Lawsuit: Adjourned zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 10

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zLost

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Case Filing


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


zLost
Plaintiff

v.

The Commonwealth of REdmont
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF

The Defence has appointed an individual who does not meet requirements laid out by Executive policy to the position of Public Affairs Secretary. The Plaintiff believes this appointment to be illegal, and wishes for the courts to undo it.

I. PARTIES
1. zLost
2. The Commonwealth of Redmont

II. FACTS
1. On 24th June 2025, incumbent President Kaiserin_ nominated player xDarkkex to the position of Public Affairs Secretary to the Senate (Exhibit A).
2. On 26th June 2025 at 7:25 pm EST, the nomination was approved by the Senate and xDarkkex was appointed to Public Affairs Secretary (Exhibit B).
3. As of 27th June 2025 at roughly 10:29 am EST, xDarkkex had 1d 23h 37m 45s of playtime, and therefore had less than 48 hours of playtime when he was both nominated and appointed (Exhibit C).
4. Department of Public Affairs policy, and to an extent Executive Policy (as all Departments at the time of when xDarkkex was appointed followed this same policy), under Application Information (link) states:
These requirements are standard across all government positions and are non-negotiable.
  • Minimum of 48 hours of playtime.
  • You need to have and be available on Discord.
  • You need to show in your application why you are best suited for the position.
  • You must be able to work effectively and efficiently in a team with all members of the department. (Exhibit D)
5. The position of Secretary is a government position.
6. xDarkkex fails to meet the requirements for a Secretary, and therefore was illegally nominated.


III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. xDarkkex had less than 48 hours of playtime as shown in Exhibit C, and therefore didn't meet the requirements set out by the Executive shown in Fact 4.
2. A government position by definition is a position which is in Government. A secretary is a part of the Government, and therefore is a government position.
3. As precedented in SCR 14 [2021] (link) and multiple Federal Court cases (while Federal Court precedence is non-binding on the Supreme Court, it's precedent can serve as a good reference for interpretations of the law), such as FCR 27 [2023] (link), the Executive is required to follow the policy set out by them so long as it abides by law. Therefore, department policy cannot be arbitrary and the President cannot violate it by appointing someone against that policy.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Defendant:
1. Removal of xDarkkex from the position of Public Affairs Secretary
2. All actions taken by xDarkkex as Public Affairs Secretary to be reversed.
3. $5,000 in legal fees

Timezone in picture: GMT+5

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Timezone in picture: GMT+5

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Timezone in picture: GMT+5. Individuals identity hidden for privacy reasons.
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By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 8th day of July 2025.

 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
EMERGENCY INJUNCTION

The Plaintiff believes it is of utmost importance to halt xDarkkex's power as Public Affairs secretary, given that they have been making radical change in the Department, such as removing the leaderships ability to vote on applications, dissolving the payment system, etc. The Plaintiff requests the following injunctions to be granted:

1. All actions taken by xDarkkex since he became Public Affairs Secretary to be ineffective for the remainder of this case.
2. xDarkkex's powers as Secretary of Public Affairs be halted for the remainder of this case

OR (to allow the normal functioning of the DPA for the remainder of this case)

2. The previous Public Affairs Secretary (lucaaasserole) be appointed as a temporary Secretary for the Department of Public Affairs, as the courts have done similarly in the past, as in SCR 5 [2025] (link).
 

Writ of Summons


@Attorney General's Office is required to appear before the Supreme Court in the case of zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 10.

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 
The Supreme Court of Redmont will be granting a modified Emergency Injunction.

Secretary xDarkkex is temporarily restrained from changing any policy within the Department of Public Affairs for the duration of the case or until further orders of this Court. This will not prevent any day-to-day operations or the use of any current policy. The plaintiff may refile for additional emergency limitations if proven necessary.
 
The Commonwealth is present, Your Honor.
 
You have 48 hours to present your Answer to Complaint
 

Answer to Complaint


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

zLost
Plaintiff

v.

The Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. The Defendant AFFIRMS that on 24th June 2025, incumbent President Kaiserin_ nominated player xDarkkex to the position of Public Affairs Secretary to the Senate.
2. The Defendant AFFIRMS that on 26th June 2025 at 7:25 pm EST, the aforementioned nomination was approved by the Senate and xDarkkex was appointed to Public Affairs Secretary.
3. The Defendant AFFIRMS that as of 27th June 2025 at roughly 10:29 am EST, xDarkkex had 1d 23h 37m 45s of playtime, and therefore had less than 48 hours of playtime when he was both nominated and appointed.
4. The Defendant AFFIRMS that Department of Public Affairs policy, and to an extent Executive Policy (as all Departments at the time of when xDarkkex was appointed followed this same policy), under Application Information (link) states:
These requirements are standard across all government positions and are non-negotiable.

  • Minimum of 48 hours of playtime.
  • You need to have and be available on Discord.
  • You need to show in your application why you are best suited for the position.
  • You must be able to work effectively and efficiently in a team with all members of the department.
5. The Defendant AFFIRMS that the position of Secretary is a government position.
6. The Defendant DENIES that xDarkkex fails to meet the requirements for a secretary, and therefore was illegally nominated.

II. DEFENCES
1. Departments are bound by their own department policies, insofar as they are in line with law, however the President is not a part of the Department of Public Affairs and is therefore not bound by Public Affairs department policy.
2. A position of Secretary is a Government position, but the statement in the DPA's department policy that "These requirements are standard across all government positions and are non-negotiable" refers only to regular employment positions within departments, and not all government positions across the government. If it were to refer to that, this statement would be unconstitutional and therefore invalid. §8.(2) of our Constitution states that in order to become a Representative in the House of Representatives, which is a position within the government, a player needs to have accrued 24 hours of active playtime. 24 hours is less than 48 hours, and it is therefore by the constitution impossible for there to be a minimum requirement of 48 hours of playtime on every single position in the government. Rather, this requirement is true for regular employment positions within the Department of Public Affairs which are made through a regular application on the forums.
3. The precedent in SCR 14 [2021] and FCR 27 [2023] refers to actions taken within Departments, which indeed have to follow the policy set out by them so long as it abides by law. Neither of these cases refer to actions taken by the President, who is not a part of any Department but an entity separate and above any one Department.
4. It is by no means reasonable to reverse all decisions taken by xDarkkex as Public Affairs Secretary. This will cause tremendous uncertainty, unclarity and complete chaos.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This twelfth day of July 2025

 

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Your Honor, the Defendant moves for a summary judgement and in support thereof respectfully alleges that there are no disputed facts. The only fact posed by the Plaintiff that has not been affirmed by the Defendant is " xDarkkex fails to meet the requirements for a Secretary, and therefore was illegally nominated." which is not a fact, but rather a legal interpretation that is to be made by the Court and which the entire case revolves around. As none of the actual facts posed by the Plaintiff are disputed the Defendant moves for a summary judgement as to not drag this case out unnecessarily.

 
The motion for summary judgement is granted. This case is now in recess pending verdict.
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The Plaintiff asks that summary judgement be reconsidered, due to the fact that this will set horrible precedent and is not how summary judgement is intended to be used.

A motion for summary judgement has basically never been accepted in the Supreme Court without consent from the opposing counsel, unless the opposing counsel has failed to represent themselves or has no defense. For example:

SCR 1 [2025]
SCR 5 [2024]
SCR 14 [2023]
SCR 21 [2022] (the presiding officer denies summary judgement due to the opposing counsel disagreeing)

Imposing a verdict when the Defence has made claims that the Plaintiff won't be able to argue against, without going to Discovery for the Plaintiff to provide further evidence or witness testimony, without any opening or closing statements, all without the Plaintiff's consent is insanity.

This precedent would allow the Defence to just affirm all facts, even if they don't necessarily agree, to end a case before it even starts.

Not only that, the Defence has not even actually affirmed all facts, denying one fact. If only absolute facts are counted for summary judgement, this would allow almost every case to end before opening statements. A majority of cases do not have any absolute facts that the Defence disagrees with.
 
The Motion to Reconsider is granted. We will now be moving onto Discovery, which will last 24 hours starting from this moment.
 
Your Honor, I wish for an extension of 48 hours to discovery. The Plaintiff needs more time to compile evidence and a list of witnesses, especially since I am currently travelling and have very limited access to my laptop.
 
Your Honor, I wish for an extension of 48 hours to discovery. The Plaintiff needs more time to compile evidence and a list of witnesses, especially since I am currently travelling and have very limited access to my laptop.
Extension granted.
 
