Lawsuit: Pending asexualdinosaur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] DCR 94

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Case Filing


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

asexualdinosaur (represented by ToadKing)
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

COMPLAINT

The Plaintiff complains against the Defendants as follows:

Plaintiff was terminated from their position as a State Prosecutor with the Department of Justice without prior warning or opportunity to address any alleged concerns. The reasons provided for Plaintiff's termination were materially inaccurate. Throughout Plaintiff's tenure at the Department of Justice, Plaintiff performed their duties diligently and received no formal warnings or review of their work or performance. This arbitrary termination has caused Plaintiff significant harm both financially and professionally.

I. PARTIES​

1. asexualdinosaur
2. Kaiserin_ (Attorney General)
3. Commonwealth of Redmont

II. FACTS​

1. On or around 18 August 2025, Plaintiff was hired as a State Prosecutor by the Department of Justice. (P-001)
2. Throughout Plaintiff's tenure, Plaintiff provided legal representation for the Commonwealth in numerous cases.
3. Plaintiff was actively serving as counsel for the Commonwealth in the case of Inknet v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 86, which had reached Closing Statements at the time of Plaintiff's termination, as well as Justice Compass, Ltd. v Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 98. (P-002)
4. On or around 25 October 2025, in [2025] FCR 86, a discovery dispute arose wherein the presiding judicial officer charged Plaintiff with Contempt of Court for failure to submit evidence within the discovery deadline. (P-003)
5. Plaintiff had informed Attorney General Kaiserin_ that Plaintiff would not be submitting the requested evidence, as reflected in communications where Plaintiff stated: "Nothing was missed, I informed you I wouldnt be submitting those." (P-004)
6. The Attorney General acknowledged this communication failure, responding: "ah, i thought we'd decided it'd be better to submit them. though im realising you didnt respond to that message so i def shouldve followed up haha not a huge deal in this case as i was able to just go in and submit it." (P-004)
7. Despite the Attorney General's acknowledgement that the incident was "not a huge deal" and that the AG "should've followed up," this single contempt charge was later cited as one of the primary reasons for Plaintiff's termination.
8. On 18 November 2025, at approximately 17:43 UTC, Plaintiff was terminated from employment with a Server message stating: "DOJ » You have been fired as a State Prosecutor!" (P-005)
9. Approximately two minutes later, at 17:45 UTC, Attorney General provided the following explanation: "hello, informing you that you have been terminated from your position in the DOJ for multiple charges of contempt of court, concerns about courtroom behaviour, and as part of a wider effort in increasing department informational security." (P-006)
10. The stated reasons for termination were materially inaccurate and misleading:
(a) The Attorney General claimed "multiple charges of contempt," when in fact Plaintiff received only a single contempt charge.
(b) The Attorney General cited "concerns about courtroom behaviour," yet Plaintiff's behaviour was never discussed or raised as a concern prior to termination.
(c) The reference to "informational security" concerns followed discussions about a news channel posting leaks from the DOJ, with the Attorney General later clarifying she had concerns that Plaintiff may be a source of leaks. (P-006)
11. Plaintiff received no prior notice, warning, or opportunity to respond to any allegations or "behaviour" concerns before termination.
12. In contrast to Plaintiff's treatment, Special Prosecutor xEndeavour has engaged in substantially similar - and more severe - conduct without termination:
(a) In YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76, xEndeavour received multiple warnings about courtroom behaviour, including a "final warning" about outbursts and pings, and was subsequently found in contempt of court and fined $500 for pinging the presiding officer and debating the Judge. (P-007)
(b) In Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2025] FCR 78, xEndeavour was warned about speaking without approval, then found in contempt of court and fined $5,000 plus 10 minutes jail. The Court noted that "as a former Chief Justice and regular in the courts, xEndeavour should know the proceedings by now." (P-008)
(c) In that same case, xEndeavour was charged with a second count of contempt for self-removing a wanted point to avoid jail time (later removed), and received yet another "final warning" that further issues would be considered perjury and/or contempt. (P-008)
13. Despite multiple contempt charges across multiple cases and numerous warnings about courtroom behaviour - reasons cited for Plaintiff's termination - xEndeavour remains employed as a Special Prosecutor with the Department of Justice.
14. During the subsequent conversation with the Attorney General, Plaintiff contested the accuracy of the stated reasons and requested that the decision be settled out of court. Plaintiff explicitly stated: "Not asking for a reversal, I would contest this in court and usually a re-hiring isn't par for the course. I am asking you to settle it before hitting the courts." (P-006)
15. The Attorney General declined to settle, stating: "im not reversing the decision at the moment [...] see you in court." (P-006)
16. The Attorney General acknowledged that Plaintiff's firing was partly due to "informational security concerns regarding anchor watch and the solidarity of the DOJ's internal information." (P-005)
17. The Attorney General provided no evidence to substantiate the claims that Plaintiff was involved with any information leaks or issues with "informational security".
18. The Department of Justice had previously issued a public apology in October 2025 following a similar unfair dismissal case (T04DS74 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 65), wherein Acting Attorney General Dearev stated: "The Department of Justice sincerely apologizes for the lack of notice given to ToadKing upon his firing. We will work towards providing more notice in the future [...] We will therefore establish clear protocols for notice periods in firings, as well as specific guidance for firings in general, in our policy." (P-009)
19. Despite these promises, the Department has not implemented the promised protocols, resulting in the same pattern of arbitrary termination without notice being repeated against Plaintiff.

