Lawsuit: In Session Commonwealth of Redmont v. kisskissy [2026] FCR 84

Matthew100x

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Matthew100x
Matthew100x
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Case Filing


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


Commonwealth of Redmont
Plaintiff

v.

kisskissy
Defendant

COMPLAINT​

The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF​

The Commonwealth of Redmont, through the Department of Education (“DOE”) and an investigation conducted by the Department of Justice and its investigative authorities, became aware of an ongoing compromise of DOE-administered examinations. The investigation uncovered online videos and related materials displaying and disseminating answers to DOE-administered examinations. The Commonwealth’s evidence connects Defendant kisskissy to the publication and dissemination of those materials and further shows that the Defendant offered or sold exam answers to others.

The investigation has presently identified 123 compromised exam questions and corresponding answers, spanning legal examinations and several additional DOE-administered examinations. Some of the compromised material has remained publicly available for at least approximately one month. Its continued availability has substantially impaired the DOE’s ability to use and enjoy its controlled examination materials, has required or will require the review and replacement of compromised questions, and continues to facilitate cheating so long as the material remains available.

The Commonwealth therefore brings this action for Nuisance and Breach of Academic Integrity, seeking the statutory civil penalties and an order requiring the Defendant to abate the continuing nuisance by removing and ceasing dissemination of the compromised examination materials.

I. PARTIES​

  1. Plaintiff, the Commonwealth of Redmont, is the sovereign government of Redmont and acts in this matter through its appropriate Executive departments, including the Department of Education and Department of Justice.
  2. Defendant, kisskissy, is the person whom the Commonwealth alleges published, disseminated, and/or sold answers to DOE-administered examinations.

II. FACTS​

  1. The Department of Education administers examinations within the Commonwealth of Redmont. (see Part VII, §§ 1(a)-(b), 2(a)-(d), Act of Congress - Bar Association of Redmont Act).
  2. With respect to legal examinations specifically, the DOE possesses statutory authority to develop, maintain, and update the examinations, establish examination procedures and requirements, and set passing criteria. The DOE is additionally required to ensure examination security and maintain examination records. (see Id.)
  3. Through its examination records and administration, the DOE became aware of suspicious patterns involving multiple persons completing and passing legal examinations within unusually short periods of time and in close temporal proximity to one another.
  4. Those circumstances prompted further investigation by the Commonwealth.
  5. The Department of Justice and its investigative authorities thereafter investigated the suspected compromise of DOE-administered examinations.
  6. The investigation identified an online video channel containing videos that disclosed questions and corresponding answers from DOE-administered examinations. (See P-001, which we will disseminate in closed court).
  7. The Commonwealth will not identify the channel or reproduce the compromised examination content in this public filing because doing so would further disseminate the material that this action seeks to contain and abate.
  8. The Commonwealth possesses evidence connecting Defendant kisskissy to the publication and dissemination of those videos. The Commonwealth intends to submit evidence revealing the channel, its contents, and the evidence connecting the Defendant to it through an appropriate closed-court procedure so that the evidence itself does not further compromise DOE examinations.
  9. The investigation further produced evidence that the Defendant gave, offered, and/or sold DOE-administered examination answers to other persons.
  10. The videos and related materials were accessible to other persons and were used or available to be used for the purpose of obtaining answers before completing DOE-administered examinations.
  11. Some of the compromised material has remained available for at least approximately one month, making the interference continuing rather than isolated or momentary.
  12. Further review established that the compromise was not limited to legal examinations. The compromised materials also included answers associated with the Jeweller, Hunter, Driver’s License, Miner, and Fisher examinations, among other examination material identified in the Commonwealth’s evidence.
  13. The Commonwealth has presently identified 123 individual exam questions and corresponding answers that were compromised and disseminated through the Defendant’s conduct.
  14. Because those answers were made available indiscriminately to prospective examinees, the affected questions can no longer reliably perform their intended function as secure examination questions without review, alteration, replacement, or other remedial action by the DOE.
  15. The Defendant had no authorization or consent from the Commonwealth or the DOE to publish, distribute, give, or sell the answers.
  16. The continued publication of the compromised examination materials impairs the Commonwealth’s continuing use of its examination bank, undermines examination security, and imposes upon the DOE the need to identify, review, modify, and replace compromised material.
  17. To the extent evidence originating outside Redmont is introduced, the Commonwealth offers that evidence as corroboration of the Defendant’s identity, authorship, dissemination, or related Redmont-directed conduct. The Commonwealth does not rely upon the mere existence of conduct outside Redmont as a separate cause of action.
  18. Certain administrative penalties arising from the examination-compromise investigation may already have been assessed against the Defendant. To the extent an identical act has already resulted in an administrative assessment, the Commonwealth seeks enforcement or confirmation of the outstanding assessment rather than a duplicative second assessment for the same act.
  19. The Commonwealth has suffered a concrete injury because examination materials under DOE administration and control have been compromised, their continued secure use has been impaired, and at least 123 questions must now be reviewed and potentially changed. The alleged injury is directly attributable to the Defendant’s dissemination of those materials, the conduct is alleged to violate the Redmont Civil Code Act, and that Act expressly supplies civil penalties and abatement relief. The Commonwealth therefore satisfies the requirements of standing. (see Rule 2.1,Information - Court Rules and Procedures ).
  20. One Civil Penalty Unit is presently equivalent to $120. (see Part II, § 8(3), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act ).
  21. Plaintiff alleges 123 separately disseminated examination answers. At the statutory maximum of 20 Civil Penalty Units for each proven Breach of Academic Integrity violation, Count II places up to 2,460 Civil Penalty Units, or $295,200, in controversy before consideration of Count I.
  22. The Federal Court possesses original jurisdiction over major civil cases whose value exceeds $120,000. (see Part II, § 18(1)(c), Government - Constitution).