The Supreme Court of Redmont will be granting a modified Emergency Injunction.

Secretary xDarkkex is temporarily restrained from changing any policy within the Department of Public Affairs for the duration of the case or until further orders of this Court. This will not prevent any day-to-day operations or the use of any current policy. The plaintiff may refile for additional emergency limitations if proven necessary.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The Plaintiff believes that restricting the change of any further policy alone is not sufficient to prevent unrecoverable harm. Secretary xDarkkex along with Acting Secretary juniperfig who is in acting in his stead have been threatening actions and taking actions against multiple members of the department, using previous policies set by them and other absurd reasons as justification for these warnings/fires.

If it turns out that xDarkkex's appointment was illegitimate, and they were fired illegally due to the illegitimate appointment, it would result in long and lengthy legal battles such as in RaiTheGuy07 v. Department of Homeland Security [2025] FCR 21. Not only that, the damages that the individuals would face would not be able to be compensated through monetary gain, given that they would miss out on the ability to host events during a peak time of the year (summer) for hosting events.

Therefore, we ask that the courts grant both or at least one of the following emergency injunctions along with what has already been injunctioned:
1. Policies and firings by xDarkkex or anyone acting in his stead before this case to be ineffective for the remainder of this case.
2. Removal of the DPA Secretary's ability to fire any employees for the remainder of this case.

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The emergency injunction is granted, the court finds it neccesary to expand the current limitations set by the original EI in order to prevent potential harm. Secretary xDarkkex and any Acting Secretaries are temporarily prohibited from terminating or disciplining DPA employees for the remainder of this case or another Court order.
 
Your Honor, apologies for speaking out of turn, but I wish to ask if those who have been fired will remain fired for the remainder of this case.
 
Your Honor, apologies for speaking out of turn, but I wish to ask if those who have been fired will remain fired for the remainder of this case.
Those who have been already yes
 
The Plaintiff wishes to submit the following witness list:

ItsKatto, former DCT Secretary
 
The Plaintiff wishes to submit the following witness list:

ItsKatto, former DCT Secretary

Objection


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - RELEVANCE

Your Honor, the Defendant does not see how testimony of a former DCT secretary is related to the case at hand in any way.

 
The Plaintiff wishes to submit the following witness list:

ItsKatto, former DCT Secretary
What is the relevance of a former DCT Secretary in a trial related to the DPA?
 
What is the relevance of a former DCT Secretary in a trial related to the DPA?
The Plaintiff wishes to question the former DCT secretary about how they treat DCT policy in regards to evictions and if they can arbitrarily change it to fit eviction requirements.
 
The Plaintiff wishes to question the former DCT secretary about how they treat DCT policy in regards to evictions and if they can arbitrarily change it to fit eviction requirements.
Could you clarify specifically the connection between DCT policy and the matter at hand?
 
Discovery has now concluded, the validity of the witness is pending and will be determined once the plaintiff clarifies the relevance of their testimony to the case.
 
Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are given 72 hours, running simultaneously to present opening statements.
 
Could you clarify specifically the connection between DCT policy and the matter at hand?
Deep apologies for the late response, your honor. As the Plaintiff stated earlier, I have been busy IRL and therefore this response has been delayed.

Given that the Plaintiff is arguing that the Executive cannot arbitrarily choose to not follow or follow their policy when needed, we believe it would help our case if a former DCT secretary affirms in court that they cannot arbitrarily change their departmental policy to fit a certain eviction.
 
Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are given 72 hours, running simultaneously to present opening statements.
Your Honor, may I ask why opening statements are being given simultaneously?
 
They are being given simultaneously in order to keep the case moving within the timeline given by the Court Rules and Procedures. Both parties are still given the 72 hours allotted.
 

Objection


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - RELEVANCE

Your Honor, the Defendant does not see how testimony of a former DCT secretary is related to the case at hand in any way.

Objection sustained. This court does not believe that the testimony of a former DCT Secretary regarding eviction policy has sufficient connection between the case concerning the DPA. The witness is struck.
 
They are being given simultaneously in order to keep the case moving within the timeline given by the Court Rules and Procedures. Both parties are still given the 72 hours allotted.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMOWNEATLH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

What timeline in the Court Rules and Procedures, your Honor? The Court Rules and Procedure state that the Plaintiffs Opening Statement is given first and then the Defences Opening Statements are given.