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF​

1. Unfair Dismissal​

Defendant's termination of Plaintiff constitutes unfair dismissal in violation of Section 7(1) of the Commercial Standards Act. The termination was unjust under Section 7(1)(d), which permits:
(d) other metrics that courts find necessary to consider in accordance with what may be considered unfair dismissal by any reasonable person and is consistent with the previous language and intent of this section.
No reasonable person would consider this termination just or fair. The Attorney General terminated Plaintiff citing three reasons: "multiple charges of contempt of court, concerns about courtroom behaviour, and as part of a wider effort in increasing department informational security." Each of these stated reasons fails to withstand basic scrutiny.

First, the claim of "multiple charges of contempt" is demonstrably false. Plaintiff received a single contempt charge, not multiple. Moreover, that single charge arose from a miscommunication that the Attorney General herself acknowledged was "not a huge deal" and for which she admitted she "should've followed up." No reasonable person would consider a single contempt charge - stemming from a miscommunication the employer admits fault in - grounds for immediate termination without warning.

Second, the citation of "concerns about courtroom behaviour" is wholly unsupported. Plaintiff's courtroom behaviour was never discussed, documented, or raised as a concern at any point during Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff received no warnings or indication that any aspect of their conduct was problematic. A reasonable person would expect that if an employer had genuine concerns about an employee's behavior, those concerns would be communicated to the employee with an opportunity to respond or improve. Terminating an employee for behavioural concerns that were never raised is arbitrary and unfair.

Third, the reference to "informational security" concerns is entirely without evidentiary foundation. The Attorney General provided no evidence whatsoever that Plaintiff was responsible for any leak of Department information. When pressed on this point, the Attorney General could offer nothing but suspicion, stating only that she had "informational security concerns regarding anchor watch and the solidarity of the DOJ's internal information." Suspicion alone, without any evidence, cannot justify termination. A reasonable person would find it absurd and unjust to terminate an employee based on unsubstantiated suspicion of wrongdoing. The Attorney General's willingness to fire Plaintiff on mere speculation - without conducting any investigation, gathering any evidence, or even asking Plaintiff about the matters - represents precisely the type of arbitrary and capricious conduct that Section 7(1) is designed to prevent.

The termination also fails under Section 7(1)(a) and (b). There was no financial necessity requiring Plaintiff's termination, as the Department was not engaged in any type of downsizing operations. Plaintiff's continued employment would not have been a detriment to the workflow, reputation, or legal standing of the Department - to the contrary, Plaintiff was actively serving as counsel in Inknet v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 86 and Justice Compass, Ltd. v Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 98.

2. Violation of DOJ Policy Handbook​

The Department of Justice violated its own Policy Handbook (P-010) in terminating Plaintiff, which establishes progressive discipline procedures that were entirely disregarded.

The Defendant provided no documentation supporting Plaintiff's termination and offered reasons that were either demonstrably false or entirely unsupported by evidence. The Department cannot defend a decision based on "multiple charges of contempt" when only one charge existed. The Department cannot cite "concerns about courtroom behaviour" that were never documented or communicated to the Plaintiff. The Department cannot invoke "informational security" concerns without any evidence linking Plaintiff to any security breach.

