Appeal: Denied In re SCR 5 [2023] | SCR 4 [2026]

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I am representing myself

What Case are you Appealing?: [2023] SCR 5

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Commonwealth of Redmont v. Derpy_Bird and xEndeavour [2023] SCR 5 // Appeal: Denied - [2023] SCR 5 - Appeal

Basis for Appeal:

The Court’s refusal to accept this appeal on limitation grounds is inconsistent with its own precedent, legislation, and the Constitution.

In SCR 20, the Supreme Court accepted an appeal more than a year after the original decision. It did so because the appeal met s19(4) of the Constitution, not because it was filed within a particular time period. The Court did not treat appeal rights as expiring for the expressly written reasons for appeal.

The effect of the wording of the Constitution’s Supreme Court Appeals section has not changed since SCR 20. The Court has not overruled that decision, distinguished it, or explained why it no longer applies. Silent landmark decisions are not an exercise of discretion.

If the Court now takes the view that constitutional appeals are subject to a strict time bar, it must say so plainly and justify that position. Until then, SCR 20’s verdict is the common law that binds the Court in identical circumstances.

The reliance on limitation is also wrong in statute. Since May 2020, High Crimes have been expressly excluded from limitation. The Criminal Code repeats that exclusion for corruption as a high crime. The findings in [2023] SCR 5 concern this offence. There is no lawful limitation barrier.

Section 19(4) exists because the Supreme Court can get things wrong. SCR 20 is proof of that. Treating the appeal clause as optional or procedural defeats its purpose. The SCR figuratively crucified the former Chief Justice for effectively weaponising the bench in the appeal against SCR 20, realising why this limitation does not exist against the SCR in decisions where these reasons for appeal exist.

The appeal should be accepted and dealt with on its merits:

1. The constitution expressly provides for supreme court appeals in specific circumstances. This appeal meets those circumstances.

2. Common law supports this appeal’s foundation.

3. High crimes (corruption) is excluded from limitation in law, and has been since May 2020 in the original statute of limitations.

4. The JSA is effectively redundant due to the CCA’s updated limitation standards and is the primary legislative foundation for criminal law.

5. Limiting Supreme Court appeals for reasons that are expressly governed by the Constitution is not reasonable. The Constitution provides that Supreme Court verdicts are final except in specific circumstances. If those constitutionally-defined circumstances are then made subject to the same limitation rules as ordinary appeals, the distinction drawn by the Constitution is rendered meaningless. The Supreme Court is singled out because those limited appeal rights must remain effective when serious judicial error occurs.

This appeal should be read in conjunction with the reasons put forward in my previous SCR 5 appeal (linked).

Supporting Evidence:

 

[Anthony_Org]

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This application was submitted almost a month ago and has not yet been considered.

The appeal raises a serious and substantive issue in that the Court has departed from its own prior decision by denying this request, despite having previously accepting an identical request in similar circumstances. That earlier decision has been silently overruled, and no reasons have been given for the apparent change in precedent. Respectfully, the court cannot just make a landmark decision to change common law by denying an appeal.

If the Court is now taking a different view of the constituion, that is something that should be stated openly and resolved through proper consideration. Leaving the issue unanswered risks undermining certainty in the Court’s own precedent.

 

[Matthew100x]

Verdict

In a 2-1 decision authored by Associate Justice Matthew100x and signed by Chief Justice Aladeen22, the Supreme Court of Redmont has declined to hear this appeal on common law and Constitutional grounds. Associate Justice Smallfries4 concurs as to the judgment, and in part as to the reasoning, but dissents to the Constitutional issue.

Decision:

In 2023, the Supreme Court, in [2023] SCR 5, convicted then-President Derpy_Bird of corruption and the Appellant of an accomplice to corruption. Although the Court expressly found no evidence of personal gain, concealment, or misuse by the Appellant beyond participation in the sale, the Court reasoned that the transaction “could not have occurred without both parties” and therefore held that xEndeavour provided “direct assistance” to corruption, rendering him an accomplice.

The Appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court outside the ordinary statutory appeal period. (see Appeal: Denied - [2023] SCR 5 - Appeal). The appeal relied on section 19(4) of the Constitution, which provides for Supreme Court appeals in limited circumstances where the Court has applied an incorrect principle of law or made findings of fact unsupported by the evidence. The Appellant argued that the Court’s interpretation of “create” imposed a restriction not found in the constitutional text and effectively criminalized routine government procurement practices that pre-dated and post-dated the decision. The Appellant further argued that accomplice liability could not be sustained absent evidence of corruption, improper benefit, or participation in wrongdoing.

The Supreme Court declined to accept the appeal on the basis that it was filed out of time, without addressing whether section 19(4) created an exception to ordinary limitation rules.

The Appellant filed this renewed appeal, contending that, among other things: (1) Section 19(4) of the Constitution governs Supreme Court appeals independently of statutory limitation periods; (2) in a prior decision (“SCR 20”), the Supreme Court accepted an appeal more than one year after judgment on the basis that the constitutional appeal criteria were satisfied, without treating time as determinative; and (3) the constitutional text governing Supreme Court appeals has not changed since SCR 20, and that decision has not been overruled or distinguished.

As this court stated in Appeal: Denied - [2023] SCR 5 - Appeal, the Supreme Court has statutory limitations. The Judicial Standards Act clearly controls and limits the timing for appeals. Simply because the Constitution dictates that we have the power to hear an appeal, does not mean other law cannot apply. The statutory limits within the Judicial Standards Act have long been in place. (see Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act; see also Act of Congress - Criminal Code Act §§ 2, 4). The XL Peel Those Appeals is an Act of Congress that initially created a requirement that an appeal must be filed within one month of the court decision, and that once a case has been decided by the Supreme Court, “it cannot be appealed again.” (It should be noted that this being an Act of Congress amending a Constitutional law is an old legal issue). This law came into force on Sep. 2, 2022. (see Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act). This law has not been changed until recently in the Subversion of Appeal Act, which functionally did not change the time requirement. (see Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act).

