Lawsuit: Pending IgnitedTnT v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2026] FCR 20

[ToadKing]

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

IgnitedTnT (represented by ToadKing)
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

On 27 March 2026, the Department of State opened a Special Election for the House of Representatives. The Plaintiff, a sitting Representative, declared candidacy in compliance with every stated requirement. On 29 March 2026, the Department of State disqualified the Plaintiff from the ballot, citing Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act. Due to the actions of the Defendant, the Plaintiff was stripped of his constitutional right to run for elected office by a statutory provision that the Constitution does not authorise.

I. PARTIES​

1. IgnitedTnT
2. Commonwealth of Redmont
3. Department of State

​

II. FACTS​

1. On or around 11 March 2026, the results of the House of Representatives Election were published, confirming IgnitedTnT as an elected Representative. (P-001)
2. IgnitedTnT has continuously served as a Representative since that date.
3. On or around 27 March 2026, Representative Malka resigned from the House of Representatives, creating a vacancy.
4. On 27 March 2026 at 10:00 PM UTC, the Department of State formally opened a Special Election to fill that vacancy, setting out the activity requirements as follows (P-002):

Activity Requirements
In order to run for and maintain their seat in the House of Representatives, citizens need to meet these requirements:

• Holds a valid passport issued by the Department of State.
• Has accrued at least 12 hours of active playtime in the past 30 days.
• Has accrued at least 24 hours of total active playtime.

5. On 27 March 2026 at 10:17 PM UTC, the Plaintiff posted the following declaration (P-003):

I, IgnitedTnT, declare that I will be contesting a seat in the House of Representatives as a representative for the Redmont Beach Party

6. On 29 March 2026 at 11:46 PM UTC, following the close of the declaration period, the Department of State published the official candidate list. The Plaintiff was not included on the ballot. (P-004)
7. The Department of State provided the following express reason for the Plaintiff's exclusion (P-004):

Candidate is currently a Representative and therefore ineligible to run for a seat in the House of Representatives under Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act.

8. Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act provides:

(6) Excluded Individuals. In order to run for a seat in a special election, the individual must not currently hold a seat in that chamber in that Class (e.g. a Representative cannot run in a special election for the House of Representatives, but a Class A Senator can run for a Class B Senate seat).

9. The Plaintiff has not been sentenced to any disqualification or ban from public office by any court of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
10. The Department of State, acting in its capacity as the electoral authority of the Commonwealth, applied Section 8(6) deliberately and as a matter of official policy, citing it by name as the sole basis for the Plaintiff's disqualification.

​

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF​

1. Violation of Constitutional Rights​

The Redmont Civil Code Act (RCCA), Part XI, Section 1 provides:

1. Violation of Constitutional Rights
Violation Type: Intentional/Negligent
Remedy: No Fixed Remedy
A person commits a violation if the person:
(a) acting under colour of law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
Relevant Law: The Constitution

Three elements must be established:

1. the Defendant acted under colour of law;
2. the Defendant deprived the Plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution; and
3. the violation was intentional or negligent.

Each element is plainly satisfied by the facts of this case.

​

1.1 Colour of Law​

The Department of State is the electoral authority of the Commonwealth of Redmont, charged by the Executive Standards Act with the "Facilitation of Federal elections (and other elections as requested), including debates." When the DOS excluded the Plaintiff from the ballot, it did so in the exercise of that official authority - citing a specific provision of the Electoral Act as its legal basis. There is no question that the act of disqualification was performed under colour of law. The Department was not acting in a private capacity. It was exercising governmental power in an official proceeding pursuant to a statutory mechanism.

1.2 Deprivation of a Constitutional Right​

The Constitution, Part V, Section 35(1), provides:

(1) The right to participate in, and run for elected office, unless as punishment for a crime.

This provision is framed as a right - one that is expressly guaranteed by the "Charter of Rights and Freedoms". The Plaintiff, as a citizen of the Commonwealth, unquestionably holds this right. The question before this Court is whether Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act lawfully abridges it.

The text of Section 35(1) is specific and unambiguous. It identifies one, and only one, circumstance under which the right to run for office may be curtailed: "as punishment for a crime". This carve-out is exhaustive. It specifies the limit on this right with exactness. Had other restrictions been intended - administrative, structural, or eligibility-based - they would not have identified a single, narrow exception. The language's deliberate narrowness reflects a constitutional choice.

1.2.1 Lex Specialis
The Defendant may point to the preamble of Section 35, which provides that guaranteed rights are subject to "reasonable limits prescribed by law that are justified in a free and democratic society." This argument fails on the foundational principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali: the specific law prevails over the general.

The preamble is a general clause. It speaks in broad terms, applying across every right enumerated in Section 35 without distinction. Section 35(1) is a specific provision. It addresses one particular right - the right to run for elected office - and it identifies, with precision, the one circumstance under which that right may be limited: as punishment for a crime. Where a specific provision has already defined its own exception, a general clause cannot be invoked to supplement or expand upon it. The specific governs the general, not the other way around. That is what lex specialis demands.

To apply the preamble's reasonable limits language to Section 35(1) as though it operates independently of the specific carve-out already written into that provision would be to render the words "unless as punishment for a crime" entirely superfluous. If the preamble alone were sufficient to justify any reasonable statutory restriction on the right to run for office, there would have been no need to specify a limit at all. This isn't an oversight. Section 35(8) provides that citizenship rights apply "unless otherwise codified in law outside this Constitution." That language is an express statutory carve-out - a deliberate constitutional mechanism that permits ordinary law to modify the right in question. Section 35(1) contains no such language. It contains only the criminal punishment exception. The absence of a carve-out is a clear choice. Where the Constitution intended ordinary law to be able to modify a right, it said so. Where it did not, the silence is deliberate. The preamble sets the general framework, and Section 35(1) sets the specific rule. Under lex specialis, the specific rule controls.

1.2.2 Weighted Test
Should the Court decline to apply lex specialis and instead reach for the weighted standard test established in Dartanman v Commonwealth [2023] SCR 13 - weighing government necessity against the importance of maintaining individual rights - Section 8(6) fails that test on its own terms.

The weighted standard test was first articulated in [2023] SCR 13, where the Court held that when evaluating the validity of a governmental limitation on a constitutional right, it is necessary to "weigh the government necessity of taking said action against the importance of maintaining individual rights." This Court subsequently adopted and applied that same framework in Snowy_Heart v Commonwealth [2023] FCR 76, where it applied the test directly to an election eligibility dispute. The [2023] FCR 76 Court described the weighted test as requiring it to first "establish whether or not the actions conducted by the Defendant was in 'reasonable limits'" before weighing those limits against the individual right at stake. The Plaintiff accepts this as the operative framework should the Court decline the primary textual argument. What the Plaintiff submits is that an honest application of that framework to Section 8(6) - using precisely the analytical tools those courts employed - exposes the restriction as one that cannot survive scrutiny.

In [2023] SCR 13, the Court found the DOS's party registration requirements constitutionally permissible because they constituted, in the Court's words, "an empirical, objective standard" that was "reasonable and does not discriminate against social status." The Court was satisfied because the restriction was consistent and rationally connected to a legitimate government interest: maintaining orderly elections and ensuring that parties had genuine public support. The restriction treated everyone the same. It did not single out a class of otherwise-qualified candidates and bar them categorically.

Section 8(6) does not share those characteristics. It is not an empirical or objective standard applied uniformly. It is a categorical exclusion that applies to one class of candidates - sitting Representatives - while expressly permitting an analogous class - sitting Senators - to contest seats within their own chamber "(e.g. a Representative cannot run in a special election for the House of Representatives, but a Class A Senator can run for a Class B Senate seat)". The [2023] SCR 13 Court's approval of the DOS's threshold rested on its consistency and objectivity. Section 8(6) fails both of those qualities within its own text. A restriction that cannot meet the standard the SCR itself applied to uphold a government limit cannot be said to constitute a reasonable and justified limit on a constitutional right.

If a Class A Senator successfully contests a Class B Senate seat, they vacate their Class A seat. That vacancy triggers a further special election. The downstream administrative consequence of the permitted scenario is identical to the downstream consequence of the prohibited one: a sitting representative wins a new seat, their old seat becomes vacant, and another election must follow. If the government's necessity for Section 8(6) rests on preventing that chain of events - a sitting member contesting a seat and potentially triggering a further vacancy - then the provision's own internal exception produces the very outcome it purports to prevent. The Defendant cannot point to "administrative efficiency" or "electoral stability" as a compelling necessity when the statute expressly tolerates the same consequence in the Senate context. The internal inconsistency is evidence that the restriction is arbitrary in character, and where a restriction is arbitrary, no genuine justification exists to deprive any candidate of their constitutional right, including this Plaintiff.

What [2023] SCR 13 establishes is that government necessity must be genuine, consistent, and rationally connected to a legitimate state interest. Section 8(6) satisfies none of those requirements. It treats identical downstream consequences differently depending on which chamber is involved, it singles out one class of candidates while exempting an analogous class within the same provision, and it cannot identify a necessity that its own text does not immediately contradict. The government's necessity, on the evidence of Section 8(6) itself, does not exist.

The application of Section 8(6) to the Plaintiff was not within reasonable limits, because a restriction that rests on no constitutional foundation cannot be reasonable by definition. In [2023] FCR 76, the Court identified constitutional grounding as the source of legitimacy that made a limit on the right to run for office permissible under the weighted test. The Court's precise finding was that "the limitation imposed by the Electoral Act, a constitutional amendment, acts as a reasonable limit" on the right to run for office. That reasoning rests on a critical premise: the constitutional character of the Electoral Act justified the restriction. The Defendant may invoke that finding here, pointing to Section 8(6) of the same Electoral Act as carrying the same legitimacy. That argument fails on the Constitution's own terms. Section 51 provides that "Only text physically contained within the Constitution itself may be considered a part of the Constitution. No text outside of this document may be considered constitutionally binding in any way." The Electoral Act is not physically contained in the Constitution. Whatever the [2023] FCR 76 said about its character, Section 51 is unambiguous: the Electoral Act is "stripped of any constitutional authority, and reclassified as ordinary statute". Section 8(6) is therefore an ordinary statute. The constitutional legitimacy that the Court identified as the foundation for a permissible limit does not exist here, and the Defendant cannot borrow it. On the weighted test, a restriction of purely statutory character cannot claim the constitutional grounding that the court held was necessary to justify a limit on this right.

[2023] FCR 76 treated the right to run for office as a substantive entitlement that warranted genuine scrutiny. The plaintiff in that case was removed from the ballot on a playtime calculation. The Court found in the plaintiff's favour, issuing consequential damages and a writ of mandamus. Critically, the Court did not treat removal from the ballot as a minor procedural matter - it treated it as a deprivation serious enough to ground both constitutional analysis and civil remedy. The Plaintiff in the present case has faced the exact same deprivation - removal from the ballot - but the government's constitutional footing in this case is weaker than anything the [2023] FCR 76 Court was asked to assess. Here, the DOS applied Section 8(6) correctly as written. The question is whether Section 8(6) itself is constitutional. If that Court found removal from the ballot warranted a remedy where the government could at least point to a statutory requirement, however misapplied, then the government's actions here fall further still from reasonable limits - and the case for a remedy is more substantial.

What [2023] FCR 76 establishes is that the right to run for office is a substantive constitutional entitlement, that removal from the ballot is a deprivation serious enough to warrant remedy, and that the legitimacy of any restriction depends on it being grounded in something more than ordinary statutory authority. Section 8(6) provides none of that grounding. The constitutional foundation is completely absent. The restriction is not within "reasonable limits", and the deprivation suffered by this Plaintiff is at least as serious as the one that the Court remedied.

