Appeal: Accepted In re [2026] FCR 7 | [2026] SCR 7

[TheSnowGuardian]

Username: TheSnowGuardian

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: Bank of Reveille, LLC

File(s) attached

What Case are you Appealing?: [2026] FCR 7

Link to the Original Case: Appeal: Accepted - [2025] DCR 108 - Appeal | [2026] FCR 7

Basis for Appeal: (see Brief below)

Supporting Evidence: https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/bank-of-reveille.32570/

Thread 'Legal Entity Act'

Jun 26, 2025

House Vote: 9-0-0
Senate Vote: 4-0-0

A
BILL
To

Provide for Legal Entities​

The people of the Commonwealth of Redmont, through their elected Representatives in the Congress and the force of law ordained to that Congress by the people through the Constitution, do hereby enact the following provisions into law:

1 - Short Title and Enactment
(1) This Act may be cited as the 'Legal Entity Act'
(2) This Act shall be enacted immediately upon its signage.
(3) This Act has been authored by Omegabiebel.
(4) This Act has been co-sponsored by Senator Bezzergeezer...

• Omegabiebel
• Replies: 4
• Forum: Acts of Congress

Thread 'Legal Entity Act'

Dec 29, 2025

A
BILL
To

Provide for legal entities​

The people of the Commonwealth of Redmont, through their elected Representatives in the Congress and the force of law ordained to that Congress by the people through the constitution, do hereby enact the following provisions into law:

1 - Short Title and Enactment
(1) This Act may be cited as the “Legal Entity Act” or the “LEA”.
(2) This Act shall be enacted upon signature
(3) This Act has been authored by Senator Omegabiebel and Vice-President Multiman155
(4) This Act has been co-sponsored by Senator Omegabiebel

2 - Reasons...

• zLost
• Replies: 22
• Forum: Acts of Congress

• 
• 

Thread 'Business Structuring Act Sunset Act'

Oct 5, 2025

House Vote: 6-0-2
Senate Vote: 4-0-0

A
BILL
TO

resolve the ambiguity of BSA to LEA transitions.​

The people of the Commonwealth of Redmont, through their elected Representatives in the Congress and the force of law ordained to that Congress by the people through the constitution, do hereby enact the following provisions into law:

1 - Short Title and Enactment

(1) This Act may be cited as the 'Business Structuring Act Sunset Act' or as the 'BSASA'

(2) This Act shall be enacted immediately upon signage.

(3) This Act has been authored by BlueOtterRiver...

• Talion77
• Replies: 6
• Forum: Acts of Congress

(Further evidence attached below)

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

Under Rule 1.7 of Court Rules and Procedures, the Appellant hereby submits the following evidence that were either (a) had no chance of being admitted in the previous trial, AND/OR (b) were non-existent at the time of the FCR appeal:

Spoiler: DOC Convo

Spoiler: Amended and Final CoF

See Attachment 'BOR - Certificate of Formation(1).pdf'

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

Brief

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
BASIS FOR APPEAL​

I. INTRODUCTION

Bank of Reveille, LLC ("BOR") respectfully appeals the Federal Court's judgment in [2026] FCR 7, dated 16 February 2026. That judgment vacated the District Court verdict in BOR's favour, declared BOR's Legal Entity Act ("LEA") registration void ab initio, ordered BOR's dissolution under the Business Structuring Act Sunset Act ("BSASA"), and directed repayment of $28,850 plus $6,000 in legal fees to the Appellee.

BOR submits that the Federal Court committed three reversible errors of law. First, the court misread the LEA by treating the DOC Secretary's signature as a mere procedural formality, despite LEA Section 9(5)(c) providing that existence unambiguously "shall begin" at that moment. Second, the court applied the BSASA to a company that had already completed its LEA transition before that Act was even enacted - a retroactive application the BSASA's own text does not authorise. Third, even if the court's registration analysis were correct, it erred in finding BOR failed to make continuing reasonable efforts to transition, because the DOC never notified BOR of any deficiency during the transition period, making correction impossible.

For these reasons, BOR asks the Supreme Court to reverse [2026] FCR 7, restore the District Court judgment, and alternatively grant BOR the statutory eight-week transition period it never had the opportunity to use.

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​

II. JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over Federal Court judgments pursuant to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont. This appeal raises questions of statutory interpretation of the LEA and BSASA, and the constitutional validity of BSASA provisions, all squarely within this Court's jurisdiction. BOR appeals as of right from a final judgment that declared its legal existence void and ordered its dissolution.

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​

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background

BOR was incorporated as an LLC under the Business Structuring Act ("BSA") in 2024. On 10 August 2025, the LEA was enacted, repealing the BSA. On 20 October 2025, BOR filed formation documents with the Department of Commerce ("DOC") to transition to the LEA. Acting DOC Secretary ElysiaCrynn signed those documents on or about 21 October 2025. Under LEA Section 9(5)(c), BOR's existence as an LEA entity commenced at that moment.

The BSASA was not enacted until 6 November 2025 - sixteen days after BOR had already completed its LEA registration. BOR therefore entered the BSASA era as an LEA entity, not a BSA entity.

On 20 December 2025, BOR filed the underlying action [2025] DCR 108 to recover a loan. Default judgment was entered for BOR on 10 January 2026.

On 25 January 2026 - 24 days after the BSASA transition deadline had already expired - the DOC conducted a re-review and notified BOR of deficiencies in its formation documents. BOR's manager, Nacholebraa, had no actual notice of these issues until 4 February 2026, when the DOC made direct Discord contact. On that same day, the Appellee filed the present appeal. BOR retained counsel on 7 February 2026, submitted corrected formation documents on 14 February 2026, and provided further amendments on 16 February 2026. All identified deficiencies were cured before any dissolution order could take effect.

B. The Federal Court's Decision

The Federal Court held: (1) the Secretary's signature did not cure the absence of mandatory statutory elements; (2) BOR's LEA registration was void ab initio; (3) BOR remained a BSA entity subject to BSASA; (4) BSASA Section 4(1)(b) prohibited BOR from filing the lawsuit; and (5) BOR failed to make reasonable efforts to transition. The court ordered dissolution and vacated the DCR judgment.

Notably, the Federal Court included Order 4(a), which permits the DOC, at its independent discretion, to allow BOR's filings to be rectified and the status quo before litigation to be restored. BOR submits that this discretionary avenue does not cure the legal errors in the judgment and does not provide the certainty of legal standing that only a reversal on the merits can supply.

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​

IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Federal Court erred in holding that the DOC Secretary's signature did not commence BOR's existence under the LEA, where LEA Section 9(5)(c) expressly provides that the entity "shall begin its existence" from that moment, and LEA Section 6(2)(f) separately provides that Company Docket records - including that signature - are immutable and permanent.

2. Whether the Federal Court erred in applying the BSASA to BOR, where BOR had already completed its LEA transition sixteen days before the BSASA was enacted, meaning BOR was not a "firm under the Business Structuring Act" within the meaning of BSASA Section 5(1) at the time of that Act's enactment.