There is no guarantee for this by having both opening statements be given simultaneously, and it's inherently unfair for the Defendant, if they are waiting for the Plaintiff to give their opening statement. They will most likely have less than 24 hours to respond to the Plaintiffs argument. The Plaintiff can simply wait until the last minute to not allow the Defendant to give an opening statement.

The Plaintiff asks that the courts reconsider making both counsels give their opening statements simulatenously, and restart the 72 hour counter. The Plaintiff has spent the limited time they have (in real life due to circumstances) on this motion to reconsider instead of the opening statement.

If this motion to reconsider is denied, the Plaintiff wishes to ask for a 48 hour extension on opening statements due to the reasons above.
 
The Plaintiff has 48 hours to present their Opening Statement. Immediately after it is posted, the 48-hour timer for the Defendant will begin.
 
The defense will be given the same extension time of 48 hours to present opening statements.
 
Apologies for not giving an opening statement your honor, I didn't have time in real life to make it within the timeframe given, but as I do not want to extend this case too long nor did I believe it would be accepted, I did not ask for an extension.

I will accept a contempt of the court charge if the courts believe it to be appropriate to charge me with it.
 
The Defendant chooses not to file an opening statement and requests we move on to closing statements.
 
The plaintiff has 72 hours to present Closing Statements, after it is posted, the 72-hour timer for the Defendant will begin.
 

Closing Statement


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CLOSING STATEMENT

The Defence argues that the President is not bound by policy made through the Department of Public Affairs given that they are not in the Department of Public Affairs, however, the Plaintiff believes this to be untrue. The Constitution states:

(1) Authority. Cabinet derives its authority through delegated Presidential executive authority.

Therefore, policies made by Departments are through the delegated powers of the President, and it's possible for the President to be bound to Department Policy. To support this fact, the Attorney General, in their answer to complaint, affirmed that the policy in question is to an extent executive policy, implying that they agree with this interpretation.

The Defence also agrees with the Plaintiff that Departments have to follow the policy set out by them as long as it follows the law, but argues that since the policy is not set by the President, but by the Department, the President does not have to follow it. The counterargument to this argument is the same as above, which is that department policies are made through delegated powers of the president, and therefore the President cannot violate such policy, since it is, to an extent, their own policy.


The Defence also argues that the policy is unconstitutional if it referred to all government positions, since Representatives and Senators have different playtime requirements as stated in the constitution. However, the Plaintiff does not believe this makes the policy unconstitutional.

For the positions of Representative, Senator, Judge, Justice, etc., their required playtime is mentioned in the Constitution and/or legislation. Therefore, the policy does not have jurisdiction over their playtime requirements. However, in regards to Government Employees and Secretaries, there is no legislation to the knowledge of the Plaintiff which specifies their playtime, and therefore this policy has jurisdiction over deciding their playtime requirements.


The Defence expresses concerns over reversing all actions taken by xDarkkex throughout his term, which the Plaintiff has grown to agree with. The Plaintiff would be more than content to reverse all actions which would be non-detrimental to the DPA if reversed (such as hirings, firings, department policy changes, etc.), rather than every action.


The Plaintiff believes that nominating xDarkkex to be Secretary without meeting the requirements in the stated department policy would be a violation of Constitutional Right 13, which states:

(13) Every citizen is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without unfair discrimination and, in particular, without unfair discrimination based on political belief or social status.

Department policies are extensions of the law, as they are made through delegated Presidential Authority, which is granted by the law. Therefore, this right also applies to departmental policies. The Plaintiff believes that creating an arbitrary exception for xDarkkex would violate this right as it gives him extra benefit of an extension of the law.

 
@gribble19 you have around 53.5 hours to present closing statements.
 

Verdict


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
VERDICT

zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 10

Civil Action

I. PLAINTIFF’S POSITION​

  1. The Plaintiff argues the validity of the appointment of xDarkkex to the position of Secretary of Public Affairs, asserting that it violated the Department of Public Affairs internal policy requiring a minimum of 48 hours of playtime for all government positions.

  2. The Plaintiff argues that the Department’s policy, which states that such requirements are "standard across all government positions and are non-negotiable," is binding on the executive, including the President, by consequence of being part of executive policy.