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF​

COUNT I — NUISANCE​

  1. Nuisance is an intentional or negligent property violation for which the Civil Code authorizes up to 50 Civil Penalty Units and an order to abate the nuisance. A violation occurs where a person causes a substantial and unreasonable interference with another’s use and enjoyment of property and that interference would be offensive to a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position. The statute excludes interference to which the plaintiff consented or which results from the ordinary and reasonable use of the defendant’s own property. (see Part VII, § 6(a)–(d), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act ).
  2. The Civil Code places Nuisance within its Property Torts Part, which protects the possession, use, and enjoyment of property and addresses unlawful interference with property rights. (see Part VII, introductory provision, Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).
  3. The Commonwealth, through the DOE, develops, maintains, administers, controls, and uses its examination materials. With respect to legal examinations, statute expressly assigns the DOE responsibility for developing and maintaining the examinations and for ensuring their security. (see Part VII, §§ 1(1)(a), 2(2)(a), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).
  4. The Defendant substantially interfered with the Commonwealth’s use and enjoyment of those controlled examination materials by publishing and disseminating their answers to persons who could access those answers before taking the examinations.
  5. That interference is substantial because at least 123 examination questions and answers have been compromised, requiring the DOE to review, modify, replace, or otherwise remediate the affected examination materials before they may again reliably function as secure assessments.
  6. The interference is continuing because the Defendant’s videos and associated materials have remained available over an extended period and remain capable of compromising examinations for so long as they continue to be accessible.
  7. The interference is unreasonable. A reasonable person in the Commonwealth’s position, charged with administering examinations and maintaining examination security, would find the unauthorized public dissemination and sale of confidential examination answers offensive and incompatible with the continued secure use of those materials.
  8. The Commonwealth and DOE did not consent to the Defendant’s publication or dissemination of the examination answers.
  9. The interference did not arise from the ordinary and reasonable use of the Defendant’s own property. Publishing, distributing, or selling another entity’s controlled examination answers for use by prospective examinees is not an ordinary or reasonable use sufficient to invoke § 6(d).
  10. Accordingly, Defendant committed Nuisance in violation of Part VII, § 6 of the Redmont Civil Code Act.

COUNT II — BREACH OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY​

  1. Breach of Academic Integrity is an administrative violation carrying a remedy of up to 20 Civil Penalty Units where a person gives or sells answers to DOE-administered exam questions, or purchases or receives cheated answers and uses them on a DOE-administered examination. (see Part XIII, § 8(a)–(b), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).
  2. The Commonwealth alleges that the Defendant gave answers to DOE-administered exam questions by recording, publishing, and making videos and related materials containing those answers available to other persons.
  3. The Commonwealth further alleges that the Defendant sold or offered to sell DOE-administered examination answers to other persons, or otherwise disseminated this information by giving it away for free.
  4. The Commonwealth’s present investigation has identified 123 individual examination questions whose corresponding answers were disclosed through the scheme.
  5. Plaintiff alleges that each independently disclosed answer constitutes a discrete act of giving an answer to a DOE-administered exam question and therefore pleads 123 violations of Breach of Academic Integrity under Part XIII, § 8(a).
  6. In the alternative, should the Court determine that the statutory unit of violation is a discrete publication, transfer, sale, or dissemination event rather than each individual answer disclosed, Plaintiff requests a finding of liability for each separate dissemination or sale established by the evidence.
  7. Administrative violations may be directly enforced only by a government entity and are subject to a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden. The Commonwealth is the governmental enforcing party in this action. (see Part II, § 9(5), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).
  8. The Civil Code further defines an administrative violation as a regulatory breach subject to immediate government enforcement without a formal trial and provides that such enforcement may subsequently be contested before a judicial officer. (see Part II, § 7(5), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).
  9. Accordingly, for any violation already administratively assessed against the Defendant based upon the same act, the Commonwealth requests judicial confirmation and enforcement of the outstanding assessment rather than the imposition of a duplicative assessment. For additional violations proven in this action that have not previously been assessed, the Commonwealth requests the penalty authorized by Part XIII, § 8.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF​

The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Defendant:

  1. A finding of liability for Nuisance under Part VII, § 6 of the Redmont Civil Code Act.
  2. The full 50 Civil Penalty Units authorized for the Nuisance violation, in light of the duration, scope, intentional nature, and continuing consequences of the Defendant’s conduct. In selecting a civil penalty, the Court may consider the seriousness of the violation, the violator’s intent and conduct, aggravating circumstances, compliance history, community protection, and deterrence
  3. An order abating the nuisance, requiring Defendant kisskissy, within a period fixed by the Court, to:
    • remove all videos, posts, documents, files, or other materials within the Defendant’s possession or control that reveal answers to DOE-administered examinations;
    • cease publishing, republishing, distributing, giving, or selling the compromised examination answers;
    • take reasonable steps available to the Defendant to remove copies uploaded through accounts or channels controlled by the Defendant; and
    • certify compliance with the Court’s abatement order under potential sanction of contempt of court.
  4. A finding of liability for each Breach of Academic Integrity violation proven by clear and convincing evidence under Part XIII, § 8(a) of the Redmont Civil Code Act.
  5. A finding, on Plaintiff’s principal theory, that the 123 independently disclosed examination answers constitute 123 violations, and an award or enforcement of up to 20 Civil Penalty Units per proven violation, subject to appropriate credit or treatment for any identical violation already administratively assessed.
  6. In the alternative, should the Court reject a per-answer unit of violation, the maximum authorized penalty for each discrete publication, dissemination, transfer, or sale that the Court determines constitutes a separate violation under Part XIII, § 8(a).
  7. For any Breach of Academic Integrity violations already administratively assessed but remaining unpaid, judicial confirmation and enforcement of those outstanding assessments, rather than duplicative penalties for the identical conduct.
  8. Leave to submit evidence that would reveal currently compromised examination questions, answers, channel identifiers, or other security-sensitive information through an appropriate closed-court procedure, so that litigating this action does not itself further disseminate the compromised material.
  9. Such further orders as are necessary to effectuate and enforce the statutory abatement of the nuisance.
The Commonwealth reserves the ability to introduce additional material during discovery consistent with Court Rule 4.2, which requires material relied upon in legal argument to have been included in the complaint, an amendment, or a discovery submission. (see Rule 4.2, Information - Court Rules and Procedures).

