Lawsuit: Adjourned KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104

[ElysiaCrynn]

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

KingBOB99878 (represented by ElysiaCrynn)
Plaintiff

v.

truffleboy123 (doing business as “AQR”)
Defendant

Proof of Representation:

Spoiler: Proof of Representation

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF

I entered into this agreement in good faith, believing I was investing in a legitimate company. I paid immediately, sending $150,000 in line with the agreement we made. Since then the defendant has failed to send me any of the promised payments. This has caused me significant financial strain, forcing me to take on debt to cover other obligations I had planned to fund with the promised returns. I am submitting this to rightfully recover what is mine and hold the defendant accountable for his actions.

I. PARTIES
1. KingBOB99878 - Plaintiff
2. truffleboy123 - Defendant, the individual who entered into the Agreement and accepted funds from the Plaintiff while doing business under the name of “AQR”.

At all times relevant to this case, the entity referred to as "AQR" was not a registered in-game company or a legally incorporated entity within the Commonwealth of Redmont. Pursuant to the precedent set in Privacy Matters v. Nexalin [2025] FCR 36, an individual who acts on behalf of a non-existent company is personally and fully liable for all actions, obligations, and debts entered into under that company's name. Therefore, the Defendant is the proper and sole party responsible for the claims herein.

II. FACTS
1. On August 16, 2025, the Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a "Convertible Preferred Share Investment Agreement" (the "Agreement"). (P-001, P-003)
2. The Agreement identified the recipient as the company “AQR”, an entity controlled and operated by the defendant, which the defendant presented themselves as acting on behalf of. (P-001, P-003).
3. The Agreement was formed via discussions on Discord, where the terms were presented via a Google Document and explicitly accepted by truffleboy123 on behalf of the company, stating "I agree to the following under the laws of Redmont" (P-003).
4. Pursuant to the Agreement, the Plaintiff invested $150,000 into a bank account of the Defendant under the name “AQR”. The transfer of these funds was successfully completed on August 16, 2025. (P-004)
5. In exchange for this investment, the Agreement stipulates under Section 2 that the Defendant would pay the Plaintiff a yield of 50% of the initial investment amount per month, equal to $75,000 per month. This payment was due on or before the last day of each calendar month. (P-001)
6. The Defendant has failed to make the required yield payment for the month of August 2025, which was due on or before August 31, 2025.
7. The Defendant has subsequently failed to make the required yield payment for the month of September 2025, which was due on or before September 30, 2025.
8. To date, the Plaintiff has received $0 of the $150,000 in yields owed under the Agreement.
9. Section 5.2 of the Agreement outlines a penalty for default, stating: "the Company shall owe the Investor five (5) times the unpaid yield amount as liquidated damages... and the amount the investor put in will be given back." (P-001)
10. Based on the two missed payments, the liquidated damages owed are $750,000 ($150,000 x 5).
11. The Agreement also stipulates that the original investment of $150,000 is to be returned to the Plaintiff upon such a default.
12. Due to the Defendant's failure to provide the expected returns, the Plaintiff was forced to secure external financing for planned business operations, incurring $20,000 in interest costs on loans that would have otherwise been unnecessary. (P-002 for one of the loans).
13. On July 31st, the Defendant claimed to be experienced with "sales & trading", "brokerage" and the economy in the context of Minecraft servers. (P-005)
14. On August 12th, the Defendant announced a range of contractual financial services being offered under AQR. (P-006)
15. On August 14th, the Defendant advertised the Discord server for AQR and publicly claimed to have already made "$80k" from his financial services. (P-007, P-008)
16. On August 15th, one day prior to the Agreement, the Defendant initiated contact with the Plaintiff to solicit an investment opportunity. (P-009)
17. On August 18th and 21st, the Defendant continued to engage in financial activities by attempting to enter into further contracts through public auction bids. (P-010, P-011)

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. Breach of Contract
A valid and enforceable contract was formed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, meeting all requirements under Section 4(2) of the Contracts Act:

(a) Offer: The Plaintiff, through the Google Document presented on Discord, made a clear and unequivocal offer by proposing the specific terms of the investment agreement to the Defendant.

(b) Acceptance: The Defendant provided a positive and unambiguous acceptance on Discord, stating, "I agree to the following under the laws of Redmont."

(c) Consideration: Valid consideration was exchanged. The Plaintiff provided $150,000, and the Defendant promised monthly yields and convertible shares in return.

(d) Intent: The formal nature of the written Agreement, the specific financial terms, and the actual transfer of funds demonstrate a clear intention from both parties to create legal obligations.

(e) Capacity: Both parties possessed the legal capacity to enter into the contract.