Appellant argues Section 19(4) of the Constitution governs Supreme Court appeals independently of statutory limitation periods primarily because of the decision of [2022] SCR 20. [2022] SCR 20 was filed on Nov. 19, 2023, well after the XL Peel Those Appeals Act came into force. His argument was the same there as it is here, that the referenced section clearly enables the Court to take action even if his appeal is well outside the deadline. This Act of Congress is a constitutional amendment amending a constitutional law. Thus, two competing laws could have been applied. One was a normal Act of Congress that amended a law that required a constitutional amendment. The second Act of Congress followed the constitutional amendment process and amended the JSA. The court in [2022] SCR 20 decided to allow the case to be decided under the second Act of Congress, the Redress Act, which properly amended the Constitution.

This is an incredibly important distinction. When the Constitution was redone in 2025 and signed into force on March 7, 2025, (see Act of Congress - Commonwealth of Redmont Constitution Act), the Judiciary was given an two important prerogatives on how to handle the constitutional changes in the form of the Commonwealth of Redmont Constitution Act §§ 3(2), 3(3)(a)-(b).

(2) This Constitution supersedes the previous Constitution.

(3) Any statute, judicial standard, or constitutional reference established before the enactment of this Act that conflicts with it shall be superseded.

(a) Amendments to the previous Constitution will not be repealed in their entirety; only the superseded sections will be severed from the legislation.

(b) Where legislative gaps arise, reason, convention, and judicial discretion should guide interpretation to be within the intent of this Constitution and for the application of what could be reasonably expected in a free and fair democratic society.

Act of Congress - Commonwealth of Redmont Constitution Act. Prior to this new constitution, there were “Constitutional Laws” that were passed by Congress utilizing the Constitutional Amendment Process. These laws, among others, were the ESA, JSA, and LSA. The ESA was intentionally repealed as a constitutional amendment. (see Act of Congress - Executive Standards Act). So was the LSA. (see Information - Legislative Standards Act). The JSA, however, had issues. The JSA went up for the same change that the ESA and LSA went; however, the first attempt at changing it was found to have been improperly done by the Federal Court. (see https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/end-v-commonwealth-of-redmont-2025-fcr-31.25561/page-2#post-10544). Thereafter, there have been three more efforts (see First time: https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/judicial-standards-amendment-act-referendum.25072/, Second time: Vetoed - Judicial Standards Amendment Act). The third time, Congress attempted to remedy this issue by going through and passing the Unified Constitutional Act (see Act of Congress - Unified Constitution Act). Congress was explicit in their reasoning that the point of the act was to amend the Constitution because the JSA remained part of the Constitution. (see 2(2), Act of Congress - Unified Constitution Act). This law added this text to Section 48. Constitutional Amendment: “Only text physically contained within the Constitution itself may be considered a part of the Constitution. No text outside of this document may be considered constitutionally binding in any way.” (see 3, Act of Congress - Unified Constitution Act). And herein lies the problem. However, Section 48 also stated: “Any constitutional amendment must start with ‘A Bill to Amend the Constitution’ and must serve exclusively to amend only the Constitution, without amendment to any other laws.” (see Act of Congress - Commonwealth of Redmont Constitution Act).

For us to conclude this as a matter of law, we have to decide whether or not the JSA is still constitutional or not. A “Constitutional law” is a vestigial area of law familiar to older lawyers of Redmont. It refers to the ESA, JSA, LSA, Election Act, and other laws that were passed using the constitutional amendment process. These laws properly amended the Constitution, but their provisions were not always within the text of the Constitution itself. All vestiges of this law are gone; all except for the JSA. The JSA, as illustrated above, has repeatedly survived attempts to repeal it. Congress’s latest attempt is the Unified Constitution Act. Congress is explicitly clear here, and the Supreme Court understands what Congress was attempting to do with perfect clarity.

Congress’s intent and reasoning lay out that the purpose of the Unified Constitution Act is to remove this vestigial area of law once and for all. That “Constitutional” law must be properly within the Constitution itself. The language explicitly states such. In no way, shape, or form does Congress want the JSA to remain. Yet ever, this stubborn vestige remains questioned as to its status. To demystify the point, could text not in the Constitution be constitutional? The answer is an ever-resounding no, but that was true regardless of the Unified Constitution Act. If Congress were to pass an Act of Congress, such a law would not be a Constitutional Amendment, and as such could not be treated as Constitutional law. Here, Congress did not pass an Act of Congress; it passed a Constitutional Amendment. Even if the text were not “physically” in the Constitution, it is still Constitutional. These are Constitutional laws, and they still carry the force of the Constitution behind them.

Yet further to illustrate the point, when the new Constitution was passed, it explicitly stated in Section 48: “A constitutional amendment is defined as any amendment made to the Constitution itself. Any constitutional amendment must start with ‘A Bill to Amend the Constitution’ and must serve exclusively to amend only the Constitution, without amendment to any other laws.” The JSA has those words both when the new Constitution was passed and even now. The JSA was passed as a Constitutional Amendment, and contained the words “A Bill to Amend the Constitution.” For us to hold that the Unified Constitutional Act properly eliminates the JSA as a Constitutional law, despite it still being in law as a constitutional amendment, goes against the very principles of law the Supreme Court has set out since the beginning. That any change to the Constitution must be done properly and in accordance with the law. The JSA still is a Constitutional Law, and improper attempts to modify it with statute must fail because the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.

