Appeal: Pending In re [2026] FCR 91 | [2026] SCR 24

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION


Appellants respectfully pray, under Judicial Standards Act Part V, Section 1(2)(b), for an emergency injunction during this proceeding, as follows:

  1. An order barring the Department of Commerce, until final judgment in this appeal, from collecting any fee under Section 16(12) of the Redmont Commerce and Finance Act ("RCFA") from Appellants, and from acting under RCFA Section 18(3) against Appellants for non-payment of such a fee.
  2. An order tolling the periods in RCFA Section 59(5) as they apply to Appellants until final judgment in this appeal, and barring the Department from acting under RCFA Section 59(6) or Part X against Appellants for non-compliance with Sections 16(5) or 59(5) during that time.

GROUNDS FOR THE MOTION

I. Urgency
  1. On September 27, 2026, the Federal Court granted this same relief in full and tolled the Section 59(5) periods until final judgment (TheStockExchange LLC vs. President antonfr [2026] FCR 91). The Verdict of October 12, 2026 lifted that injunction on the very date the Section 59(5) capital plan was originally due.
  2. Section 59(5) provides that "the Department may not extend" these periods. Only this Court can preserve the status quo while the appeal is heard.

II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
  1. The Federal Court defined a tax as a charge that serves general revenue collection and is not calculated on the cost of a service. On the established facts, the Section 16(12) charge is paid into the general DCGovernment account and is calculated as 1% to 5% of a capital figure, with a mandatory floor unrelated to cost (Facts 4 and 5). It meets every element of the Court's own test.
  2. The Federal Court reached the opposite result by attributing to Congress an intent found nowhere in the Act, and by adding a "generality" element absent from its own definition. This Court has reversed the Federal Court for applying a standard whose source the trial court "did not explain," and has held that Congress's will is to be found in the text it enacted (Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (appeal)).
  3. That decision also confirms that a department may act only "within the law and within the enabling statute provided by Congress." Part I, Section 2(4) of the Constitution reserves control of taxation to Congress, and the delegation of the rate to the Executive is not within the law.

III. Irreparable Harm
  1. Under Section 59(6), an institution that misses the Section 59(5) requirement "shall either surrender its license and return customer funds in an orderly manner, or apply for a license class whose requirement it does meet." Surrender would close Appellants' exchange and harm its listed companies and investors in a way no later judgment can undo.
  2. Surrender or reclassification would also end Appellants' liability to the Class F charge and threaten to moot this appeal before the constitutional question is decided. The Federal Court has recognized that courts should not continue to adjudicate disputes that have become obsolete (IgnitedTnT v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2026] FCR 20). The loss of the ability to obtain a ruling at all cannot be remedied after the fact.
  3. The alternative, meeting the capital requirement, locks $250,000 in place for at least 90 days under Section 16(8), and any transaction returning it to an owner is voidable by the Department.


 

Brief


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
APPELLANT'S BRIEF


I. GROUNDS FOR APPEAL

Appellants TheStockExchange LLC and TSEInvestmentBank LLC appeal the Verdict of the Federal Court entered on October 12, 2026 in TheStockExchange LLC vs. President antonfr [2026] FCR 91, which ruled for the Defendants on all claims and lifted the emergency injunction of September 27, 2026. This appeal is brought under Judicial Standards Act ("JSA") Part VI, Section 1(2)(a) on the following errors of law:


  1. The Court held that the Section 16(12) supervisory charge is a fee, although on the established facts it satisfies every element of the Court's own definition of a tax.
  2. The Court rested that holding on a finding that Congress intended statutory capital figures to serve as "a proxy for regulatory burden," a finding with no support in the text of the Act or the record.
  3. The Court did not apply RCFA Section 4(1)(a), which requires that substance prevail over "legal form, label or characterisation."
  4. The Court added a "generality" requirement that appears nowhere in its own definition of a tax, and treated a uniform class-wide rate, a hallmark of taxation, as evidence of a fee.
  5. The Court relied on zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 75, a non-binding decision that does not concern a charge of this kind.
  6. The Court disposed of Claim 2 without deciding it, although Claim 2 raises an independent constitutional defect in RCFA Section 7(7).
Appellants do not pursue Claim 3 on appeal.