3. Whether the Federal Court erred in finding that BOR failed to make continuing reasonable efforts to transition, where the DOC never notified BOR of any deficiency during the transition period, correcting during that period was factually impossible.

4. Whether, even if BOR's registration were void, dissolution is the appropriate remedy given that all identified deficiencies have since been fully cured and the DOC confirmed BOR's dissolution would cause substantial harm to the Commonwealth's economy.

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​

V. ARGUMENT

Ground One: The Federal Court Misread the LEA - The Secretary's Signature Commences Existence by Operation of Law, and the Resulting Docket Record Is Immutable

A. The Statutory Sequence Is Unambiguous: "Shall Begin Its Existence"

LEA Section 9(5) sets out a clear, sequential formation process for LLCs. First, the incorporator files a Certificate of Formation. Second, if it fails verification, the DOC provides reasons, and the process stops. Third - and only if verification is passed - a Company Docket is opened, the Secretary signs, and the entity's existence begins. The critical language is in Section 9(5)(c)(iii):

The Corporation shall begin its existence from the point the signature of the Certificate of Formation has been posted in the Company Docket.

The word "shall" is mandatory in statutory construction. The provision does not say the entity "may" begin existence, or that it begins existence "provided the documents are fully compliant." It says the entity shall begin its existence at that point, full stop. This is not ambiguous. This is not open to interpretation. The Federal Court acknowledged this language and then characterised the signature as evidencing "that verification occurred, not that statutory prerequisites were satisfied." With respect, this reading rewrites the statute. The LEA does not say the signature is evidence of verification. It says the signature triggers existence.

B. A Wholly New and Dispositive Argument: LEA Section 6(2)(f) Makes the Company Docket Record Immutable by Law

This argument was not raised or addressed at the FCR stage. It goes directly to the heart of the Federal Court's error.

LEA Section 6(2)(f) provides, in full:

Information recorded in the Company Docket shall be immutable and permanent, even if the Incorporated Entity does not exist anymore. (i) Small mistakes such as spelling mistakes may be corrected shortly after posting, but may not alter the meaning or the spirit of the record.

The Secretary's signature on BOR's Certificate of Formation is a record in the Company Docket. It was posted there on 21 October 2025. Under LEA Section 6(2)(f), that record is immutable and permanent. It cannot be deleted, reversed, or treated as if it never happened.

The Federal Court's ruling that BOR was void ab initio requires precisely that: it requires this Court to treat the Secretary's signature - a permanent, immutable docket record under the LEA's own terms - as legally meaningless. The LEA itself forbids this. Section 6(2)(f) is not a minor procedural provision. It is a substantive rule of evidentiary permanence that the legislature deliberately enacted to give legal certainty to Company Docket records. To hold that a court may declare an immutable record void is to strike down a clear statutory mandate.

The only carve-out in Section 6(2)(f)(i) is for "small mistakes such as spelling mistakes" - and even those "may not alter the meaning or the spirit of the record." The Secretary's signature is not a spelling mistake. It is the foundational act of formation. It cannot be corrected away, it cannot be voided, and it cannot be treated as legally inoperative. This Court should find that the Federal Court's void ab initio declaration is incompatible with LEA Section 6(2)(f).

C. The DOC's Power to Reject Is Exhausted Upon Signing - There Is No Post-Signature Revocation Power

LEA Section 9(5)(b) grants the DOC one specific and limited power: to reject a deficient Certificate before signing, and to "provide a clear reason" for that rejection. This is the DOC's only statutory opportunity to act on deficient formation documents. The DOC did not exercise this power at the point of review on 21 October 2025. It verified, signed, and opened the docket.

The LEA contains no provision allowing the DOC to revoke, nullify, or retroactively reject a formation after the docket has been opened. Separately, LEA Section 6(3) states:

DOC shall have the power to reject any formation of an Incorporated Entity for a clear and justifiable reason.

"Reject" applies to "formation" - the process. Once formation is complete and existence has begun under Section 9(5)(c)(iii), there is no longer a formation to reject. The DOC can only reject before the act is complete. This is confirmed by the immutability rule in Section 6(2)(f): once posted in the docket, the record stands.

The legislature chose to vest the gatekeeping function in the DOC's verification process. If the DOC negligently passes a deficient document, the remedy is to hold the DOC accountable - not to void the entity's existence at the expense of an innocent incorporating party who relied in good faith on the official docket.

D. The Void Ab Initio Finding Creates Unworkable Consequences Inconsistent with Legislative Intent

Under the Federal Court's ruling, any LEA entity whose formation documents contain a deficiency the DOC failed to catch is retroactively void from the date of filing - potentially months after trading, contracting, and litigating. This produces absurd results: all contracts would be of doubtful validity, all judgments obtained would be vulnerable to collateral attack, and any party that relied on the official Company Docket as confirmation of valid formation would have no legal protection. Courts in this Commonwealth should not adopt interpretations that produce such manifestly unreasonable results.

E. All Deficiencies Have Been Cured

Even accepting the Federal Court's view that deficiencies must be corrected, BOR corrected all of them before dissolution proceedings commenced. The corrected Certificate of Formation (revised 14 February 2026, further amended 16 February 2026) explicitly states the LLC is member-based, correctly names the entity as "Bank of Reveille," uses the correct instrument title, and adds all required sections. The DOC Secretary confirmed receipt and ongoing review. Where a deficiency is cured, the rationale for voiding the registration evaporates.

Ground Two: The BSASA Does Not Apply to BOR - Applying It Would Require Retroactive Reclassification That the Statute Does Not Authorise

A. The BSASA's Plain Text Applies Only to Firms "Under the Business Structuring Act" - BOR Was Not

BSASA Section 5(1) states:

All firms under the Business Structuring Act shall be given 8 weeks from the enactment of this act to transition to the Legal Entities Act, failure to do this will result in dissolution.

The operative phrase is "firms under the Business Structuring Act." This is a status question, assessed at the moment of the BSASA's enactment: 6 November 2025. On that date, was BOR under the BSA? No. BOR had filed its LEA formation documents on 20 October 2025 and received the Secretary's signature on 21 October 2025 - sixteen days earlier. Under LEA Section 9(5)(c)(iii), BOR's existence as an LEA entity commenced at that signature. BOR was therefore an LEA entity, not a BSA firm, when the BSASA was enacted.

The Federal Court did not dispute this timeline. It reached BOR via the back door: by first declaring the LEA registration void, it reclassified BOR as a BSA firm, then applied the BSASA to that reclassified entity. But this sequencing is circular. It requires the court to use the BSASA's consequences (dissolution) to justify a reclassification that is the necessary predicate for applying the BSASA in the first place. If the LEA registration is valid - as Ground One establishes it is - then BOR was never a BSA firm on 6 November 2025, and the BSASA simply does not reach it.

B. This Is a Genuinely New Argument Not Addressed at FCR Stage: The BSASA Cannot Operate Retroactively

The FCR proceedings debated whether BOR's registration was valid - but did not squarely confront the retroactivity problem that arises from the Federal Court's approach.