Our colleague on the Supreme Court will disagree with us on semantics, but the law is clear here on the process for the Constitution. A Constitutional Amendment must be properly passed in order to properly amend the Constitution. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Prodigium & Partners at Law v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 1). It is against the law to amend the Constitution with an Act of Congress (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Ko531 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 33). However, the Federal Court has previously held that the unconstitutional laws can stay on the books and that Congress should fix the issue, (see id.). This was an error. An unconstitutional act cannot be law because, at its inception, it failed to correctly follow the process. And, if this is so, why did this Court just uphold the statutory limitation for appeals in the previous case? If it was not legal, was the Court wrong? Yes, but also no. As far as this Court’s decision goes on the XL Peel Those Appeals, the Act of Congress is invalidated. But as far as the principle goes on appeal, we do not extend the holding of [2022] SCR 20. That case is an anomaly, and the circumstances with which that appeal got granted can largely be attributed to beginning the coup-era crisis that ended with “steady the ship.” As a matter and principle of law under judicial power, no Court should hear appeals of cases decided over a month ago. This is because at a certain point, the factors that made up the trial become moot, and the people who prosecuted, defended, and adjudicated the case have all left.

Allowing such an appeal flies in the face of certainty for Court decisions. To permit appeals of cases that are older than a month allows for a certain level of uncertainty in every adjudication, as the passing of time and changing of the guard--the Judicial Officers in the Judiciary--would allow any would-be appellant to challenge any decision that they thought was unfair. The Court cannot let this stand. For instance, the case being appealed here was originally filed by Dusty_3, a banned player. The case was defended by the Appellant, who is active. The co-defendant of the case, Derpy_Bird, has not been online in over a month and is not active. The Justices on the case were JoeGamer, who has not played in two years, and BananaNova, who has not played in the last 10 months. No one, beyond the Appellant, is an active player with personal knowledge of both the facts and proceedings. While we cannot uphold the XL Peel Those Appeals decision, the underlying premise in denying this appeal stands. This Court will not accept appeals for decisions older than a month, and as such, we decline this appeal.

Spoiler: Associate Justice Smallfries4's Dissent

Associate Justice Smallfries4 concurs as to the judgment, and in part as to the reasoning.

As discussed in section six, the following is for the most part my original opinion on this matter, intended to be the majority, and is now a concurrence. Section six serves as a dissent as to the main disagreement I have with the majority.

Appellant xEndeavour appeals their appeal of their conviction of Accomplice to Corruption. See [2023] SCR 5 - Appeal. In that proceeding, Appellant filed their appeal petition thirty-three months after the decision being appealed was handed down. In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court noted in the appeal that the deadline for appeals has existed since 2022. See id.; see also Judicial Standards Act (“JSA”) § 20(2). That deadline to post has been, and is now, one month. No arguments were presented as to the frankly obvious question of: “Why the hell should we accept an appeal nearly three years after a case was finished?” Consequently, we had none in mind. Being quite confused, we denied.

Appellant comes now before the court, humbly and helpfully providing something of an argument as to why a third of a decade should be no barrier to overturning a past legal case in whole.

In their brief, Appellant contends: “In SCR 20, the Supreme Court accepted an appeal more than a year after the original decision.” Nodding sagely, we went to click the link that surely was attached to “SCR 20” for our easy consumption. Nothing happened. We, the Supreme Court of Redmont, slow as we are, took a minute to think. We were confused; Appellant had previously included not one, but two links. Did he somehow forget how to do it?

After some thought, we heartily chuckled to ourselves and realized—Appellant wanted us to go search in the archives for the case ourselves! There are so few Supreme Court cases, it surely would be a simple matter. Appellant was playing a small practical joke. And so, off we went to look. SCR 20 implies it was the twentieth case of the year. With the Supreme Court being as lightly-burdened as it is, this would be a simple matter!

Appellant did not include a year to this case citation, anywhere in their brief. There are six cases named SCR 20. See Commonwealth of Redmont v. ReinausPrinzzip [2021] SCR 20; Matthew100x v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20; Ligthiago v. FuriousPaladin [2023] SCR 20; [2022] SCR 20 - Appeal; Commonwealth of Redmont v. Overlordofpeonys [2024] SCR 20; Commonwealth of Redmont v. ImzaKRD [2025] SCR 20.

Of these, it is thankfully fairly simple to see on its face which Appellant is probably referencing. The appeal for SCR 20 [2022] is the only appeal among these, and sure enough it was filed by the Appellant here. SCR 20 [2022] (appeal accepted). Appellant, and all readers, should be on notice: There is a reason that proper citation of support is required, and that links are customarily used.

Not only does proper information sharing in the form of links and accurate citations give Judicial Officers quick access to what you are using to support your arguments (and thus hastening the progress of verdicts), but it undercuts the possibility of misunderstanding what you are using as a source, or perhaps ignoring your attempts in their entirely. It would not be out of the question for a court to dismiss a point out of hand for want of backing said point. It is not expected that Judicial Officers undergo a lengthy search as we have done here to effectively do a party’s job for them. It is the individual party’s responsibility to do so.

In the cited case, the appellant there appealed over a year after the case being appealed had adjourned. In the instant case, Appellant claims that SCR 20 “did so because the appeal met s19(4) [sic] of the Constitution, not because it was filed within a particular time period. The Court did not treat appeal rights as expiring for the expressly written reasons for appeal.”

Appellant charges this Court with the allegation that we have expressly overruled some time-honored, cherished, and well-known precedent. Appellant demands that “If the Court now takes the view that constitutional appeals are subject to a strict time bar, it may say so plainly and justify that position.” We will gladly take up arms to do so now.

At issue is Appellant’s contention with “precedent, legislation, and the Constitution." The following sections should suffice to cover these arguments.

