relief is an alleged violation of Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights. This is extremely confusing to the Defense, as that executive order was enacted on 27 December 2025, and the only dated factual allegation is 17 November 2025.

The Federal Court has ruled that ex post facto civil legislation is generally restricted (Vendeka Inc. and Pepecuu v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 107, Opinion of the Court, No. 4). While an Executive Order is not legislation, the general constitutional analysis carries through. The Federal Court cannot apply an Executive Order issued on 27 December to actions on 17 November; ex post facto application of an Executive Order to create civil liability is an affront to our Common Law and constitutional principles of justice.

2.1.3 An alleged violation of an executive order fails to create a claim against a private individual under the law.​

Holding aside ex-post facto considerations, we also choose to examine whether or not an executive order may generate civil liability for a private individual.

We must ask ourselves, what is an Executive Order? Under the Federal Constitution, "Executive Orders must only be used as a mechanism by which the President can exert powers expressly granted to the Executive within the Constitution" (Const. 45; emphasis mine).

This then makes us ask the question: Does the Constitution expressly grant the Federal Executive unilateral authority to create civil liability for private citizens? The answer is clear: no. It is the legislative authority invested in the Congress that is responsible for lawmaking (Const. 2); the Executive cannot by decree create civil liability for individuals.

As such, even if Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights were accepted to be the relevant EO at the time of the alleged incidents described in this case, it would not plausibly cause civil liability for a private individual.

2.1.4 Conclusion: The first claim for relief should be dismissed with prejudice.​

The Department of Justice has brought a claim against defendant Yeet_Boy for violations of a Town Constitution as well as violations of an Executive Order that was published over 1 month after the dated factual allegations in the Complaint. The Department of Justice lacks legal authority to bring suit against a private party for violation of Oakridge's constitution, the application of Executive Order 46/25 - Town's Rights to the factual allegations here would raise extreme ex-post facto concerns, and Executive Orders cannot create causes of actions against private citizens to begin with.

This claim for relief cannot survive. It must be dismissed with prejudice.

2.2 The second claim for relief is a generalized grievance rather than a legal claim.​

The second claim for relief presented by the Plaintiff is as follows:



The claim quotes no statutes nor clauses of any law nor executive order. The claim is a generalized grievance that "federal and local policy" was violated, but fails to specify what federal policy or local policy was violated. If these are the same federal and local policies as referred in the first claim, the analysis in 2.1 and subsections should apply, and dismissal with prejudice would be warranted. If this is meant to refer to anything else, it is plainly not cognizable.

Dismissal with prejudice is warranted.

2.3 The third claim for relief has no basis in law.​

The third claim for relief presented by the Plaintiff is as follows:


As discussed infra in 2.1 (and subsections), violations of an Executive Order (particularly, an executive order that was signed over 1 month after the date of alleged actions in this case) do not plausibly create civil liability against a private party.

The Department of Justice appears to separately assert that Yeet_Boy is personally liable as a private party for a violation of the Constitution. This is nonsense, and borderline frivolous:

• In ToadKing v. Culls [2025] DCR 82, the District Court found that "[a]s a general principle, rights enumerated in the Charter bind government actors and governmental authority. They do not extend horizontally to disputes between private persons".
• The Federal Court endorsed this finding in 12700k v. ToadKing__ [2026] FCR 9, and issued an Order to Show Cause regarding the attempt to bind a private citizen to constitutional obligations in a civil suit.

The Defense understands that the Commonwealth is attempting to seek a permanent injunction that is so sweeping that it binds all towns and town officials everywhere (see also: Complaint, second prayer for relief). That does not mean that it can sue a private party to do so; no legal basis for claim against a citizen in his private capacity has been plausibly alleged.

This claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

2.4 The Fourth Claim for Relief does not have a basis in law.​

The fourth claim for relief presented by the Plaintiff is as follows:


The claim alleges that the Defendant "undermined the authority of the DCT" because the defendant allegedly violated Executive Order 46/25. As discussed infra, application of an Executive Order signed in December to facts alleged in November creates extreme concerns around ex post facto and the application of an Executive Order to create civil liability for private parties is constitutionally incoherent.

This claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

3. This case should be dismissed with prejudice, and legal fees should be awarded​

As has been demonstrated above, each claim fails as a matter of law, and the Plaintiff has failed to properly join relevant parties to this case. When each claim fails as a matter of law, dismissal with prejudice is warranted to prevent a repeat of the same legal filings being made anew.