Under Section 7(1) of the Contracts Act, “A breach of contract occurs when a party fails to fulfil its contractual obligations.” A valid contract was formed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. As established in Privacy Matters v. Nexalin [2025] FCR 36, the Defendant is the true party to this contract, not the non-existent entity "AQR." The Defendant accepted the Agreement and the Plaintiff's investment and was personally obligated to pay a monthly yield of RD$75,000. The Defendant's failure to make any payments for August and September 2025 constitutes a material breach, causing direct financial harm and triggering the Agreement's penalty clauses.

2. Violation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Under Section 14 of the Contracts Act, there exists an "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract." The Defendant accepted the Plaintiff's $150,000 investment and then immediately failed to perform any of its primary financial obligations under the Agreement. This conduct demonstrates a lack of honesty and fairness, violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

3. Fraud
Pursuant to the Commercial Standards Act Section 12, Fraud is defined as "the knowing or reckless misrepresentation or omission of a material fact to another, causing reliance and resulting in harm". The Defendant represented an intent to make monthly payments of $75,000. While intending to enter a binding agreement to receive the Plaintiff's funds, the Defendant knowingly or recklessly misrepresented his own ability to fulfill the payment obligations therein. The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant's representation that he would make monthly payments of $75,000. The Defendant's immediate and total failure to perform is compelling evidence that this representation was false and made to fraudulently induce the Plaintiff to invest. This outrageous conduct warrants significant punitive damages to deter the Defendant and others from engaging in such predatory financial schemes.


IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Defendant:
1. Compensatory Damages totalling $170,000, comprising:
(a) The return of the principal investment: $150,000
(b) Interest costs on loans taken as a direct result of the breach: $20,000.
2. Liquidated Damages: as stipulated in the Agreement's default clause, calculated as five (5) times the unpaid yield ($150,000), totalling $750,000.
3. Punitive Damages: $200,000 for the Defendant’s outrageous conduct in relation to the breach of the contract, failing to even attempt to comply with the Agreement. Accepting a large sum of money under the promise of extraordinary returns and then immediately defaulting without a single payment is predatory behavior that warrants significant punitive damages to deter the Defendant and others from similar predatory conduct in the future, as established in precedents like MegaMinerM v. Blazora Corporation [2025] FCR 27.
4. Legal fees: An award for legal fees amounting to 30% of the total damages awarded.


Evidence:

Spoiler: P-001

Convertible Preferred Share Investment Agreement

Spoiler: P-002

Spoiler: P-003

Spoiler: P-004

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 7th day of October 2025

 

[AmityBlamity]

Writ of Summons

@Truffleboy123, is required to appear before the federal Court in the case of KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

[ElysiaCrynn]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff moves that the court proceeds with a default judgment as the Defendant has failed to appear in the 72 hours allotted by the Court.

 

[AmityBlamity]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff moves that the court proceeds with a default judgment as the Defendant has failed to appear in the 72 hours allotted by the Court.

Motion denied. A public defender will be appointed.

 

[Vernicia]

Motion denied. A public defender will be appointed.

Your Honour,

I have just been assigned to this case.

 

[AmityBlamity]

Your Honour,

I have just been assigned to this case.

You have 48 hours to provide an Answer to Complaint.

 

[Vernicia]

Answer to Complaint

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT



KingBOB99878 (represented by ElysiaCrynn)
Plaintiff

V.

truffleboy123 (doing business as “AQR”, represented by PD Vernicia)
Defendant

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. The Defendant DENIES this. As I will set out under defences 1 through 5
2. The Defendant DENIES this, as no agreement was formed.
3. The Defendant DENIES this, as no agreement was formed.
4. The Defendant AFFIRMS receipt of this funds, but notes that no agreement was formed.
5. The Defendant DENIES this, as no agreement was formed.
6. The Defendant NEITHER AFFIRMS, NOR DENIES this, but notes that no agreement was formed.
7. The Defendant NEITHER AFFIRMS, NOR DENIES this, but notes that no agreement was formed.
8. The Defendant NEITHER AFFIRMS, NOR DENIES this, but notes that no agreement was formed.
9. The Defendant DENIES this, as no agreement was formed.
10. The Defendant DENIES this, as no agreement was formed.
11. The Defendant DENIES this, as no agreement was formed.
12. The Defendant NEITHER AFFIRMS, NOR DENIES this, as the defendant can not speak to the financial situation of Plaintiff’s business.
II. DEFENCES
The Defendant lacked legal capacity to enter into an agreement
1. Section 4(2)(e) of the Contracts Act states:

Capacity. Parties entering into a contract must possess the legal capacity to do so. Players with low playtime may lack the capacity to fairly enter a contract.