I. Precedent in SCR 20 [2022]’s Appeal

To begin, it is interesting that Appellant is so pointed and demanding that we must give our opinion “plainly” and “justify that position.” In the cited case, the Supreme Court there did not justify their position as to why they accepted the year-hence appeal, nor did they even explicitly state they were disregarding the time limitation at all. See SCR 20 [2022] (appeal accepted).

There is no reasoning. There is no weighing of the argument presented, no explanation for what language in what provision of the Constitution or other article of law supports their decision. There is nothing. Consequently, the only precedential argument that can be had in support of the Appellant’s proposition is merely that the Supreme Court did it once. There is, then, no common law or precedential reasoning to work with at all. The appellant’s arguments in that case are just that, their own arguments. They are not adopted by the Court, and we will not put words in the Court’s mouth. Decisions of the past rest in their slumber and shall be only observed, not tampered with.

It is clear, then, that there is no official precedential argument to work with, or any clear judicial reasoning written as to why appeals of Supreme Court cases are forever and eternally shielded from time limits placed upon them.

Appellant states in their brief that “The Court has not overruled [SCR 20], distinguished it, or explained why it no longer applies.” Were we to be pedantic, we would state that because of our previous ruling, that “precedent” has already been overruled. Just as the court in SCR 20 gave absolutely no explanation for why they acted the way they did, we gave no indication as to why we “changed” how the Constitution was interpreted—although it should be noted we did analyze the law as we saw it, and explained our ruling as far as we saw proper and were able, given the lack of relevant argumentation from Appellant. This is far more than the previous Court has done.

As discussed supra, the precedent was not reasoned, and has never been expounded on as far as we can see. If Appellant demands reasoning, the first dismissed appeal on this matter more than eclipsed SCR 20. As we will discuss infra, precedent is not an eternally binding contract that prevents us from adopting a more proper and perfect interpretation of the law as justice demands. Because of this, and because of the failure of listed precedent to explain its contentions with more persuasive power than our own, and because of Constitutional changes (discussed infra), we reject precedential argument.

II. Legislative Arguments

Appellant, in a single sentence, seems to indicate that the appellate standards written in the JSA are wholly redundant and repealed, because “the [Criminal Code Act’s] updated limitation standards” in some way supersede them. Appellant offered no specific argumentation as to how the Criminal Code Act (“CCA”) does this, or what specific section of this deals with another section of that to deal with the matter at hand. If you are confused as to the convoluted wording of that sentence, now you understand our confusion as to the lack of argumentation here. To add insult to injury, Appellant again does not link either mentioned act. It is not the Court’s job to do research and argue a party’s case for them, and we could very easily strike this entire section (and frankly, this appeal) on the grounds that it is improperly briefed.

However, this verdict demands special attention. We Endeavour now to crush this issue once and for all, and to continue our ever-vigilant march towards a workable framework of jurisprudence and justiciable outcomes in the law.

Affixing our fishing hats and casting our lines once again into the legislative deep, we find our way to the JSA and the CCA. In the former, section eleven clearly lays out that “a valid appeal must be filed within one month of the original decision.” JSA § 11. This firmly establishes a limitation on how long a party may wait to appeal a case. Were there no time limits, any losing party could simply wait until a favorable court came into being that would more than likely rule in their favor, and file then—even if the opposing party had long since left the server, and were thus unable to defend themselves or clarify with important context.

The intention, function, and purpose of a time limit to appeals is obvious. The proper and fair administration of justice requires losing parties make reasonable efforts to quickly appear before an appellate court with their alleged errors of law. This furthers the principles of the rule of law and equal justice. Were parties able to wait as long as they pleased, as mentioned, they could simply wait until a more favorable court sat to do their bidding. Further, given a wide gulf of time between a case’s close and its appeal, relevant witnesses, evidence, and ideas of argumentation might become invalid, inaccessible, or otherwise unavailable.

There is no functional argument against the one-month period that does not have the same flaws it purports to fix—namely, that the court can get things wrong. It is true that the Supreme Court is not flawless, and in the past has made many errors of law that even today we seek to fix. However, to throw the doors open and say that every day may be a new day in the highest court in the land, and that any case from the past may be re-litigated is, frankly, absurd. As discussed supra, this would enable many correctly decided cases to be potentially appealed and then decided in a manner inconsistent with the law by a theoretical judiciary that is hostile to the rule of law and good, impartial governance. Rather than risk such a prospect, or make our humble branch a valuable target, we instead cut the losses and say that a limitation on time for appeals is proper.

Standing against this thought, Appellant states that the CCA makes the above provision in the JSA improper. Again, Appellant provides no link or citation, nor does he reason in particular why it is improper or redundant. Shaking our heads, we turn to the CCA to see if we can find out what he means, doing his job for him.

The statute of limitations for all crimes except High Crimes is, at most, four months. CCA Part I, § 8(a). High crimes are specifically listed, and include Corruption. Id. Part I, § (8)b. Accomplice to a crime is not a high crime, but a normal, indictable crime. Id. Part IX, § 21.

Appellant, in the appealed case of the appealed appeal (say that three times fast), was accused and then convicted on one count of being an accomplice to corruption. Commonwealth of Redmont v. Derpy_Bird [2023] SCR 5. In his original appeal here, Appellant appealed his conviction of that count.

Even were the argument that a high crime was forever appealable correct, it would not apply to Appellant. Oddly, Appellant recognizes his charge as accomplice to corruption in the original appeal, but in the instant case speaks only of the charge of corruption itself, which he was not accused of. We are not sure if Appellant misread something, is intentionally obfuscating the facts to try to make his interpretation work, or truly thinks that two statutorily listed crimes, in separate sections, are one in the same. Regardless, accomplice to corruption is not a high crime. For this reason alone, the legislative argument fails. But our analysis does not end here.