What's more, the Plaintiff is seeking to enjoin a vast swath of government entities, but has only attempted to sue one individual in a private capacity. The Federal Court should send a strong message that these sorts of filings are not welcome.

The Defense also requests that, should Your Honor grant dismissal, that legal fees be paid in the amount of $6,000, in line with the Redmont Civil Code Act.

Further, we respectfully ask that any deadline on an answer to complaint be tolled until after the MTD is ruled upon.

While the Commonwealth will address the remainder of these points in the future, we will acknowledge that section 2.1.2(and subsequent sections addressing the inclusion of 46/25) has merit, as this was a citation error.

However, the applicable details are also present in the preceding executive order. Therefore we are requesting your Honors permission to amend the complaint to include the correctly applicable executive order (Executive Order 21/25 - Town's Rights).


This should address any concerns from the Defendant on the subject of the EO being signed after the date of the alleged actions.

 

[Muggy21]

While the Commonwealth will address the remainder of these points in the future, we will acknowledge that section 2.1.2(and subsequent sections addressing the inclusion of 46/25) has merit, as this was a citation error.

However, the applicable details are also present in the preceding executive order. Therefore we are requesting your Honors permission to amend the complaint to include the correctly applicable executive order (Executive Order 21/25 - Town's Rights).


This should address any concerns from the Defendant on the subject of the EO being signed after the date of the alleged actions.

So granted, as of now you have until 2/25/26 @ 9pm EST for the MtD. (I'm not making a response due at 4am EST.)

 

[Novakerbal]

So granted, as of now you have until 2/25/26 @ 9pm EST for the MtD. (I'm not making a response due at 4am EST.)

Your Honor,

Due to the abnormally large girth of this MTD, the Plaintiff respectfully requests an extra 24 hours in order to handle the prodigious size of the Motion.

 

[Muggy21]

Your Honor,

Due to the abnormally large girth of this MTD, the Plaintiff respectfully requests an extra 24 hours in order to handle the prodigious size of the Motion.

Response due on 2/26/26 at 9pm EST.

 

[Franciscus]

While the Commonwealth will address the remainder of these points in the future, we will acknowledge that section 2.1.2(and subsequent sections addressing the inclusion of 46/25) has merit, as this was a citation error.

However, the applicable details are also present in the preceding executive order. Therefore we are requesting your Honors permission to amend the complaint to include the correctly applicable executive order (Executive Order 21/25 - Town's Rights).


This should address any concerns from the Defendant on the subject of the EO being signed after the date of the alleged actions.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

Your Honor,

The Defense has reviewed the Plaintiff's changes to the Complaint. Upon our own reassessment, the defense submits a further motion to dismiss under Rule 5.12 (Lack of Personal Jurisdiction) and respectfully alleges as follows:

1. The Department of Justice Lacks Standing​

Under Rule 5.12 (Lack of Personal Jurisdiction), a case may be dismissed when a "plaintiff fails to have sufficient standing in order to pursue the case".

To survive dismissal, consistent with Rule 2.1 (Standing Application), Plaintiff must demonstrate the following to this Court:

1. Suffered some injury caused by a clear second party; or is affected by an application of law.
2. The cause of injury was against the law.
3. Remedy is applicable under relevant law that can be granted by a favorable decision.

This case was brought by the Department of Justice acting of its own accord, not the Town of Oakridge (Docket No. 10). Keeping this in mind, the Defense respectfully alleges that the Complaint does not plausibly demonstrate any of these three points.

1.1 The Plaintiff was not injured​

The first prong of standing fails inasmuch as the Plaintiff’s standing theory is not grounded in a cognizable injury. The Complaint alleges (at most) that the Department of Construction and Transportation should “action evictions,” and that Yeet_Boy (as Mayor) petitioned Staff directly to transfer a plot.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that technical or abstract grievances, absent a cognizable injury and an available remedy, do not satisfy Rule 2.1. In ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 19, the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of standing where the alleged wrong did not amount to a cognizable legal injury and where the requested remedy was not supported by an existing remedial framework.

Here, the Plaintiff does not allege that the Commonwealth lost money, lost property, or itself suffered legal consequences. It alleges that an internal allocation of responsibility should have been followed. That is not an injury of the kind that permits a suit under Rule 2.1.