The Federal Court's reasoning works like this: (1) the formation documents were deficient; (2) therefore, the LEA registration was always void; (3) therefore, BOR was always a BSA firm; (4) therefor,e the BSASA applied to BOR from 6 November 2025 onwards. Steps (2) and (3) involve a retroactive reclassification - looking back to 21 October 2025 and recharacterising BOR's status on that date.

But statutes do not operate retroactively unless they expressly say so. The BSASA contains no retroactivity clause. It applies to "firms under the Business Structuring Act" - a present-tense status at the time of enactment, not a status that courts may later assign retrospectively based on post-enactment findings. The Federal Court essentially enacted its own retroactivity provision by judicial decision. That is not statutory interpretation. It is judicial legislation, and this Court should not endorse it.

Retroactive application of the BSASA to BOR is also unconstitutional. R. Const. Section 32(14) protects against deprivation except "in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Retroactively reclassifying an entity as a BSA firm - based on a DOC error that BOR had no knowledge of - and then applying dissolution provisions that were never in force at the time of BOR's transition, is not fundamentally just by any standard.

C. The Appellee’s Internal Contradiction

If the Court accepts that BOR was a BSA firm subject to the BSASA, then BSASA Section 4(1)(a) prohibited BOR from entering into the loan contract during the transition period. The loan contract would be void. If the contract is void, the entire judgment - the very thing the Appellee is trying to protect by bringing this appeal - is vacated anyway. There is no path available to the Appellee that preserves both the dissolution argument and the underlying debt. BOR's registration was either valid (BSASA does not apply, judgment stands) or it was not (contract void, judgment falls). The Appellee cannot have it both ways.

Ground Three: The Federal Court Erred in Finding BOR Failed to Make Reasonable Efforts to Transition

A. BOR Could Not Correct Deficiencies It Was Never Notified Of - This Is a New Factual Argument

BSASA Section 5(2)(a) postpones dissolution as long as a firm "continues to make reasonable efforts to transit." The Federal Court held that BOR made no corrective efforts during the transition period, and this constituted a failure of the "continuing" requirement.

What makes this finding legally untenable is a simple factual sequence that the Federal Court did not adequately address: the DOC did not notify BOR of any deficiency during the transition period. The transition period ran from 6 November 2025 to 1 January 2026. The DOC posted its notification in the Company Docket on 25 January 2026 - twenty-four days after the deadline had already expired. The DOC then made direct Discord contact on 1 February 2026. BOR's manager had actual awareness of the issue on 4 February 2026.

The question this Court must ask is: what "reasonable effort to transit" was available to BOR during the window it was given, when the DOC itself had not identified any problem with the registration? The answer is none - because from BOR's perspective, the transition was already complete. The DOC's own signature said so. The Company Docket said so. BOR had no obligation to second-guess the regulator's official verification.

"Reasonable" is an objective standard assessed against the circumstances known to the party. BOR's circumstances included an official DOC signature confirming formation. No reasonable incorporator in that position would have taken further corrective steps during the transition period. To find that BOR "failed" to make efforts is to impose a standard of clairvoyance, not reasonableness.

B. Once BOR Had Actual Notice, It Acted Promptly

BOR's manager had no actual notice of any issue until 4 February 2026. Within three days, counsel was retained. Within ten days of actual notice, a corrected Certificate of Formation was submitted. All identified issues were resolved by 16 February 2026. This is a demonstrably prompt and continuing good-faith effort. The statute requires reasonable effort, not instantaneous perfection, and BOR met that standard the moment it became aware there was a problem.

C. The DOC's Own Conduct Caused the Prejudice

The Federal Court itself noted that the DOC Secretary who signed BOR's documents was newly appointed and had been in post barely one month. The DOC had over two months during the transition period to identify and flag the deficiencies. It did not. It then waited a further 24 days after the deadline to notify BOR. This is an institutional failure by the regulator. The consequences of that failure should not be borne by BOR, the innocent party. To dissolve BOR for failing to correct deficiencies that the DOC sat on for three months is to use dissolution as a punishment for the regulator's own negligence.

Ground Four: Dissolution Is Disproportionate When All Deficiencies Have Been Cured and the DOC Has Confirmed Economic Risk

Even if this Court concludes that BOR's original registration was deficient, dissolution is not the only or necessary remedy. The Federal Court itself recognised this through Order 4(a), which gives the DOC discretion to permit rectification and restoration of the status quo. BOR submits that rectification should be the primary outcome, not a fallback.

The DOC's own assessment, filed pursuant to the Federal Court's Writ of Mandamus, stated unequivocally that BOR's dissolution "may pose substantial harm to the Commonwealth's economy." BOR holds over $12 million in its database balance - approximately 11% of all cash in Redmont's economy not held by the Federal Reserve Bank. The DOC specifically identified risks of capital lock-up, disruption to depositor confidence, and systemic consequences for Redmont's financial industry.

The purpose of dissolution under the BSASA is to ensure all firms are properly constituted under the LEA framework. That purpose is fully served if BOR is permitted to regularise its position. As of 16 February 2026, BOR has submitted fully compliant formation documents. Dissolving an entity that is now in compliance, whose dissolution the government's own department says will harm the economy, serves no legitimate regulatory purpose, and causes disproportionate harm.

Ground Five: Congress Itself Has Declared That BOR Continues to Exist - This Argument Was Impossible to Raise at FCR Stage

A. The New LEA Part VIII Section 2 Is a Direct Legislative Declaration of BOR's Continued Existence

This argument was not available at the FCR stage because the new Legal Entity Act was signed into law on 7 February 2026 - after the FCR briefing process had already begun. It is therefore squarely new evidence and a new legal argument for this Court.

The new Legal Entity Act, enacted on 7 February 2026, contains the following provision at Part VIII, Section 2:

All entities existing under the repealed Act shall be regarded as continuing to exist under this Act.

BOR existed under the repealed LEA from 21 October 2025, the date the DOC Secretary signed its Certificate of Formation and opened the Company Docket. Under the old LEA Section 9(5)(c)(iii), BOR's existence commenced at that moment. BOR was therefore an entity "existing under the repealed Act" when the new LEA came into force.

Congress has therefore expressly declared, by statute, that BOR continues to exist under the new Act. This is not a court's inference or a lawyer's argument - it is a direct legislative declaration. The Federal Court's void ab initio ruling, issued on 16 February 2026, directly contradicts an express act of Congress signed nine days earlier. A court judgment cannot override a congressional declaration of corporate existence. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont establishes that Congress is the supreme law-making body. Where Congress has spoken plainly - "all entities existing under the repealed Act shall be regarded as continuing to exist" - no court may declare the contrary.

B. The New LEA's Immutability Provision Confirms and Strengthens the Section 6(2)(f) Argument

The new LEA restates the immutability rule at Part III Section 1(5), with one important addition not present in the old LEA: subsection (c) provides that "The Incorporated Entity Summary shall be exempt" from the immutability rule. This carve-out is significant. The legislature specifically identified the one category of Company Docket record that can be updated - the Incorporated Entity Summary - and declared everything else immutable.