Why is it that for high crimes, the language in the CCA must remove in its entirety the concept of time limits for appeals as written in the JSA? The world wonders. Appellant does not answer. We believe, simply put, that it is Appellant’s interpretation that the redundancy-inducing quality of the CCA comes from the statute of limitations section. There, the statute reads in part: “Except for claims arising from High Crimes, all legal action must be commenced within [time limit]. . .” This seems to be the only portion of the statute that could possibly support Appellant’s view. However, it too fails at first look.

The language of the statute is immediately clear. The text firmly states that only claims are exempt from the statute of limitations. Claims in criminal matters are only raised in prosecutions. Appeals are not the place for claims. Appellant here does not file any claims. There is no protection afforded to Appellant.

If the failure of Appellant to realize not one, but two blaring textual roadblocks is not enough, here is a structural one. Appellant supposes, without introspection, that the exception on the statute of limitations for crimes is a benefit to them for matters of appeals. This blatantly goes against the purpose of such a government construction. Statutes of limitations are made to limit the government’s police power, ensure the government is diligently pursuing criminal matters as they arise, and to ensure that not too much time has passed so that the defendant’s witnesses or other useful evidence do not expire in some way. In short, a statute of limitations is to the benefit of the defendant, and to the detriment of the government.

What, then, is the purpose of an exception to such a burden? It is clear that Congress must have intended for those claims arising under the exception to be forever prosecutable. Each of the enumerated high crimes are political in nature and highly related to the benefits of public office. It is likely that Congress anticipated these crimes, likely committed by those in office or those attached to office-holders, would likely be protected by said office for some time. It seems likely that Congress intended for those alleged crimes to be permanently attached to alleged wrongdoers until the circumstance of their political protection evaporated, and they could be duly prosecuted.

With the above in mind, it must then be true that the exception is to the benefit of the government and to the detriment of the alleged wrongdoers. Why would this be turned on its head simply because a successful conviction is appealed? What reason is there to suspect that Congress intended for all legal action related to a high crime to be infinitely appealable? Simply put, with such an important protection stripped from prospective defendants, why should it be read that Congress intended to entirely nullify that government benefit upon appeal?

We see no reason, and Appellant raises none. It is clear that Congress intended for high crimes to be treated at a heightened level and to be forever punishable, regardless of circumstance. To say that this obvious intent therefore leads to a permanent right to appeal a conviction for a high crime is nonsensical, and is contrary to the most basic tenets of statutory interpretation.

Therefore, because Appellant was not convicted of a high crime, appeals are not claims within the meaning of the CCA, and because legislative intent of the high crimes exception clearly does not indicate infinite appeal time, we dismiss Appellant’s legislative argument.

III. Constitutional Arguments

We finally turn to Appellant’s (implied) constitutional arguments. Appellant claims that “In SCR 20, the Supreme Court accepted an appeal more than a year after the original decision . . . because the appeal met s19(4) [sic] of the Constitution.” As discussed supra, the Court in that case did not provide a reason for why they accepted an appeal outside the time frame provided. We do not consider their ruling well-reasoned enough to be bound to it, nor do we believe it is necessary to dogmatically adhere to that slim precedent for reasons discussed infra.

The text of the Constitution is fairly barebones. It should be noted that, as the appellant in SCR 20 pointed out, the relevant text was in section twenty-three of the Constitution at the time, and not section nineteen as it is now. In only a few sentences, the Constitution lays out the entirety of its demands for appealing verdicts of this Court: “A party may appeal a Supreme Court decision only if they can demonstrate that the court previously [applied] an incorrect principle of law; or [made] a finding of fact or facts on an important issue . . . not supported by the evidence.” R.C. Const. Part II, § 19(4). Further, the Elastic Clause gives Congress the power to legislate as it sees fit, addressing issues not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Id. Part I, § 2(7).

Appellant supposes that merely meeting this criteria means the Supreme Court forever has appellate jurisdiction over his matter. It is true that absent statutory or common law, without a specific limitation there is none. However, there is also no specific or implicit language that grants appellants an affirmative right to appeal without limit. It is odd and inconsistent with basic jurisprudential pragmatism to say that Congress is barred from legislating on a topic where they have a clear and legitimate interest when the Constitution does not limit them in any real way.

Appellant seems to be reading the appeals section as a minimum test for appeals, and any action that meets criteria shall always and forever be eligible for appeal. Nowhere is this stated in the plain language. The only policy or structural argument that could be introduced to support this proposition is that courts get rulings wrong, or may be corrupt at the time, and thus a long-term legal solution is needed. Though perhaps persuasive at first glance, this view falls apart when examined from the other direction. Were we to support this interpretation, a momentary corruption of the judiciary could allow for long-standing correctly and neutrally decided cases to be appealed. This interpretation would make it a fact that every single day is a new day in the Supreme Court. This is unacceptable.

It is clear that as a matter of pragmatism, it is in the common interest that limits to appeals should be made. The Constitution does not speak on this subject, nor does it speak on a vast array of topics for which Congress legitimately legislates anyways. In the words of one learned commentator, “Shall we write in the [C]onstitution that you also need to breathe to have a government job[?]” No, dear reader, we shall not. Nor too shall we necessitate that Congress must have specific abilities to regulate areas of law when there is a clear public interest to do so, and the Constitution or settled law does not otherwise prohibit that regulation. See ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 18 (laying out in relevant part that a small subsection of activities of the government are so specifically granted that those activities can only be self-regulated); R.C. Const. Part I, § 2(8).