DATED: This 30th day of August, 2026.



Motion


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION


Commonwealth of Redmont,
Plaintiff

v.

kisskissy
Defendant

The Commonwealth of Redmont respectfully moves this Court for an Emergency Injunction preserving assets belonging to Defendant kisskissy up to the amount of $295,200, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. RELIEF REQUESTED​

  1. The Commonwealth requests an immediate Emergency Injunction restraining Defendant kisskissy from transferring, withdrawing, gifting, selling, concealing, encumbering, dissipating, or otherwise disposing of money or other readily transferable assets to the extent necessary to preserve $295,200 pending resolution or satisfaction of the Commonwealth's administrative assessment for Breach of Academic Integrity.
  2. The Commonwealth further requests that the Department of Homeland Security, or other appropriate governmental authority designated by the Court, be authorized and directed to identify and secure Defendant's funds and liquid assets, including funds held through Redmont financial institutions, only until assets totaling $295,200 have been preserved.
  3. The Commonwealth does not request an unlimited freeze of Defendant's property. Any money or property exceeding the $295,200 preservation amount should remain unrestricted.
  4. If Defendant possesses less than $295,200 in money and readily transferable assets, the Commonwealth requests preservation of all available assets up to their total value.
  5. In the alternative, should the Court determine that direct preservation through DHS is unnecessarily restrictive, the Commonwealth requests that Defendant be required to place or maintain assets totaling $295,200 in a secured account, bond, or equivalent Court-approved mechanism for the duration of this proceeding.

II. AUTHORITY FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF​

  1. The Judicial Standards Act expressly authorizes a Court to issue an injunction compelling a litigant to do, or refrain from doing, an act. It further authorizes an Emergency Injunction before or during a proceeding upon the application of a litigant or prospective litigant. (see Part V, § 1(1)–(2)(b), Judicial Standards Act).
  2. The underlying civil proceeding has already been commenced through the Commonwealth's Complaint against Defendant. The statutory rule governing expiration of an Emergency Injunction where no proceeding has been commenced therefore presents no obstacle here. (see Part V, § 1(3), Judicial Standards Act).
  3. The Judicial Standards Act additionally authorizes the Courts to issue writs necessary in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. To the extent implementation of this preservation order requires governmental assistance beyond an injunction directed personally against Defendant, the Commonwealth alternatively requests relief under that authority. (see Part V, § 2(1), Judicial Standards Act).

III. THE COMMONWEALTH MAY IMMEDIATELY ENFORCE BREACH OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY​

  1. Breach of Academic Integrity is expressly classified as an Administrative Violation under the Redmont Civil Code Act. It carries a remedy of up to 20 Civil Penalty Units where a person gives or sells answers to DOE-administered examination questions. (see Part XIII, § 8(a), Redmont Civil Code Act).
  2. The Civil Code defines an Administrative Violation as a regulatory breach enforced by a government entity through an immediate penalty, without the need for a formal trial, which may subsequently be contested before a judicial officer. (see Part II, § 7(5), Redmont Civil Code Act).
  3. Administrative Violations may only be directly enforced by a government entity and require proof by clear and convincing evidence. (see Part II, § 9(5), Redmont Civil Code Act).
  4. The Commonwealth is the governmental enforcement entity in this matter.
  5. Based upon the investigation described in the Complaint and the evidence possessed by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth has identified 123 DOE-administered examination questions and corresponding answers that Defendant gave, distributed, published, and/or sold.
  6. The Commonwealth therefore alleges 123 separate violations of Breach of Academic Integrity and, contemporaneously with this proceeding, has administratively assessed the maximum authorized penalty of 20 Civil Penalty Units per violation, subject to Defendant's statutory right to contest that enforcement before a judicial officer.
  7. One Civil Penalty Unit is presently equal to $120. (see Part II, § 8(1)–(3), Redmont Civil Code Act).
  8. The administrative assessment is therefore calculated as follows: 123 violations × (20 Civil Penalty Units × $120) = $295,200.
  9. Accordingly, the $295,200 that the Commonwealth seeks to preserve is not an estimate of speculative future consequential damages, punitive damages, legal fees, or some multiplier potentially awarded after trial. It represents the amount of the Commonwealth's presently asserted administrative assessment arising directly from the Breach of Academic Integrity violations.

IV. AN EMERGENCY INJUNCTION IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DISSIPATION OF ASSETS​

  1. The purpose of an Emergency Injunction in Redmont is preventative: it exists to prevent harm before final adjudication.
  2. The Supreme Court has explained that Emergency Injunctions exist to prevent irreparable harm and that interim relief must be directed toward preventing future harm rather than merely compensating for past harm. (see Commonwealth v. Bardiya_King [2023] SCR 23, Post #4).
  3. Here, the harm sought to be prevented is not merely the underlying academic-integrity violation. That conduct has already occurred and is addressed through the administrative penalties.
  4. The distinct and prospective harm is that Defendant may spend, transfer, conceal, distribute, or otherwise dissipate the assets available to satisfy those penalties while this litigation and any judicial contest of the administrative enforcement remain pending.
  5. The Commonwealth's assessment totals $295,200, a substantial sum.
  6. The Commonwealth further understands that Defendant does not presently possess sufficient immediately accessible funds to satisfy the entire assessment.
  7. That makes preservation especially important. Where the Defendant's assets are already insufficient to satisfy the administrative obligation, continued spending or transfer of the remaining assets would materially diminish the Commonwealth's ability to enforce the penalty.
  8. Money that is transferred, gifted, spent, concealed through entities, deposited into other accounts, converted into transferable property, or otherwise placed beyond the Defendant's immediate ownership may require separate investigations or proceedings to recover.
  9. An order entered after those assets have disappeared would not meaningfully preserve the Commonwealth's enforcement power. The purpose of the Emergency Injunction is therefore to preserve the existing pool of assets while the Defendant retains the ability to contest the administrative assessment.