1.2 The Defendant did not plausibly act against the law​

The second prong of standing also fails: the Plaintiff’s asserted cause of injury is not against the law as pleaded. Executive Orders are constitutionally confined to implementing "powers expressly granted to the Executive within the Constitution" (Const. 45). Since-repealed Executive Order 21/25, which is now relied upon by the Plaintiff, reads as a governance delegation framework for towns and departments that was in effect prior to the Town Rights Expansion Act's amendments to the constitution. This EO is plainly not a civil liability statute creating enforceable duties for private citizens (such as is the defendant in this case).

Likewise, the Oakridge Constitution is a charter establishing internal institutions to the Town of Oakridge, including local enforcement through the Oakridge Police Department and local litigation representation by the Mayor or designee (Const. 32(2); Oak. Const., generally). The Oakridge Constitution does not create a DOJ-enforceable federal civil cause of action against a private citizen for alleged noncompliance with Oakridge’s governmental structure.

1.3 Remedy sought is not authorized under the law​

The third prong of standing is fatal on its face. The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and a permanent injunction aimed at "all current and future mayors" and "any Town Council members … for any town" (Complaint, Prayer for Relief 1-2). Rule 2.1 requires that the remedy both be "applicable under relevant law" and be able to "be granted by a favorable decision".

The Plaintiff has not identified any statute authorizing this sweeping remedy, and the Commonwealth’s own civil code does not supply it: the Redmont Civil Code Act contains no "Executive Order" enforcement cause of action, no "town constitution" enforcement cause of action, and no injunction/declaratory remedial framework on which the Plaintiff can rely. The defense cannot find any such causes of action at Common Law prior to the passage of the Act, nor any statute authorizing civil causes of action against private citizens on the basis of "Executive Order" or violation of a Town Constitution in the laws in place at the time of the incident alleged in the complaint's factual allegations. We posit that this is because no such cause of action exists.

1.4 Conclusion: The Plaintiff lacks standing, warranting dismissal with prejudice​

The Supreme Court’s approach is clear: where a plaintiff cannot show an injury and cannot point to a remedy the Court can grant under relevant law, the case is dismissed for lack of standing.

Accordingly, this plaintiff fails to have sufficient standing in order to pursue the case under Rule 5.12, and this Court should dismiss this case with prejudice.

 

[Novakerbal]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

Your Honor,

The Defense has reviewed the Plaintiff's changes to the Complaint. Upon our own reassessment, the defense submits a further motion to dismiss under Rule 5.12 (Lack of Personal Jurisdiction) and respectfully alleges as follows:

1. The Department of Justice Lacks Standing​

Under Rule 5.12 (Lack of Personal Jurisdiction), a case may be dismissed when a "plaintiff fails to have sufficient standing in order to pursue the case".

To survive dismissal, consistent with Rule 2.1 (Standing Application), Plaintiff must demonstrate the following to this Court:


This case was brought by the Department of Justice acting of its own accord, not the Town of Oakridge (Docket No. 10). Keeping this in mind, the Defense respectfully alleges that the Complaint does not plausibly demonstrate any of these three points.

1.1 The Plaintiff was not injured​

The first prong of standing fails inasmuch as the Plaintiff’s standing theory is not grounded in a cognizable injury. The Complaint alleges (at most) that the Department of Construction and Transportation should “action evictions,” and that Yeet_Boy (as Mayor) petitioned Staff directly to transfer a plot.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that technical or abstract grievances, absent a cognizable injury and an available remedy, do not satisfy Rule 2.1. In ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 19, the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of standing where the alleged wrong did not amount to a cognizable legal injury and where the requested remedy was not supported by an existing remedial framework.

Here, the Plaintiff does not allege that the Commonwealth lost money, lost property, or itself suffered legal consequences. It alleges that an internal allocation of responsibility should have been followed. That is not an injury of the kind that permits a suit under Rule 2.1.

1.2 The Defendant did not plausibly act against the law​

The second prong of standing also fails: the Plaintiff’s asserted cause of injury is not against the law as pleaded. Executive Orders are constitutionally confined to implementing "powers expressly granted to the Executive within the Constitution" (Const. 45). Since-repealed Executive Order 21/25, which is now relied upon by the Plaintiff, reads as a governance delegation framework for towns and departments that was in effect prior to the Town Rights Expansion Act's amendments to the constitution. This EO is plainly not a civil liability statute creating enforceable duties for private citizens (such as is the defendant in this case).