It should be clear, then, that there is no constitutional barrier to Congress legislating time limits for appeals. Indeed, there is a strong and legitimate public interest for them to do so, as discussed supra. This interest is so strong that even were there no statutory limits on appeals, we would consider creating some today. It cannot be denied that effective justice necessitates limiting the time in which appellants may bring an alleged error of law. Appellants have an affirmative duty to present their arguments before the court in a timely manner, in the same and equal way that claimants in civil cases and the government in criminal cases have an affirmative duty (for the most part) to bring their claims before the court in a timely manner.

Finally, there is one pressing argument that is likewise fatal to Appellant’s contention. In their cited-but-not-cited case, then-appellant in brief cites the Constitution at the time as: “Section 23 - Supreme Court Appeals. A party can appeal based on a point of law. The appeal must convince the Court that the Justices that heard the original case made an error of law. . .” SCR 20 [2022] (appeal accepted) (emphasis added).

The written text gives a fair assumption that an appealed case from the Supreme Court would, or should, be heard by different Justices than those that originally heard the appealed case. However, even taking for granted this language intended for appeals to be heard before a new court, it is not necessarily true that the intent of this was to give an indefinite period for appealing.

Consider the discussion regarding high crimes above. If a case was decided by the court in a fundamentally unfair, corrupt, or incompetent way, the remedy is clearly not legal, but political. At that point, it is up to Congress to prove that the Justice(s) are repulsive to the Constitution and remove them. The implied intent here is that nakedly corrupt Justices would be impeached and removed, preferably within a month or two, and an appeal could be lodged that could secure a new trial with fair, competent, and neutral Justices.

It is clearly not necessary for an appellant to wait several years for a new crop of legal figures to hear their case. Of the twenty-three confirmed Associate Justice terms to the Supreme Court, nine of them—nearly forty percent—have at time of writing tenures of less than two months. List of Justices of the Supreme Court, DemocracyCraft Wiki (Accessed January 28, 2026). It is not uncommon for Justices to resign, and not impossible for wicked Justices to be impeached. There is no real reason to have to wait several years to appeal a case. However, even if we were to agree with this interpretation of the past constitutional language at face value, the language is just that: past. That language no longer exists. Now, no reference to Justices of an “original case” are made at all. Any argument flowing from that text is, consequently, worthless.

Because there is no affirmative right to unconstricted appeals, Congress is not prohibited from legislating such a limit, the changed constitutional text does not support Appellant, and because basic justice concerns and public policy is strongly in favor of limiting appeals, we dismiss Appellant’s constitutional argument.

IV. Overturning Precedent and the role of Stare Decisis
The role of the courts in developing the law are twofold. First, there are wrongs to be righted, holes to be filled, and provisions to be interpreted. The courts exist to do all of these things and provide for a consistent and workable framework of governance and law that protect rights, limit government overreach, and provide for the common welfare of the people.

Second, it is the job of the courts to act as a moderating influence on the law of the land. The courts exist as guardians of the status quo, and as a general matter seek to stabilize what that status quo is, and—absent a constitutional amendment or Congressional override—frustrate movement away from that balanced equilibrium.

It is here that precedent comes into play. Precedent is, simply put, any court decision on a question of law or interpretation. Taken as a whole, precedent exists within the grand sea of common law, all of which is generally adhered to. This concept of adherence to past judicial decisions is broadly referred to as stare decisis, a widely-adopted judicial doctrine that translates from Latin as “let the decision stand.”

Under stare decisis, courts generally give wide discretion to previous decisions and try not to disturb those decisions, preferring instead to rule similarly to past courts or allow legislative bodies to change the law for them. At times, however, it is appropriate and even necessary to disturb or entirely uproot precedent. Given that the point of stare decisis is to promote a uniform, consistent, and stable platform for citizens and legislators to deal with the law, such a decision must not be taken lightly. It is therefore important now to clarify when precedent should be overruled, and when it should be deferred to, even when disagreed with as a matter of personal course.

Stare decisis is not an exorable command permanently pulling the courts down, unable to be amended. In similar fashion as Congress may amend past legislation and the President may repeal past executive orders, the courts may amend, abrogate, or repeal precedent as appropriate. However, given the lack of democratic legitimacy afforded to the courts as a nature of our appointments and grand potential for abuse, there need to be some limits. It is clear that those limits must serve to protect the goals of stare decisis, while allowing precedent to be shaped as the community and legal industry matures and grows, creating law that works, is reasonable, and promotes the common good.

To that end, the considerations regarding overruling or overturning past precedent are the quality of the precedent’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, and general reliance of the community and the courts on that decision. A decision that is explained poorly, lightly, or not at all may be easily trumped by reasoning that is fully developed and logical, exploring multiple facets of the law. A decision that creates a burdensome rule that is extremely difficult to observe in practice may be overcome by a ruling that simplifies the process or expectation of relevance, while protecting rights and other legal considerations. A decision that has never, or has very rarely, been used or relied upon by the community as a whole or the political/business/legal world in specific may be overcome much easier than a decision that is relied upon daily, such as common law contract principles.

Here, we overrule the Court’s decision in the cited appeal for SCR 20 [2022]. All three of these above factors are implicated here. First, there was no reasoning for the decision. Our decision today examines exhaustively the law as it was and is, and the reasons thereof. Second, the rule, while not burdensome per se, was contrary to the administration of justice, and presented a headache of nightmarish proportions. Under the previous rule, a judicial officer would have to operate under the knowledge that no matter what, their case could be appealed even decades after their decision was rendered. This meant, in effect, that the government and all litigants before the courts were permanently on notice that they may end up losing long-settled “won” cases, even years hence. Finally, the rule created by this decision has very rarely been relied upon. We cannot seem to find, and Appellant gives no evidence of, the rule being relied upon at all besides the two times he has done so over the last six-odd years.

Therefore, it is proper and just that we overrule the precedent contained in the appeal for SCR 20.