The Secretary's signature on the BOR's Certificate of Formation is not part of the Incorporated Entity Summary. It is a separate filing in the Company Docket. It therefore falls squarely within the immutability rule and outside the only exception Congress created. The new LEA makes this clearer than the old one did. Congress has now twice - in the immutability provision and in Part VIII Section 2 - enacted provisions that are inconsistent with the Federal Court's void ab initio declaration.

C. The New LEA Removes Interest-Based LLCs and Requires Conversion - BOR Is Unaffected Because It Is Member-Based

The Federal Court's Appellant Reply Brief argued that BOR "cannot comply" with the new LEA's requirement to convert interest-based LLCs to corporations within 30 days, because BOR had never specified its structure. This argument is now moot. BOR's corrected Certificate of Formation, submitted 14 February 2026, explicitly states the LLC is member-based. Member-based LLCs are preserved under the new LEA. The new LEA Part VIII Section 1(1) applies only to interest-based LLCs. BOR is not affected by it. The Appellee’s argument that BOR's failure to specify its structure compounds its non-compliance, therefore, has no further force.

Ground Six: StateStreet Is Factually Distinguishable and Should Not Be Extended to This Case

The Federal Court relied on ToadKing v. StateStreet [2025] FCR 134. That case is distinguishable on its central fact: StateStreet never received the Secretary's signature confirming LEA formation. The entity had genuinely never completed the transition. BOR, by contrast, received the Secretary's signature on 21 October 2025, which under LEA Section 9(5)(c)(iii) commenced its existence as an LEA entity. The precise factual element that drove the StateStreet outcome - absence of the Secretary's signature - is not present here.

Furthermore, the immutability argument under LEA Section 6(2)(f) was not before the court in StateStreet. That provision provides an independent and dispositive basis for distinguishing this case: BOR has a permanent, immutable docket record of its formation that StateStreet lacked. This Court should not extend StateStreet to cover a factual situation that is materially different in the most legally significant respect.

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VI. ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT: IF THE COURT FINDS BOR WAS SUBJECT TO BSASA, IT MUST BE GRANTED THE STATUTORY EIGHT-WEEK TRANSITION PERIOD

Should this Court accept the Federal Court's finding that BOR remained a BSA firm, BOR submits it is nonetheless entitled to the eight-week transition period prescribed by BSASA Section 5(1).

BOR genuinely and reasonably believed it had already transitioned to the LEA. When the BSASA was enacted, BOR did not participate in the transition process because it understood itself to already be an LEA entity - a belief the DOC's own signature and the Company Docket record supported. To now classify BOR as a BSA firm and simultaneously deny it the eight-week period the statute grants to every BSA firm produces a result the legislature could not have intended: a firm is penalised more harshly for having attempted a transition in good faith than one that had never tried at all.

If BOR is to be treated as a BSA firm, equity and constitutional fairness require it be given eight weeks from the date of this ruling to complete the LEA transition. BOR has already submitted corrected documents that the DOC is reviewing. The transition could be completed within days. There is no legitimate interest in denying this.

Should the Court raise the question of what statutory provision allows such a request, we ask that the Court go back to BSASA Section 5(2)(a). This clause allows the Court to order the postponement of dissolution for 8 weeks. Should the DOC accept the amended CoF, then the Court is requested to postpone dissolution for an undefined/indefinite period of time for this matter.

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VII. RELIEF REQUESTED

For the foregoing reasons, BOR respectfully requests that this Court:

1. REVERSE the Federal Court's judgment in [2026] FCR 7 in its entirety;

2. DECLARE that BOR was validly registered under the LEA from 21 October 2025, the date of the DOC Secretary's signature, and that the Company Docket record of that registration is immutable and permanent under LEA Section 6(2)(f);

3. REINSTATE the judgment of the District Court in [2025] DCR 108 awarding BOR $28,850 in compensatory damages and 30% legal fees;

4. ORDER that all sums directed to be repaid pursuant to the Federal Court judgment be returned to BOR;

5. AWARD BOR its legal fees in these proceedings;

6. In the ALTERNATIVE, if the Court declines to reverse: DECLARE that BOR is entitled to a full eight-week transition period from the date of this ruling to rectify its formation documents and complete its LEA transition, and DIRECT the DOC to accept BOR's corrected Certificate of Formation as the basis for its LEA registration;

7. Such further or other relief as this Honourable Court deems just and appropriate.

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Motion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION
The Appellant requests that the Court grant an emergency injunction prohibiting the Department of Commerce from placing the Appellant into receivership pending appellate review.

Receivership proceedings are imminent and would cause immediate and irreparable harm to the Appellant, effectively rendering any appeal moot before the Court has an opportunity to consider it. The requested injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo and ensure that appellate review remains meaningful.

Furthermore, receivership may cause:
- Loss of operational control,
- Damage to contractual and financial relationships,
- Possible liquidation or forced restructuring,
- Rendering appellate relief ineffective.

Maintaining the present state of affairs pending appeal serves the interests of justice and prevents irreversible consequences arising before the legality of the underlying actions can be reviewed.

Motion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION

The Appellant requests that the Court grant an emergency injunction prohibiting the Department of Commerce from dissolving the Bank of Reveille.

Dissolution would cause irreparable harm to the Bank of Reveille and, therefore, makes any matter before this court moot.

We request that the Court grant this emergency injunction until the Court considers the Appeal.

 

[Matthew100x]

I am recusing from this case due to my past work with BOR and because I am presently on their staff for Alexandria.

 

[Smallfries]

This case is an appeal of a decision made in an appeal. In re DCR 108 [2025] | FCR 7 [2026]. Upon the resignation of Chief Justice Aladeen, there are two sitting Justices on the Supreme Court of Redmont. There is constitutional language detailing what is to happen when there are only two judges sitting on the bench, and an appeal of an appeal comes before the court. See generally In re SCR 5 [2023] | SCR 4 [2026]; see also Judicial Standards Act ("JSA") § 12(2). When that occurs, the Speaker of Congress "will also preside" over that case.

The Speaker of Congress is called to sit as a third Justice in this case.

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

Your Honour(s),

We wish to ask a question before the court on prevalence of opinion/judgement incase of disagreement of the Court before it. We seek your permission.

 

[Smallfries]

Your Honour(s),

We wish to ask a question before the court on prevalence of opinion/judgement incase of disagreement of the Court before it. We seek your permission.

I am confused as to what exactly this is trying to say. Furthermore, absent a quorum of 2, I cannot answer any questions, provide any guidance, or do anything procedural with this case.

Final note: were it not clear already, with the recusal of Default Chief Justice Matthew100x, I will be acting as Senior Justice for tie-breaking purposes.

 

[Smallfries]

Speaker @Kaiserin_ is present as second acting Justice.

 

[Smallfries]

Following the passage of the Unified Constitution II Act, the Judicial Standards Act is no longer constitutional. As statute cannot amend or override the Constitution, the section giving the Speaker of Congress the role as acting Justice in this circumstance is no longer valid.

@Kaiserin_ is removed as acting Justice. This case no longer has a constitutionally needed quorum to proceed.

