Response
TO MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiffs respectfully oppose the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss, which invokes Rule 5.5 (lack of claim), Rule 5.12 (lack of personal jurisdiction), and Rule 2.1 (standing). As shown below, each asserted ground for dismissal is unfounded under the Laws and Constitution of the Commonwealth Redmont. Plaintiff's Complaint adequately alleges violations of constitutional rights and a breach of the government’s duty of care, thus stating a valid claim. Moreover, this Court has jurisdiction over the Commonwealth’s actions affecting Redmont citizens, and Plaintiffs plainly satisfy the standing requirements. For these reasons, the motion should be denied.
Introduction
Plaintiffs respectfully oppose the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss, which invokes Rule 5.5 (lack of claim), Rule 5.12 (lack of personal jurisdiction), and Rule 2.1 (standing). As shown below, each asserted ground for dismissal is unfounded under the Laws and Constitution of the Commonwealth Redmont. Plaintiff's Complaint adequately alleges violations of constitutional rights and a breach of the government’s duty of care, thus stating a valid claim. Moreover, this Court has jurisdiction over the Commonwealth’s actions affecting Redmont citizens, and Plaintiffs plainly satisfy the standing requirements. For these reasons, the motion should be denied.
I. Rule 5.5 – Lack of Claim
Plaintiffs have Stated Valid Legal Claims. The Commonwealths's motion argues no constitutional rights were violated because the Department of Commerce’s actions were authorized by law and done for a brief emergency period. This argument misapplies the law.
Under Redmont’s Constitution, Plaintiffs have a clear cause of action: the Department’s directive commandeering all private financial institutions for a so-called “bank holiday” constitutes an unreasonable seizure of citizens’ property rights, in violation of Part IV, Section 33, Clause 15 of the Constitution. That clause guarantees “[e]very citizen has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” By freezing bank transfers and withdrawals with no valid law cited, the government effectively seized control of Plaintiffs’ financial assets and economic liberty, at least temporarily. Such a sweeping deprivation – even for 3 hours – is presumptively unconstitutional absent proper authority and due cause. The brief duration or claimed good intentions (“to prevent harm to depositors”) do not erase the legal injury; even a short-lived infringement of a fundamental right is actionable.
Furthermore, Part IV, Section 33, Clause 14 of the Constitution provides that no citizen may be deprived of life, liberty, or personal security except in accordance with fundamental justice. Here, fundamental justice was lacking: the Department issued an edict commandeering private banks without contemporaneously citing any statute or providing any due process to persons affected by this commandeering, suggesting the action was ultra vires. The Defendant invokes the Taxation Act as purported authorization. However, even if that Act delegates emergency powers, it does not license arbitrary deprivation of rights. In fact, the Taxation Act’s emergency power of commandeering were given restraints by the drafters of the Act: in cases of “extraordinary circumstances, such as insolvency, near insolvency, financial crises, or situations where the institution’s continued operation poses a systemic risk”. It authorizes the Commerce Department to “commandeer and take temporary control” of a troubled financial institution in such exceptional cases – not to impose a blanket freeze on every bank irrespective of their individual financial conditions. The announcement in question identified no failing bank or specific crisis; it simply declared a general “bank holiday” with threat of sanctions.
In other words, the Commonwealth's sweeping and broad action, which the Defense affirms in its response to the complaint that "in effect temporarily rendered financial firm client assets unable to be accessed by clients pursuant to a government order", finds no authority in the text of any law or the Constitution, and Plaintiffs were unable to locate any lawful authority for commandeering private institutions en masse. Thus, the Complaint properly alleges that the Commerce Department acted without lawful power and in contravention of constitutional limits, which states a valid claim for relief. As such, dismissal under Rule 5.5 is unwarranted.
Breach of Duty of Care: In addition to straightforward constitutional violations, the Complaint asserts the Commonwealth breached its duty of care to citizens. Redmont law recognizes that executive agencies owe a duty to act within the bounds of their constitutional and statutory obligations. As the Federal Court held in smokeyybunnyyy v. Commonwealth [2024] FCR 103, “Every department within the executive branch has a duty of care to uphold its constitutional obligations.” And, as the ruling in RaiTheGuy v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 29 succinctly notes, when a duty of care "is not upheld, it is considered a breach, and the party who is obliged to uphold the duty can be liable for damages". Here, by overstepping its legal authority and infringing Plaintiffs’ rights, the Department of Commerce breached that duty.