II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
  1. Whether a compulsory charge that funds general revenue, is calculated as a percentage of a statutory capital figure with a mandatory floor unrelated to the cost of any service, and is enforced by debt recovery and license revocation is a tax under the Federal Court's own definition and under RCFA Section 4(1)(a).
  2. Whether a trial court may supply a finding of congressional intent, and an additional "generality" element, that have no basis in the statutory text or the record.
  3. Whether Part I, Section 2(4) of the Constitution permits Congress to let the Executive fix, by its own rule, the rate of such a charge within a fivefold range.
  4. Whether RCFA Section 7(7), which purports to let a non-binding resolution void a binding rule, can sustain said delegation.

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY

  1. On September 26, 2026, Appellants filed suit challenging Section 16(12) of the Redmont Commerce and Finance Act ("RCFA").
  2. On September 27, 2026, the Federal Court granted the emergency injunction in full. It barred collection of any Section 16(12) fee and tolled the Section 59(5) periods so that they "begin to run again only from the date of final judgment."
  3. Defendants answered after the court-ordered 72 hours. They answered "neither affirms or denies" to all fourteen facts, thereby pleading no contest to every fact (Court Rules and Procedures, Rule 3.2(3)). They raised no defenses and filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law that the Court denied because it "does not specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment."
  4. The Court found Facts 1 through 14 established, denied Appellants' Rule 9.2 motion, and proposed summary judgment proceedings, to which Defendants did not object.
  5. On October 12, 2026, the Court entered its Verdict for the Defendants and lifted the injunction.

Established Facts Material to this Appeal
  1. TSE is deemed to hold a Class F license, and the Class F capital figure is $250,000 (Facts 2 and 3).
  2. Section 16(12)(b) authorizes "a supervisory fee ... of not less than 1% and not more than 5% of that capital figure in aggregate over any 12 month period," set by Department rule (Fact 4). For Class F this means a mandatory charge of at least $2,500 and up to $12,500 a year, whatever it costs to supervise any given exchange.
  3. "Fee revenue is directed to the DCGovernment account." The Act does not reserve that revenue for supervision costs (Fact 5).
  4. An unpaid fee "is recoverable as a debt and is a ground for action under section 18(3)," which permits refusal, suspension or revocation of a license (Fact 6).
  5. Every Class F holder reports monthly "regardless of its size," and the fee is payable with each report (Fact 7).
  6. The only congressional check is that "Congress may disallow a rule by resolution of both chambers" (Section 7(7); Fact 10).
  7. In the Taxation Act, enacted the same day, Congress provided that tax rates "may be changed only by an Act of Congress" (Sections 6(2) and 13(3); Fact 11).
  8. Section 59(5) gives existing institutions 30 days to file a capital plan and 90 days to meet the capital requirement, which "the Department may not extend." Section 59(6) requires an institution that misses them to surrender its license and return customer funds or change class (Facts 12 and 13).

IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT


The Federal Court defined a tax as "a charge that serves the purpose of general revenue collection, is not related to any service the government provides, and is not calculated based on the cost of such services," and a fee as a charge "calculated based on the cost of such service." On the established facts, the Section 16(12) charge is paid into general revenue and is calculated as a percentage of a capital figure, with a mandatory floor that has nothing to do with cost. It is therefore a tax under the Court's own test.


The Court avoided that result in two ways. It attributed to Congress an intent that capital figures act as "a proxy for regulatory burden," which nothing in the Act states. It also added a "generality" element its definition does not contain. Both are errors of law of the kind this Court reversed in Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (appeal).


Because the charge is a tax, Part I, Section 2(4) reserves control of its rate to Congress. Congress cannot hand that control to the Executive while keeping only a non-binding resolution as a check. The Verdict should be reversed.


V. ARGUMENT


A. The charge satisfies every element of the Federal Court's own definition of a tax.


Appellants accept, for purposes of this appeal, the definitions the Federal Court adopted. The error lies in how the Court applied them.