 

[Smallfries]

Final note: were it not clear already, with the recusal of Default Chief Justice Matthew100x, I will be acting as Senior Justice for tie-breaking purposes.

As I was confirmed as Chief Justice, as of yesterday I will be assuming the full role of Chief Justice for tie-breaking purposes.

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

Your Honours, with the confirmation of Her Honour (yes, HER Honour) Kaiserin, the Appellee humbly asks the status of this appeal.

 

[Smallfries]

Your Honours, with the confirmation of Her Honour (yes, HER Honour) Kaiserin, the Appellee humbly asks the status of this appeal.

I am not an idiot. Please do not insult my intelligence by asking for the status of an appeal I have been exceedingly consistent in updating the status of. You will wait and be patient. If you try to rush my proceedings again you will get a contempt of court charge.

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

I am not an idiot. Please do not insult my intelligence by asking for the status of an appeal I have been exceedingly consistent in updating the status of. You will wait and be patient. If you try to rush my proceedings again you will get a contempt of court charge.

Your Honour, I did not mean to offend you. I was not trying to rush the proceedings, but I was indeed asking if this appeal would continue. Your Honour is most definitely not an idiot, but I surely may be slow in matters of intelligence sometimes.

To simplify, I was asking if this appeal is going to continue with Her Honour Kaiserin now added to the bench.

 

[Smallfries]

Your Honour, I did not mean to offend you. I was not trying to rush the proceedings, but I was indeed asking if this appeal would continue. Your Honour is most definitely not an idiot, but I surely may be slow in matters of intelligence sometimes.

To simplify, I was asking if this appeal is going to continue with Her Honour Kaiserin now added to the bench.

What part of "you will wait and be patient" do you not understand?

 

[Kaiserin_]

In a 2-0 decision, the Supreme Court grants this appeal. Appellant ( @TheSnowGuardian ) shall have 72 hours to file their appellant brief.

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

In a 2-0 decision, the Supreme Court grants this appeal. Appellant ( @TheSnowGuardian ) shall have 72 hours to file their appellant brief.

Your Honour,
Apologies for the delay,
Appellant wishes to waive posting a new brief and wishes to mark the orginal appeal in the SCR as the Appellant's brief.

 

[Kaiserin_]

Your Honour,
Apologies for the delay,
Appellant wishes to waive posting a new brief and wishes to mark the orginal appeal in the SCR as the Appellant's brief.

So noted. Appellee ( @Nacho @ToadKing ) shall have 72 hours to file their appellee brief.

 

[ToadKing]

So noted. Appellee ( @Nacho @ToadKing ) shall have 72 hours to file their appellee brief.

Your Honour,

@Nacho in this case (owner of Bank of Reveille) is the Appellant. In spite of that, I am not counsel for the Appellee, and am not authorised to represent him in this appeal. The Appellee would either have to source counsel themselves, or in the interests of justice and to necessitate a fair trial, a Public Defender could be appointed.

 

[Kaiserin_]

Your Honour,

@Nacho in this case (owner of Bank of Reveille) is the Appellant. In spite of that, I am not counsel for the Appellee, and am not authorised to represent him in this appeal. The Appellee would either have to source counsel themselves, or in the interests of justice and to necessitate a fair trial, a Public Defender could be appointed.

You are correct. Sincerest apologies for the mix-up and the unnecessary ping.

Actual Appellee @KingBOB99878 , and whomever his counsel may be, shall have 72 hours from this message to present their appellee brief. If more time is required, feel free to request an extension. If a Public Defender is required, one will be assigned.

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

You are correct. Sincerest apologies for the mix-up and the unnecessary ping.

Actual Appellee @KingBOB99878 , and whomever his counsel may be, shall have 72 hours from this message to present their appellee brief. If more time is required, feel free to request an extension. If a Public Defender is required, one will be assigned.

Motion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

Your Honours,

The Appellee was granted 72 hours to respond to the Appellant Brief; it is now past that time.

The Defense respectfully requests that:
1) A default judgment for this appeal be made for failure to present a defense, OR
2) A Public Defender be assigned.

Thank you.

 

[Kaiserin_]

Motion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

Your Honours,

The Appellee was granted 72 hours to respond to the Appellant Brief; it is now past that time.

The Defense respectfully requests that:
1) A default judgment for this appeal be made for failure to present a defense, OR
2) A Public Defender be assigned.

Thank you.

Such a motion is not applicable in this appeal - this is not a trial.

That said, the Court declines to appoint a Public Defender at this time, and sees no reason to continue to appellant response, seeing as appellee has filed no brief. The Court will now enter recess pending verdict.

 

[Smallfries]

Verdict

Chief Justice Fries writes the unanimous opinion of the Court. Associate Justice Matthew100x did not take part in discussion or voting.

Appellant Bank of Reveille (“BOR” or “Appellant”) appeals an intermediate appellate action against them. There, appellant KingBob99878 (“KingBob” or “Appellee”) appealed the verdict of the District Court. In the intermediate appeal, the reviewing court held for KingBob and overturned in its entirety the trial court’s order. The reviewing court further held BOR’s October 20, 2025 registration invalid, and thus the organization was prohibited by statute to file lawsuit.

Appellant filed this appeal seeking relief, asking for the Court to overturn the reviewing court’s judgment in its entirety and reinstate the initial award of the District Court. Appellant raises three issues, which we construe into four: (1) The reviewing court erred when it read the signature clause of the original Legal Entity Act (“LEA”) to be a mere formality, (2) the Business Structuring Act Sunset Act (“BSASA”) should not have been applied post-hoc as they had already transitioned, (3) even if the reviewing court’s analysis is correct, the court erred when it held that BOR failed to make efforts to transition, and (4) even if the registration is properly voided, dissolution of the organization is inappropriate when all deficiencies are fixed and substantial harm is likely.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and we review each argument in turn.

I. Facts​

A. Procedural History

On December 20, 2025, Appellant-Plaintiff filed the original case with the District Court, alleging Appellee-Defendant KingBob failed to fulfill the terms of a contract between the two parties. On January 9, 2026, the court entered default judgment in favor of the Appellant, ordering $28,850 in damages (the full amount requested).

On February 3rd, 2026, Appellee appealed to the Federal Court, alleging that Appellant lacked capacity to sue due to a failure to properly transition its registration from the Business Structuring Act (“BSA”) to the LEA, and asking the court to overturn the trial court’s judgment and dissolve BOR. On February 15, 2026, the court ruled in favor of Appellee, vacating in its entirety the trial court’s judgment, declaring the BOR invalidly registered under the LEA, ordering BOR’s dissolution (though giving a way out), and declaring two sections of legislation unconstitutional.

The instant action was filed February 26, 2026.

B. History

The BOR was incorporated sometime in 2024. At the time, the existing law regulating business associations was the BSA, which was passed September 7, 2024. See BSA. Later, the LEA was enacted, repealing the BSA. LEA § 13. That law contained a transition provision mandating BSA associations be converted into LEA associations using the process described in the latter law. BOR attempted to do so October 20.