2. As shown by P-001 and P-003, the Defendant sent his message allegedly signing the agreement on 16 August 2025 at 19:35 EST (GMT-4). Converted to GMT+2, this is 17 August 2025 at 01:35.

3. As shown in D-001 and D-002, in which times are shown in GMT+2, at the time of the alleged signing of the agreement, the Defendant had a playtime of 6 hours and 4 minutes.

4. The alleged Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant is highly irregular and atypical for a new player with only just over six hours of playtime. Its terms are disproportionately adverse to the Defendant’s interests, especially given the Defendant’s limited experience and the Plaintiff’s superior knowledge of the server and the implications of a contract like this one. Among others, this is illustrated by:

1. The extraordinarily high “yield” (effectively an interest rate) of 50% of the initial capital investment per month.
2. The extraordinarily high liquidated damages amount, set at 5 times the unpaid yield.

5. By consequence, the Defendant must be deemed to have lacked legal capacity to enter into the alleged Agreement. As capacity is required for a contract to be established, the contract must be deemed null and void, and to have never been established.


The Plaintiff committed New Player Fraud by entering into the Agreement
6. The Commercial Standards Act defines the offence of “New Players Fraud” as:

To take advantage of a new player's wealth and or resources for another's profit or advantage.

7. As established under 1 through 4, the Defendant was and is a new player and the alleged Agreement was highly irregular and disproportionally adverse to Defendant’s interests.

8. The disproportionally adverse nature of this agreement to Defendant’s interests suggests that the Plaintiff took advantage of Defendant’s inexperience to obtain his wealth and/or resources for his own advantage by entering into the alleged Agreement.

9. It is a common law principle that a contract is illegal and void if its formation involves a breach of law or the commission of a criminal act. By consequence, the alleged Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant must be deemed to be illegal and void.


The Plaintiff failed to uphold the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
10. Section 4(2) of the Contracts Act states:

There exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract covered by this Act, whether or not expressly stated. This covenant shall be read into contracts to ensure that the parties act with honesty, integrity, and fairness in all aspects of their contractual relationship.

11. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implies that each party to a contract has a duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence when entering into an agreement. The Defendant violated this duty by knowingly and recklessly entering into a very high-stakes agreement with a very new player, Defendant having only joined 16 days prior and having only just over 6 hours of playtime. He cannot now hold against Defendant that defendant was unable to keep the alleged promises he made in this alleged Agreement, given Plaintiff should have known from the start that Defendant would never have been able to uphold them.

12. Defendant also violated the implied covenant by knowingly entering into an agreement with extremely adverse terms for his very inexperienced counterparty, thereby showing reckless disregard for Defendant’s legitimate interests.

13. Violating this implied covenant constitutes a material breach to any Agreement allegedly formed. According to Section 12 of the Contracts Act, a material breach is grounds for termination of an Agreement.
14. Therefore, if this Court holds that an Agreement was legally established, the Defendant contends that such Agreement should be terminated forthwith.

Spoiler: D-001

Spoiler: D-002

Spoiler: D-003

Spoiler: D-004

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 23 day of 10.2025

 

[AmityBlamity]

We shall now enter Discovery, which shall last 5 days or shorter if both parties agree to such.

 

[ElysiaCrynn]

Evidence

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE

Pursuant to Court Rule 4.6, the Plaintiff submits the following evidence into the record.

Spoiler: P-005

Spoiler: P-006

Spoiler: P-007

Spoiler: P-008

Spoiler: P-009

Spoiler: P-010

Spoiler: P-011

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO AMEND

Pursuant to Court Rule 3.3, the Plaintiff respectfully moves to amend the Complaint to include newly discovered facts and evidence that are relevant to the defences raised in the Defendant's Answer to Complaint.


FACTS
13. On July 31st, the Defendant claimed to be experienced with "sales & trading", "brokerage" and the economy in the context of Minecraft servers. (P-005)
14. On August 12th, the Defendant announced a range of contractual financial services being offered under AQR. (P-006)
15. On August 14th, the Defendant advertised the Discord server for AQR and publicly claimed to have already made "$80k" from his financial services. (P-007, P-008)
16. On August 15th, one day prior to the Agreement, the Defendant initiated contact with the Plaintiff to solicit an investment opportunity. (P-009)
17. On August 18th and 21st, the Defendant continued to engage in financial activities by attempting to enter into further contracts through public auction bids. (P-010, P-011)

 

[AmityBlamity]

@ElysiaCrynn You have 72 hours to present your Opening Statements.