The weighted test, applied faithfully to the principles articulated in [2023] SCR 13 and [2023] FCR 76, does not produce a result favourable to the Defendant. Whether the Court applies the specific textual rule of lex specialis or the weighted standard test, the conclusion is that Section 8(6) does not lawfully abridge the Plaintiff's right under Section 35(1) of the Constitution.

1.2.3 Passports
The Defendant may point to the passport requirement imposed by the Passport Act and reflected in the Special Election announcement as evidence that the legislature is permitted to impose eligibility conditions beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. The passport requirement is constitutionally distinguishable from Section 8(6) in a legally meaningful way. The Passport Act mandates that a passport must be issued to any applicant who has reached the active player threshold - the same threshold already required to run for office. Any citizen who qualifies to stand for election qualifies, as a matter of right, to receive a passport. The requirement imposes no real barrier; it is a procedural verification of eligibility that any qualifying candidate can satisfy. Section 8(6) is categorically different as it does not impose a procedural step, but instead, imposes a categorical exclusion - an entire class of otherwise-qualified citizens is barred from candidacy regardless of their qualifications, purely by virtue of their current office. The distinction is between verifying eligibility and denying it. The former is permissible; the latter is not. The Plaintiff was excluded for one reason only: Section 8(6).

1.2.4 Closing
The Plaintiff was not sentenced to any disqualification from office. The only basis for his removal from the ballot was Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act - a statutory eligibility restriction that is not, and cannot be, characterised as a criminal punishment. It does not flow from a criminal verdict. It was not imposed by a court. It is simply a legislative rule that purports to limit who may run for office. The legislature's power to prescribe reasonable limits under Section 35 operates only in the space the Constitution leaves open. Where a specific provision has already defined its own exclusive exception - as Section 35(1) has - that space is closed. Ordinary statute cannot expand it. Section 35(1) reserves that power exclusively to the criminal justice process.

In removing the Plaintiff from the ballot, the Defendant deprived the Plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed right to run for elected office, on a basis that the Constitution does not authorise. That is a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution.

1.3 Intentionality​

The RCCA defines an intentional violation as one where"the violator acts with the purpose of causing harm or with substantial certainty that harm will result from their conduct."

The DOS did not accidentally exclude the Plaintiff. It identified his declaration, assessed it, and then deliberately excluded him, citing Section 8(6) by name as the specific statutory basis for his removal. The disqualification was a considered, deliberate act of official application of law. The Department knew, with substantial certainty, that excluding the Plaintiff from the ballot would deprive him of the ability to contest that election. That is precisely the harm that resulted.

The intentional element does not require the Defendant to have known that it was acting unconstitutionally; it requires that the act causing harm be deliberate. It was. The intentional element is plainly satisfied.

1.4 Conclusion​

The Department of State, acting under colour of law as the electoral authority of the Commonwealth, deliberately applied Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act to remove IgnitedTnT from the ballot of the Special Election. Section 8(6) restricts the right to run for elected office on grounds other than criminal punishment. The Constitution does not permit this. The Plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution, intentionally, by an agent of the Defendant acting in its official capacity. The Defendant is therefore liable for a Violation of Constitutional Rights under RCCA Part XI, Section 1.

​

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF​

The Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant the following relief:

1. A declaration that Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act is unconstitutional and of no force or effect, as it purports to restrict the right of a sitting Representative to contest a special election for a seat in the House of Representatives, in contravention of Section 35(1) of the Constitution.

2. $7,500 in Nominal Damages, pursuant to RCCA Part III, Section 4, in recognition that the Plaintiff's constitutional right to run for elected office was unlawfully abridged.

3. 30% Legal fees as provided under RCCA Part III, Section 7.

4. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

EVIDENCE​

Spoiler: P-001

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/house-of-representatives-elections-mar-2026.35516/post-138304

Spoiler: P-002

https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/house-of-representatives-election-mar-2026-special.36171/

Spoiler: P-003

https://www.democracycraft.net/thre...s-election-mar-2026-special.36171/post-140296

Spoiler: P-004

https://www.democracycraft.net/thre...s-election-mar-2026-special.36171/post-140577

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 30th day of March 2026

Spoiler: Proof of Representation

 

[Franciscus]

Given my role as an electoral manager within the Department of State, and my role in verifying candidates for this election, I recuse from this action.

 

[Muggy21]

Writ of Summons

@Dogeington is hereby commanded to draw hither to the Federal Court for the case IgnitedTnT v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2026] FCR 20

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

[Dogeington]

Present, Your Honour

 

[Muggy21]

Present, Your Honour

You have 48 Hours to present an Answer, if you wish to submit a dispositive motion the Answer deadline will be tolled. (Please let the Court know if you wish to do so).

 

[Dogeington]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Rule 5.5 (Lack of Claim)
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont Part 1 §3 states,

3. House of Representatives
The House of Representatives shall consist of 11 citizens, referred to as Representatives who are elected for a 2-month term.

This is a requirement stated by the constitution for the size and composition of the House; it must be composed of 11 citizens. While the DOS cited a statutory limitation on the plaintiff's ability to run for office, the reason that a member of Congress cannot run for multiple seats in the House is due to this §3 requirement that the House must be made up of 11 citizens, not 11 seats.

The case before your honor is absurd and should be dismissed immediately with prejudice.

 

[Muggy21]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Rule 5.5 (Lack of Claim)
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont Part 1 §3 states,

This is a requirement stated by the constitution for the size and composition of the House; it must be composed of 11 citizens. While the DOS cited a statutory limitation on the plaintiff's ability to run for office, the reason that a member of Congress cannot run for multiple seats in the House is due to this §3 requirement that the House must be made up of 11 citizens, not 11 seats.

The case before your honor is absurd and should be dismissed immediately with prejudice.

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order - CW Motion to Dismiss

DENIED.

R. Const § (3) provides that the House of Representatives "shall consist of 11 citizens, referred to as Representatives who are elected for a 2-month term." This provision establishes the size and electoral structure of the House. It does not mandate that the House maintain exactly 11 members at all times throughout its session. Vacancies arise regularly through resignations, removals, and other circumstances, and the House continues to function during such periods with fewer than 11 members until the vacancy is filled. The very existence of the special election mechanism presupposes that the House will, at times, operate without its full complement.

To endorse the Commonwealth's position would subject the House to the proposition that it may not operate without a full complement at all times. That is a proposition without constitutional support, and one that would produce consequences far beyond the scope of this case. If the House could not lawfully function with fewer than 11 seated citizens, every resignation, removal, or vacancy would call into question the validity of legislative action taken before the vacancy was filled. The Constitution does not impose such a constraint, and this Court declines to read one into it.

So ordered,
Judge Mug

 

[Muggy21]

After reviewing the Constitution and the Plaintiff's complaint in more detail, the Court is both confused and concerned about the Plaintiff's overall standing to even bring the instant action.

The Court will issue an Order to Show Cause on standing. The deadline for the CW's Answer is tolled.

 

[Dogeington]

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order - CW Motion to Dismiss

DENIED.

R. Const § (3) provides that the House of Representatives "shall consist of 11 citizens, referred to as Representatives who are elected for a 2-month term." This provision establishes the size and electoral structure of the House. It does not mandate that the House maintain exactly 11 members at all times throughout its session. Vacancies arise regularly through resignations, removals, and other circumstances, and the House continues to function during such periods with fewer than 11 members until the vacancy is filled. The very existence of the special election mechanism presupposes that the House will, at times, operate without its full complement.

To endorse the Commonwealth's position would subject the House to the proposition that it may not operate without a full complement at all times. That is a proposition without constitutional support, and one that would produce consequences far beyond the scope of this case. If the House could not lawfully function with fewer than 11 seated citizens, every resignation, removal, or vacancy would call into question the validity of legislative action taken before the vacancy was filled. The Constitution does not impose such a constraint, and this Court declines to read one into it.

So ordered,
Judge Mug

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The court is misunderstanding the Defense's Motion to Dismiss. In its denial of the Defense's MTD, the court does establish that special elections must take place to maintain that 11 member count for the House of Representatives. If a less than 11 member House were allowed, there would be no need for special elections; the reason that a special election takes place is due to this requirement that the House must maintain this number of citizens.

The Defense in no way postures that Congress may not operate without all seats filled; this is not mentioned even in the slightest in the Defense's MTD.

The position of the Commonwealth is that the Constitution is explicit in its requirement for 11 distinct persons to be in the House of Representatives. The Constitution differentiates between the words "citizen" and "seat." In Part 1 §3, the Constitution specifically mandates that 11 citizens occupy the House, not that the House be made up of 11 seats. One person can not be multiple citizens.

Seats in the Constitution are in reference to the roles themselves; for example Part 1 §7.1 states:

7. Electoral Terms and Limitations
(1) Chamber Eligibility. A citizen may only serve in one chamber of Congress. If a citizen is elected to both the House of Representatives and the Senate, they must forfeit their seat in the House and assume their seat in the Senate.

The likely reason that the drafters of our Constitution used the word "seat" when referring to electoral terms and limitations is due to the fact that, without it, an individual could run for both offices as they would be a unique citizen in each chamber, satisfying the requirements set out in §3 and §4.

Seats in the Constitution are only used in the context of Congress, while the word "citizen" is used throughout the Constitution in other contexts not relating to Congressional structure.
For example, Part 5 §35.8 states:

(8) Unless otherwise codified in law outside this Constitution, all players are to be granted Citizenship upon joining the server for the first time.

And further in §35.14:

(14) Every citizen has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

It is clear and beyond a doubt that, within the Constitution, citizenship is referring to individuals within the Commonwealth of Redmont and is not a term interchangeable with seats of a chamber of Congress.

Therefore when The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont Part 1 §3 states:

3. House of Representatives
The House of Representatives shall consist of 11 citizens, referred to as Representatives who are elected for a 2-month term.

that must be referring to distinct individuals within the Commonwealth. There must be 11 distinct persons within the chamber, one person can not be multiple citizens.

 

[Muggy21]

@ToadKing Respond to the motions as you see fit by Apr 2nd, 2026 at 9pm EST.

 

[ToadKing]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The court is misunderstanding the Defense's Motion to Dismiss. In its denial of the Defense's MTD, the court does establish that special elections must take place to maintain that 11 member count for the House of Representatives. If a less than 11 member House were allowed, there would be no need for special elections; the reason that a special election takes place is due to this requirement that the House must maintain this number of citizens.

The Defense in no way postures that Congress may not operate without all seats filled; this is not mentioned even in the slightest in the Defense's MTD.

The position of the Commonwealth is that the Constitution is explicit in its requirement for 11 distinct persons to be in the House of Representatives. The Constitution differentiates between the words "citizen" and "seat." In Part 1 §3, the Constitution specifically mandates that 11 citizens occupy the House, not that the House be made up of 11 seats. One person can not be multiple citizens.

Seats in the Constitution are in reference to the roles themselves; for example Part 1 §7.1 states:

The likely reason that the drafters of our Constitution used the word "seat" when referring to electoral terms and limitations is due to the fact that, without it, an individual could run for both offices as they would be a unique citizen in each chamber, satisfying the requirements set out in §3 and §4.

Seats in the Constitution are only used in the context of Congress, while the word "citizen" is used throughout the Constitution in other contexts not relating to Congressional structure.
For example, Part 5 §35.8 states:

And further in §35.14:

It is clear and beyond a doubt that, within the Constitution, citizenship is referring to individuals within the Commonwealth of Redmont and is not a term interchangeable with seats of a chamber of Congress.