In closing this section, it must be noted that the precedent we set today with overruling precedent is of the utmost importance, and must stand the test of time. As discussed supra, every day is not a new day in the courts. The law must be consistent, workable, and reliable. It can change, of course—but such change must be measured, deliberate, and necessary. The mere fact of a judicial officer merely disagreeing with a legal question’s previous answer does not immediately grant them the ability to overrule it. We must, as the sworn defenders of the Constitution and the Republic’s rule of law, abide by precedent, and thus must forever be bound by this guide for overturning it. The fate of the nation and the rights of all citizens depends on it.

V. Conclusion

Appellant’s contentions are without merit. In three parts, we dismiss Appellant’s precedential, legislative, and constitutional arguments. Appeals, unless otherwise legislated by Congress, have a statutory limit of one month. This is necessary to protect justice and the rule of law. No appeals may ever be lodged after one month from the day the decision of the instant case is handed down. Appellant’s appeal is dismissed with prejudice.

VI. Dissent

All of the above was written around two weeks before the majority decision in this case was finished. At the time I shared it with my colleagues, they liked it quite a bit and approved of it. It seemed as if this decision would be the majority.

However, this did not come to pass. One of my colleagues brought up an issue with the constitutionality of amending the JSA, even post Unified Constitution Act (“UCA”), and the other agreed. This archaic legal construction of how our law works, rooted deeply in their minds, entirely de-railed our deliberative process and led us to what we have now. This portion of my opinion is the only portion amended since the majority was written.

Where to even begin? The main legal difference between the majority and I is the ultimate effects of the UCA. In my original opinion I had not even entertained the thought that the subversion of appeals act and other amendments to the JSA were unconstitutional. It seemed blindingly obvious to me that after the UCA, there would be no further hangups over so-called “constitutional” acts. This was an issue I had against Redmontian law since I joined just over a year, a month, and a week ago, and it is why I wrote (and then had the now President propose) the UCA.

The purpose, then and now, was to eliminate this cock-eyed artifact of pre-Trolligarch law where outside of purely constitutional and purely statutory law, there existed a third secret category that was equal to the Constitution in terms of power but was not in the Constitution itself. This means that the body of “constitutional law” included a select few acts, plus the Constitution itself. This was a nightmare, not least of which for those that dealt with the law. New attorneys, such as myself, had to spend time reading through all of the laws to see which, if any, were supposed to be constitutional.

A Constitution serves as the fundamental law of the land, standing on its own with nothing supporting it. That is the entire point of such a document. To insist that auxiliary law complements or even supplements portions of the Constitution in a manner equal to direct text amendments of the Constitution itself was absurd. It is for this reason that the UCA was proposed, passed, and ratified. The direct text of the UCA states, in relevant part, “Only text physically contained within the Constitution itself may be considered a part of the Constitution. No text outside of this document may be considered constitutionally binding in any way.” UCA § 3. The stated reasoning for this amendment was “Federal Court precedent firmly confirms that the [JSA] remains part of the Constitution through the present day, which has caused confusion as to what laws are ‘constitutional’ in nature.” Id. § 2(2). Though never dispositive, it may also be helpful to note who authored the act. See id. § 1(3).

It is clear that the Congress and the People, through their referendum, wanted to cleanly and wholly dispose of this third, miasmatic body of law. The reasoning of the amendment specifically mentions the JSA and confirms that the act was meant to clarify what laws are “constitutional in nature.” The text of the amendment says that only text physically added or contained in the Constitution itself could be considered to be on the same level as the Constitution.

In practice, to be constitutional, a law must be in the Constitution itself. To be “constitutional” means that a law cannot be overridden by mere statute as it is a part of the Constitution (even if not literally so in text pre-UCA), and is binding at the same level as the Constitution as a result thereof. These two conditions are necessarily a result of being constitutional. A law cannot be constitutional without having both of the above attached to it. Any alternative hypothesis as to what the effect of a law being constitutional means is absurd. I have yet to see any disagreement, either among my colleagues or anywhere else in Redmont, on this obvious point.

The majority today very clearly states that the UCA attempted to remove the JSA from the pool of what can rightfully be considered constitutional law. I do not disagree. See id. They say “Congress is explicitly clear . . . and [we] understand what Congress was attempting to do with perfect clarity.” One would expect, then, given this confirmation of the amendment’s attempt and clear language that the JSA would therefore no longer be a constitutional law. How could an act not within the Constitution be constitutional law, if the Constitution itself firmly states “[n]o text outside of this document may be considered constitutionally binding in any way”?

One would think these points would be self-evident. Because the amendment clearly wished to make the JSA no longer constitutional law, the text clearly states that a law is not constitutional unless it is within the Constitution itself, and that to be a constitutional law that law must be on the same level as and congruent with the Constitution, the JSA is no longer constitutional. According to the majority here today, you would be wrong.

Despite Congress being “explicitly clear” in their “intent and reasoning . . . to remove this vestigial area of the law,” the majority sees fit to stifle their effort. “In no way, shape, or form does Congress want the JSA to remain.” What, then, is the majority’s reasoning? They say that it was already true that text not in the Constitution was not constitutional, and then two sentences later say that “even if the text were not ‘physically’ in the Constitution, it is still constitutional. These are constitutional laws, and they still carry the force of the Constitution behind it.” If text not in the Constitution was not constitutional already, then what was the point of the UCA? Even adhering entirely to their view, the UCA either is wholly worthless, ineffectual, and redundant, or clearly was intended to do something—likely something to do with the JSA. That they do not let it do anything to the JSA is a clear mistake.