 

[ElysiaCrynn]

Opening Statement

Your Honour,

This is a straightforward case of breach of contract and fraud. The Plaintiff entered into a formal, written agreement with the Defendant and upheld his end of the bargain, investing $150,000 in good faith. The Defendant took that money and then completely failed to perform any of his obligations, making zero of the promised monthly payments.


The Defence's entire case rests on the argument that the Defendant lacked the legal capacity to form this contract due to his "low playtime." This is a fundamental misapplication of the law. The Contracts Act's mention of playtime is intended to protect genuinely confused newcomers, not allow for individuals who misrepresent their experience to solicit investments and then fail to deliver on contracts made. The Defendant's own public statements prove he possessed an understanding of financial contracts and the server economy, beyond that of a typical new player. Ignorance cannot be claimed as a legal defence on this matter.

The evidence in this case supports as much:

• On July 31st, weeks before the agreement, the Defendant was publicly advertising his experience in "sales & - trading" and "brokerage" (P-005).
• On August 12th, he announced a full range of contractual financial services being offered by his entity, AQR (P-006).
• On August 14th, just two days before the agreement, he was publicly boasting of having already made "$80k" from his financial services (P-007, P-008).
• On August 15th, most importantly, it was the Defendant who initiated contact with the Plaintiff to solicit this investment opportunity (P-009).

This is not the behaviour of a confused, incapable newcomer. This is the calculated behaviour of an individual actively marketing himself as a financial professional. He sought out this investment. He presented himself as a credible and experienced individual that would be capable of entering into contracts as such. The Defendant cannot now claim to be a victim of his own agreement after he has taken the Plaintiff’s money. It was based on this representation as a financial expert capable of entering contracts that the Plaintiff engaged with him.


Furthermore, the Defence has gone on to accuse the Plaintiff of "New Player Fraud." This claim does not hold up. Who is the victim here? The person who invested $150,000 in good faith and received nothing, or the self-proclaimed financial expert who took the money, made zero payments, and has now violated their agreement? The evidence clearly shows that the Plaintiff is the victim of this situation, having lost out on this $150k for over 2 and half months. The attempt to now claim he was too new to understand what he was doing is not a legitimate defence; it is a disingenuous attempt to escape the consequences of the investment agreement he solicited.


Even if we accept the premise that due to their low playtime, the Defendant lacked the capacity to enter a contract, the Plaintiff has still been defrauded of $150,000 with no loss to the Defendant. To leave this unresolved would be unjust and allow an individual working to engage in good faith, legitimate business to suffer significant financial loss over misrepresentations by the Defendant.


We are not asking the Court to create a new obligation. We are asking the Court to enforce the one the Defendant freely and explicitly accepted. We respectfully ask this Court to find the Defendant liable for breach of contract and fraud, and to award the full compensatory, liquidated, and punitive damages laid out in the complaint to make the Plaintiff whole and to deter such bad faith behaviour in our community.

 

[AmityBlamity]

@Vernicia You have 72 hours to make your Opening Statement

 

[Vernicia]

Opening Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OPENING STATEMENT

Your Honour,

It is not the Defendant who has acted in bad faith here. On the contrary, the Plaintiff has sought to take advantage of a newcomer to this Commonwealth, a citizen with barely six hours of playtime, by luring him into an agreement so one-sided, so patently exploitative, that it shocks the conscience of this Court and offends the principles of fairness our Commonwealth is built upon.
This case is not about a deliberate breach or some malicious attempt to avoid a lawful debt. It is about a deeply unfair contract that was never truly understood, never fairly negotiated, and never stood a chance of being fulfilled. The terms of this contract were designed to fail from the very start. The Plaintiff offered what seemed like an investment deal, but in truth it was a trap: a so-called “Convertible Preferred Share agreement" that demanded a fifty percent monthly yield. Fifty percent, Your Honour. A rate so outrageous that, just weeks later, our legislature found it necessary to outlaw such terms under the Anti-Usury Act.
Now, I do not claim that this new law applies retroactively. But it does speak volumes about the character of this deal. The community itself has now recognised that such predatory yields have no place in a fair economy. The Defendant was not a sophisticated investor or banker: he was a new arrival, inexperienced and unfamiliar with the financial systems of this server. Yet the Plaintiff, a highly experienced player, saw an opportunity and seized it, presenting a contract with impossible obligations and ruinous penalties. Five times the unpaid yield, Your Honour - a penalty clause designed not just to penalise, but to bankrupt and to crush the Defendant under the weight of an impossible debt, ensuring that one missed payment would spell financial ruin.
The Plaintiff will tell this Court that the Defendant failed to pay. That much is true, but the Court must ask why. Was it because the Defendant acted in bad faith? Or because no reasonable person could ever meet the obligations of a fifty-percent-per-month return? The Defendant never intended to defraud anyone. He was overwhelmed by terms that no ordinary citizen could meet, terms that can impossibly be considered fair.
What this case truly reveals is not breach, but exploitation. The Plaintiff now comes before this Court seeking to enforce an agreement that never should have existed, and to profit massively from a deal that would now, under the Anti-Usury Act, be illegal. That fact alone tells this Court what justice demands: not the blind enforcement of an unfair bargain, but the protection of citizens from predatory contracts.
In the end, Your Honour, this case is about fairness and good faith. The Defendant stands before you not as a schemer, but as a victim of one. Even if he had some experience with Minecraft economies, he lacked the experience, the understanding, and the opportunity to negotiate fair terms in this economy, in the Commonwealth of Redmont. The Plaintiff knew this and pressed on regardless, seeking to bind the Defendant to impossible promises and then to punish him when those promises could not be kept.
When all is said and done, we will ask this Court to see this contract for what it truly is: a relic of bad faith, an agreement born of imbalance and exploitation, and a deal that, at least in spirit, violates the very public policy that the Commonwealth has since enshrined in law. The Defendant did not act in bad faith. He simply refuses to be destroyed by it.
Accordingly, we respectfully ask this Honourable Court to dismiss this case in its entirety. The alleged contract was void for lack of capacity and the Plaintiff committed New Player Fraud and violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. But if the Court is minded to grant any relief to the Plaintiff, let it be limited only to the return of the original principal investment. No yields, no penalties, no inflated damages, but merely the return of what Defendant received, nothing more.