  3. According to the Plaintiff, the appointment of xDarkkex despite not meeting these requirements constitutes unequal treatment in violation of Constitutional rights, and that their actions taken as Secretary should be declared null and void.

II. DEFENDANT’S POSITION​

  1. The Defendant agrees that xDarkkex had not accrued 48 hours of playtime at the time of his appointment but contends that this requirement is not applicable to secretarial appointments made by the President.

  2. The Defendant maintains that the internal policies of a department are not binding on the President, who is a separate constitutional entity empowered to make appointments independent of departmental hiring criteria unless otherwise restricted by law.

  3. The Defendant further asserts that interpreting departmental policy as binding on executive appointments would create an unconstitutional conflict, as the Constitution permits elected government officials to serve with only 24 hours of playtime.

  4. Finally, the Defendant argues that reversing all actions taken by xDarkkex in office would result in administrative confusion and chaos, highlighting that such actions were taken under the color of authority and should remain valid.

III. THE COURT’S OPINION​

Departmental policies, while important for internal operations and employment processes within their respective departments, do not carry the force of law unless established by legislation. These internal requirements, such as playtime requirements for applicants, may guide hiring practices and promote consistency within departments, but they cannot independently impose legal obligations on the executive branch or alter constitutional powers unless.

The requirement cited by the Plaintiff of a minimum of 48 hours of playtime, clearly falls within the scope of internal hiring criteria designed for regular employee applicants, rather than for executive appointments. It exists to assist department leadership in evaluating applications from potential employees, not to limit the constitutional power granted to the President in nominating Secretaries. The authority to appoint department Secretaries is derived directly from the Constitution and is subject only to Senate confirmation. The President’s power to nominate cannot be overridden by the department's policy, which does not rise to the level of binding law.

Furthermore, the Court finds the phrasing within the policy, specifically the assertion that the listed requirements apply to “all government positions” to be unconvincing when examined in its legal context. Interpreting this language to include secretarial appointments would lead to an illogical result. It would be both inconsistent and legally unjustifiable for an internal department policy to require a higher threshold for appointed officials than the Constitution requires for elected ones. To adopt the Plaintiff’s interpretation would set a dangerous precedent, effectively allowing departments to unilaterally redefine eligibility for public office without legislative approval.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the appointment of xDarkkex did not violate any binding legal requirement. The internal policy cited, while applicable to standard departmental hires, does not govern or limit the President’s constitutional authority to nominate a Secretary. As such, the appointment was lawful and remains valid.

Associate Justice Smallfries dissents:
In this case, zLost (Plaintiff) asserts that President Kaiserin (President) violated the law when she nominated xDarkkex (Dark) to Secretary of the Department of Public Affairs (DPA). My brethren on the court rules in favor of the Commonwealth, finding that internal operations and processes within departments do not carry the force of law, and cannot impose any legal obligations. The Majority also finds that the ability of the President to nominate Secretaries is granted directly by the Constitution, and thus cannot be limited by departmental policy in any way. Finally, the Majority further finds that it would be inconsistent and legally impermissible for an appointed department position to require a higher barrier than the Constitutionally mandated requirements for an elected Article I position.

I find all of these determinations unconvincing, and thus I respectfully dissent.


  1. Facts
On or around June 24, 2025, the President nominated Dark to become the Secretary of the DPA. On or around June 26, 2025, the Senate approved of the nomination. On or around June 27, 2025, then confirmed Secretary Dark had obtained only just under two days of playtime.

Plaintiff alleges that the department policy regarding the minimum playtime was violated. The DPA application information states that “all government positions [have the following requirements] and are non-negotiable.” Application Information, Department of Government Affairs. Among these non-negotiable requirements stands a minimum of forty-eight hours of playtime.

Following Dark’s confirmation, Dark took several actions as Secretary not relevant here. Plaintiff soon filed suit, alleging Dark was illegitimately nominated for Secretary due to not fulfilling the forty-eight hour requirement necessary for all “government positions,” requesting as relief Dark be removed as Secretary of the DPA, all actions Dark has undertaken as Secretary to be reversed, and legal fees.


  1. Analysis
The issue in this case is if department policy may place some limit on the nomination, confirmation, and then initial hiring of Secretaries for that department.