Likewise, the Oakridge Constitution is a charter establishing internal institutions to the Town of Oakridge, including local enforcement through the Oakridge Police Department and local litigation representation by the Mayor or designee (Const. 32(2); Oak. Const., generally). The Oakridge Constitution does not create a DOJ-enforceable federal civil cause of action against a private citizen for alleged noncompliance with Oakridge’s governmental structure.

1.3 Remedy sought is not authorized under the law​

The third prong of standing is fatal on its face. The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and a permanent injunction aimed at "all current and future mayors" and "any Town Council members … for any town" (Complaint, Prayer for Relief 1-2). Rule 2.1 requires that the remedy both be "applicable under relevant law" and be able to "be granted by a favorable decision".

The Plaintiff has not identified any statute authorizing this sweeping remedy, and the Commonwealth’s own civil code does not supply it: the Redmont Civil Code Act contains no "Executive Order" enforcement cause of action, no "town constitution" enforcement cause of action, and no injunction/declaratory remedial framework on which the Plaintiff can rely. The defense cannot find any such causes of action at Common Law prior to the passage of the Act, nor any statute authorizing civil causes of action against private citizens on the basis of "Executive Order" or violation of a Town Constitution in the laws in place at the time of the incident alleged in the complaint's factual allegations. We posit that this is because no such cause of action exists.

1.4 Conclusion: The Plaintiff lacks standing, warranting dismissal with prejudice​

The Supreme Court’s approach is clear: where a plaintiff cannot show an injury and cannot point to a remedy the Court can grant under relevant law, the case is dismissed for lack of standing.

Accordingly, this plaintiff fails to have sufficient standing in order to pursue the case under Rule 5.12, and this Court should dismiss this case with prejudice.

Response

Your Honor,

For the sake of Brevity, the Commonwealth shall address all points in both Motions to Dismiss in one filing.

Motion to Dismiss 1:

1- The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff has failed to include parties relevant to this case, as the proposed permanent injunction would indirectly affect members of the Aventura and Oakridge Town Governments. The purpose of this prayer for relief is principally to request a legal interpretation from the presiding judge to take judicial action(in the form of a permanent injunction) in order to set a strong future precedent by which any further incidents can be handled. The Commonwealth is not asking for any of these other parties to be declared in violation of the law, but rather to create a permanent injunction to act as precedent to constrain future actions. Being abstractly affected by precedent set during a case is not sufficient to warrant inclusion as a party to said case. To claim as such would require the inclusion of extraneous parties in many cases, as many citizens could have their rights affected by a precedent-setting decision. Yeet_Boy is listed as a party due to their alleged actions, no other member of the Oakridge Town Council or Aventura at large has, to the knowledge of the DOJ, committed any actions that would warrant them being listed as a party to this case.

2-The Defendant asserts that the Commonwealth’s claims are incoherent, and inconsistent with the law. However, the Commonwealth maintains that these claims have proper basis.

2.1- Addressed below in many subpoints.

2.1.1- While it may be true that the DOJ does not directly enforce the Oakridge Town Constitution via criminal action, The Commonwealth has the full capability of pursuing a civil claim. The Defendant has inflicted clear injury upon the DCT’s (and by extent the Executive’s as a whole) ability to lawfully execute its authority upon local governments. Such an undermining of the DCT’s authority meets the standards for injury, allowing the Commonwealth to bring a civil suit. Indeed the Supreme Court in [2025] FCR 117 - Appeal maintained that “It is indeed true that individuals do not need to prove they have been specifically harmed in some discrete, tangible manner—but they still must prove some injury occurred. It should be noted that the bar for this is extremely low.”. By undermining both the authority of the DCT and the execution of a lawfully binding Executive Order, the alleged actions inflicted clear injury to the Commonwealth, therefore granting the ability to bring suit in order to seek remedy for the actions undertaken by local Government officials.

2.1.1.1- Indeed, the DOJ is not representing the Town of Oakridge in this case. Instead the DOJ is representing the Commonwealth, specifically in asserting its right to sue based on illegal harm inflicted.