Therefore when The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont Part 1 §3 states:

that must be referring to distinct individuals within the Commonwealth. There must be 11 distinct persons within the chamber, one person can not be multiple citizens.

Response

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Your Honour,

The Plaintiff opposes the Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider (MtR) and respectfully submits that it should be denied.

I. SUBSTANCE​

The Motions Guide states:

Reconsider

A request to reconsider a previous ruling based on a point of law or new evidence. Only one motion to reconsider can be made per decision, with all arguments included in a single submission.

The MtR does not identify an error in the Court's initial reasoning and does not raise a new point of law. It restates the same premise - that Section 3's reference to "11 citizens" prevents a sitting Representative from contesting a seat, with additional linguistic elaboration on the word "citizen." The Court found that Section 3 "establishes the size and electoral structure of the House" and does not mandate that the House maintain exactly 11 members at all times. The Commonwealth's MtR does not address that finding, nor does it identify where the Court's reasoning was wrong. It simply restates the original premise with additional linguistic exaggeration. That is not grounds for reconsideration and should therefore be denied.

II. FALSE PREMISE​

The Commonwealth's position rests on a false premise that the Plaintiff was attempting to hold two seats simultaneously, thereby occupying two of the eleven citizen positions "required" to be distinct by the Constitution. He was not. The Plaintiff sought to contest a seat. Contesting an election and holding a seat are not the same thing. Had the Plaintiff won, he would have vacated his existing seat upon taking the new one. At no point would one citizen have occupied two positions, and the House would still retain the opportunity to be composed of eleven distinct citizens. The Commonwealth's citizen/seat distinction, however linguistically interesting, does not change this fundamental fact.

Nonetheless, the Constitution contains no express requirement that a sitting member must resign before contesting another seat in their chamber, nor that a sitting member is expressly prohibited from running for a seat. The Commonwealth is asking this Court to read a prohibition into Section 3 that its text does not contain. The restriction they claim is constitutionally grounded exists nowhere in the Constitution - it exists only in Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act, the ordinary statute whose constitutionality is the very question before this Court.

III. WHAT ABOUT THE SENATE?​

Section 4 of the Constitution provides:

4. Senate
The Senate shall consist of 6 citizens, referred to as Senators who are elected for a 4-month term. The Senate acts as the house of review to the House of Representatives.

That language is identical in character to the Section 3 provision the Commonwealth relies upon. A Class A Senator is already one of those 6 constitutionally mandated citizens. Under the Commonwealth's logic, a Class A Senator contesting a Class B seat raises the identical constitutional concern that one citizen potentially occupies two of the six constitutionally mandated positions. The Commonwealth offers no basis for treating the Senate's identical "shall consist" language differently from Section 3. If Section 3 creates a candidacy bar for Representatives, the same reading applies to Senators - yet Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act expressly permits that exact scenario. Section 7(1) of the Constitution provides a forfeiture mechanism only for cross-chamber elections. It is entirely silent on intra-chamber scenarios. The Electoral Act likewise provides no mechanism requiring a Class A Senator to vacate their Class A seat upon winning a Class B seat. There is no "requirement for resignation or forfeiture" provision, yet the system functions regardless because the vacancy process operates on election. Section 7(1) confirms that this is precisely how the Constitution itself resolves dual-seat conflicts, through post-election forfeiture rather than pre-election disqualification.

If this Court were to adopt the Commonwealth's position - that Section 3 constitutionally prohibits a sitting member from contesting a seat in their own chamber - the Commonwealth is, in effect, advocating for the invalidation of Section 8(6) on its own reasoning. Section 8(6) expressly permits Class A Senators to do precisely what the Commonwealth says the Constitution forbids. The statutory provision would be unconstitutional on the Commonwealth's own terms. The Commonwealth, therefore, faces an inevitable dilemma of its own making. Either their reading of Section 3 is correct, or it is not.

If the Defendant is correct - that one citizen cannot contest a second position in their own chamber - then Section 8(6) is unconstitutional, because it expressly purports to override the Constitution, and allow sitting Senators to run for seats in their own Chamber.
If the Defendant is incorrect - if Section 3 does not, in fact, prohibit a sitting member from contesting a seat in their chamber - then the constitutional prohibition they have built their entire argument upon does not exist, and the MtR crumbles.

The Commonwealth may attempt to distinguish the Senate scenario on the basis that Class A and Class B constitute distinct constitutional positions. The Constitution mandates 6 citizens in the Senate regardless of class. A Class A Senator contesting a Class B seat remains one of those 6 citizens throughout. The dilemma stands that either Section 3 prohibits what the Commonwealth claims, in which case Section 8(6) is unconstitutional on its own terms, or it does not, in which case their argument fails entirely.

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's MtR should be denied.

 

[Muggy21]

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order to Show Cause - Standing

The Court, in review of the Complaint and Constitution, is concerned that Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain the instant action. For this reason, Plaintiff is ordered to show cause to discuss why the action should not be dismissed.


1. Mootness
The Special Election ("Election") that forms the basis of this Complaint has concluded. The declaration period closed on March 29th, 2026, where the election proceeded without the Plaintiff on the ballot. This Court doesn't have the ability to hear cases about electoral returns and such a relief isn't requested. Further, a writ isn't requested ordering, if it were even possible at this time, to restore Plaintiff to the ballot.

In electoral/political situations, where the underlying dispute has been resolved or the requested relief can no longer be granted, a case may be dismissed as moot. In zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] SCR 21, the Supreme Court dismissed proceedings concerning the removal of a Senator after the issue had become irrelevant, holding that courts should not expend judicial resources on cases where the central dispute has become obsolete. Similarly, in xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 8, this Court dismissed proceedings without prejudice after the original complaint had been fulfilled and the relief sought was no longer operative.

The Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act is unconstitutional. The Court is not satisfied, without further argument, that a bare declaratory judgment on a provision of the Electoral Act, untethered to any live electoral controversy, is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Dusty_3 v. The Commonwealth [2023] SCR 8 found in favor of the Plaintiff on the merits of an unconstitutional appointment but was ultimately unable to grant the requested relief due to mootness. If the highest court of this Commonwealth has recognized that mootness may limit the remedies available even where a constitutional violation is established, this Court must be satisfied that the present action does not suffer from the same deficiency.

2. Lack of Redress

The Plaintiff requests $7,500 in nominal damages for the deprivation of his constitutional right to run for elected office. Yet the Plaintiff remains a sitting Representative. He currently holds the very office he sought to contest a special election seat for. The Court questions whether the Plaintiff has suffered a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to ground an award of damages, or whether the alleged harm is too abstract to support the relief requested, given that the Plaintiff would have been required to vacate his existing seat had he prevailed in the Special Election.
The Supreme Court in ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 12 dismissed a case sua sponte under Rule 2.2 for lack of standing, holding that a plaintiff must request a cognizable remedy. This Court must be satisfied that the remedies sought here are ones capable of redressing the alleged harm.

3. Limitations of Colour of Law Claims

The Plaintiff brings this action under RCCA Part XI, Section 1, alleging a Violation of Constitutional Rights committed under colour of law. As Plaintiff alleges, the Department of State applied Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act, a duly enacted statute passed by the legislature and signed into law through the ordinary constitutional process. The Department identified the provision by name, applied it based on its own interpretation, and reached the conclusion it believed the statute required.

The Court raises, sua sponte, the question of whether faithful execution of a statute by an executive department constitutes the type of conduct that the RCCA's colour of law provision was designed to remedy. The RCCA requires that the violation be "intentional or negligent." The Department's conduct here was neither rogue nor discretionary. It was mechanical application of a legislative command. If every executive officer who faithfully applies a statute later found to be unconstitutional is thereby personally or departmentally liable in tort, the consequence is that the executive branch assumes legal risk every time it enforces legislation, which may or may not be unreasonable. The Court questions whether this is the framework the RCCA contemplates, or whether the proper remedy for an unconstitutional statute lies elsewhere, such as through declaratory or injunctive relief directed at the statute itself rather than tort liability directed at the officer or department that applied it.


Plaintiff may bring in other arguments relevant to his standing. He shall have 72 Hours to respond. The Commonwealth, although not required to submit an argument, is more than welcome to respond in kind within the same period.

Parties are admonished to follow the Regulations of the Federal Court as the rules imposed by this Court.

So ordered,
Judge Mug.

 

[ToadKing]

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order to Show Cause - Standing

The Court, in review of the Complaint and Constitution, is concerned that Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain the instant action. For this reason, Plaintiff is ordered to show cause to discuss why the action should not be dismissed.


1. Mootness
The Special Election ("Election") that forms the basis of this Complaint has concluded. The declaration period closed on March 29th, 2026, where the election proceeded without the Plaintiff on the ballot. This Court doesn't have the ability to hear cases about electoral returns and such a relief isn't requested. Further, a writ isn't requested ordering, if it were even possible at this time, to restore Plaintiff to the ballot.

In electoral/political situations, where the underlying dispute has been resolved or the requested relief can no longer be granted, a case may be dismissed as moot. In zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] SCR 21, the Supreme Court dismissed proceedings concerning the removal of a Senator after the issue had become irrelevant, holding that courts should not expend judicial resources on cases where the central dispute has become obsolete. Similarly, in xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 8, this Court dismissed proceedings without prejudice after the original complaint had been fulfilled and the relief sought was no longer operative.

The Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act is unconstitutional. The Court is not satisfied, without further argument, that a bare declaratory judgment on a provision of the Electoral Act, untethered to any live electoral controversy, is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Dusty_3 v. The Commonwealth [2023] SCR 8 found in favor of the Plaintiff on the merits of an unconstitutional appointment but was ultimately unable to grant the requested relief due to mootness. If the highest court of this Commonwealth has recognized that mootness may limit the remedies available even where a constitutional violation is established, this Court must be satisfied that the present action does not suffer from the same deficiency.

2. Lack of Redress

The Plaintiff requests $7,500 in nominal damages for the deprivation of his constitutional right to run for elected office. Yet the Plaintiff remains a sitting Representative. He currently holds the very office he sought to contest a special election seat for. The Court questions whether the Plaintiff has suffered a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to ground an award of damages, or whether the alleged harm is too abstract to support the relief requested, given that the Plaintiff would have been required to vacate his existing seat had he prevailed in the Special Election.
The Supreme Court in ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 12 dismissed a case sua sponte under Rule 2.2 for lack of standing, holding that a plaintiff must request a cognizable remedy. This Court must be satisfied that the remedies sought here are ones capable of redressing the alleged harm.

3. Limitations of Colour of Law Claims

The Plaintiff brings this action under RCCA Part XI, Section 1, alleging a Violation of Constitutional Rights committed under colour of law. As Plaintiff alleges, the Department of State applied Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act, a duly enacted statute passed by the legislature and signed into law through the ordinary constitutional process. The Department identified the provision by name, applied it based on its own interpretation, and reached the conclusion it believed the statute required.

The Court raises, sua sponte, the question of whether faithful execution of a statute by an executive department constitutes the type of conduct that the RCCA's colour of law provision was designed to remedy. The RCCA requires that the violation be "intentional or negligent." The Department's conduct here was neither rogue nor discretionary. It was mechanical application of a legislative command. If every executive officer who faithfully applies a statute later found to be unconstitutional is thereby personally or departmentally liable in tort, the consequence is that the executive branch assumes legal risk every time it enforces legislation, which may or may not be unreasonable. The Court questions whether this is the framework the RCCA contemplates, or whether the proper remedy for an unconstitutional statute lies elsewhere, such as through declaratory or injunctive relief directed at the statute itself rather than tort liability directed at the officer or department that applied it.