During the lower court’s review, an excessive, overwhelming, and overbearingly voluminous record shows that Appellee asserted (and Appellant did not contest) four defects with BOR’s LEA filing. Appellee further asserted that these defects—mandated by the LEA—were fatal. Appellant contested this with the argument that the errors were clerical in nature, there is no reason to assume that these errors made BOR’s registration invalid, and that the language of the statute initiated BOR’s existence under the LEA.

The reviewing court was not persuaded by this argument. In its opinion, BOR’s LLC LEA registration was invalid due to the failure of the Certificate of Formation (COF) to properly list the association as member or interest-based. Because this requirement (and others) was not strictly optional, and BOR did not properly put it in, the statutory requirements to satisfy the LEA were not met. Therefore, the BOR was not validly registered, and the court voided the registration. As a result, the only valid registration of BOR was under the previous BSA, which then fell under the BSASA. See generally BSASA.

In coming to this conclusion, the reviewing court then applied the BSASA to BOR, and held that BOR could not validly file a lawsuit. Further, because the action was outside of the transitionary period, BOR was mandated by law to be dissolved. Id. § 5.

II. Discussion​

A. Rule

During the relevant timeframe, business associations were governed by the LEA. LEA § 2. LLCs require a COF, which must contain the name of the LLC, the name of the formator, the stated purpose, the operating agreement, and whether the LLC is interest or member based. Id. § 9(5)–(6). Further, after filing, the Department of Commerce (“DOC”) reviews the COF. See id. § 9(5). If the COF fails, the DOC “shall provide a clear reason [as to why].” Id. § 9(5)(b). If it passes, then the Secretary of the DOC “shall sign” the COF, and the association “shall begin its existence from the point the signature of the [COF] has been posted.” Id. § 9(5)(c)(ii)–(iii).

The BSASA grants an eight week transition period for firms to fully transfer from the BSA to the LEA. BSASA § 5. Failure to transition “will result” in the association being dissolved, with an exception for firms that have only one “shareholder.” Id. The firm may be placed into a receivership by the DOC if the dissolution “may pose substantial harm to [the economy].” Id. § 5(3).

B. Applicability of the Legal Entity Act

In first issue, Appellant contends that the Federal Court erred when it held that the LEA was not the valid applicable law to evaluate BOR. The court arrived at this conclusion when it interpreted the LEA’s requirements for COF filings to be absolutely mandatory for a valid association to be formed. The court’s reasoning is that without the mandatory statutory requirements, the association does not exist, and its filing must be rendered void regardless of any other consideration.

On appeal, Appellant argues that this viewpoint is in error. Appellant points out that the LEA mandates an association “shall begin its existence” when they receive a signature from the DOC. LEA § 9(5)(c)(iii). Appellant points out that there is no other conditional wording here, including that it may only exist when all of the statutory requirements in another section are met: the only stated requirement to exist is a signature from the DOC.

Further, the LEA provides that the information contained in the company document when posted is “immutable and permanent, even if the Incorporated Entity does not exist anymore.” Id. § 6(2)(f). Because of this language, Appellant argues, the reviewing court erred when it essentially deleted the signature from the court upon voiding its existence.

Finally, Appellant argues that the DOC’s discretion ends when a signature is granted. As mentioned supra, the DOC may either reject or accept (and then sign) a COF. After this, the argument goes, the LEA contains no provision that grants power to the DOC to unilaterally change or revoke a COF. Appellant argues that the meaning of the word “reject” in section six applies only proactively to unsigned COF’s, and the DOC cannot somehow reject a COF after signing. See LEA § 6(3) (“DOC shall have the power to reject any formation of an Incorporated Entity for a clear and justifiable reason”).

To begin, we are not convinced by Appellant’s second argument. While true that the company docket is, by law, immutable and unchangeable (but for a limited few circumstances), this is not for legal reasons. Rather, it is exceedingly clear that Congress desired an unchanging historical record for business associations. Given the nature of editing posts, it can be unclear and difficult for those without specific permissions to see what exactly may have changed between an original post and its current edit. Therefore, to ensure that potential business partners, shareholders, and others have all of the proper information that may be relevant, Congress mandated that posts in the docket be untampered with in order to maintain a clear record and timeline.

Further, the reviewing court did not violate this directive when it declared BOR’s COF void. If it had, then a dissolution of a company docket would likewise violate the statutory commandment. It clearly does not. The docket immutability provision is a matter of historical record-keeping alone, and does not imply legal significance in any way.

As to Appellant’s third argument, we agree that it seems clear that the DOC’s discretion in accepting or rejecting a COF is abrogated the moment a signature is posted. According to the wording of the act, it seems that the DOC may only take administrative action to unilaterally force an association to act (in regards to a COF) up until the signature is sent. See LEA § (6)(3). When the signature is sent, there is no longer anything to “reject.” However, this does not mean the DOC must become an inert observer forevermore. The DOC may choose to conduct further investigation, request an association make changes to comply with regulation, or add further regulations as allowed by law. LEA § (12)(a)(iii). The only restriction is that, under the language of the LEA, the DOC may not unilaterally force an association to comply. The remedy if an association does not comply is to file suit and obtain a court order to that effect.

This brings us to Appellant’s initial and most important argument. Does a signature from the DOC on a company docket alone result in the company’s existence, even if required items in other sections of the LEA are missing? A deep dive is warranted.

To begin with, we look at the language of the statute. The LEA says: “If the [COF] passes verification . . . The Corporation shall begin its existence from the point the signature of the [COF] has been posted in the Company Docket.” LEA § 9(5)(c)(iii). Further, another sub-section lists out mandatory contents of the COF, including the name of the association, the operating agreement, and whether the association is interest or member based. Id. § 9(6)(c).

The statute is clear. In no uncertain terms, when the COF passes verification and receives a signature, it is validly created. However, there are two different ways to interpret “passes verification.” Thus, the crux of our issue lies upon the interpretation of the phrase “passes verification.” In the first, verification is a hard requirement that is set by another section of the controlling statute, and can only be met objectively. Under this reading, all mandatory requirements must be met before the verification can be passed. The reviewing court takes this stance. In the other, passing verification is subjective, and only requires the DOC to conduct a good-faith review of the proposed COF. If they believe it meets all requirements, the COF passes verification, the Secretary may sign, and the association is legally created regardless of any unmet mandatory requirements. This is the view of Appellant.

Here, we side with Appellant. It is easy to see the other interpretation’s reasoning: there are mandatory requirements clearly written out in the statute. These are, in no uncertain terms, mandatory. They must be done. Some may ask: how can we validly cast aside this brazen language? That’s the neat part: we don’t.

The only effective difference between the two interpretations is what happens when it is discovered that a COF is statutorily invalid as to the mandatory portions. To be clear, neither interpretation has any real effect until an invalid COF is discovered. Until then, COFs are filed, reviewed, and then accepted or rejected in the same way. However, in the hard, objective view, if the DOC mistakenly accepts a COF that does not meet all of the statutory requirements, that COF necessarily has not “passed verification.” Because of that, the signature is invalid.