V. REDMONT PRECEDENT SUPPORTS A CAPPED ASSET-PRESERVATION ORDER​

  1. Redmont courts have previously employed Emergency Injunctions to prevent the dissipation of assets necessary to satisfy the subject matter of pending litigation.
  2. In ko531 v. Incarnation__ & Jakkuwu_ et al. [2026] FCR 47, the Federal Court granted an Emergency Injunction with modification and directed DHS to seize and secure assets up to the amount the Court found appropriate to preserve pending adjudication. The Court rejected a substantially larger requested freeze and instead limited the restraint to the amount sufficiently connected to the underlying claim. (see ko531 v. Incarnation__ & Jakkuwu_ et al. [2026] FCR 47, Post #7).
  3. The Commonwealth does not ask the Court to freeze millions of dollars in assets merely because Defendant possesses them, nor does the Commonwealth ask the Court to restrain property above the administrative assessment.
  4. The Federal Court's decision in MasterCaelen v. Hon. Magistrate Dr_Eksplosive [2026] FCR 14 further demonstrates the importance of tailoring an asset freeze to the proper parties and amount. There, the Federal Court vacated an Emergency Injunction insofar as it froze millions of dollars belonging to a person who was not a party to the underlying litigation, while expressly restoring the injunction as applied to the named defendants. (see MasterCaelen v. Hon. Magistrate Dr_Eksplosive [2026] FCR 14, Court Order).
  5. The concerns identified in MasterCaelen are avoided here.
    1. First, kisskissy is the named Defendant in this proceeding.
    2. Second, the Commonwealth seeks to restrain only assets in which Defendant possesses an ownership interest.
    3. Third, the requested restraint is expressly capped at the amount of the administrative assessment: $295,200.
    4. Fourth, Defendant retains the ability to appear before this Court, contest the administrative assessment, move to reconsider the injunction, and otherwise exercise the procedural rights afforded to a named litigant.

VI. THE BALANCE OF HARM FAVORS PRESERVATION​

  1. The requested injunction is narrowly tailored.
  2. If the injunction is granted, Defendant's assets are preserved only up to $295,200. Assets exceeding that amount remain available for Defendant's use.
  3. If Defendant ultimately succeeds in contesting some or all of the administrative violations, the preserved assets can simply be released to the extent the assessment is reduced.
  4. Conversely, if no injunction is entered and Defendant dissipates the assets during litigation, a later decision sustaining the Commonwealth's assessment may be substantially more difficult or impossible to enforce against the presently available property.
  5. The potential harm caused by the injunction is therefore temporary restriction of a defined amount of Defendant's assets.
  6. The potential harm caused by denying the injunction is permanent dissipation of the assets necessary to satisfy an immediately enforceable governmental penalty.
  7. The latter harm is greater.
By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 30th day of August, 2026.

 

Motion


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION


Commonwealth of Redmont,
Plaintiff

v.

kisskissy
Defendant

The Commonwealth of Redmont respectfully moves this Court for an Emergency Injunction preserving assets belonging to Defendant kisskissy up to the amount of $295,200, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. RELIEF REQUESTED​

  1. The Commonwealth requests an immediate Emergency Injunction restraining Defendant kisskissy from transferring, withdrawing, gifting, selling, concealing, encumbering, dissipating, or otherwise disposing of money or other readily transferable assets to the extent necessary to preserve $295,200 pending resolution or satisfaction of the Commonwealth's administrative assessment for Breach of Academic Integrity.
  2. The Commonwealth further requests that the Department of Homeland Security, or other appropriate governmental authority designated by the Court, be authorized and directed to identify and secure Defendant's funds and liquid assets, including funds held through Redmont financial institutions, only until assets totaling $295,200 have been preserved.
  3. The Commonwealth does not request an unlimited freeze of Defendant's property. Any money or property exceeding the $295,200 preservation amount should remain unrestricted.
  4. If Defendant possesses less than $295,200 in money and readily transferable assets, the Commonwealth requests preservation of all available assets up to their total value.
  5. In the alternative, should the Court determine that direct preservation through DHS is unnecessarily restrictive, the Commonwealth requests that Defendant be required to place or maintain assets totaling $295,200 in a secured account, bond, or equivalent Court-approved mechanism for the duration of this proceeding.

II. AUTHORITY FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF​

  1. The Judicial Standards Act expressly authorizes a Court to issue an injunction compelling a litigant to do, or refrain from doing, an act. It further authorizes an Emergency Injunction before or during a proceeding upon the application of a litigant or prospective litigant. (see Part V, § 1(1)–(2)(b), Judicial Standards Act).
  2. The underlying civil proceeding has already been commenced through the Commonwealth's Complaint against Defendant. The statutory rule governing expiration of an Emergency Injunction where no proceeding has been commenced therefore presents no obstacle here. (see Part V, § 1(3), Judicial Standards Act).
  3. The Judicial Standards Act additionally authorizes the Courts to issue writs necessary in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. To the extent implementation of this preservation order requires governmental assistance beyond an injunction directed personally against Defendant, the Commonwealth alternatively requests relief under that authority. (see Part V, § 2(1), Judicial Standards Act).