The Policy Handbook establishes that termination should be a last resort following other disciplinary measures, not an immediate first response. The section on "Handling Conflicts of Interest" provides that failure to comply "could result in forced recusal or disciplinary action, up to and potentially including termination of employment from the department." The phrase "up to and potentially including" clearly establishes a graduated approach where termination represents the maximum sanction after lesser disciplinary measures have been considered or implemented. Similarly, the "Evidence Confidentiality" provision states that failure to follow this principle "will result in disciplinary action, up to and potentially including termination of employment from the department," again establishing progressive discipline. Plaintiff received no prior disciplinary action, no warnings, and no opportunity to respond before being immediately terminated, in direct violation of the progressive discipline framework established by the Policy Handbook.

3. Unfair Discrimination​

Defendant's actions constitute unfair discrimination in violation of Section 32(13) of the Constitution, which guarantees that:
(13) Every citizen is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without unfair discrimination and, in particular, without unfair discrimination based on political belief or social status.
Special Prosecutor xEndeavour has committed substantially similar - and objectively more severe - conduct to that cited for Plaintiff's termination, yet remains employed by the Department of Justice.

In YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76, xEndeavour received multiple warnings about courtroom behaviour from the presiding judicial officer, including a "final warning" that any further outbursts or pings would result in contempt charges. xEndeavour was subsequently found in contempt of court for pinging the presiding officer and debating the Judge, and was fined $500.

In Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2025] FCR 78, xEndeavour was again warned about speaking without approval from the Attorney General, then found in contempt of court and fined $5,000 plus 10 minutes jail. The Court specifically noted that "as a former Chief Justice and regular in the courts, xEndeavour should know the proceedings by now and know when to speak and not speak within the court." xEndeavour was subsequently charged with a second count of contempt for self-removing a wanted point to avoid jail time, and received yet another "final warning" that further issues would be considered perjury and/or contempt.

The disparate treatment between Plaintiff and xEndeavour is stark and indefensible. Plaintiff received one contempt charge arising from a miscommunication acknowledged by the Attorney General as "not a huge deal" and was immediately terminated. xEndeavour received multiple contempt charges across multiple cases, multiple warnings about courtroom behaviour, fines and jail time, yet continues to serve as a Special Prosecutor.

This unequal application of disciplinary standards demonstrates that Plaintiff's termination was not based on legitimate workplace concerns but rather arbitrary or retaliatory motives that cannot withstand scrutiny under the equal protection guarantee.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF​

The Plaintiff seeks the following from this Court:

1. Compensatory Damages under Section 4 of the Legal Damages Act for unpaid salary and compensation for work performed on behalf of the Department of Justice during November 2025.

2. $15,000 in Consequential Damages for Loss of Enjoyment under Section 7(1)(III) of the Legal Damages Act, specifically for the loss of ability to practice law on behalf of the Commonwealth and the work invested in ongoing cases, including [2025] FCR 86 and [2025] FCR 98.

3. $15,000 in Punitive Damages under Section 5 of the Legal Damages Act, which authorises damages "awarded against a person to punish them for their outrageous conduct and to deter them and others like them from similar conduct in the future."

4. A declaration that the Defendant's termination of Plaintiff was unlawful and constituted unfair dismissal in violation of Section 7(1) of the Commercial Standards Act.

5. An order directing the Department of Justice to implement the termination protocols it publicly committed to following T04DS74 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 65, including notice periods and specific guidance for firings, and to update the DOJ Policy Handbook to reflect these procedures.

6. A formal written apology from the Defendant acknowledging the improper termination and violation of Plaintiff's rights.

7. 30% legal fees as provided under Section 9 of the Legal Damages Act.

EVIDENCE​

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See DoJ Policy Handbook.pdf

WITNESSES​

1. Kaiserin_
2. Dearev
3. xEndeavour
4. asexualdinosaur

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 18th day of November 2025



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Attachments

Last edited:

Motion


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECUSE

Plaintiff requests that Magistrate dearev, the sole Magistrate in the DCR, recuse from this case as they are a named witness.
Plaintiff requests that an FCR judge be assigned to this case.

 

Motion


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECUSE

Plaintiff requests that Magistrate dearev, the sole Magistrate in the DCR, recuse from this case as they are a named witness.
Plaintiff requests that an FCR judge be assigned to this case.

Granted.
 
@ToadKing

For the moment, I'll be the PO on this case pending internal discussion. A summons will occur within a few days for docket management.
 
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