Plaintiff may bring in other arguments relevant to his standing. He shall have 72 Hours to respond. The Commonwealth, although not required to submit an argument, is more than welcome to respond in kind within the same period.

Parties are admonished to follow the Regulations of the Federal Court as the rules imposed by this Court.

So ordered,
Judge Mug.

Response

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Your Honour,
this order to show cause has no basis in law-
The Plaintiff submits this response to the Court's Order to Show Cause and addresses each concern raised in turn.

I. MOOTNESS​

The Court raises mootness on the basis that the Election has concluded and questions whether a declaratory judgment on Section 8(6), untethered to a live electoral controversy, is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. The Plaintiff submits that this case is not moot and that the cases the Court relies upon do not support dismissal here.

The Court cites zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] SCR 21 and xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 8. Read carefully, both cases are distinguishable in a legally meaningful way from the present action, and the distinction is the same in both instances. In each of those cases, there was genuinely nothing left for the court to do. In this case, there is.

In [2023] SCR 21, the SCR dismissed sua sponte because the subject matter had become entirely irrelevant. The plaintiff's theory in that case was wholly contingent on a senator being removed - zLost wanted to run for the vacated seat. The referendum had concluded; the senator had not been removed; there was no longer any vacancy to contest, and therefore no remedy the court could provide. The controversy had evaporated entirely. In that case, the court was simply declining to spend resources on an "obsolete central dispute".

In [2024] FCR 8, this Court dismissed without prejudice because the original complaint had been fulfilled. The plaintiff sought to compel the President to facilitate presiding officer elections. By the time of dismissal, those elections had commenced. The defendant had already done what the plaintiff asked. There was nothing left to order.

Neither of those conditions exists here. The Plaintiff's complaint has not been fulfilled, and no declaration or action has been issued. Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act remains in force and continues to govern every future special election. The Plaintiff was disqualified from the ballot under that provision on 29 March 2026. That disqualification is a completed, concrete injury. The provision that caused it remains operative. Unlike the cases this court cited, where the controversy had evaporated, this case involves an underlying wrong that has already occurred, and the statutory provision that caused it remains capable of causing the same wrong again.

The Court also cites Dusty_3 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] SCR 8, stating "If the highest court of this Commonwealth has recognized that mootness may limit the remedies available even where a constitutional violation is established, this Court must be satisfied that the present action does not suffer from the same deficiency." The Plaintiff does not disagree, but submits that [2023] SCR 8 supports proceeding here rather than dismissing. In that case, the SCR found the appointment of an Acting Secretary unconstitutional, entered a decision in favour of the plaintiff on the merits, and then addressed each prayer for relief individually. The prayer for removal was moot because the official was no longer in the position. The prayer to reverse prior actions was moot because those actions were ordinary and had effectively been ratified by a successor. The prayer for a public apology was moot because the President was no longer in office. In each instance, mootness attached to a specific remedy that could no longer be granted. Instead of declining to adjudicate the constitutional question, the SCR adjudicated it, found the violation, and then declined only those prayers that had become impossible to execute. Even if the Court were to conclude that restoring the Plaintiff to the ballot is impossible - which the Plaintiff doesn't request in their prayers anyway, and the court already notes "such a relief isn't requested" - the constitutional question remains live, the nominal damages remain available, and the declaratory relief sought is prospectively meaningful because Section 8(6) continues to operate. The Plaintiff has made clear in the complaint that they are not asking this Court to revisit "electoral returns". He is asking this Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of a statutory provision and to award nominal damages recognising a finished rights violation against the Plaintiff. Both are within this Court's power.

This principle is demonstrated by Krix v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 7, where the SCR found that the process used to declare the President incapacitated was unconstitutional, entered a decision in the plaintiff's favour, but held that reinstatement to the presidency was not legally available, due to the plaintiff’s failure to challenge within a reasonable time and resulting constitutional disqualification through inactivity. The inability to grant one specific prayer did not defeat the action. The Plaintiff's position is stronger than [2021] SCR 7, because the remedies sought - nominal damages and a declaration that Section 8(6) is of no force or effect - are not contingent on undoing a past election. They are available regardless of what occurred on 29 March 2026.

The FCR has previously adjudicated the constitutionality of statutes and struck them as invalid where the statute itself constituted the live controversy. In RoryyyMC v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 129, this Court repealed the Executive Officer Freedom Act and awarded nominal damages for the failure to hold the required referendum to properly enact the bill. The Court did not decline to act on jurisdictional grounds; rather, it treated the validity of the statute itself as the operative controversy. The same is true for this case. Section 8(6) remains in force and continues to govern future elections, and its constitutionality is properly before the Court.

This matter is not moot.

​

II. LACK OF REDRESS​

This Court questions whether the Plaintiff has suffered a "concrete and particularised injury sufficient to ground an award of damages", noting that he remains a sitting Representative and suggesting the harm may be too abstract. With respect, the Court's concern misapprehends the nature and purpose of nominal damages under the RCCA, and the authority the Court cites does not support the proposition for which it is invoked.

The Court cites ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 12. In this case, the SCR dismissed the action, stating:

In a 3-0 decision the Supreme Court dismisses this case sua sponte under Rule 2.2 for lack of standing. The Plaintiff has failed to request a remedy this Court can grant to him.

The Prayer for Relief in that case sought only removal from office and legal fees. The SCR dismissed on the basis that removal from office through the judiciary was not an appropriate remedy. What this Court's Order omits is what happened next. The exact matter was refiled with an additional prayer for nominal damages in ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 80. Originally filed in the SCR, it was then ruled:

In a 3-0 decision, the Supreme Court dismisses the Plaintiffs request for removal from office against the Vice President under Rule 2.2 for lack of standing and remands this case to the Federal Court.

We believe that removing someone from office through the judiciary is only appropriate when the actions made by the office holder question the legality surrounding their ascension to office. Misconduct committed while in office is a matter for Congress which has the constitutional power of impeachment, the Supreme Court will not bypass the separation of powers.

The SCR dismissed only the removal from office prayer, remanded the case to the FCR, and allowed the nominal damages prayer to proceed. The SCR's own handling of that matter is a direct and authoritative answer to the Court's concern here: the addition of a nominal damages prayer was sufficient to transform a case with no "cognizable remedy" into one that could proceed. If the highest court of this Commonwealth treated nominal damages as a live and cognisable remedy sufficient to sustain an action following a standing dismissal, this Court should be satisfied that the same remedy sustains standing here.

More fundamentally, the Court's concern that the Plaintiff may not have suffered a sufficiently concrete injury is answered directly by the text of the RCCA itself. The RCCA, Part III, Section 4 defines nominal damages as follows:

4. Nominal Damages
(1) Definition:
(a) Nominal damages are a trivial sum of money given as recognition that a legal cause of action has been established, even though the plaintiff has suffered no substantial loss and is not entitled to any other damages.

The definition is clear and unambiguous in that these damages are awarded precisely in circumstances where a plaintiff has not suffered substantial loss. They exist to recognise that a "legal cause of action has been established" - in this case, that a constitutional right was violated - regardless of the scale of the practical consequences. The Court's question whether the Plaintiff has suffered a "concrete and particularised injury sufficient to ground an award of damages" inverts this framework. Nominal damages do not require substantial injury. The Plaintiff has alleged a completed deprivation of a constitutional right, which is sufficient injury to sustain nominal damages.

(3) Diminution of Award:
(a) There shall be no diminution of award or defences to nominal damages.

The RCCA does not permit a defence to nominal damages, and it does not condition their availability on the magnitude of the plaintiff's loss.

The Plaintiff was removed from the ballot pursuant to a statutory provision of the Electoral Act. That removal deprived him of his constitutional right to contest that election under Section 35(1). The injury is the deprivation of the right itself, not the loss of a seat. The fact that he remains a sitting Representative does not eliminate the injury - he was specifically prevented from running in the election, and the Constitution, the Plaintiff is arguing, guarantees him the right to run. Nominal damages are the precise remedy designed for exactly this kind of rights-based injury without "substantial loss" or entitlement "to any other damages".

Notwithstanding the foregoing, nominal damages are not the only relief sought. The Plaintiff still seeks a declaration that Section 8(6) is unconstitutional and of no force or effect. As this Court's prior actions in [2024] FCR 129, as well as MrFluffy2U94 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 41 and [2025] DCR 108 - Appeal | [2026] FCR 7 reaffirm, the striking of an unconstitutional statutory provision is a remedy this Court is fully empowered to grant and has granted before. The Court retains full discretion over whether to award any or all of the prayers for relief - that is a matter for the merits. The Plaintiff submits that the Court should be satisfied that the remedies sought here are capable of redressing the alleged harm, and that this action should proceed. The "Redressability" of this case does not require restoring the Plaintiff to the ballot. Nominal damages redress the completed deprivation of rights, and declaratory relief prevents future enforcement of the unconstitutional provision. Together, these remedies directly address both the past injury and its ongoing cause. Accordingly, on this basis, the action should proceed.

​

III. LIMITATIONS OF COLOUR OF LAW CLAIMS​

Finally, the Court raises the question of "whether faithful execution of a statute by an executive department constitutes the type of conduct that the RCCA's colour of law provision was designed to remedy", and suggests that the proper remedy for an unconstitutional statute may lie elsewhere.

The Plaintiff, as the primary author of the RCCA, fully understands the nature and intended purpose of this provision. Part XI of that Act is introduced with the following statement of purpose:

This Part addresses civil violations relating to obligations owed to public authorities, administrative bodies, and government institutions. It ensures compliance with lawful orders, and promotes the rights of citizens against government bodies.

Part XI exists to "promote the rights of citizens against government bodies". It was drafted to standardise and provide citizens with a civil remedy when a government body or agent, acting under colour of law, deprives them of rights secured by the Constitution. The Violation of Constitutional Rights simply reads:

A person commits a violation if the person:
(a) acting under colour of law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont.

The violation is keyed to two elements: action under colour of law, and deprivation of a constitutional right. Both are present here, as argued in III.1.1 and III.1.2, respectively. The DOS acted in its capacity as the electoral authority of the Commonwealth. It cited a statutory provision by name. It excluded the Plaintiff from the ballot. The constitutional right at issue is expressed in clear text. Nothing in the provision requires the Court to inquire into whether the Defendant believed it was acting lawfully. The RCCA’s intent requirement is satisfied where the act causing the deprivation is deliberate, not where the actor subjectively knows the law is unconstitutional. The DOS deliberately applied Section 8(6) to exclude the Plaintiff from the ballot. That deliberate act is sufficient to satisfy the intentional standard, irrespective of the Defendant’s belief as to legality.

It contains no exemption for "good faith compliance", nor a carve-out for "mechanical application of a statute". There is no textual basis for reading such an exception into the provision. The Court's concern - that mechanical compliance should be treated differently from discretionary conduct - is a policy argument for amending the provision, not an interpretive basis for reading a limitation into it that its author did not place there.

The Court's concern - that "If every executive officer who faithfully applies a statute later found to be unconstitutional is thereby personally or departmentally liable in tort, the consequence is that the executive branch assumes legal risk every time it enforces legislation, which may or may not be unreasonable" - does not find support in prior cases in this Court.

In Vernicia v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 51, the plaintiff brought a claim of "Unreasonable seizure" and "Violations of liberty and security of the person" arising from the DOC's imposition of a mandatory bank holiday across the financial sector. The DOC acted pursuant to statutory authority under the Taxation Act and was not acting outside the law, but rather applying a statutory instrument. The Commonwealth’s defence was that its conduct was authorised and fell within “reasonable limits prescribed by law.” The Court did not decline to hear the claim on that basis. Instead, it engaged directly with the constitutional question of whether the statutory authority justified the resulting limitation of rights, and ultimately ruled on the merits. The significance of [2025] FCR 51 is that statutory authority was treated as a merits defence, not a bar to adjudication. The fact that a department acts pursuant to statute does not remove the conduct from constitutional scrutiny or foreclose a colour of law claim. That is sufficient to answer the concern raised in the Court’s Order.