III. THE COMMONWEALTH MAY IMMEDIATELY ENFORCE BREACH OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY​

  1. Breach of Academic Integrity is expressly classified as an Administrative Violation under the Redmont Civil Code Act. It carries a remedy of up to 20 Civil Penalty Units where a person gives or sells answers to DOE-administered examination questions. (see Part XIII, § 8(a), Redmont Civil Code Act).
  2. The Civil Code defines an Administrative Violation as a regulatory breach enforced by a government entity through an immediate penalty, without the need for a formal trial, which may subsequently be contested before a judicial officer. (see Part II, § 7(5), Redmont Civil Code Act).
  3. Administrative Violations may only be directly enforced by a government entity and require proof by clear and convincing evidence. (see Part II, § 9(5), Redmont Civil Code Act).
  4. The Commonwealth is the governmental enforcement entity in this matter.
  5. Based upon the investigation described in the Complaint and the evidence possessed by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth has identified 123 DOE-administered examination questions and corresponding answers that Defendant gave, distributed, published, and/or sold.
  6. The Commonwealth therefore alleges 123 separate violations of Breach of Academic Integrity and, contemporaneously with this proceeding, has administratively assessed the maximum authorized penalty of 20 Civil Penalty Units per violation, subject to Defendant's statutory right to contest that enforcement before a judicial officer.
  7. One Civil Penalty Unit is presently equal to $120. (see Part II, § 8(1)–(3), Redmont Civil Code Act).
  8. The administrative assessment is therefore calculated as follows: 123 violations × (20 Civil Penalty Units × $120) = $295,200.
  9. Accordingly, the $295,200 that the Commonwealth seeks to preserve is not an estimate of speculative future consequential damages, punitive damages, legal fees, or some multiplier potentially awarded after trial. It represents the amount of the Commonwealth's presently asserted administrative assessment arising directly from the Breach of Academic Integrity violations.

IV. AN EMERGENCY INJUNCTION IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DISSIPATION OF ASSETS​

  1. The purpose of an Emergency Injunction in Redmont is preventative: it exists to prevent harm before final adjudication.
  2. The Supreme Court has explained that Emergency Injunctions exist to prevent irreparable harm and that interim relief must be directed toward preventing future harm rather than merely compensating for past harm. (see Commonwealth v. Bardiya_King [2023] SCR 23, Post #4).
  3. Here, the harm sought to be prevented is not merely the underlying academic-integrity violation. That conduct has already occurred and is addressed through the administrative penalties.
  4. The distinct and prospective harm is that Defendant may spend, transfer, conceal, distribute, or otherwise dissipate the assets available to satisfy those penalties while this litigation and any judicial contest of the administrative enforcement remain pending.
  5. The Commonwealth's assessment totals $295,200, a substantial sum.
  6. The Commonwealth further understands that Defendant does not presently possess sufficient immediately accessible funds to satisfy the entire assessment.
  7. That makes preservation especially important. Where the Defendant's assets are already insufficient to satisfy the administrative obligation, continued spending or transfer of the remaining assets would materially diminish the Commonwealth's ability to enforce the penalty.
  8. Money that is transferred, gifted, spent, concealed through entities, deposited into other accounts, converted into transferable property, or otherwise placed beyond the Defendant's immediate ownership may require separate investigations or proceedings to recover.
  9. An order entered after those assets have disappeared would not meaningfully preserve the Commonwealth's enforcement power. The purpose of the Emergency Injunction is therefore to preserve the existing pool of assets while the Defendant retains the ability to contest the administrative assessment.

V. REDMONT PRECEDENT SUPPORTS A CAPPED ASSET-PRESERVATION ORDER​

  1. Redmont courts have previously employed Emergency Injunctions to prevent the dissipation of assets necessary to satisfy the subject matter of pending litigation.
  2. In ko531 v. Incarnation__ & Jakkuwu_ et al. [2026] FCR 47, the Federal Court granted an Emergency Injunction with modification and directed DHS to seize and secure assets up to the amount the Court found appropriate to preserve pending adjudication. The Court rejected a substantially larger requested freeze and instead limited the restraint to the amount sufficiently connected to the underlying claim. (see ko531 v. Incarnation__ & Jakkuwu_ et al. [2026] FCR 47, Post #7).
  3. The Commonwealth does not ask the Court to freeze millions of dollars in assets merely because Defendant possesses them, nor does the Commonwealth ask the Court to restrain property above the administrative assessment.
  4. The Federal Court's decision in MasterCaelen v. Hon. Magistrate Dr_Eksplosive [2026] FCR 14 further demonstrates the importance of tailoring an asset freeze to the proper parties and amount. There, the Federal Court vacated an Emergency Injunction insofar as it froze millions of dollars belonging to a person who was not a party to the underlying litigation, while expressly restoring the injunction as applied to the named defendants. (see MasterCaelen v. Hon. Magistrate Dr_Eksplosive [2026] FCR 14, Court Order).
  5. The concerns identified in MasterCaelen are avoided here.
    1. First, kisskissy is the named Defendant in this proceeding.
    2. Second, the Commonwealth seeks to restrain only assets in which Defendant possesses an ownership interest.
    3. Third, the requested restraint is expressly capped at the amount of the administrative assessment: $295,200.
    4. Fourth, Defendant retains the ability to appear before this Court, contest the administrative assessment, move to reconsider the injunction, and otherwise exercise the procedural rights afforded to a named litigant.

VI. THE BALANCE OF HARM FAVORS PRESERVATION​

  1. The requested injunction is narrowly tailored.
  2. If the injunction is granted, Defendant's assets are preserved only up to $295,200. Assets exceeding that amount remain available for Defendant's use.
  3. If Defendant ultimately succeeds in contesting some or all of the administrative violations, the preserved assets can simply be released to the extent the assessment is reduced.
  4. Conversely, if no injunction is entered and Defendant dissipates the assets during litigation, a later decision sustaining the Commonwealth's assessment may be substantially more difficult or impossible to enforce against the presently available property.
  5. The potential harm caused by the injunction is therefore temporary restriction of a defined amount of Defendant's assets.
  6. The potential harm caused by denying the injunction is permanent dissipation of the assets necessary to satisfy an immediately enforceable governmental penalty.
  7. The latter harm is greater.
By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 30th day of August, 2026.

The Emergency Injunction is granted. The DHS is ordered to seize and hold in custody $295,200 from the Defendant.

My apologies, it seems as this case slipped through the cracks.
 

Writ of Summons


@kisskissy is hereby commanded to appear before the Federal Court in the case of Commonwealth of Redmont v. kisskissy [2026] FCR 84.