 

[AmityBlamity]

As no witnesses were called, @ElysiaCrynn you have 72 hours to make your Closing Statement.

 

[ElysiaCrynn]

Closing Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CLOSING STATEMENT


Your Honour,
The Defence has presented a narrative of a newcomer lured into a predatory deal. It is however, contradicted by the Defendant’s own words and actions. This case is not about exploitation; it is about accountability. This case is a bout a self-proclaimed financial expert who solicited a major investment, took $150,000, and then failed to uphold a single part of his end of the bargain.

I. The Matter of Playtime
The entire defence rests on a single pillar: that the Defendant, with six hours of playtime, lacked the legal capacity to enter into this contract. The Contracts Act does indeed offer protection for players with low playtime who are genuinely incapable. It does not, however, provide a get out of jail free card for individuals who actively and publicly misrepresent their expertise to solicit funds.

• He claimed expertise: Weeks before this agreement, the Defendant was publicly advertising his experience in "sales & trading" and "brokerage" (P-005).
• He offered financial services: He announced a full suite of contractual financial services under his "AQR" brand (P-006).
• He boasted of success: He publicly claimed to have already made "$80k" from these ventures just two days before this agreement (P-007, P-008).
• He solicited the investment: Most crucially, it was the Defendant who initiated contact with the Plaintiff to propose this investment (P-009).

As shown by the evidence, the Defendant made frequent claims that supported his image as a successful businessman, actively marketing his expertise and seeking capital. The Defendant cannot represent himself as a financial professional to solicit an investment and then be claimed to be incapable of engaging in such financial endeavours. The law on capacity is designed to protect those who are genuinely unaware, not to provide an escape clause for those whose ambitions outstrip their abilities.


II. The New Player Fraud Defense
The Defence has accused the Plaintiff of "New Player Fraud". This is an astonishing and offensive reversal of reality. Who is the victim here? The Plaintiff who is out $150,000 and has received nothing, or the self-proclaimed financial professional who took that money and immediately defaulted? The Plaintiff acted in good faith, relying on the Defendant's own representations of expertise and success. The fraud was perpetrated by the Defendant, who created a facade of a legitimate financial operation via AQR and used it to solicit a massive investment he had no intention or ability to service.


III. The Contract and Its Unambiguous Breach
The defence asks the Court to disregard the explicit terms of the Agreement because they were "extraordinarily high." While the 50% monthly yield was indeed high, it was the promise upon which the Plaintiff's $150,000 investment was made. The penalty clause of five times the unpaid yield and the return of the principal, was a security measure against the very default that has now occurred.

The Defendant read these terms. The Defendant typed, "I agree to the following under the laws of Redmont" (P-003) entering into a binding contract with the Plaintiff. It is not the Court's role to rewrite a contract to save a party from a deal they freely entered, especially when that party presented themselves as a professional capable of understanding such a deal. To do so would render all contracts meaningless, turning them into mere suggestions that can be discarded when they become inconvenient. The Defendant was not coerced or misled, he made a business decision. Businesses, especially high-yield investments, involve risk. The Defendant willingly accepted that risk in exchange for a substantial capital injection.