The more comprehensive answer, however, comes from YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76. In that case, this Court addressed the broader doctrinal question that underlies the present Order: when does state action attract liability, and when does institutional character shield government conduct from judicial correction? The Court articulated the doctrine of Limited-Scope State Immunity, drawn from Justice Compass, Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 98, under which "the Commonwealth enjoys Limited-Scope State Immunity when it exercises powers arising directly from the Constitution in good faith" - described as "a reasonable, non-arbitrary effort that does not require the Executive to pursue futile or impossible enforcement measures." [2025] FCR 76 drew the boundary of those principles with precision. It held that they "define the outer boundary of this Court's reach. They do not define the present case." The reason was straightforward: the DCT does not exercise an exclusive constitutional power immune from scrutiny. It exercises delegated administrative authority - in that case, under the Property Standards Act - authority that "is at all times subject to the constraints of law, regulation, and the Constitution." The Court held that where statutory "authority is exercised unlawfully, or in a manner that infringes constitutional guarantees, this Court is not merely permitted to intervene; it is obligated to do so." It further reaffirmed, quoting [2025] FCR 98, that Limited-Scope State Immunity "does not insulate the government from actions alleging abuses of arrest, unlawful conduct, or violations of constitutional guarantees," and that where state power "infringes protected rights, the doors of the Court remain fully open."

Substitute the Electoral Act for the Property Standards Act, and the DOS for the DCT, and the [2025] FCR 76 framework applies here in all material respects. The DOS does not exercise an exclusive constitutional power immune from scrutiny. It exercises delegated administrative authority over elections, authority conferred by the Executive Standards Act and the Electoral Act. That authority "is at all times subject to the constraints of law, regulation, and the Constitution". The DOS's application of Section 8(6) to remove the Plaintiff from the ballot was the exercise of statutory authority over an individual constitutional right. If that exercise infringed a right secured by the Constitution - which is the exact question the Plaintiff's claim puts to this Court - then under the framework this Court articulated in [2025] FCR 76, "this Court is not merely permitted to intervene; it is obligated to do so."

The Court's Order suggests that the proper remedy for an unconstitutional statute may lie in declaratory or injunctive relief directed at the statute itself, rather than tort liability directed at the officer or department that applied it. The Plaintiff doesn't disagree, and that is precisely what the prayer for relief requests. The Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Section 8(6) is unconstitutional and of no force or effect, but additionally, as has been done in numerous constitutional rights cases before, nominal damages in recognition of the rights violation that has already occurred. The Plaintiff’s invocation of the RCCA violation is not a vehicle for punishing the DOS for doing its job. Rather, it is the proper cause of action through which a citizen asks this Court to determine whether the statutory command the DOS applied is constitutional, and to recognise, through nominal damages, that a right was violated in the process.

The Court's concern about the effects on executive enforcement is answered by the same structural component of the RCCA that answers the redress question: the remedy under the Violation of Constitutional Rights provision is discretionary. The provision carries no fixed remedy. A court may limit relief to nominal damages and a declaration precisely where, as here, the executive applied a statutory command in good faith. The remedy structure was designed to allow courts to distinguish between predatory abuse of power and good faith institutional compliance with a law later found wanting. That flexibility is not a reason to dismiss this claim at this threshold. If "faithful statutory compliance" were sufficient to defeat liability, the RCCA’s Violation of Constitutional Rights provision would have no practical application, as most constitutional deprivations by the government can, and will, occur through the enforcement of statutes.

​

IV. STANDING​

On the matter of standing, the three requirements under Rule 2.1 are satisfied on the face of this complaint and the arguments set out above.

First, the Plaintiff suffered a concrete injury caused by a clear second party. The DOS removed the Plaintiff from the ballot of the Special Election by express application of Section 8(6). That removal is documented and attributable directly to the Defendant.

Second, the cause of that injury was against the law. The Plaintiff's complaint alleges, with supporting argumentation, that Section 8(6) unlawfully abridges the right to run for elected office guaranteed by Section 35(1) of the Constitution. Whether that argument succeeds is a question for the merits. At this stage, it is sufficient that the cause of injury is alleged to be against the law.

Third, a remedy applicable under relevant law is available and capable of being granted by a favourable decision. Nominal damages under RCCA Part III, Section 4 are available upon establishment of a cause of action regardless of the scale of loss. A declaration that Section 8(6) is unconstitutional is a remedy this Court has granted before and is squarely within this Court's power.

​

V. CONCLUSION​

The Court's Order raises three concerns: mootness, lack of redress, and the limits of colour of law liability. Each has been answered.

The matter is not moot. The injury is complete, the provision that caused it remains operative, and the remedies sought do not require undoing the election.

The redress is cognizable. Nominal damages are expressly permitted for rights violations without substantial loss. The "highest court of this Commonwealth" itself treated its addition as sufficient to sustain an action following a standing dismissal. A declaration striking a statute as unconstitutional is a remedy this Court has granted before, in multiple separate instances.

The colour of law claim is properly brought. Part XI of the RCCA exists to "promote the rights of citizens against government bodies". Nothing in its text exempts "mechanical statutory compliance" from its reach. This Court's own findings in [2025] FCR 76 confirm that delegated administrative authority over private rights is not shielded from judicial intervention where constitutional guarantees are infringed, and that where they are, intervention is not merely permitted but "obligated".

All three elements of Rule 2.1 standing are satisfied. The Plaintiff suffered a documented injury, caused by conduct alleged to be against the law, redressable by remedies within this Court's power to grant.

The Plaintiff submits that this action should proceed on its merits.

 

[Superwoops]

Your honour,
I will be lead counsel for this case, at least temporarily.
I ask this Court to grant the Commonwealth a 48-hour extension to the deadline to respond to the order to show cause.

 

[Muggy21]

Your honour,
I will be lead counsel for this case, at least temporarily.
I ask this Court to grant the Commonwealth a 48-hour extension to the deadline to respond to the order to show cause.

Sure, Response due by 4/7/26 @ 9pm EST

 

[Superwoops]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Response

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Your Honour,
this order to show cause has no basis in law-
The Plaintiff submits this response to the Court's Order to Show Cause and addresses each concern raised in turn.

I. MOOTNESS​

The Court raises mootness on the basis that the Election has concluded and questions whether a declaratory judgment on Section 8(6), untethered to a live electoral controversy, is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. The Plaintiff submits that this case is not moot and that the cases the Court relies upon do not support dismissal here.

The Court cites zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] SCR 21 and xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 8. Read carefully, both cases are distinguishable in a legally meaningful way from the present action, and the distinction is the same in both instances. In each of those cases, there was genuinely nothing left for the court to do. In this case, there is.

In [2023] SCR 21, the SCR dismissed sua sponte because the subject matter had become entirely irrelevant. The plaintiff's theory in that case was wholly contingent on a senator being removed - zLost wanted to run for the vacated seat. The referendum had concluded; the senator had not been removed; there was no longer any vacancy to contest, and therefore no remedy the court could provide. The controversy had evaporated entirely. In that case, the court was simply declining to spend resources on an "obsolete central dispute".

In [2024] FCR 8, this Court dismissed without prejudice because the original complaint had been fulfilled. The plaintiff sought to compel the President to facilitate presiding officer elections. By the time of dismissal, those elections had commenced. The defendant had already done what the plaintiff asked. There was nothing left to order.

Neither of those conditions exists here. The Plaintiff's complaint has not been fulfilled, and no declaration or action has been issued. Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act remains in force and continues to govern every future special election. The Plaintiff was disqualified from the ballot under that provision on 29 March 2026. That disqualification is a completed, concrete injury. The provision that caused it remains operative. Unlike the cases this court cited, where the controversy had evaporated, this case involves an underlying wrong that has already occurred, and the statutory provision that caused it remains capable of causing the same wrong again.

The Court also cites Dusty_3 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] SCR 8, stating "If the highest court of this Commonwealth has recognized that mootness may limit the remedies available even where a constitutional violation is established, this Court must be satisfied that the present action does not suffer from the same deficiency." The Plaintiff does not disagree, but submits that [2023] SCR 8 supports proceeding here rather than dismissing. In that case, the SCR found the appointment of an Acting Secretary unconstitutional, entered a decision in favour of the plaintiff on the merits, and then addressed each prayer for relief individually. The prayer for removal was moot because the official was no longer in the position. The prayer to reverse prior actions was moot because those actions were ordinary and had effectively been ratified by a successor. The prayer for a public apology was moot because the President was no longer in office. In each instance, mootness attached to a specific remedy that could no longer be granted. Instead of declining to adjudicate the constitutional question, the SCR adjudicated it, found the violation, and then declined only those prayers that had become impossible to execute. Even if the Court were to conclude that restoring the Plaintiff to the ballot is impossible - which the Plaintiff doesn't request in their prayers anyway, and the court already notes "such a relief isn't requested" - the constitutional question remains live, the nominal damages remain available, and the declaratory relief sought is prospectively meaningful because Section 8(6) continues to operate. The Plaintiff has made clear in the complaint that they are not asking this Court to revisit "electoral returns". He is asking this Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of a statutory provision and to award nominal damages recognising a finished rights violation against the Plaintiff. Both are within this Court's power.

This principle is demonstrated by Krix v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 7, where the SCR found that the process used to declare the President incapacitated was unconstitutional, entered a decision in the plaintiff's favour, but held that reinstatement to the presidency was not legally available, due to the plaintiff’s failure to challenge within a reasonable time and resulting constitutional disqualification through inactivity. The inability to grant one specific prayer did not defeat the action. The Plaintiff's position is stronger than [2021] SCR 7, because the remedies sought - nominal damages and a declaration that Section 8(6) is of no force or effect - are not contingent on undoing a past election. They are available regardless of what occurred on 29 March 2026.

The FCR has previously adjudicated the constitutionality of statutes and struck them as invalid where the statute itself constituted the live controversy. In RoryyyMC v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 129, this Court repealed the Executive Officer Freedom Act and awarded nominal damages for the failure to hold the required referendum to properly enact the bill. The Court did not decline to act on jurisdictional grounds; rather, it treated the validity of the statute itself as the operative controversy. The same is true for this case. Section 8(6) remains in force and continues to govern future elections, and its constitutionality is properly before the Court.

This matter is not moot.

​

II. LACK OF REDRESS​

This Court questions whether the Plaintiff has suffered a "concrete and particularised injury sufficient to ground an award of damages", noting that he remains a sitting Representative and suggesting the harm may be too abstract. With respect, the Court's concern misapprehends the nature and purpose of nominal damages under the RCCA, and the authority the Court cites does not support the proposition for which it is invoked.

The Court cites ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 12. In this case, the SCR dismissed the action, stating:

The Prayer for Relief in that case sought only removal from office and legal fees. The SCR dismissed on the basis that removal from office through the judiciary was not an appropriate remedy. What this Court's Order omits is what happened next. The exact matter was refiled with an additional prayer for nominal damages in ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 80. Originally filed in the SCR, it was then ruled:

The SCR dismissed only the removal from office prayer, remanded the case to the FCR, and allowed the nominal damages prayer to proceed. The SCR's own handling of that matter is a direct and authoritative answer to the Court's concern here: the addition of a nominal damages prayer was sufficient to transform a case with no "cognizable remedy" into one that could proceed. If the highest court of this Commonwealth treated nominal damages as a live and cognisable remedy sufficient to sustain an action following a standing dismissal, this Court should be satisfied that the same remedy sustains standing here.