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

Writ of Summons


@kisskissy is hereby commanded to appear before the Federal Court in the case of Commonwealth of Redmont v. kisskissy [2026] FCR 84.

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

Im poor i want a free lawyer
 
Im poor i want a free lawyer
Pursuant to the Public Defence Policy of the Judiciary, a public defender may be called when the case will result in a default judgement, or if "the defendant requests a public defender and can reasonably justify compelling circumstances of hardship financial or otherwise".

As you requested a public defender, you are ordered to submit a brief to the Court explaining your compelling circumstances of hardship, financial or otherwise, with evidence attached, within 72 hours.
 
In Lawsuit: Pending - Megamango800 vs. JackalGG [2026] DCR 164, Magistrate Judge Poker found that the defendant was ineligible for a public defender because they are a lawyer. Here, we're not alleging that the Defendant cheated to pass the exams. We're alleging that the Defendant recorded themselves passing the exams and then uploaded those videos. Defendant is at minimum a barrister (I cannot check online at the moment to see if they achieved the attorney rank) and therefore capable of representing himself in Federal Court because his license to practice is not in question.

Additionally, the constitutional right to a lawyer is a right to protect the public from prosecutorial overreach, especially in the context of the recent amendment to said right. (see Act of Congress - Hire an Attorney Act). Now, at the time the case was filed, this wasn't signed yet. However, since the case has been summoned, this right has come into effect.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth is not charging the Defendant with a crime. We are charging them civilly for a Nuisance (see Part VII, § 6(a)–(d), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act) and Breach of Academic Integrity (see Part XIII, § 8(a)–(b), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act), which are both civil charges under the Redmont Civil Code Act. Under the amendment's changes, a Public Defender is not given to protect a defendant in civil cases.

Therefore, the Defendant should not be awarded a public defender to defend them in this action and should represent themself.
 
In Lawsuit: Pending - Megamango800 vs. JackalGG [2026] DCR 164, Magistrate Judge Poker found that the defendant was ineligible for a public defender because they are a lawyer. Here, we're not alleging that the Defendant cheated to pass the exams. We're alleging that the Defendant recorded themselves passing the exams and then uploaded those videos. Defendant is at minimum a barrister (I cannot check online at the moment to see if they achieved the attorney rank) and therefore capable of representing himself in Federal Court because his license to practice is not in question.

Additionally, the constitutional right to a lawyer is a right to protect the public from prosecutorial overreach, especially in the context of the recent amendment to said right. (see Act of Congress - Hire an Attorney Act). Now, at the time the case was filed, this wasn't signed yet. However, since the case has been summoned, this right has come into effect.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth is not charging the Defendant with a crime. We are charging them civilly for a Nuisance (see Part VII, § 6(a)–(d), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act) and Breach of Academic Integrity (see Part XIII, § 8(a)–(b), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act), which are both civil charges under the Redmont Civil Code Act. Under the amendment's changes, a Public Defender is not given to protect a defendant in civil cases.

Therefore, the Defendant should not be awarded a public defender to defend them in this action and should represent themself.
The Court agrees with the Plaintiff and denies Defendant's request for a public defender summarily. They shall represent themselves or employ representation.

Defendant shall file their answer to the complaint within 48 hours.

@kisskissy
 
I rerequest a Public Lawyer
The Court agrees with the Plaintiff and denies Defendant's request for a public defender summarily. They shall represent themselves or employ representation.

Defendant shall file their answer to the complaint within 48 hours.

@kisskissy
 
I rerequest a Public Lawyer
Your initial request for a public defender was denied, the Court will not grant reconsideration without any arguments being introduced. You are not to submit ridicolous requests to the Court, should you continue to do so you may be held in contempt of court.

The pending deadline stands.
 
Your initial request for a public defender was denied, the Court will not grant reconsideration without any arguments being introduced. You are not to submit ridicolous requests to the Court, should you continue to do so you may be held in contempt of court.

The pending deadline stands.
my agruement is that i dont know what to say
 
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my agruement is that i dont know what to say
You are hereby held in contempt of court. As it appears obvious to the Court that Defendant acted with the intent to blatantly disrespect the Court, they shall be fined $12,000 and be imprisioned for 10 minutes. The deadline still stands. The out of turn statement is further struck.
 
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Motion


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF REDMONT
MOTION TO ENTER INQUEST PROCEEDINGS

Seeing as how the defence has failed to file a responsive pleading within the deadline, given multiple warnings by the court, and has been formally denied a public defender, I move we enter inquest procceedings under Rule 3.6.1.

 

Motion


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF REDMONT
MOTION TO ENTER INQUEST PROCEEDINGS

Seeing as how the defence has failed to file a responsive pleading within the deadline, given multiple warnings by the court, and has been formally denied a public defender, I move we enter inquest procceedings under Rule 3.6.1.

Court Order


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
COURT ORDER - INQUEST PROCEEDING

Granted.

Pursuant to Rule 3.6.1 of the Court Rules and Procedures, as the defendant has failed to respond to the summons within 72 hours, the case shall proceed into an inquest proceeding under Rule 3.6.2.

Discovery shall be open for 5 days from now on. The Plaintiff may apply by motion for the issuance of subpoenas, writs, or summonses as the Court deems judicially prudent. After the closure of discovery, the Plaintiff shall submit a written brief containing a factual narrative of the controversy and all relevant legal arguments.

So ordered.

Signed,
Judge Talion Montclair-Contour

 
I only sold the answers in everwild and due to it being a law and not a rule i should be getting sued and those vids u mentioned that are mosted somewhere are not mine. you got any proof that those are my vids? )whats the account that posted them)
 
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I only sold the answers in everwild and due to it being a law and not a rule i should be getting sued and those vids u mentioned that are mosted somewhere are not mine. you got any proof that those are my vids? )whats the account that posted them)
You are hereby held in contempt of court again for your repeated out-of-turn statements. As it appears obvious to the Court that Defendant acted with the intent to blatantly disrespect the Court, they shall be fined $12,000 and be imprisioned for 10 minutes. The out-of-turn statement is struck.
 