In the softer and more subjective view, if the DOC mistakenly accepts a deficient COF, that COF is still legally valid as to the creation of the association itself. However, the signature alone does not cure any stated deficiencies. The result from this view is that an incomplete COF may still validly create an association, but that association carries with it legal baggage that, when observed, must be remedied.

This comports with the intended purpose of the various business organization acts. Congress clearly intended to allow for complex formation of business associations, and to give clear boundaries for them and the regulation of them to spur their existence. If we were to apply the objective interpretation to the instant case, the outcome is clear: the DOC improperly gave BOR notice that they passed verification. They then existed for several weeks as a financial institution, almost certainly engaging in a great many transactions, potentially worth a great deal of money (as can be inferred from a lower court brief submitted by the DOC stating that BOR dissolving could pose “substantial harm” to the Commonwealth’s economy). As a result of the improper formation, the signature—and therefore, the creation under the LEA—in the docket was invalid.

Such a harsh view has momentous implications on corporate law, and would be an extremely draconian measure that does not seem to align with the rest of the body of corporate law within Redmont. This interpretation, if endorsed, would be an odd, extremely formalistic, and highly uncompromising anomaly in a field of otherwise somewhat vague and accommodating law. As to harm, there is potentially no notice afforded to accidental victims of such a mistake. In the instant case, the Appellant was not afforded a previously-extended eight-week grace period that they could have used to fix their COF. However, because the mistake was not found until after the grace period expired, they instead were liable for immediate dissolution. This does not seem to fit with the clear intent, purpose, or desired outcome of Congress.

Further, the text itself does not lend to the objective interpretation. The text first discusses the signature, and says that a signature may be given when the COF “passes verification.” What suffices as “verification” is not explained or detailed, but can be reasonably assumed to mean that the DOC is tasked with verifying the legal requirements are met and other requirements of the DOC are similarly fulfilled. What the text does not say is that the DOC may only sign a docket when the mandatory parts of the statute are satisfied by the COF. The text only says that the DOC must verify. We read this, in totality, to mean that it is permissible for the DOC to be wrong when it verifies. If this happens, an association is still validly created when the DOC grants a signature, even if there exist several flaws as to mandatory portions of the COF. However, when discovered, the association has a duty to alert potentially relevant parties and remedy the deficiencies as soon as possible, and potentially to cease operations (or at least acquiring new business) until the deficiencies are cured.

There is no compelling textual reason to assume that “passes verification” necessitates an objectively correct COF. To pass verification is a subjective (though hopefully objectively correct) fact-based analysis by a human being. Once this is done, any deficiencies later discovered can and must be remedied, especially if they are statutorily mandatory. The DOC can surely force an association to do this by filing suit. Further, enforcing such a stringent requirement on associations that may not have any real notice for weeks or months can do great harm to the community or national economy, and we do not want to read into Congressional legislation such a harm unless they clearly and expressly desire for that harm or burden to exist. Therefore, we hold that the reviewing court erred when it found that BOR was not a valid association under the LEA. Though they undisputedly had deficiencies that were mandatory to fix (perhaps even under pain of criminal liability), this does not override the good-faith verification attempt by the DOC, and there is no textual, purposive, or structural reason to assume that a harder, more objective view should be used.

C. Alleged error of applying the BSASA

In their second issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it applied the BSASA to them after finding that the attempted formation under the LEA was invalid. As discussed supra, we hold that the attempted formation, though incomplete, was valid as to the letter of the law in creating the business. Therefore, it is impermissible to use the BSASA to regulate activities of BOR. As a result, we agree with Appellant and hold that the reviewing court erred when it applied the BSASA.

D. BOR’s attempts to transition

For reasons similar to the previous point, we dismiss as procedurally irrelevant and unnecessary Appellant’s third argument, alleging that the court erred when it found BOR failed to make reasonable efforts to transition. We congratulate them on their transition.

E. Appropriateness of dissolution as a remedy

For reasons similar to the previous issues, we dismiss as irrelevant the fourth issue (whether it was appropriate for the reviewing court to order BOR’s dissolution after it had made attempts to remedy its errors) as a matter of law. However, there is something to say on this topic.

The law is not a cudgel with which to beat those who are ignorant to it. While true enough that ignorance to the law is not an excuse for breaking it, it is also true that, as a matter of equity and fairness, some leeway should perhaps be shown to those that err in good faith, and certainly when they reasonably relied on a trusted official assuring them of their compliance leading to further harm. Here, some tenderness and forgiveness could easily be afforded to BOR. As a matter of equity and fairness, even had the reviewing court been correct up until this point, there is no real reason based in statute or the principles of due process and fairness to deny BOR a chance to ameliorate their situation, as they allege they have done.

Here, there is no statutory hook or legitimate judicial reason to order the unambiguous or unwavering dissolution of BOR. The court, wisely, gave something of a (perhaps not very clearly worded) out in the form of a remedial receivership. We should very much remember that this is little more than a time-consuming hobby conducted by non-professionals with limited time, resources, and attention. The rules do indeed matter; but some leeway should be afforded to those who may unintentionally stray, especially when commandment by law does not explicitly call for their harshest condemnation.

Courts should give even-handed and just sentences even where wrongdoing is found, and can feel free to offer a hand and assist those who are just trying to right a mistake. This is doubly the case for a weeks-hence missed error which could cause great amounts of harm and consternation for not just the involved party, but unaware third parties and bystanders.

III. Conclusion​

The LEA was the proper statutory regimen to evaluate the instance case on. The reviewing court erred when it improperly dismissed the attempted LEA formation as invalid simply because not all requirements for a complete registration were present, despite the very clear commandment by Congress to begin an entity’s existence at the time of signature. Because the LEA controls here, and because verification by the DOC does not require an objectively true and complete review (only a good faith subjective effort, subject to future corrections), we hold that BOR should not have been evaluated under the BSASA or dissolved. We overturn the lower court’s judgment in its entirety and uphold the trial court’s judgment, restoring the latter and dismissing the former (with exception to the contempt fine), including the declarations of unconstitutionality. We further award legal fees of 30% of the compensatory damages ordered by the District Court, so as to compensate Appellant’s counsel for their work in this appeal.

IV. Dicta​

In their opinion, the reviewing court declares two sections of statute unconstitutional: section 5(4)(e) of the BSASA, and section 9(7)(a) of the LEA. As ordered supra, we overturn both of these determinations. We now turn to discuss why.

To begin with, the discussion as to the BSASA was never reached. When we held that the LEA was the controlling statute, all arguments as to the BSASA—including its constitutionality—were irrelevant and were properly discarded. It would make no sense for us to discard those arguments but keep their effects, and so we discard out of hand the unconstitutionality decree. Further, we decline to independently review the unconstitutionality decree because it is not at issue in this appeal, and was not discussed in the preceding appeal until the reviewing court decided to strike it as unconstitutional.

As to the struck section of the LEA, we further find it somewhat distasteful that the reviewing court again reached out of its way to decisively strike down a facet of federal law with little recourse. Here, the parties at issue are both private. Neither brought up the issue of constitutionality in either the preceding appeal or in the instant matter. Without prompting, or without any word from the government—who would ostensibly defend the constitutionality of the text—the reviewing court decisively struck down the text.