More fundamentally, the Court's concern that the Plaintiff may not have suffered a sufficiently concrete injury is answered directly by the text of the RCCA itself. The RCCA, Part III, Section 4 defines nominal damages as follows:

The definition is clear and unambiguous in that these damages are awarded precisely in circumstances where a plaintiff has not suffered substantial loss. They exist to recognise that a "legal cause of action has been established" - in this case, that a constitutional right was violated - regardless of the scale of the practical consequences. The Court's question whether the Plaintiff has suffered a "concrete and particularised injury sufficient to ground an award of damages" inverts this framework. Nominal damages do not require substantial injury. The Plaintiff has alleged a completed deprivation of a constitutional right, which is sufficient injury to sustain nominal damages.

The RCCA does not permit a defence to nominal damages, and it does not condition their availability on the magnitude of the plaintiff's loss.

The Plaintiff was removed from the ballot pursuant to a statutory provision of the Electoral Act. That removal deprived him of his constitutional right to contest that election under Section 35(1). The injury is the deprivation of the right itself, not the loss of a seat. The fact that he remains a sitting Representative does not eliminate the injury - he was specifically prevented from running in the election, and the Constitution, the Plaintiff is arguing, guarantees him the right to run. Nominal damages are the precise remedy designed for exactly this kind of rights-based injury without "substantial loss" or entitlement "to any other damages".

Notwithstanding the foregoing, nominal damages are not the only relief sought. The Plaintiff still seeks a declaration that Section 8(6) is unconstitutional and of no force or effect. As this Court's prior actions in [2024] FCR 129, as well as MrFluffy2U94 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 41 and [2025] DCR 108 - Appeal | [2026] FCR 7 reaffirm, the striking of an unconstitutional statutory provision is a remedy this Court is fully empowered to grant and has granted before. The Court retains full discretion over whether to award any or all of the prayers for relief - that is a matter for the merits. The Plaintiff submits that the Court should be satisfied that the remedies sought here are capable of redressing the alleged harm, and that this action should proceed. The "Redressability" of this case does not require restoring the Plaintiff to the ballot. Nominal damages redress the completed deprivation of rights, and declaratory relief prevents future enforcement of the unconstitutional provision. Together, these remedies directly address both the past injury and its ongoing cause. Accordingly, on this basis, the action should proceed.

​

III. LIMITATIONS OF COLOUR OF LAW CLAIMS​

Finally, the Court raises the question of "whether faithful execution of a statute by an executive department constitutes the type of conduct that the RCCA's colour of law provision was designed to remedy", and suggests that the proper remedy for an unconstitutional statute may lie elsewhere.

The Plaintiff, as the primary author of the RCCA, fully understands the nature and intended purpose of this provision. Part XI of that Act is introduced with the following statement of purpose:

Part XI exists to "promote the rights of citizens against government bodies". It was drafted to standardise and provide citizens with a civil remedy when a government body or agent, acting under colour of law, deprives them of rights secured by the Constitution. The Violation of Constitutional Rights simply reads:

The violation is keyed to two elements: action under colour of law, and deprivation of a constitutional right. Both are present here, as argued in III.1.1 and III.1.2, respectively. The DOS acted in its capacity as the electoral authority of the Commonwealth. It cited a statutory provision by name. It excluded the Plaintiff from the ballot. The constitutional right at issue is expressed in clear text. Nothing in the provision requires the Court to inquire into whether the Defendant believed it was acting lawfully. The RCCA’s intent requirement is satisfied where the act causing the deprivation is deliberate, not where the actor subjectively knows the law is unconstitutional. The DOS deliberately applied Section 8(6) to exclude the Plaintiff from the ballot. That deliberate act is sufficient to satisfy the intentional standard, irrespective of the Defendant’s belief as to legality.

It contains no exemption for "good faith compliance", nor a carve-out for "mechanical application of a statute". There is no textual basis for reading such an exception into the provision. The Court's concern - that mechanical compliance should be treated differently from discretionary conduct - is a policy argument for amending the provision, not an interpretive basis for reading a limitation into it that its author did not place there.

The Court's concern - that "If every executive officer who faithfully applies a statute later found to be unconstitutional is thereby personally or departmentally liable in tort, the consequence is that the executive branch assumes legal risk every time it enforces legislation, which may or may not be unreasonable" - does not find support in prior cases in this Court.

In Vernicia v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 51, the plaintiff brought a claim of "Unreasonable seizure" and "Violations of liberty and security of the person" arising from the DOC's imposition of a mandatory bank holiday across the financial sector. The DOC acted pursuant to statutory authority under the Taxation Act and was not acting outside the law, but rather applying a statutory instrument. The Commonwealth’s defence was that its conduct was authorised and fell within “reasonable limits prescribed by law.” The Court did not decline to hear the claim on that basis. Instead, it engaged directly with the constitutional question of whether the statutory authority justified the resulting limitation of rights, and ultimately ruled on the merits. The significance of [2025] FCR 51 is that statutory authority was treated as a merits defence, not a bar to adjudication. The fact that a department acts pursuant to statute does not remove the conduct from constitutional scrutiny or foreclose a colour of law claim. That is sufficient to answer the concern raised in the Court’s Order.

The more comprehensive answer, however, comes from YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76. In that case, this Court addressed the broader doctrinal question that underlies the present Order: when does state action attract liability, and when does institutional character shield government conduct from judicial correction? The Court articulated the doctrine of Limited-Scope State Immunity, drawn from Justice Compass, Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 98, under which "the Commonwealth enjoys Limited-Scope State Immunity when it exercises powers arising directly from the Constitution in good faith" - described as "a reasonable, non-arbitrary effort that does not require the Executive to pursue futile or impossible enforcement measures." [2025] FCR 76 drew the boundary of those principles with precision. It held that they "define the outer boundary of this Court's reach. They do not define the present case." The reason was straightforward: the DCT does not exercise an exclusive constitutional power immune from scrutiny. It exercises delegated administrative authority - in that case, under the Property Standards Act - authority that "is at all times subject to the constraints of law, regulation, and the Constitution." The Court held that where statutory "authority is exercised unlawfully, or in a manner that infringes constitutional guarantees, this Court is not merely permitted to intervene; it is obligated to do so." It further reaffirmed, quoting [2025] FCR 98, that Limited-Scope State Immunity "does not insulate the government from actions alleging abuses of arrest, unlawful conduct, or violations of constitutional guarantees," and that where state power "infringes protected rights, the doors of the Court remain fully open."

Substitute the Electoral Act for the Property Standards Act, and the DOS for the DCT, and the [2025] FCR 76 framework applies here in all material respects. The DOS does not exercise an exclusive constitutional power immune from scrutiny. It exercises delegated administrative authority over elections, authority conferred by the Executive Standards Act and the Electoral Act. That authority "is at all times subject to the constraints of law, regulation, and the Constitution". The DOS's application of Section 8(6) to remove the Plaintiff from the ballot was the exercise of statutory authority over an individual constitutional right. If that exercise infringed a right secured by the Constitution - which is the exact question the Plaintiff's claim puts to this Court - then under the framework this Court articulated in [2025] FCR 76, "this Court is not merely permitted to intervene; it is obligated to do so."

The Court's Order suggests that the proper remedy for an unconstitutional statute may lie in declaratory or injunctive relief directed at the statute itself, rather than tort liability directed at the officer or department that applied it. The Plaintiff doesn't disagree, and that is precisely what the prayer for relief requests. The Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Section 8(6) is unconstitutional and of no force or effect, but additionally, as has been done in numerous constitutional rights cases before, nominal damages in recognition of the rights violation that has already occurred. The Plaintiff’s invocation of the RCCA violation is not a vehicle for punishing the DOS for doing its job. Rather, it is the proper cause of action through which a citizen asks this Court to determine whether the statutory command the DOS applied is constitutional, and to recognise, through nominal damages, that a right was violated in the process.

The Court's concern about the effects on executive enforcement is answered by the same structural component of the RCCA that answers the redress question: the remedy under the Violation of Constitutional Rights provision is discretionary. The provision carries no fixed remedy. A court may limit relief to nominal damages and a declaration precisely where, as here, the executive applied a statutory command in good faith. The remedy structure was designed to allow courts to distinguish between predatory abuse of power and good faith institutional compliance with a law later found wanting. That flexibility is not a reason to dismiss this claim at this threshold. If "faithful statutory compliance" were sufficient to defeat liability, the RCCA’s Violation of Constitutional Rights provision would have no practical application, as most constitutional deprivations by the government can, and will, occur through the enforcement of statutes.

​

IV. STANDING​

On the matter of standing, the three requirements under Rule 2.1 are satisfied on the face of this complaint and the arguments set out above.

First, the Plaintiff suffered a concrete injury caused by a clear second party. The DOS removed the Plaintiff from the ballot of the Special Election by express application of Section 8(6). That removal is documented and attributable directly to the Defendant.

Second, the cause of that injury was against the law. The Plaintiff's complaint alleges, with supporting argumentation, that Section 8(6) unlawfully abridges the right to run for elected office guaranteed by Section 35(1) of the Constitution. Whether that argument succeeds is a question for the merits. At this stage, it is sufficient that the cause of injury is alleged to be against the law.

Third, a remedy applicable under relevant law is available and capable of being granted by a favourable decision. Nominal damages under RCCA Part III, Section 4 are available upon establishment of a cause of action regardless of the scale of loss. A declaration that Section 8(6) is unconstitutional is a remedy this Court has granted before and is squarely within this Court's power.

​

V. CONCLUSION​

The Court's Order raises three concerns: mootness, lack of redress, and the limits of colour of law liability. Each has been answered.

The matter is not moot. The injury is complete, the provision that caused it remains operative, and the remedies sought do not require undoing the election.

The redress is cognizable. Nominal damages are expressly permitted for rights violations without substantial loss. The "highest court of this Commonwealth" itself treated its addition as sufficient to sustain an action following a standing dismissal. A declaration striking a statute as unconstitutional is a remedy this Court has granted before, in multiple separate instances.

The colour of law claim is properly brought. Part XI of the RCCA exists to "promote the rights of citizens against government bodies". Nothing in its text exempts "mechanical statutory compliance" from its reach. This Court's own findings in [2025] FCR 76 confirm that delegated administrative authority over private rights is not shielded from judicial intervention where constitutional guarantees are infringed, and that where they are, intervention is not merely permitted but "obligated".

All three elements of Rule 2.1 standing are satisfied. The Plaintiff suffered a documented injury, caused by conduct alleged to be against the law, redressable by remedies within this Court's power to grant.

The Plaintiff submits that this action should proceed on its merits.

Your honour,
Following precedent set by the Honourable Justice Smallfries in Appeal: Accepted - In re [2025] FCR 123 | [2026] SCR 5, opposing counsel does not have the right to edit their filing after it is posted. While corrections might be allowed shortly after the filing of the case at the discretion of the PO, this was edited several hours after it was submitted.

Should Your Honour have the ability to revert it to the original message, I ask that this be done.

 

[Muggy21]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Your honour,
Following precedent set by the Honourable Justice Smallfries in Appeal: Accepted - In re [2025] FCR 123 | [2026] SCR 5, opposing counsel does not have the right to edit their filing after it is posted. While corrections might be allowed shortly after the filing of the case at the discretion of the PO, this was edited several hours after it was submitted.

Should Your Honour have the ability to revert it to the original message, I ask that this be done.

OVERRULED.