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This time i said nothing stupid and you only do contempt of court to me cause you hate me like i didnt even get a lawyer and i said the truth
You are hereby held in contempt of court again for your repeated out-of-turn statements. As it appears obvious to the Court that Defendant acted with the intent to blatantly disrespect the Court, they shall be fined $12,000 and be imprisioned for 10 minutes.
 
This time i said nothing stupid and you only do contempt of court to me cause you hate me like i didnt even get a lawyer and i said the truth
The out-of-turn statement is struck. You are an Attorney, you know better than this. Should you wish to submit defences, follow the correct procedure.
 
Your Honor,

KSLaw is present on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant, kisskissy, an Attorney in good standing, shall serve as lead counsel, and sillyjustin shall appear as co-counsel under the Defendant's direct supervision pursuant to Part VIII, § 1 of the Bar Association of Redmont Act. The Defendant has reviewed and approved this filing.

kisskissy's consent to this arrangement, naming the firm, lead counsel and co-counsel.
1791477678887.png


kisskissy's Qualifications.

1791477759016.png


Commands /business staff list KSLaw and /business info KSLaw, showing sillyjustin and kisskissy.

1791477776554.png

1791478012876.png

Motion


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT

Your Honor,

The defence moves that the default in this case be vacated, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

1. Under Rule 3.6.3 (Motion to Vacate Default), the Court "shall entertain such a motion upon a showing of good cause for the party's prior failure to respond."

2. The Defendant did not ignore this case. The Defendant appeared the day after the summons and, in that first post, asked for counsel (Post #4), and asked again after that request was denied (Post #11). After the denial on 23 September (Post #10), the Defendant had 48 hours to find counsel or answer, alone, a Federal Court complaint seeking $295,200.

3. The order entering the inquest (Post #17) did not notify the Defendant and did not state a deadline for a Motion to Vacate. Rule 6.6 provides that "Judicial Officers shall notify the respective party in a case whenever they are required to deliver a filling... Failure to notify may justify an extension of deadlines if a party can show that they were unaware of their turn." The Defendant, then unrepresented, was not told that a Motion to Vacate was available or when it was due.

4. The Defendant's out-of-turn statement on 3 October (Post #18) was rightly struck. The defence does not rely on its content. It is raised only to show that the Defendant was trying to contest the claims and did not know the procedure for doing so. The Defendant retained counsel on 6 October, and this motion follows as soon as the supervision required by Part VIII, § 1 of the Bar Association of Redmont Act could be put in place.

5. Vacating the default will not prejudice the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has not yet filed its inquest brief, and the Emergency Injunction already directs the DHS to seize and hold the Defendant's assets up to $295,200 (Post #2). The Plaintiff told this Court that the Defendant "retains the ability to appear before this Court, contest the administrative assessment... and otherwise exercise the procedural rights afforded to a named litigant" (Post #1). The Redmont Civil Code Act, Part II, § 7(5), likewise provides that an administrative violation "can be contested before a judicial officer after enforcement." Without a vacatur, 123 counts at the statutory maximum would be decided without any defence being heard.

6. Courts have vacated defaults on lesser showings. In MegaMango800 v. Ebborsnam [2026] DCR 170, Post #16, a default was vacated where the defendant had simply been away from the server. In Slime_Mario v. Commonwealth of Redmont and Vernicia [2026] DCR 148, Post #37, the Court held that defaulting a party who had not been invited to answer was "too strict a reading of the Rules." In PlayerData v. Jane_Street [2026] DCR 128, Post #28, the presiding officer in this case allowed the defence to file an answer to complaint after the deadline had passed.

The defence respectfully requests that the Court:

1. Vacate the default and resume proceedings under the general rules of Court, pursuant to Rule 3.6.3;
2. Grant the Defendant 48 hours to file an Answer to Complaint, and re-open discovery for 72 hours thereafter; or
3. In the alternative, grant the Defendant leave to file a legal brief in response to the Plaintiff's inquest brief before verdict.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 8th day of October, 2026.

 
Your Honor,

KSLaw is present on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant, kisskissy, an Attorney in good standing, shall serve as lead counsel, and sillyjustin shall appear as co-counsel under the Defendant's direct supervision pursuant to Part VIII, § 1 of the Bar Association of Redmont Act. The Defendant has reviewed and approved this filing.

kisskissy's consent to this arrangement, naming the firm, lead counsel and co-counsel.
View attachment 101549

kisskissy's Qualifications.

View attachment 101553

Commands /business staff list KSLaw and /business info KSLaw, showing sillyjustin and kisskissy.

View attachment 101554
View attachment 101565

Motion


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT

Your Honor,

The defence moves that the default in this case be vacated, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

1. Under Rule 3.6.3 (Motion to Vacate Default), the Court "shall entertain such a motion upon a showing of good cause for the party's prior failure to respond."

2. The Defendant did not ignore this case. The Defendant appeared the day after the summons and, in that first post, asked for counsel (Post #4), and asked again after that request was denied (Post #11). After the denial on 23 September (Post #10), the Defendant had 48 hours to find counsel or answer, alone, a Federal Court complaint seeking $295,200.

3. The order entering the inquest (Post #17) did not notify the Defendant and did not state a deadline for a Motion to Vacate. Rule 6.6 provides that "Judicial Officers shall notify the respective party in a case whenever they are required to deliver a filling... Failure to notify may justify an extension of deadlines if a party can show that they were unaware of their turn." The Defendant, then unrepresented, was not told that a Motion to Vacate was available or when it was due.

4. The Defendant's out-of-turn statement on 3 October (Post #18) was rightly struck. The defence does not rely on its content. It is raised only to show that the Defendant was trying to contest the claims and did not know the procedure for doing so. The Defendant retained counsel on 6 October, and this motion follows as soon as the supervision required by Part VIII, § 1 of the Bar Association of Redmont Act could be put in place.