2.1.1.2- Again, the DOJ is not claiming to directly enforce the Town Constitution of Oakridge on behalf of Oakridge. This case is a civil matter brought in order to address the clear harm inflicted on the Commonwealth. The Constitution creates no such carveout that restricts the Commonwealth's ability to bring such a suit when proper standing has been established.

2.1.1.3- Regardless of whether the Commonwealth is responsible for enforcing the Oakridge Town Constitution, the Mayor is legally obligated to follow it, and any actions taken in defiance of the Town Constitution is a violation of the law. Even if the Town of Oakridge itself is the only entity capable of properly enforcing a violation of their Constitution, it does not change the fact that the actions were a violation of the law regardless. The Commonwealth reserves the right to bring a civil suit when standing has clearly been established by the violation of Executive Order and Statute, and injury has been inflicted to the Commonwealth itself.

2.1.2- Rendered moot by the amended complaint.

2.1.3- This case does not ask for Yeet_Boy to be held personally liable, rather it seeks to establish that the alleged actions taken were a violation of the legal authority extended to them in their official capacity as Mayor of Oakridge. Indeed, no prayer for relief has requested any personal liability such as monetary fines from the Defendant.

2.1.4- We believe that the above reasons establish sufficient standing and reason for this claim for relief to remain active, and this case to continue.

2.2- This claim was reiterating the fact that federal (Executive Order 21/25 - Towns' Rights) and local (Oakridge Town Constitution) policies were violated by the Defendant, something which is plainly evident from context. Our defense of the above applies.

2.3- This claim for relief does not seek to establish that Yeet_Boy is liable for violating the constitution, as the described constitutional changes passed after the actions were taken. This section explicitly exists to provide support for why permanent precedent based on the newly amended constitution is warranted to govern future instances of such actions.

2.4- Mostly rendered moot by the amended complaint, however the Commonwealth would like to reiterate that the undermining of the DCT and the Executive at large by local government officials did create quantifiable harm leading to sufficient civil standing as discussed above.

3-We believe this has sufficiently addressed the issues raised in the Defendants Motion to Dismiss, we ask the honorable judge to allow this case to be properly adjudicated.

Motion to Dismiss 2:

1- Addressed below in many subpoints, we believe this case meets all criteria for standing.

1.1- The harm suffered in this case is quite clear in its nature. The DCT suffered injury when its authority was illegally undermined by a local Government official. Additionally, the Executive as a whole suffered injury by having a lawful Executive Order undermined in its authority. The Commonwealth has the constitutional right and duty to enforce the law as written by the legislature. When its authority is undermined, this is not just a matter of preference or procedure – it is an abridgement of the legal rights of the federal government.

1.2- As we have examined in the response to the prior Motion to Dismiss, we believe this is mostly a rehashing of previous arguments, and therefore a response above should suffice.

1.3- This appears to be a deceptive argument at its face. The Redmont Civil Code Act is unambiguous when it states that “This Code constitutes a non-exhaustive listing of civil violations within the jurisdiction of Redmont” (Part II §3.1) and “Nothing in this Code prevents a plaintiff from seeking remedy for harm not explicitly codified, where common law principles or judicial precedent support such a claim” (Part II §3.1.a). The assertion that the lack of an explicit Executive Order or Town Constitution enforcement clause prevents any such remedy from being sought is patently untrue, as demonstrated in the Redmont Civil Code Act, signed into law by former President Multiman155. In addition, we have already examined why the Judiciary is perfectly capable of creating future constitutional precedent.

1.4- The Commonwealth has demonstrated a clearly applicable injury, the ability to set future constitutional precedent exists, and no codification of harm is required. Therefore, this case need not be dismissed.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth would like to address allegations that the Defendant Yeet_Boy is being held personally liable for these actions in Civil Court. We would like to reject these claims. No claim for relief or prayer for relief asks for Yeet_Boy to be held personally liable for the actions undertaken, as the alleged actions were taken under the official guise of mayoral authority. The Defendant took action in their official capacity as the Mayor of Oakridge, and the DOJ recognizes this in not attempting to hold the Defendant personally liable. Yeet_Boy is only named as the Defendant in this case because it was his actions alone, in his capacity as Mayor of Oakridge, that generated the present claim. If the honorable judge determines that Yeet_Boy should not be the named defendant in this case, we ask that the defendant be amended to “Town of Oakridge”, as this is a procedural change that does not change the material facts or prayers for relief of this case.