First, Honourable Chief Justice Smallfries, he's not a Justice. (just nitpicking)

Second, this is the only meaningful edit I see in the history and this doesn't materially change anything about the filing.

 

[Superwoops]

Sure, Response due by 4/7/26 @ 9pm EST

Apologies for our tardiness. We believe the Honourable Judge has all the necessary information to issue a favourable ruling. As such, the Commonwealth retracts its request to respond to the Order.

 

[Muggy21]

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order - Certified Questions to the Supreme Court

Mr. Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,

Greetings.

The Federal Court, as permitted under the Judicial Standards Act, does transmit to the Supreme Court a certified question herein issued sua sponte.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action under RCCA Part XI, Section 1, alleging a Violation of Constitutional Rights committed under colour of law. The Department of State allegedly excluded the Plaintiff from the ballot of a Special Election for the House of Representatives by applying Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act. The Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Section 8(6) is unconstitutional, nominal damages, and legal fees.

In a consideration of standing, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause raising several threshold concerns. The Commonwealth has declined to respond. Two of those concerns remain unresolved and carry implications beyond this case. This Court is not satisfied that it can resolve either without guidance from the Supreme Court.

I. JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAP

This Court holds original jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality per R. Const Section 18(1)(a). However, this Court questions whether the Plaintiff's claim is properly characterised as a question of constitutionality at all, or whether it is in substance a different type of dispute wearing constitutional clothing.
The Plaintiff's complaint concerns a citizen's exclusion from the ballot of a federal election by the Department of State acting as the electoral authority of the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court holds original jurisdiction as the Court of disputed returns under Section 20(1)(c) and over disputes between government institutions under Section 20(1)(b). Whether a candidate was lawfully included on or excluded from a ballot is, at its core, a question about the lawfulness of an electoral return. The fact that the Plaintiff advances a constitutional argument in support of that challenge does not necessarily transform the nature of the controversy. Many disputed returns will involve constitutional arguments; that does not mean they cease to be disputed returns.
The Constitution is silent on confliction of jurisdictions between the Federal and Supreme Court. Generally, this Court would remove actions to the Supreme Court in cases where Federal jurisdiction is clearly inapt from the outset. Here, however, this Court cannot say with confidence that its jurisdiction is clearly inapt, nor that it clearly prevails. The overlap is genuine, and there is no settled framework to resolve it.

II. THE COLOUR OF LAW CAUSE OF ACTION

Separately, this Court's Order to Show Cause questioned whether the faithful execution of a duly enacted statute constitutes conduct the RCCA's colour of law provision was designed to remedy. The Plaintiff responded that the provision contains no exemption for good faith statutory compliance. The Court acknowledges the textual point but is not satisfied that it resolves the doctrinal question.

There is a meaningful distinction between two categories of government conduct. In the first, a department acts outside the law, exceeds its authority, or exercises unlawful discretion. The deprivation arises from the department's own conduct, and the colour of law provision plainly applies. In the second, a department mechanically applies a duly enacted statute exactly as written. If that statute is later found unconstitutional, the deprivation flows from the statute itself, not from the department's conduct. The legislature made the choice; the department is the designated instrument of the statute's enforcement.

If the colour of law provision applies to the second category, every act of statutory enforcement carries contingent tort liability that crystallises the moment a court strikes the underlying statute. The executive would bear legal responsibility not for its own unconstitutional conduct, but for the legislature's unconstitutional enactment. Whether that framework is what the RCCA contemplates is a question whose answer will govern how every future constitutional challenge to legislation interacts with the executive branch.

III. CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

These concerns are interrelated. If the Federal Court must yield jurisdiction where a reasonable avenue for Supreme Court original jurisdiction exists, this Court may lack competence to reach the colour of law question at all. Conversely, if the colour of law cause of action does not extend to faithful statutory enforcement, the Plaintiff may lack a cause of action before this Court, and the question of where the challenge properly belongs becomes unavoidable.
Therefore, the Federal Court certifies and humbly submits the following questions to the Supreme Court:

Question 1: Where the Federal Court's original jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality under Section 18(1)(a) overlaps with the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Section 20(1), and a reasonable avenue exists by which the substance of the dispute may fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, is the Federal Court to retain jurisdiction over the action or yield to the Supreme Court?​

​

Question 2: Does the Violation of Constitutional Rights cause of action under RCCA Part XI, Section 1 impose liability on an executive department that faithfully applies a duly enacted statute, where the constitutional defect lies in the statute itself rather than in the department's exercise of discretion or authority?​

​

All proceedings are stayed pending the Supreme Court's disposition. All deadlines are tolled. No part of this order shall be construed to indicate that the Federal Court imposes any conditions or requirements on the Supreme Court for its response.

So ordered,
Judge Mug

@Smallfries @Kaiserin_ @Matthew100x

 

[Smallfries]

Verdict

The Federal Court of Redmont issues two certified questions to the Supreme Court. These are: (1) Where the Federal Court's original jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality under Section 18(1)(a) overlaps with the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Section 20(1), and a reasonable avenue exists by which the substance of the dispute may fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, is the Federal Court to retain jurisdiction over the action or yield to the Supreme Court, and (2) Does the Violation of Constitutional Rights cause of action under RCCA Part XI, Section 1 impose liability on an executive department that faithfully applies a duly enacted statute, where the constitutional defect lies in the statute itself rather than in the department's exercise of discretion or authority?

Under the Judicial Standards Act (“JSA”) as amended by the Certified Question Procedure Act, certified questions may be posed to the Supreme Court, or another appellate body designated by the aforementioned, to resolve a question of law that is necessary to resolve a genuine legal uncertainty. JSA Part IX §§ 1, 5. The question may not be posed as a substitute for appeal, and must only be granted when a matter could not be properly or efficiently resolved without higher authority involvement. Id. at 4, 7.

The Supreme Court takes the questions, reviewing as presented. We take both in turn.
​

I. Jurisdiction​

The jurisdictional question at issue is whether the matter at hand appropriately flows best to the Supreme Court or the Federal Court. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court identifies the Federal Court as the proper forum in this matter.

The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont grants the Federal Court jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality. C. R. Const. Part II § (18)(1)(a). The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over some electoral concerns, “serving as the Court of disputed returns.” Id. at § 20(1)(b).

Here, the trial court raises a question of potential ambiguity as to whether this case falls in overlap between the two jurisdictions, and if it does, how to resolve this difference. Plaintiff IgnitedTnT filed suit against the Commonwealth for removing him from the candidate list of a special election. The details of why are not important at this time. The alleged injury is the potentially unconstitutional removal of Plaintiff from the candidate list. This alleged harm arose from an alleged default in the constitutionality of the underlying statute that prompted the Commonwealth to act. Plaintiff does not allege the Commonwealth exceeded its delegated authority.

The action at issue occurred before the election. As a result of the alleged harm, Plaintiff did not stand in the election at issue. Plaintiff does not request the election be overturned, redone, or altered in any way, nor does he request any representative to be removed from office. The only relief requested is nominal in value, and a declaration of unconstitutionality for the relevant statute.

It is clear that the question of constitutionality has been raised, and thus this case falls squarely into the Federal Court’s original jurisdiction. The only question that remains is if this case turns on an issue arising out of a “disputed return.” The clear answer is no.

Disputed returns are not defined in the Constitution. To assist in discovering what is meant in the Constitution, we first turn to the plain meaning of the text. A return in this sense likely means similar to a tax return—that is, a tabulation of all relevant numbers and presentation to a relevant authority. Under this definition, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would be implied any time someone questioned the results as to their methodology, data, or legal existence. Merely saying that an individual should not or should have been able to run, and their inclusion or exclusion would have or did change the outcome, is not a dispute of an electoral return under this definition.

Without going into exhaustive listing, many online dictionary definitions, legal definitions, and electoral code assumptions in the real world agree with this general viewpoint. Further, Redmontian jurisprudence generally regards this view as proper. See Snowy_Heart v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 76; RylandW v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 4 (for a case where the proper forum was the Supreme Court, and the issue was a dispute over an election return).

This narrowness is necessary to preserve the structural design of our constitutional framework. Were we to be any more broad, the definition of an “electoral return” would impermissibly change to include any and all disputes regarding an election. This would, in turn, punt all questions of an election’s happening to the Supreme Court. Common sense and precedent tells us that because the Constitution said “disputed returns,” and not “disputed elections,” it seems clear to us that it was not intended that all questions surrounding elections come immediately to us. Thus, we hold that only the Federal Court has an interest in this matter as written.
​

II. COLOR OF LAW​

In its second question, the Federal Court asks if the execution by the Commonwealth of a good faith duty created by an allegedly unlawful statute from Congress “impose[ s ] liability,” which we construe to mean impose additional liability, versus the Commonwealth acting in excess of their legislative discretion or authority. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court does not find it necessary to answer this question at this time.

Certified questions are only to be answered when a matter could not be properly or efficiently resolved without higher authority involvement. JSA Part IX § 4(2). We believe the Federal Court is more than capable of giving a reasoned, efficient, and fully-explained answer to this question, and do not believe it necessary or prudent to intervene at this moment to answer.
​

​

 

[Muggy21]

Verdict

The Federal Court of Redmont issues two certified questions to the Supreme Court. These are: (1) Where the Federal Court's original jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality under Section 18(1)(a) overlaps with the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Section 20(1), and a reasonable avenue exists by which the substance of the dispute may fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, is the Federal Court to retain jurisdiction over the action or yield to the Supreme Court, and (2) Does the Violation of Constitutional Rights cause of action under RCCA Part XI, Section 1 impose liability on an executive department that faithfully applies a duly enacted statute, where the constitutional defect lies in the statute itself rather than in the department's exercise of discretion or authority?

Under the Judicial Standards Act (“JSA”) as amended by the Certified Question Procedure Act, certified questions may be posed to the Supreme Court, or another appellate body designated by the aforementioned, to resolve a question of law that is necessary to resolve a genuine legal uncertainty. JSA Part IX §§ 1, 5. The question may not be posed as a substitute for appeal, and must only be granted when a matter could not be properly or efficiently resolved without higher authority involvement. Id. at 4, 7.

The Supreme Court takes the questions, reviewing as presented. We take both in turn.
​

I. Jurisdiction​

The jurisdictional question at issue is whether the matter at hand appropriately flows best to the Supreme Court or the Federal Court. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court identifies the Federal Court as the proper forum in this matter.

The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont grants the Federal Court jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality. C. R. Const. Part II § (18)(1)(a). The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over some electoral concerns, “serving as the Court of disputed returns.” Id. at § 20(1)(b).

Here, the trial court raises a question of potential ambiguity as to whether this case falls in overlap between the two jurisdictions, and if it does, how to resolve this difference. Plaintiff IgnitedTnT filed suit against the Commonwealth for removing him from the candidate list of a special election. The details of why are not important at this time. The alleged injury is the potentially unconstitutional removal of Plaintiff from the candidate list. This alleged harm arose from an alleged default in the constitutionality of the underlying statute that prompted the Commonwealth to act. Plaintiff does not allege the Commonwealth exceeded its delegated authority.

The action at issue occurred before the election. As a result of the alleged harm, Plaintiff did not stand in the election at issue. Plaintiff does not request the election be overturned, redone, or altered in any way, nor does he request any representative to be removed from office. The only relief requested is nominal in value, and a declaration of unconstitutionality for the relevant statute.

It is clear that the question of constitutionality has been raised, and thus this case falls squarely into the Federal Court’s original jurisdiction. The only question that remains is if this case turns on an issue arising out of a “disputed return.” The clear answer is no.