Why does the commonwealth deny that the facts as alleged by the Plaintiff would constitute a breach of duty, which would thus be a valid cause of action? The Commonwealth's motion doesn't say. The best that the Plaintiff can discern is that the Commonwealth is assuming, as it does in its response to the complaint, that "1. Taxation Act §8 gives broad non-exhaustive power to the DOC to protect depositors of deposit-taking institutions", without citing any specific clause in the section or language in the law itself. That being said, taking this to mean the language in clause 3 thereof (i.e. "The Department of Commerce will have the following non-exhaustive powers in relation to regulating financial institutions"), this simply does not create unlimited emergency powers. The section simply enumerates a list of powers and associated conditions when they may be used, while not precluding other laws from granting additional powers. Taking action beyond those limits – such as by effectively commandeering the whole of the interest-bearing banking sector ultra vires and without valid cause, while depriving both Plaintiffs their ability to make or accept payments using their lawfully obtained bank accounts – is a breach of the duty of care the government owes to the public.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ allegations are firmly grounded in concrete legal rights (constitutional provisions and statutory duties), not vague or “undefined” rights. A claim alleging unconstitutional seizure of assets and breach of an executive duty of care is undeniably a cognizable legal claim in Redmont. Just as above, dismissal under Rule 5.5 is unwarranted.
II. Rule 5.12 – Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The Court Has Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs Are Properly Before the Court. The Commonwealth’s Rule 5.12 argument asserts that because the Commerce Department’s directive was “taken against financial institutions NOT against citizens,” Plaintiffs supposedly were not affected by the Commonwealth's action. This is a misconceived view of jurisdiction and standing.
To start, the Federal Court plainly has personal jurisdiction over the Commonwealth of Redmont in this matter. The Constitution vests judicial power in this Court to interpret and apply the law, including the Constitution itself. When citizens allege that the government violated their constitutional rights, the proper forum is this Court – the Commonwealth is not immune from suit and has been a named defendant in numerous cases enforcing constitutional compliance (indeed, no claim of immunity under Court Rule 5.11 is raised). Thus, there is no question that the Court can hear a case against the Commonwealth for its official actions.
The defense’s true contention is not about jurisdiction in the traditional sense, but rather an assertion that Plaintiffs were not personally harmed by the directive. This overlaps with standing (addressed in Part III below). However, even on its own terms the argument fails. After all, the Commonwealth's announcement ordered vast swaths of private banks to halt transactions for a period, which by design directly impacted every user of those banks, including Plaintiffs. The Commonwealth practically admits as much, having affirmed in their answer to the Complaint that the announcement "in effect temporarily rendered financial firm client assets unable to be accessed by clients pursuant to a government order". That the order was addressed to institutions does not shield the Commonwealth from liability – Discover Bank v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 77 makes clear that the Commonwealth can indeed be heald liable for violations of individuals' constitutional rights, even when ostensibly acting taking action directly against a company.
The fact that another entity (e.g. Volt Bank) was the immediate subject of the order does not erase the injury to those (like Plaintiffs) who rely on that entity’s services. Redmont courts have recognized that government actions interfering with a citizen’s rights – even indirectly – give rise to a justiciable controversy. It would be a hollow reading of the Constitution to say the government can circumvent judicial review by acting through private intermediaries; the Courts exist to protect citizens against
all unlawful government interference, direct or indirect.
Accordingly, the
Court’s jurisdiction is properly invoked. The Federal Court has authority to adjudicate this dispute under Section 13 of the Constitution, and no jurisdictional bar prevents reviewing the Commonwealth’s challenged conduct. Rule 5.12 itself defines “lack of personal jurisdiction” as a failure of the plaintiff to have standing. As shown below, Plaintiffs do have standing. There is also no claim that this case belongs in a different court or forum – it is appropriately filed in Federal Court, which handles constitutional claims against the government. In sum, Rule 5.12 is inapplicable because
Plaintiffs are proper parties with a real stake in the outcome, and the Court unquestionably has authority over the Commonwealth in this matter.
III. Rule 2.1 – Standing
Plaintiffs Satisfy All Standing Requirements. Under Court Rule 2.1, a plaintiff must show the folowing to the court:
- That the Plaintiff suffered some injury caused by a clear second party; OR is affected by an application of law.