  1. General revenue collection. Revenue goes to the general DCGovernment account, and the Act does not reserve it for supervision (Facts 4 and 5). The Court answered only that payment into the Treasury "does not, in substance, constitute a tax." Appellants never argued that destination alone is decisive. The point is that nothing in the Act links the money to the service. When the money goes to general revenue and nothing ties it to a service, the first element of the Court's own test is satisfied.
  2. Not calculated on the cost of a service. The Court conceded that calculation "not based on the cost of any service provided is a strong indicator of such a charge not being a fee." The statute calculates the charge as 1% to 5% of a capital figure. The floor is mandatory: even if supervising an exchange cost the Department nothing, the Department could not charge less than $2,500 a year, apart from the narrow first-period and wind-down reductions in Section 16(12)(d). A charge whose minimum is fixed without any reference to cost is not "calculated based on the cost of such service."
  3. Not tied to a service. Supervision is not a service an institution requests. Licensing and reporting are imposed by law on every holder of the class, and the charge falls due with each mandatory report whether or not the Department does any supervisory work in that period.

Once every element of the Court's definition of a tax was met, the Court was bound to find a tax. It erred in law by holding otherwise.


B. The "proxy for regulatory burden" finding has no basis in the text or the record.


The Verdict says the Court "believes that the intent of Congress was to utilise the statutory capital figures as a proxy for regulatory burden." The Verdict cites no statutory language, legislative statement or evidence for that belief, and the record contains none. This Court has held that "Congress's will must be deferred to," and has found that will in the enacted text and its stated reasons (Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (appeal)). Deferring to Congress means reading what Congress wrote, not attributing to it a purpose it did not express.

  1. Section 16(5) capital figures measure solvency, not supervisory work. They are the amount an institution must hold, kept in "unencumbered liquid assets" and not disposed of for 90 days (Fact 14). They protect customers. They do not measure the Department's supervisory workload.
  2. Congress already measured supervisory intensity elsewhere, and did not use that measure here. Section 31(1)(a) sets reporting tiers. Every Class F holder is Tier 1 and reports monthly "regardless of its size" (Fact 7). Congress built a burden-based tool and chose not to tie the charge to it.
  3. A proxy is not cost-based calculation. Even if capital were a rough proxy for burden, the Court's own definition requires that a fee be "calculated based on the cost of such service." A charge pegged to a substitute measure, with a mandatory floor, is not calculated on cost.
  4. Section 16(12)(d) cannot override the arithmetic of Section 16(12)(b). A duty to keep the charge "proportionate" within a statutory band of 1% to 5% does not change how the charge is calculated. The band and the floor are fixed by statute, and Section 16(12)(c) forbids individual assessment by requiring a uniform class rate. Proportionality between whole license classes, judged against a capital base, does not make a charge cost-based.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Where no issue of fact remains, this Court reviews the legal decision afresh from the factual determinations (Court Rules and Procedures, Rule 8.2). A finding of legislative intent drawn from outside the text and the record should be set aside.


C. The Court did not apply RCFA Section 4(1)(a).


Congress wrote its own interpretive rule into the Act: "the economic substance and practical effect of a transaction, instrument or arrangement prevails over its legal form, label or characterisation" (RCFA Section 4(1)(a)). Appellants relied on it in the Complaint (Claim 1, paragraph 7) and in their Rule 9.2 motion (paragraph 11). The Verdict does not mention it.


Instead, the Court relied on the label "fee" and on Section 16(12)(f)'s description of the fee as a "regulatory and compliance cost." Section 4(1)(a) prohibits exactly that reliance. In substance, the arrangement is a compulsory, revenue-raising levy calculated on a capital base and enforced by revocation. Failing to apply a governing statutory rule is an error of law, and the argument is squarely presented for this Court's decision (Rule 8.5).


D. The Court added a "generality" element and then applied it backwards.


The Court's definition of a tax has three elements: general revenue purpose, no link to a service, and no calculation on cost. "Generality" is not among them. The Court nonetheless rejected Appellants' fourth indicator because "the charge is calculated in a manner specific enough not to satisfy the generality of a tax." This Court reversed the Federal Court in Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (appeal) for applying a requirement whose source "the trial court did not explain," calling it "Constitutionally baseless." The same error occurred here.