To recap, the majority today understands the point of the UCA was to remove “constitutional laws” from existence, and explicitly to demolish the elevated standing of the JSA. They understand the UCA was explicitly created to fulfill such a purpose, and that no text not in the Constitution is constitutional law. They then say that constitutional laws still exist, are constitutional, and act as though they are a part of the Constitution itself. How does this make any sense? The majority today is shoving their heads in the sand, clearly ignoring the obvious intent, reasoning, purpose, and text of the amendment—which they clearly understand and do not disagree with me about. This is absurd and offensive to Congress, the People, and the most basic, plain-text understanding of the Constitution.

They justify this veritable head-scratcher by saying the JSA initially was a constitutional amendment. Because of this, it remains a constitutional amendment. The most pressing effect of this is that any purely statutory amendments (such as the Subversion of Appeals Act, the Warrant Fix Act, and the Verdict Freedom of Information Act) to the JSA are now (and have always been) unconstitutionally passed, as an act/statute cannot amend the Constitution or a constitutional act. Forget the fact that most if not all of these acts were passed after the UCA was, and that they do not amend any constitutional provision in any way. They are now all overruled as a matter of law. Overruled, overruled, overruled.

I cannot say this enough—the majority today holds that despite understanding and recognizing the clear purpose and text of the UCA to say that nothing outside of the Constitution is constitutional, the JSA is constitutional. Therefore, everything legitimately passed into the JSA is a part of the Constitution. This is despite the fact that not everything passed into the JSA is physically located in our Constitution, and that the Constitution says only text physically inside it is constitutional. Despite this non-constitutionality according to the Constitution, the holding today mandates that everything in the JSA is constitutional. For example, the case commission section of the JSA was passed under a bill stated to “amend the Constitution,” and is not—nor ever has been as far as I can tell—in the Constitution itself. According to the majority, this is constitutional text, though not in the Constitution, and the pay for judges therefore cannot be changed unless the Constitution is amended.

To the majority, the fact that a constitutional amendment was passed that (in their own words) explicitly was targeted to remove the constitutionality of the JSA is not enough. They seem to think that once passed, constitutional amendments physically hold up the Constitution itself. This is not correct and is an illogical absurdity. The law is not the words in the amendment, but what is actually amended in or out of the Constitution.

The amendments to the Constitution, frankly, should never have had force of law besides their one-time action upon ratification of inserting, changing, or removing language from the Constitution. Now that the UCA has passed, this is very explicitly how it all works. When an amendment to the Constitution is passed, its only effect is to change the text of the Constitution. Nothing that it does or can do that is not solely an amendment to the text of the Constitution has any effect. See UCA § 3. The correct interpretation of the UCA is that the JSA and all other like acts were stripped of their constitutionality at its ratification, and became no more than statutory acts that had old text saying they were once amendments at the top. Despite this, the majority today holds that language not in the Constitution is constitutional in nature, despite the explicit command of the Constitution itself.

The majority says my issue with their holding today is merely semantic in nature. This cannot be further from the truth. We are not arguing definitions or syntax, but the fundamental nature of the law itself. The majority clings to the old, outmoded, and explicitly outlawed version of the law where language not in the Constitution could be held at the same level as the Constitution itself. I embrace the newer, cleaner, and democratically passed version of the law that says the Constitution stands alone and without assistance. I embrace the text, the clear meaning, and the structural purpose of that act that the majority recognizes, yet fails to act upon. As that vision of our law disintegrates before my very eyes, I know not what I can do except make my stand here and hope somebody else cares.

I protest this decision in the strongest of terms. I have no power to stop the majority, or to temper them. The majority says that an amendment must be “properly passed.” How was the UCA not properly passed? It explicitly—and again, they agree on this—aimed to destroy the constitutional aspect of the JSA. Everyone understood it as doing so. Several individuals have commented on the JSA’s seemingly non-constitutionality since, and Congress has passed a handful of amendments to the JSA. They certainly thought it was properly passed and de-constitutionalized.

How, then, could the JSA’s constitutionality be “properly” repealed, if an amendment clearly designed to repeal it was not enough? The majority does not elaborate. They say that an act of congress (i.e., a statute) cannot amend the Constitution. This is clearly correct. But the UCA was not an “act” as they describe, but a proper amendment. The majority does not allege that the UCA was improperly made into law, and it remains within the Constitution today.

So what are they talking about? Like my above analysis on [2022] SCR 20, the majority today does not adequately explain their reasoning. All they say is that the JSA is still a constitutional law because when originally passed it was an amendment, and it remains constitutional law today because it still has that language, the UCA’s explicit command notwithstanding. If the UCA was not explicit enough, despite their recognition of its purpose, then the only way to remove the constitutionality of the JSA is an amendment to the Constitution.

But what would such an amendment say? Would it write into the Constitution that the “JSA is not constitutional?” Why? Why does this need to be done so specifically? Where in the Constitution does it say that? If it doesn’t need to be this specific, then what else can we write? Is “no text not within this document can be considered constitutional” good enough? If so, why does the UCA not do as everyone recognizes what it was meant to do?

This is the core contradiction with the majority’s decision: The JSA is constitutional, and can only be overridden by a constitutional amendment, despite the former not being in the Constitution at all. If you understand the basic text of the UCA saying nothing not in the Constitution is constitutional, how is it necessary to remove something not in the Constitution with a constitutional amendment? And god forbid if said constitutional amendment is not itself included in the Constitution. This is nonsensical.

For all of the above reasons, I must emphatically dissent. My questions above were not satisfied in my discussions with the majority or in reading their opinion. I frankly do not have answers as to where we go from here. While Congress could just pass the JSA as it stands today into a separate statutory law, this would only be half a solution, as the JSA itself still lingering as constitutional law creates many issues and is outright hostile to the Constitution. I wish them (and the voting masses) the best of luck in figuring this out. I have tried and cannot. Perhaps the wisdom of the mob will trump my own.

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