Disputed returns are not defined in the Constitution. To assist in discovering what is meant in the Constitution, we first turn to the plain meaning of the text. A return in this sense likely means similar to a tax return—that is, a tabulation of all relevant numbers and presentation to a relevant authority. Under this definition, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would be implied any time someone questioned the results as to their methodology, data, or legal existence. Merely saying that an individual should not or should have been able to run, and their inclusion or exclusion would have or did change the outcome, is not a dispute of an electoral return under this definition.

Without going into exhaustive listing, many online dictionary definitions, legal definitions, and electoral code assumptions in the real world agree with this general viewpoint. Further, Redmontian jurisprudence generally regards this view as proper. See Snowy_Heart v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 76; RylandW v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 4 (for a case where the proper forum was the Supreme Court, and the issue was a dispute over an election return).

This narrowness is necessary to preserve the structural design of our constitutional framework. Were we to be any more broad, the definition of an “electoral return” would impermissibly change to include any and all disputes regarding an election. This would, in turn, punt all questions of an election’s happening to the Supreme Court. Common sense and precedent tells us that because the Constitution said “disputed returns,” and not “disputed elections,” it seems clear to us that it was not intended that all questions surrounding elections come immediately to us. Thus, we hold that only the Federal Court has an interest in this matter as written.
​

II. COLOR OF LAW​

In its second question, the Federal Court asks if the execution by the Commonwealth of a good faith duty created by an allegedly unlawful statute from Congress “impose[ s ] liability,” which we construe to mean impose additional liability, versus the Commonwealth acting in excess of their legislative discretion or authority. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court does not find it necessary to answer this question at this time.

Certified questions are only to be answered when a matter could not be properly or efficiently resolved without higher authority involvement. JSA Part IX § 4(2). We believe the Federal Court is more than capable of giving a reasoned, efficient, and fully-explained answer to this question, and do not believe it necessary or prudent to intervene at this moment to answer.
​

​

The Justices of the Supreme Court having pleased this Court, we shall now resume the proceedings.

I'll issue a ruling on the OSC for standing. If in the negative, I believe (if parties consent) we can skip discovery and go to closing statements.

 

[Muggy21]

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order to Show Cause - Standing

The Court issued its OSC raising multiple concerns bearing on Plaintiff's standing to bring the instant action. After issuing certified questions to the Supreme Court, and in consideration of that Court's response along side arguments, the Court must now resolve its own questions; These questions, although plain in language, are not clear on its face, and this Court won't proffer otherwise.


First, speaking plainly, the Plaintiff is still a sitting Representative; He has not been harmed by the result of the Commonwealth's actions. Had he prevailed in the Election, he would've had to vacate his current seat in order to take the new one. The net results, measured in offices held, would have been the same as the result that we reach today. The Plaintiff has not lost his position, his UBI stipend, nor any other reasonably aligned harm. In the ordinary sense of the word, Plaintiff was injured only in the narrow respect that he was not permitted to have his name appear on a ballot for an office he already occupied.

The temptation to dismiss this action, at first, was very real. The Judiciary's role is to resolve controversies that, without the judicial intervention, would lead to everlasting harm to a litigant. There is a plain-language intuition, and an intuition not without merit, that a person who is told he cannot run for an office he already holds has not really been kept from anything he does not already have. The Court acknowledges the intuition. After significant contemplation, the Court does not accept this intuition.

The Constitution, in Section 35 (1), guarantees the right to run for elected office; It is not framed as the right to hold elected office, nor as the right to the benefits of holding elected office. The text distinguishes between candidacy and incumbency, and protects the former as an independent entitlement. A citizen who is deprived of the opportunity to stand on a ballot has been deprived of something the Constitution, by its own terms, secures as a right, whether or not he would have won, whether or not he already occupies a comparable position, and whether or not the practical consequences of the deprivation are easy to measure.

THEREFORE, with consideration to Plaintiff's standing, the Court finds the claim to be cognizable and declines to dismiss.

Lastly, and likewise to the first point, the case is not moot. The Special Election has concluded. No writ of this Court can place the Plaintiff on a ballot that no longer exists. To that extent, a portion of the controversy has indeed passed beyond judicial reach. The Plaintiff has been candid about this, and has shaped his prayer accordingly. He does not ask the Court to restore him to a ballot. He does not ask the Court to disturb the election result. He asks only for a declaration that the provision under which he was excluded is of no force and effect, and for nominal damages recognising the completed deprivation. With respect to the cases invoked by this Court, and challenged by Plaintiff, there is a distinction that can't be easily rendered academic; Here, the statutory provision that caused the alleged injury continues to operate. The controversy, with respect to the Electoral Act, has caused historical action and may continue to do so.

THEREFORE, the Court does not find the action moot.

The Court declines to expand on its discussion on the Colour of Law assertion it previously made.

Thus, the Court tables its Order to Show Cause.

It would be wrong, in this Court's view, to dismiss a constitutional challenge to a statute at the standing stage on the ground that the particular plaintiff before the Court is not badly off at the end of the day. If a statute is incoherent in the face of the Constitution, that incoherence does not become less troubling because it happened to be applied to a sitting Representative rather than to a citizen with no office at all. The question the Plaintiff has put before this Court is whether a statutory provision lawfully abridges a right the Constitution reserves from statutory abridgement. That question has been raised in a procedurally proper way by a citizen who was directly subject to the provision's application. It deserves an answer.


So ordered,
Judge Mug

@Superwoops The CW shall have 48 Hours to provide an answer. I'll absolutely give you more time if needed.

@ToadKing Does the Plaintiff consent to skipping discovery? I see this as a question of law that can be proven using public information. @Superwoops Same question, does the CW consent to skipping discovery?

 

[ToadKing]

@ToadKing Does the Plaintiff consent to skipping discovery? I see this as a question of law that can be proven using public information.

Most likely, depending on the Defendant's answer.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The court is misunderstanding the Defense's Motion to Dismiss. In its denial of the Defense's MTD, the court does establish that special elections must take place to maintain that 11 member count for the House of Representatives. If a less than 11 member House were allowed, there would be no need for special elections; the reason that a special election takes place is due to this requirement that the House must maintain this number of citizens.

The Defense in no way postures that Congress may not operate without all seats filled; this is not mentioned even in the slightest in the Defense's MTD.

The position of the Commonwealth is that the Constitution is explicit in its requirement for 11 distinct persons to be in the House of Representatives. The Constitution differentiates between the words "citizen" and "seat." In Part 1 §3, the Constitution specifically mandates that 11 citizens occupy the House, not that the House be made up of 11 seats. One person can not be multiple citizens.

Seats in the Constitution are in reference to the roles themselves; for example Part 1 §7.1 states:

The likely reason that the drafters of our Constitution used the word "seat" when referring to electoral terms and limitations is due to the fact that, without it, an individual could run for both offices as they would be a unique citizen in each chamber, satisfying the requirements set out in §3 and §4.

Seats in the Constitution are only used in the context of Congress, while the word "citizen" is used throughout the Constitution in other contexts not relating to Congressional structure.
For example, Part 5 §35.8 states:

And further in §35.14:

It is clear and beyond a doubt that, within the Constitution, citizenship is referring to individuals within the Commonwealth of Redmont and is not a term interchangeable with seats of a chamber of Congress.

Therefore when The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont Part 1 §3 states:

that must be referring to distinct individuals within the Commonwealth. There must be 11 distinct persons within the chamber, one person can not be multiple citizens.

Response

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Your Honour,

The Plaintiff opposes the Commonwealth's Motion to Reconsider (MtR) and respectfully submits that it should be denied.

I. SUBSTANCE​

The Motions Guide states:

The MtR does not identify an error in the Court's initial reasoning and does not raise a new point of law. It restates the same premise - that Section 3's reference to "11 citizens" prevents a sitting Representative from contesting a seat, with additional linguistic elaboration on the word "citizen." The Court found that Section 3 "establishes the size and electoral structure of the House" and does not mandate that the House maintain exactly 11 members at all times. The Commonwealth's MtR does not address that finding, nor does it identify where the Court's reasoning was wrong. It simply restates the original premise with additional linguistic exaggeration. That is not grounds for reconsideration and should therefore be denied.

II. FALSE PREMISE​

The Commonwealth's position rests on a false premise that the Plaintiff was attempting to hold two seats simultaneously, thereby occupying two of the eleven citizen positions "required" to be distinct by the Constitution. He was not. The Plaintiff sought to contest a seat. Contesting an election and holding a seat are not the same thing. Had the Plaintiff won, he would have vacated his existing seat upon taking the new one. At no point would one citizen have occupied two positions, and the House would still retain the opportunity to be composed of eleven distinct citizens. The Commonwealth's citizen/seat distinction, however linguistically interesting, does not change this fundamental fact.

Nonetheless, the Constitution contains no express requirement that a sitting member must resign before contesting another seat in their chamber, nor that a sitting member is expressly prohibited from running for a seat. The Commonwealth is asking this Court to read a prohibition into Section 3 that its text does not contain. The restriction they claim is constitutionally grounded exists nowhere in the Constitution - it exists only in Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act, the ordinary statute whose constitutionality is the very question before this Court.

III. WHAT ABOUT THE SENATE?​

Section 4 of the Constitution provides:

That language is identical in character to the Section 3 provision the Commonwealth relies upon. A Class A Senator is already one of those 6 constitutionally mandated citizens. Under the Commonwealth's logic, a Class A Senator contesting a Class B seat raises the identical constitutional concern that one citizen potentially occupies two of the six constitutionally mandated positions. The Commonwealth offers no basis for treating the Senate's identical "shall consist" language differently from Section 3. If Section 3 creates a candidacy bar for Representatives, the same reading applies to Senators - yet Section 8(6) of the Electoral Act expressly permits that exact scenario. Section 7(1) of the Constitution provides a forfeiture mechanism only for cross-chamber elections. It is entirely silent on intra-chamber scenarios. The Electoral Act likewise provides no mechanism requiring a Class A Senator to vacate their Class A seat upon winning a Class B seat. There is no "requirement for resignation or forfeiture" provision, yet the system functions regardless because the vacancy process operates on election. Section 7(1) confirms that this is precisely how the Constitution itself resolves dual-seat conflicts, through post-election forfeiture rather than pre-election disqualification.

If this Court were to adopt the Commonwealth's position - that Section 3 constitutionally prohibits a sitting member from contesting a seat in their own chamber - the Commonwealth is, in effect, advocating for the invalidation of Section 8(6) on its own reasoning. Section 8(6) expressly permits Class A Senators to do precisely what the Commonwealth says the Constitution forbids. The statutory provision would be unconstitutional on the Commonwealth's own terms. The Commonwealth, therefore, faces an inevitable dilemma of its own making. Either their reading of Section 3 is correct, or it is not.

If the Defendant is correct - that one citizen cannot contest a second position in their own chamber - then Section 8(6) is unconstitutional, because it expressly purports to override the Constitution, and allow sitting Senators to run for seats in their own Chamber.
If the Defendant is incorrect - if Section 3 does not, in fact, prohibit a sitting member from contesting a seat in their chamber - then the constitutional prohibition they have built their entire argument upon does not exist, and the MtR crumbles.

The Commonwealth may attempt to distinguish the Senate scenario on the basis that Class A and Class B constitute distinct constitutional positions. The Constitution mandates 6 citizens in the Senate regardless of class. A Class A Senator contesting a Class B seat remains one of those 6 citizens throughout. The dilemma stands that either Section 3 prohibits what the Commonwealth claims, in which case Section 8(6) is unconstitutional on its own terms, or it does not, in which case their argument fails entirely.

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's MtR should be denied.

This court as of yet hasn't provided a definitive ruling on the Motion to Reconsider.