The new element is also applied the wrong way round. A uniform rate across a whole class of payers, fixed against a statutory base and not against any work done for an individual payer, is the defining feature of a tax. A fee, as the Court defined it, is tied to the cost of "a specific service provided." Section 16(12)(c) requires one uniform rate for every institution holding the same license class, which forbids exactly the individual link to cost that marks a fee.


E. zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 75 does not control.


The Federal Court cited zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 75 for the proposition that "a charge being compulsory for utilising a government service does not mean it is a tax." That proposition does not decide this case.

  1. zLost is a decision of the Federal Court. It does not bind this Court.
  2. By the trial court's own description, zLost concerned a charge for "utilising a government service." Here no service is used. Supervision is imposed by statute on every holder of the class, and the charge falls due with each mandatory report.
  3. zLost predates the RCFA and did not apply Section 4(1)(a). On the trial court's own description, zLost did not involve a charge set by executive rule within a statutory range, calculated as a percentage of a capital figure, paid into general revenue, and enforced by license revocation.
  4. Appellants never argued that compulsion alone makes a tax. They argued that compulsion, a general-revenue destination, and calculation that ignores cost together do. zLost does not address that combination.

F. Because the charge is a tax, Part I, Section 2(4) reserves its rate to Congress, and Claim 2 must be decided on its own terms.


The Constitution "is the highest law of the Commonwealth" and "overrides any law or authority that conflicts with it." "Congress controls taxation, government spending, appropriations, and borrowing" (R. Const. Part I, Section 2(4)). The Executive "administers and enforces the law respectively, as written by the legislature and interpreted by the judiciary" (Part III, Section 23). The Federal Court declared the delegation question moot only because it had classified the charge as a fee. If this Court reverses that classification, the question is live and should be decided here rather than remanded, because it is purely legal (Rule 8.2).


  1. Congress fixed the range but not the rate. Section 16(12) lets the Department choose any rate within a fivefold range. How much a class of citizens must pay is therefore decided by the Executive. That is control of taxation, and Section 2(4) assigns it to Congress.
  2. Congress's own same-day practice confirms this reading. In the Taxation Act, Congress provided that tax rates "may be changed only by an Act of Congress" (Sections 6(2) and 13(3)).
  3. Galactic Empire does not save the delegation. Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (appeal) recognized that departments may regulate under delegated power, but only "within the law and within the enabling statute provided by Congress," and only where they do not "upset any Constitutional right or violate any previously-existing legal standard." Part I, Section 2(4) is such a standard. Delegating administration is permitted. Delegating the rate of a tax is not. See also Partypig678 v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2021] SCR 14, as cited in Galactic Empire: departments "may not act arbitrarily or without legal backing."
  4. Section 7(7) cannot provide congressional control. "Congress may pass non-binding resolutions to express opinions or make formal requests without Presidential assent" (Part I, Section 2(5)). There are only two ways to read Section 7(7). If a disallowing resolution is non-binding, Congress has no binding control over the rate short of a new Act subject to veto. If it is binding, Section 7(7) gives a resolution an effect the Constitution denies it, and it lets binding law be made without Presidential assent (Part III, Section 24(3)). Either way, the safeguard the delegation depends on does not exist. Only text in the Constitution itself has constitutional force (Part VIII, Section 51), and an Act cannot change what a resolution is. The Part I, Section 2 list of congressional powers has been treated as exhaustive: xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] DCR 55.