  1. Applicable law
The Constitution invests in the executive branch the responsibility of managing the various government departments. R.C. Const. Part III, § 30. The Department of Public Affairs is a government department formed and organized by Congress. Executive Standards Act (EXSA) § 10. Departments have “Leadership” and “Employees.” See id. at § 10, 15; see Economic Standards Act (ECSA) Amendment I § 4(e). Congress has defined that “department positions” include the Secretaries of departments. See id. at § 4(d).

Legislative power is vested in the Congress of Redmont. R.C. Const. Part I, § 1. The Executive, including the cabinet and the secretaries of the departments and the departments thereof, are charged with administering and enforcing the law as legislated. Id. at Part III, § 23. Secretaries of departments are tasked with overseeing efficient operations of their department, creating and amending policy according to the President’s direction, and administering their department according to the law. See id. at Part III, § 29(1). Departments may not act arbitrarily in the enforcement of their policies. See Partypig678 v. Department of Constr. and Trans. [2021] SCR 14; Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth [2023] FCR 27 (no pet.).


  1. Discussion
i. All jobs within a department are government positions

The Plaintiff here asserts that because Dark had less than the policy-mandated forty-eight hours of playtime, their appointment was illegitimate. Supporting this assertion is a DPA policy standard, demanding, inter alia, a minimum of forty-eight hours of playtime. This requirement is claimed to be universal, applying to “all government positions.” What a “government position” actually is remains unclear, as there are no direct legislative or executive sources on the subject.

The Plaintiff believes that a government position is, at the very least, any position within a department up to and including the Secretary of that department. The State affirms this definition, and so we will operate under the assumption that the position of Secretary is indeed a government position. Neither party attempts to actually give a full definition of what a government position is. Department policy, as noted, requires that all government positions may only be filled by someone who has obtained forty-eight hours of playtime.

It would stand to reason then that department policy requires Secretaries to have obtained that minimum before they may fill their office. Therefore, an individual becoming Secretary with less than forty-eight hours is impermissible. However, the State maintains this is incorrect.

The State, oddly, references Part I, section eight, sub-section two of our Constitution. It is unclear what exactly the required playtime of elected officials—specifically, a Representative in Congress—has to do with hour requirement policies for departments. Charitably, the State seems to insinuate that this department minimum playtime policy seeks to override the Constitution’s specific limitations on playtime for those positions such as Representative, Senator, and even President. This is not a convincing argument—it is clear and obvious that the department policy only applies to those individuals working within the departments, not any person that vaguely works with the government in any capacity. I find it highly unlikely the departments were trying to overwrite the playtime requirements of all constitutionally-created positions.

Some ambiguity exists in the definition of what a government position is. In this case, neither party attempted to define the term, and no specific department or legislative definition of the term seems to exist. In light of this, we may use statutory interpretation to discover what the term means.

According to the EXSA—which created the DPA—departments can generally be thought of as having “Leadership” and “Employee” positions. This clearly aligns with the Secretaries (and deputy secretaries) of each department and the regular hired employees, respectively. Further, Congress has defined that “department positions” includes Secretaries. In the ECSA, Congress gives the President the ability to “decide the salaries that department positions (excluding Secretaries) receive.”

At first glance, some may believe this language actually excludes Secretaries from being in the former broad group of “department positions.” The more likely interpretation, however, is that Congress instead desired to grant the President the power to change the salaries that all department positions received—and only then removed Secretaries from the list of department positions that the President could change the salary for at whim.

Though not a perfect analogy, the parallels here help us come to the reasonable conclusion that Secretaries are indeed a part of the department—they are a department position—and that at a minimum, government positions include all department positions. No evidence has been brought forward that any department has ever tried to enforce this forty-eight hour requirement on another branch of the government or any department besides their own. There is no indication that any department has ever attempted to enforce their playtime requirement outside of their own department.

It is reasonable to believe that the intention with this policy was only to regulate the hiring of department positions within each department. Department hiring policy only applied within the departments themselves. Departments have not ever attempted or desire to restrict the hiring policies or rules of any other part of government.