IV. Good Faith Goes Both Ways
The defence argues the Plaintiff violated the covenant of good faith by offering a contract with high returns, however this argument misinterprets the covenant. The covenant of good faith does not forbid parties from entering into high-risk, high-reward agreements. It requires that both parties act with honesty and fairness in upholding their end of the bargain.

If the Defendant had truly entered this agreement in good faith but found himself unable to perform, what would he have done? He would have communicated with the Plaintiff. He would have explained the difficulties, attempted to renegotiate the terms, or made partial payments. He would have done something. Instead, he did nothing. He took the money and then went silent. This is the ultimate act of bad faith. It is not the offering of a high-risk, high-reward contract that constitutes bad faith; it is the acceptance of that contract's benefits while completely ignoring its obligations.


V. The Damages Sought Are a Direct Consequence of the Defendant's Actions
The Plaintiff is not seeking a windfall; he is seeking to be made whole under the precise terms of the contract the Defendant signed.

• The $170,000 in Compensatory Damages represents the return of his principal investment plus the direct, provable costs he incurred having to secure other loans because of the Defendant's default.
• The $750,000 in Liquidated Damages is not a penalty invented by the Plaintiff; it is the specific remedy for default that the Defendant, "under the laws of Redmont," agreed to in Section 5.2 of the contract. We are simply asking the Court to enforce the agreement as written.
• The $200,000 in Punitive Damages is necessary to address the outrageous nature of the Defendant's conduct. Soliciting a large investment under the guise of financial expertise, immediately defaulting, and failing to make a single payment is precisely the kind of predatory financial scheme that warrants significant punitive damages to deter future misconduct from both the Defendant and others who would seek to do the same.

VI. Conclusion
Your Honour, this case is simple. A contract was signed. Money was paid. The contract was broken. Enforcing this contract is vital for the health and trust in our economy. The Plaintiff performed his obligation by paying $150,000. The Defendant failed to perform any of his obligations. That is a material breach of contract.

Furthermore, the Defendant's immediate and total failure to perform is compelling evidence that he never intended to fulfil the contract's terms in the first place. He misrepresented his ability and intent to make payments, the Plaintiff relied on that misrepresentation, and the result was the loss of his investment. This amounts to fraud.

The Plaintiff acted in good faith, investing in what he was led to believe was a legitimate enterprise run by an experienced individual. He has instead been repaid with silence. We ask this Court to enforce the terms of the agreement the Defendant signed, to make the Plaintiff whole for his losses, and to send a clear message to others who would seek to exploit investors for their money.

We respectfully ask the Court to find in favour of the Plaintiff and award the full compensatory, liquidated, and punitive damages as prayed for in the complaint.

 

[AmityBlamity]

@Vernicia You have 72 hours to make your Closing Statement

 

[Vernicia]

Closing Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CLOSING STATEMENT

Your Honor,

This case is difficult. It requires the Court to carefully consider the position of the Defendant as a new player purporting to enter into a contract. Defendant's position is that the contract in question was never valid because (1) it constituted new player exploitation; and (2) it was unconscionable on the basis of amounting to usury. Plaintiff's counter-arguments are unavailing: (1) the issue of good-faith is essentially the same issue as the new-player exploitation issue; and (2) the fact that the Defendant offered the investment opportunity is immaterial.

1. The New Player Issue
The Defendant has 6 hours of total playtime. Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. On its face, this should be enough for the Court to declare the contract illegal. There must be a hard line of what. At any point, Plaintiff could have used /about to determine Defendant's playtime. Indeed, Plaintiff probably was aware of Defendant's low playtime. They chose to enter into the arrangement anyway. Plaintiff must take responsibility for their actions.

Plaintiff has a duty not to exploit new players. The fact that Defendant offered an investment opportunity is no defence. As the more experienced player, it was on Plaintiff to avoid exploiting Defendant, even incidentally. The Court knows that real-world financial experience and success does not necessarily translate to Redmont financial skill. The landscape of financial investment and opportunity in Redmont is not the same as in the real world. Plaintiff knew that; Defendant did not. That is the essence of new-player exploitation.

Defendant further submits that the Court must take a hard line against this sort of new-player exploitation. If the Court rules this conduct acceptable, then it is opening the doors for everyone to engage in deals with new players that obviously will not be fulfilled. That harms Redmont's financial sector as a whole, and particularly new players.

Therefore, this contract should be held illegal and unenforceable for breach of §10 of the Criminal Code Act. Alternatively, the Court should hold the contract unenforceable.

Yes, Plaintiff makes a loss on this contract. But that is the direct result of Plaintiff's actions: they can't reap the rewards of illegally exploiting a new player without also accepting the inherent risk in an unenforceable agreement.