We are not immediately sure why exactly the reviewing court decided to look at the offending section at all, as it is completely irrelevant to the issues presented on appeal (further, it is quite queer that the reviewing court decided to use the BSASA to dissolve BOR, but then go back and use the LEA for “winding-up”). The apparent truth of the matter is that the reviewing court decided to undertake an exercise of what is hard to call anything less than judicial legislation. This is entirely impermissible. Outside of extremely important circumstances, courts should stick to the matters before them, only straying outside of those bounds when absolutely necessary. See generally In re SCR 5 [2023] | SCR 4 [2026] (Smallfries4, J., dissenting).

Stepping aside from the issue of appropriate targeting, it is also not clear that such a declaration of statutory constitutionality can or should be made without arguments from the government being heard. At its core, declaring any act by the government—including a passed act of statutory law—unconstitutional is intuitively a remedy held against the government by an aggrieved citizen. The government, then, should have the chance to defend its actions as just and right. If the government can be punished for some action without even having a chance to defend itself in court, then they will not have an opportunity to appeal that ruling. Here, the reviewing court declared two pieces of legislation unconstitutional, unprompted, without relevant discussion by the parties, in a case where all parties were non-governmental. What redress does the government have? Procedurally, they can do nothing but bow their heads and now accept that the law is unconstitutional.

This is dangerous precedent and highly abusable, especially when wielded by singular judges with no checks on them such as the term limits recently made to burden justices of the Supreme Court. With no ability for the government to fight back, individual judicial officers can act as, at best, rogue and unchecked activists legislating as they wish, or at worst, corrupt and arbitrary tyrants. This is unacceptable, and we will not stand for it.

While we do not comment as to the particular merits of the declarations of unconstitutionality, choosing instead to see them as procedurally improper, we do have this to say. Judicial officers are entrusted with some of the most broad, unchecked, and unshackled power in the entirety of our Republic. Indeed, nothing about the powers of the judiciary can even be sardonically described as “democratic.” This is by design. The character of the law as it exists in one specific moment is not and should not bend to the wills of the masses—democratic power used in this way is ripe for abuse and risks corruption and tyranny. Instead, the democratic impulse is tilted towards what the law should be, and we see this as Congress changes the law and the executive applies and enforces the law.

This is compounded (and necessarily so) by the fact that the judiciary is not directly accountable to the citizens. We are not voted on, we do not go up for referendum, and our approval polls are not taken. We answer as an aristocratic body only to the supreme legislative authority in the Republic: Congress. Therefore, the nearly unlimited power of the judiciary to decree law or policy as they see fit is tempered by only two things: the internal regulation and self-imposed limits of judicial officers, and the oversight power of Congress.

The internal check we as judicial officers place upon ourselves is the first, most often used, and greater of the two restraints. A judicial officer’s self imposed moral, legal, and ethical code, desiring to adhere to principles of democracy and republican virtue, prevent them from exceeding or abusing their power. All those with power to make change are tempted to use it; those who restrain themselves because they know it is not truly theirs to use are of a higher moral fiber than those that would decide to make their own perfect world.

Tempting as it may be, the judiciary must not use its powers to change the law as it sees fit when such a change is clearly outside the bounds of normal judicial review, even when it would be to the great benefit of the nation. See [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal (“[T]he judiciary rules as to what the law is, not what it should be . . . if citizens dislike the outcome of this case, it is because they do not like the law as it is implemented . . . [the courts] do not exist to ‘fix’ issues of policy or politics. The courts should, shall, and must be above such temptations.”) (emphasis original). Unless it is extremely important to declare a law unconstitutional, the alternative is absolutely unworkable, or there is truly no rational alternative interpretation that could hold the statute as constitutional, courts should restrain themselves from overriding Congress, particularly when the text is not explicitly before them in argument or the government is not a party to proceedings.

We cannot understate that the judiciary is not rooted in democratic power: we are aristocrats, unshaken and undisturbed by the clamor of the people’s will. This is a necessity for the rule of law. However, this blade is double-edged: as a result, we are the least democratically legitimate, and changes we make to the fabric of law have the highest scrutiny and outcry. As we are trusted with such great power as to merely speak words and make the law so, we must exercise that power responsibly.

If the judiciary ignores these bright red lines and abuses its power (whether that abuse is of the tyrannical or the “good” activist character), the only check upon the judiciary’s power remains with Congress. Congress may hold hearings, conduct oversight, pass restrictive statutes, censure, issue public reprimands, impeach, and even promulgate constitutional amendments to curb the judiciary. We have seen each of these happen in recent months as parts of the judiciary have grown more bold and at times assertive. Whether Congress’s response was warranted or not is immaterial. What is important is that these responses do happen.

For the judiciary to function properly, it must be trusted to conduct itself appropriately and respect the common sense boundaries of its self-imposed limitations, and not be overly restricted or hampered by the reactionary impulses of a Congress fearful of tyranny. Every restriction imposed upon the judiciary’s ability to do their job is a great and terrible burden that slows the proper and efficient administration of justice. This point should be uncontroversial: Congress meddling with the workings of the judiciary is a net negative for the whole of the Republic, regardless of the intent.

Therefore, there is only one logical way for the nation to function properly: Congress must not be goaded into restricting the judiciary. To achieve this, the judiciary must self-regulate and ensure it does not overstep its boundaries. When Congress involves itself, the judiciary as a system is at dangerous risk of grinding to a halt. But if the judiciary cannot police itself, Congress has no choice but to become involved. For the good of the Commonwealth, then, it is the duty of every judicial officer to ensure that they are appropriately weighing their actions and legal orders so as not to overstep their boundaries and risk intervention from Congress, even if the action in question is ostensibly beneficial to the common good.

The Supreme Court appreciates novel and avant-garde approaches to the law, but cautions practitioners, advocates, and judicial officers to not be too far on the side of “move fast and break things.” The people, the Congress, and the Constitution’s law and desires must come first and foremost.

Finally, we have seen a concerning trend of individuals, including in this case, hold up precedent from the Federal Court as binding on other matters within the Federal Court. Though we decline to definitely speak on this matter as of right now, we find little reason other than convention as to why this should be the case. Just because one federal judge managed to grab a case with a novel issue before others did does not mean that their singular determination (absent an appeal) shall forever control the thoughts and decisions of other federal judges.

The Federal Court, with its single-member bench structure, can be argued to exist as a sort of “laboratory of democracy,” where different approaches can be tested out from different perspectives. When this happens, after some time an appeal can be brought to the Supreme Court, where we can then weigh the merits of each of the fully-litigated approaches and the accompanying valid verdicts from lower court officials. In this manner, we may determine properly what the law truly is. A “race to the bottom” with single judges forcing their mark upon jurisprudence is not healthy for our legal system. Though certainly persuasive on the intermediate court level, and perhaps mandatory if the judge who issued the precedent is the same judge applying it, one should take caution before unambiguously applying the highest level of deference to Federal Court precedent.