A “government position” is the same as a department position. The former lacks any statutory definition, and because all of the department’s policy comes from the EXSA, it can be reasonably assumed that the definition comes from that act. Thus, a government position in department policy is a mirror of the department position in statute. If nothing else, it is unreasonable to think that a department believed they had the authority to change the playtime requirement for any job outside of their department. Because of this, and all of the above, I hold that a government position and a department position are one in the same.


ii. Department policy is both not binding to outside actors, and is not unconstitutional for merely existing

The State further asserts that the President is not within the DPA, and so may act as she wishes—specifically in regards to hiring. The Constitution grants departments the authority to amend their own policies in order to efficiently operate themselves and carry out the law as written by Congress and directed by the President. However, the enforcement of those policies may not be arbitrary in nature.

It is true that the President is not exactly bound by department policy. No authority has been shown that individual actions by the President him or herself may be found illegal if done against department policy. However, any actions the President takes that force a department to act is, in effect, that department acting—and therefore should follow that department’s own policy. The President may direct a department to change its policy, and she may fire a Secretary who is unwilling or unable to do so—but she may not force a department to act against its policy. That policy instead must be changed beforehand.

Although the State is correct to say that the President is not a member of the DPA and therefore did not (nor could she) violate department policy, there is a crucial step both parties seemed to have missed. As discussed above, Secretaries are government and department positions. The Secretary, obviously, is a member of their department. Therefore, they must comply with any and all department policies produced. This includes the requirement for having forty-eight hours of playtime.

It is important to read the policy itself; nowhere in the policy is it mentioned that the policy applies only to applications to jobs in the department, nor only individuals who obtain the job through application. If this was not the case, then a Secretary could appoint forty of his friends to the job who had just joined the server yesterday. If the requirements only applied to being allowed to apply, rather than get the job at all, then this sort of incident could occur regularly. It appears obvious that the intention of this policy was to only have experienced individuals with more than two days of playtime, regardless of the origin of their employment.

Here, it is not the President who broke policy by nominating Dark to Secretary, nor did the Senate violate department policy; neither of them are beholden to policy in this instance. They both have Constitutional duties that they uphold, and department policies cannot leave the immediate borders of department duties.

The Plaintiff is correct in that Dark joining the DPA was illegitimate. However, this was only Dark’s burden to cure, and not an imposition on the President or Senate. Because of this, and how close Dark was to meeting the requirements (which he by now has), and how his failure to meet these requirements did not demonstrably impact Dark’s leading of his department, I find Dark’s illegitimate rise to Secretary harmless in nature.

However, in accepting employment as Secretary and beginning to work with the department with less than forty-eight hours, Secretary Dark violated policy. It is clear to me that the moment Dark’s appointment was confirmed by the Senate—or perhaps earlier if he began work as an acting secretary before his confirmation—he violated internal department policy, and thus ran afoul of the law here.

As discussed above, the President forcing a department to act is that department itself acting. Therefore, the President cannot force a department to act in a way that is against policy. However, here the President did not do so—Dark violated policy of his own accord when he began working with the DPA. Dark could have taken a moment to get the needed playtime, or the President could have had the policy for the department changed. There were methods to cure this deficiency, and no person in power took them. This was an easy issue to fix.


iii. The mistake was harmless

Dark’s joining the DPA was illegitimate and plainly against department policy. However, I also believe that while technically wrong, this mistake was harmless. There were only a few minutes necessary for Dark to be truly eligible for his position as Secretary, and those extra few minutes in-game would not have substantially impacted any decision he could make as Secretary.

The fact of Dark’s playtime deficiencies did not substantially impact any person’s rights (if at all), and any claim to the contrary ignores that Dark could have just logged half an hour more before becoming Secretary and then continuing with whatever decisions he desired. Dark has since cured his deficiency, and likely did so soon after this case was filed. We do not wish to encourage individuals fixing mistakes only when a case has been filed as a result of those mistakes. However, here I believe the issue at hand is so minor and so far removed from any real material impact that we can effectively ignore it.


iv. Flaws of the Majority’s opinion

I believe the Majority is obviously correct that the department policy is clearly meant to be only for internal hiring—not as some hidden pseudo-restriction on any other playtime requirements. This policy also does not impact outside actors such as the President or the Senate. However, they do not go far enough. Though true that here the President does not violate any policy (nor is she bound to any), when Dark began working for the DPA he himself broke the policy. His appointment and confirmation were not illegitimate, but his accepting the position and beginning work certainly were.