2. Usury and the validity of the contract
Plaintiff can not have seriously thought that the Defendant had the financial capacity to comply with the terms of the loan. As I said in my opening statement, usury has now been made a criminal offence under the CCA. Of course, it would not be proper for the Court to directly apply the new law to this old case. But the Court must understand that the prohibition on usury is fundamental: it ought to be a part of the common law. 50% is not a loan: it is theft. The 5 times penalty clause isn't usury per se, but it is equally unconscionable and the contract ought to be held unenforceable on that ground too.

The Defendant agrees that:

It is not the Court's role to rewrite a contract

But Defendant is not asking the Court to rewrite the contract. We are asking the Court to declare the contract illegal and unenforceable as a whole. No part of the contract needs to be "rewritten". This distinction seems semantic but it is actually crucial: rewriting a legal agreement is a subjective task. Declaring an agreement invalid is objective. It is well within the Court's remit, and the Court carries out this task on a weekly basis.

3. Good faith
The Defendant would submit that the duty of good faith applies to the period of negotiation before a contract is formally agreed. It would not make sense for the Court to apply good faith only once a contract commences. A party's duties must extend to prior to the beginning of the contract (and indeed, after its completion) otherwise the good-faith protections mean nothing. Under this view, the Court should take into account Plaintiff’s breaches of good faith: they entered into a usury-esqe contract (breach #1) with full knowledge that Defendant would not be able to meet their obligations (breach #2).

Ultimately, the alleged breaches of good faith are immaterial. They amount to no more than re-pleading the main allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiff is merely saying that the breach of a contract is a breach of the good faith duty. This is probably true: but ultimately, the question must depend upon the substantive issue. Both parties have already given their views on the legality of the contract. The Court's decision under the good-faith heading flows from the substantive issue.

4. Damages
The Plaintiff prays for damages under the laws of the Commonwealth. The common law and the statutory law is clear: the laws of the Commonwealth certainly do not allow excessive damages. The Court should not award damages, in the first instance, because of illegality of the contract. But Defendant particularly submits that $200,000 in punitive damages is excessive. Why should the Court punish a new player with an award of punitive damages worth more than the contract at issue? Such an award is not necessary to deter others. It only creates a chilling effect on aspiring entrepreneurs.

Ultimately, the case should be dismissed for the reasons given. Plaintiff entered into a clearly-exploitable contract (50% interest!) with a new player. The contract is unenforceable; Plaintiff took a big risk for a big reward. They cannot just rush to the courts when their big-risk investment falls over. An illegal contract is unenforceable.

 

[AmityBlamity]

Court is in recess pending verdict.

 

[Muggy21]

For all parties, I'm the PO on this case given the Hon Judge Amity's LOA.

Verdict will be sent down shortly.

 

[Muggy21]

Verdict

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Verdict - KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104

Summary of Controversy

Plaintiff approaches this Court praying for equitable relief arising from breach of contract, criminal fraud, and unfair dealing in a monetary transaction. As per the Complaint, Plaintiff invested $150,000 via a Convertible Preferred Share Investment Agreement (CPSIA) on August 16th, 2025 with Defendant. Defendant operated a solo proprietorship known as “AQR,” no legal company existed at the time of controversy. In consideration of the investment via the CPSIA, Defendant promised to pay $75,000 monthly (50% of initial investment). Pursuant to CPSIA Section 5.2, parties agreed to liquidated damages of five times the unpaid yield if a default occurred. Plaintiff alleges a default occurred for August and September, where $20,000 in interest was incurred and unpaid.
Defendant, via the Public Defender Program, denies the formation of a valid contract; In this defense, Defendant states that he lacked capacity due to being a new player, fraud on the party of the Plaintiff (new player fraud), unconscionability and usury, and violation of good faith on the part of the Plaintiff.

Findings of Fact

On August 16th, 2025, the parties entered into an agreement whose legality is in serious doubt. Although the Defendant advertised experience in “sales, trading, and brokerage,” allegedly suggesting familiarity with complex financial instruments, the evidence shows he possessed only minimal playtime within Redmont at the time of the alleged acceptance (D-001). The CPSIA provided for a 50% monthly yield, meaning the Plaintiff would receive $900,000 annually on a $150,000 principal. Such returns are effectively impossible within Reveille, and a reasonable player would recognize them as such.
While the Defendant made no payments after receiving the funds, the central legal issue concerns not only non-performance, but whether the CPSIA constituted an enforceable contract at all. This determination must account for (1) the Defendant’s extremely limited playtime and possible lack of legal capacity under §4(2)(e) of the Contracts Act, (2) the one-sided and economically irregular nature of the terms, and (3) the conduct of both parties during negotiation and execution of the alleged agreement.