- The cause of injury was against the law.
- Remedy is applicable under relevant law that can be granted by a favorable decision.
The motion to dismiss argues neither of the first two prongs is met, and does not contest the third prong. In fact,
each element of standing is fulfilled here:
- Injury in Fact: Plaintiffs suffered a concrete injury as a result of the Department’s actions. The defense claims “neither plaintiff has suffered injury” since the directive targeted banks and Plaintiffs are “not in the financial industry”. This is incorrect. Plaintiffs were citizens or firms beneficially owned by citizens, and each Plaintiff's ability to use their accounts to engage in financial transactions was suspended.
The constitutional rights at issue – the right to be free from unreasonable seizure of one’s property (Const. §33(15)) and the right to not be deprived of liberty or security except by fundamental justice (Const. §33(14)) – are personal rights held by every citizen. An alleged violation of those rights is itself an injury. This has been held in Redmont courts before; when in response to a motion to dismiss In totemundying v. Town of Aventura [2024] DCR 40, the Court noted that "the primary damage here is declining to the Plaintiff their right to post a bid under same conditions as anyone else", the court correctly identified that the violation of rights under the constitution itself constituted damage to the Plaintiff.
By the same logic, Plaintiffs being denied the normal use of their bank accounts (even temporarily) and being subjected to an unauthorized government freeze constitutes an injury-in-fact. Additionally, if Plaintiffs had business transactions or personal needs during the freeze, they were concretely affected (the Complaint can be reasonably read to imply such adverse effects). In short, Plaintiffs were “affected by an application of law” (or here, an executive directive with claimed force of law) as Rule 2.1’s first prong requires.
- Illegality of the Cause: The second prong asks whether the cause of injury was against the law. Plaintiffs easily satisfy this by alleging that the Department’s actions violated the Constitution and lacked statutory authority. The defense argues the cause of injury “was certainly not against the law, as the Taxation Act allotted these powers”. This assertion is highly dubious. As explained in Part I, no statute or constitutional provision actually authorized the sweeping bank freeze at issue. The Taxation Act’s emergency powers are limited to true financial emergencies (insolvency or systemic collapse) and contemplate taking control of a specific institution in trouble – not a blanket prohibition on all withdrawals absent any due process. If the Commonwealth contends a lawful “bank holiday” power exists, it has pointed to no text in the law that permits it, and it has affirmed in its response to the Complaint that the announcement itself “did not cite any legal basis” for its mandate.
In the absence of clear authority, the executive branch’s unilateral action is ultra vires (beyond its powers) and thus “against the law.” Moreover, even if some statute could be stretched to cover this scenario, any such application would conflict with the Constitution’s protections. The Constitution is the supreme law of Redmont, and any executive act that contravenes it is unlawful per se. Plaintiffs allege constitutional violations (for example, unreasonable seizure), which by definition alleges that the government’s act was not in accordance with law.
Thus, Rule 2.1’s second criterion is met: the injury flows from conduct that was ultra vires and unconstitutional, i.e. “against the law.”
- Availability of Remedy. The availability of a remedy is not contested by the Defense, and for good reason: they trivially exist. Nominal damages exist (in part) to acknowledge the violations of rights in the absence of compensatory damages. Declaratory or injunctive relief can also be issued by the Court to make clear that the Commerce Department’s initial directive was unlawful and to prevent similar unauthorized bank prohibitions in the future.
Because Plaintiffs show a personal injury, illegality of that injury, and a viable remedy, they meet all elements of standing under Rule 2.1. The defense’s standing challenge essentially reduces to the flawed notion that Plaintiffs were not harmed or that the harm was lawful – points already refuted above. Redmont law does
not require a plaintiff to be the direct addressee of a government order to have standing; it is sufficient that their rights were adversely affected in fact. Here the causal connection between the Commonwealth’s act and Plaintiffs’ injury is direct and unbroken. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this case, and dismissal on standing grounds would be improper.
Conclusion
Each ground raised in the Motion to Dismiss is unsupported by the law and facts. The Complaint alleges a legitimate constitutional claim and breach of duty, falling squarely within this Court’s purview to remedy. Dismissing this case would ignore clear constitutional provisions and undermine accountability for executive overreach. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the motion be denied, so that this case may proceed on its merits and the Commonwealth be required to answer for the alleged violations of the Commonwealth's laws and constitution.