VI. RELIEF SOUGHT


Appellants respectfully pray that the Court:


  1. Accept this appeal (JSA Part VI, Section 2(1)).
  2. Reverse the Verdict as to Claims 1 and 2 (JSA Part VI, Section 2(3)(c)).
  3. Declare that the RCFA Section 16(12) supervisory charge is a tax, and that Section 16(12), insofar as it authorizes the Department of Commerce to set the rate of that charge by rule, is inconsistent with Part I, Section 2(4) of the Constitution and void.
  4. Declare that RCFA Section 7(7) cannot give a congressional resolution binding effect, and cannot sustain the delegation in Section 16(12).
  5. Sever Section 16(12) under RCFA Section 62, leaving the rest of the Act in force.
  6. Declare void any rule made or later made under Section 16(12) to set such a charge.
  7. Award nominal damages of $7,500 under Part III, Section 4 of the Redmont Civil Code Act and legal fees as permitted under Part III, Section 7(2)(c), as compensatory actions for the plaintiff (JSA Part VI, Section 2(4)(b)); or, in the alternative, remand for determination of those remedies (JSA Part VI, Section 2(3)(d)).
  8. Grant any other relief the Court considers just.

VII. EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITIES

  1. P-002: TSE Investment Bank registration
  2. Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont
  3. Redmont Commerce and Finance Act
  4. Taxation Act
  5. Judicial Standards Act
  6. Court Rules and Procedures
  7. Redmont Civil Code Act
  8. Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (appeal)
  9. Partypig678 v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2021] SCR 14
  10. zLost v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 75
  11. xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] DCR 55

 
Muggy21 said:

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION


Appellants respectfully pray, under Judicial Standards Act Part V, Section 1(2)(b), for an emergency injunction during this proceeding, as follows:

  1. An order barring the Department of Commerce, until final judgment in this appeal, from collecting any fee under Section 16(12) of the Redmont Commerce and Finance Act ("RCFA") from Appellants, and from acting under RCFA Section 18(3) against Appellants for non-payment of such a fee.
  2. An order tolling the periods in RCFA Section 59(5) as they apply to Appellants until final judgment in this appeal, and barring the Department from acting under RCFA Section 59(6) or Part X against Appellants for non-compliance with Sections 16(5) or 59(5) during that time.

GROUNDS FOR THE MOTION

I. Urgency
  1. On September 27, 2026, the Federal Court granted this same relief in full and tolled the Section 59(5) periods until final judgment (TheStockExchange LLC vs. President antonfr [2026] FCR 91). The Verdict of October 12, 2026 lifted that injunction on the very date the Section 59(5) capital plan was originally due.
  2. Section 59(5) provides that "the Department may not extend" these periods. Only this Court can preserve the status quo while the appeal is heard.

II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
  1. The Federal Court defined a tax as a charge that serves general revenue collection and is not calculated on the cost of a service. On the established facts, the Section 16(12) charge is paid into the general DCGovernment account and is calculated as 1% to 5% of a capital figure, with a mandatory floor unrelated to cost (Facts 4 and 5). It meets every element of the Court's own test.
  2. The Federal Court reached the opposite result by attributing to Congress an intent found nowhere in the Act, and by adding a "generality" element absent from its own definition. This Court has reversed the Federal Court for applying a standard whose source the trial court "did not explain," and has held that Congress's will is to be found in the text it enacted (Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (appeal)).
  3. That decision also confirms that a department may act only "within the law and within the enabling statute provided by Congress." Part I, Section 2(4) of the Constitution reserves control of taxation to Congress, and the delegation of the rate to the Executive is not within the law.

III. Irreparable Harm
  1. Under Section 59(6), an institution that misses the Section 59(5) requirement "shall either surrender its license and return customer funds in an orderly manner, or apply for a license class whose requirement it does meet." Surrender would close Appellants' exchange and harm its listed companies and investors in a way no later judgment can undo.
  2. Surrender or reclassification would also end Appellants' liability to the Class F charge and threaten to moot this appeal before the constitutional question is decided. The Federal Court has recognized that courts should not continue to adjudicate disputes that have become obsolete (IgnitedTnT v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2026] FCR 20). The loss of the ability to obtain a ruling at all cannot be remedied after the fact.
  3. The alternative, meeting the capital requirement, locks $250,000 in place for at least 90 days under Section 16(8), and any transaction returning it to an owner is voidable by the Department.


Click to expand...
Granted 2-0 by a unanimous Court. A full written decision will follow later.

Summons will be issued when I can get online.
 
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