Opinion of the Court

1. THE CONTRACT IS VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW
   
   The CPSIA as presented by Defendant is fundamentally void as a matter of law. Pursuant to the Contracts Act § 13 (1), the constituent parts of the contract are innately severable from each other. Furthermore, Contracts Act § 14 (2) requires both parties to “act with honesty, integrity and fairness in all aspects of their contractual relationship.” On a plain reading of the CPSIA, the Court immediately voids Section 2. Yield on Preferred Shares as a matter of law because its terms are excessively one-sided to such a point that it is unconscionable and may not be a constituent of a lawful contract. The yield promised under this provision is not merely generous, it is effective impossible to obtain within Reveille. No reasonable contracting party could expect such a yield to be sustainable, and no court exercising equitable oversight can enforce a term so detached from reality. When a clause so severely departs from fairness that it effectively guarantees default, it ceases to operate as a legitimate bargain and instead functions as an instrument of exploitation.
   
   Likewise, Section 5. Default & Penalty is void as a matter of law; The provision purports to impose liquidated damages equal to five times the unpaid monthly yield. Pursuant to the Legal Damages Act § 8 (1) (a), liquidated damages are “an award whose amount the parties designate during the formation of a contract for the injured party to collect as compensation upon a specific breach. It is an estimate of otherwise intangible or hard-to-define losses to one of the parties” Liquidated Damages, although in law are meant to be an estimate for “hard-to-define losses”, may not be used punitively. In Mestiere v. zeos_exe [2022] FCR 58, the Federal Court awarded liquidated damages that were less than the compensatory prayer ($19,900 in loan principal, $10,000 in liquidated damages). The idea that Plaintiff would have suffered harms exceeding his initial payment are excessively implausible; Courts must refrain from granting excessive liquidated damages, especially those which exceed the initial monetary risks incurred.
   
   Since Sections 2 and 5, the provisions governing the yield structure and the consequences of default, are voided, the CPSIA is stripped of its essential terms. Without a lawful yield mechanism or an enforceable remedy structure, the agreement ceases to possess the mutual obligations necessary to sustain a valid and enforceable contract under §4(2) of the Contracts Act. What remains is not a contract, but a framework devoid of consideration In the absence of these foundational elements, the CPSIA is effectively void in its entirety, and the Court cannot enforce any portion of it. In The Lovely Law Firm v. babysoga [2023] FCR 87, the Court selectively enforced an agreement in which one of its constituent terms was found to be unlawful. There, the doctrine of severability permitted the remaining lawful portions of the agreement to stand, as the excised provision was ancillary rather than foundational. However, that reasoning is inapplicable in the present matter. The Court’s analysis in Lovely Law Firm turned heavily on the contract’s express Modification and Severability Clause, which preserved the agreement even after invalidation of one term.
   
   Here, unlike in Lovely Law Firm, the unlawful provisions, Sections 2 and 5 are not ancillary; they comprise the very core of the CPSIA. With the yield mechanism and default remedies void, the agreement is rendered entirely without substance. Accordingly, Lovely Law Firm supports, rather than undermines, the conclusion that the CPSIA cannot survive severance and is void in full.
   
   
   Notwithstanding the previous analysis, Defendant clearly defrauded Plaintiff. Punitive damages are warranted. Liquidated damages are not warranted. The contract is void ab initio, but tort liability remains.
   
   
2. NOTES ON MEGAMINE v. BLAZORA
   
   While the Court in MegaMinerM v. Blazora Corporation [2025] FCR 27 engaged in extensive interpretation of the bond’s terms, it did not sever any provision from the agreement. Instead, the Court was able to enforce the contract because, despite disputes about payment timing and corporate restructuring, the bond retained a coherent and enforceable structure. The present matter differs sharply; Once Sections 2 and 5 of the CPSIA are voided, the agreement no longer contains any operable performance obligations. Unlike the bond in MegaMinerM, the CPSIA’s unlawful provisions are foundational rather than ancillary, meaning their removal causes the contract to collapse entirely. For these reasons, the Court departs slightly from the analytical posture seen in MegaMinerM and finds the CPSIA void in full.
   

Order of the Court

The Court awards as follows:

1. Prayer for Compensatory Damages are partially granted, the interest prayer is denied. Defendant is liable to Plaintiff in the amount of $150,000.
2. Prayer for Liquidated Damages are denied.
3. Prayer for Punitive Damages are granted. Defendant is liable to Plaintiff in the amount of $40,000.
4. The Court awards Legal Fees in the amount of $63,000 to ElysiaCrynn

So ordered,
Judge Mug.