The Majority is also correct that the department may not unilaterally rule by fiat and create rules unsupported by legislation. However, it is clear to me that internal policies regarding employees are obviously granted by Congress through the EXSA. Congress clearly expects departments to be able to regulate themselves and efficiently organize in order to execute the law. Saying otherwise is saying that departments must either be specifically granted the ability to determine hiring practices, or that Congress itself needs to stipulate hiring requirements. I find this burden onerous, unnecessary, and unreasonable.

This internal policy is not unconstitutional. The Majority believes that one branch with no statutory or constitutional playtime requirement instituting one is somehow related to and unconstitutional because of the playtime requirement for a specific job in an entirely different section of the Constitution. I find this assertion odd. Department hiring policy, obviously and plainly, does not override requirements or otherwise mandate rules for any position outside of the departments themselves.

Finally, I find the Majority’s contention regarding the constitutionality of a forty-eight hour playtime requirement unreasonable. The Majority’s assertion that in no case can a department position have a higher time requirement than any elected position has zero basis in law or the Constitution. They seem to justify this odd conclusion with the worried belief that allowing departments to have high playtime requirements would necessarily re-write the Constitution.

This is not only an incorrect and unreasonable conclusion, but is also entirely inconsistent with the rest of their opinion. Earlier in their decision, the Majority states that the playtime requirement is an internal policy only, not meant to be binding on any outside actor. In saying here that the Plaintiff’s interpretation is incorrect, they seem to believe that the Plaintiff is saying that department policy may unilaterally change even those requirements specified in the Constitution.

This is a grave misunderstanding of the Plaintiff’s position. In their closing statement, the Plaintiff very specifically asserts that the required playtime for various positions mentioned in the Constitution specifically means that departments cannot act with those playtimes in any way. However, specifically in regards to government employees (above defined as equivalent to department employees, which is enshrined in statutory law), there is no statutory or constitutional requirement, meaning policies have room to make their own determinations. I find this line of thought reasonable and conducive to the effective administration of departments, in line with the intent of Congress.

There is no reason, logically or legally, for a prohibition of department policy requiring a playtime that happens to be higher than a playtime requirement in a different branch of government. Indeed, no authority backing this claim exists; and the Majority cites none. I find it unreasonable to say that the mere fact that the department has a playtime requirement higher than one in a completely different portion of the Constitution makes the first requirement unconstitutional.


III. Conclusion

As a result of the above, I disagree with the Majority’s rulings. Government positions and department positions are one in the same, and all positions within a department must follow department policy. Department policy, including hiring policy, is authorized by the EXSA. Though the President and the Senate were not bound to this policy in making their nomination and then confirmation, Dark was in violation when he began working for the DPA. He should not have accepted the offer or begun work until he had achieved the full forty-eight hours of playtime required for his nominated role as Secretary. However, this error was harmless.

A last thought on the Emergency Injunction: in my opinion, it should have been lifted far earlier—and perhaps never issued at all. Thirty days before the time of writing—August 6, 2025—the /about command shows that Dark had roughly three days and two hours of playtime. The date of that time would be July 7, 2025. This is the same day this suit was filed, and two days before the emergency junction was granted.

By this point, it seems that Dark already had two days of playtime, and the emergency relief was unnecessary. Even if this was not the case it does not entirely make sense that for such a minor deficiency all policy changes should be halted with no nuance for almost a month. I find it difficult to imagine any permanent or unwieldy consequences purely as a result of a Secretary who was some thirty minutes off their required playtime. If nothing else, freezing an entire department’s ability to change policy in order to respond to new events can have a far greater permanent impact letting a department change policy if they so desired. At most, the Plaintiff should have asked for emergency relief on specific policies as they were pushed through, and not given a blanket freeze on change.

Because of all of the above, I respectfully dissent from the Majority here. Were my opinion to rule as majority, I would grant the Plaintiff $5,000 in legal fees, and refuse in their entirety his other two requested reliefs due to the harmlessness of Dark’s error.

IV. DECISION​

In a 2–1 decision, the Supreme Court of Redmont rules in favor of the Defendant.

The Emergency Injunction previously issued in this case is now lifted, effective immediately.

The Supreme Court thanks all involved. This Court is now Adjourned.

 
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