5. Vacating the default will not prejudice the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has not yet filed its inquest brief, and the Emergency Injunction already directs the DHS to seize and hold the Defendant's assets up to $295,200 (Post #2). The Plaintiff told this Court that the Defendant "retains the ability to appear before this Court, contest the administrative assessment... and otherwise exercise the procedural rights afforded to a named litigant" (Post #1). The Redmont Civil Code Act, Part II, § 7(5), likewise provides that an administrative violation "can be contested before a judicial officer after enforcement." Without a vacatur, 123 counts at the statutory maximum would be decided without any defence being heard.

6. Courts have vacated defaults on lesser showings. In MegaMango800 v. Ebborsnam [2026] DCR 170, Post #16, a default was vacated where the defendant had simply been away from the server. In Slime_Mario v. Commonwealth of Redmont and Vernicia [2026] DCR 148, Post #37, the Court held that defaulting a party who had not been invited to answer was "too strict a reading of the Rules." In PlayerData v. Jane_Street [2026] DCR 128, Post #28, the presiding officer in this case allowed the defence to file an answer to complaint after the deadline had passed.

The defence respectfully requests that the Court:

1. Vacate the default and resume proceedings under the general rules of Court, pursuant to Rule 3.6.3;
2. Grant the Defendant 48 hours to file an Answer to Complaint, and re-open discovery for 72 hours thereafter; or
3. In the alternative, grant the Defendant leave to file a legal brief in response to the Plaintiff's inquest brief before verdict.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 8th day of October, 2026.

Default Judgement is vacated. Defendant shall submit their answer to complaint within 72 hours, after that, discovery shall be open for 5 days, where Plaintiff's closed court discovery submissions shall carry over. The Defendant shall be granted access to the discovery submissions on the judiciary discord as soon as discovery has commenced, an invite will be sent.
 

Answer to Complaint


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT


Commonwealth of Redmont
Plaintiff

v.

kisskissy (represented by KSLaw)
Defendant

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Parties

1. Defendant AFFIRMS that the Plaintiff is the Commonwealth of Redmont, acting through its Executive departments.
2. Defendant DENIES that the Defendant, within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, published, disseminated, or sold answers to DOE-administered examinations. The Defendant does not dispute being the person named in this action.

Facts
1. Defendant AFFIRMS that the Department of Education administers examinations within the Commonwealth of Redmont.
2. Defendant AFFIRMS that the Department of Education holds the statutory authority and duties described, as stated in Part VII, §§ 1-2 of the Bar Association of Redmont Act.
3. Defendant DENIES that the Department of Education identified suspicious patterns in its examination records. No such records have been produced, and the Plaintiff is put to strict proof.
4. Defendant DENIES that any such circumstances prompted an investigation, and puts the Plaintiff to strict proof.
5. Defendant DENIES that the investigation described took place, and puts the Plaintiff to strict proof.
6. Defendant DENIES that any video channel connected to the Defendant disclosed questions or answers from DOE-administered examinations. P-001 has not been disclosed to the Defendant, and the Plaintiff is put to strict proof.
7. Defendant AFFIRMS that the Complaint does not identify the channel or reproduce its contents.
8. Defendant DENIES that any evidence connects the Defendant to the publication or dissemination of the videos described. The Defendant did not record, publish, or disseminate those videos, and does not own or operate the channel.
9. Defendant DENIES that any giving or selling of answers to DOE-administered examinations by the Defendant took place within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, and puts the Plaintiff to strict proof. Offering is not an element of Part XIII, § 8(a) of the Redmont Civil Code Act (see Defence 3).
10. Defendant DENIES that any videos attributable to the Defendant were accessible to or used by other persons, and denies that the Defendant, within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, made any material accessible. The Plaintiff is put to strict proof.
11. Defendant DENIES that any material attributable to the Defendant remains available within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, and denies that any interference is continuing.
12. Defendant DENIES that any material attributable to the Defendant's conduct within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth compromised the Jeweller, Hunter, Driver's License, Miner, Fisher, or any other examination, and puts the Plaintiff to strict proof.
13. Defendant DENIES that 123 examination questions, or any number of them, were compromised and disseminated through the Defendant's conduct within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.
14. Defendant DENIES that the Defendant, within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, made answers available to prospective examinees, and denies the consequences alleged.
15. Defendant AFFIRMS that the Defendant held no authorisation from the Commonwealth or the Department of Education, and avers that none is required for conduct outside the Commonwealth. Nothing in this answer admits that the Defendant published, distributed, gave, or sold any examination answers.
16. Defendant DENIES that any continued publication by the Defendant within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth impairs the Commonwealth's use of its examination bank.
17. Defendant DENIES that there is any Redmont-directed conduct by the Defendant for evidence from outside Redmont to corroborate. The Defendant notes the Plaintiff's concession (Post #1) that it "does not rely upon the mere existence of conduct outside Redmont as a separate cause of action."
18. Defendant DENIES that any administrative penalty was validly assessed against the Defendant, and contests every such assessment before this Court under Part II, § 7(5) of the Redmont Civil Code Act.
19. Defendant DENIES that the Commonwealth has suffered an injury attributable to the Defendant's conduct within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.
20. Defendant AFFIRMS that one Civil Penalty Unit is equivalent to $120 under Part II, § 8(3) of the Redmont Civil Code Act.
21. Defendant DENIES that 123 violations occurred, and denies that Breach of Academic Integrity is counted per answer.
22. Defendant AFFIRMS that the Federal Court has original jurisdiction over civil cases whose value exceeds $120,000. This does not concede that Redmont law reaches the conduct alleged.

Defendant DENIES every allegation in the Complaint, including Parts III (Claims for Relief) and IV (Prayer for Relief), that is not expressly affirmed above.

II. DEFENCES

1. The Everwild lies outside the jurisdiction of Redmont

1.1 Staff and Congress have placed the Everwild outside Redmont

Staff have designated the Everwild by name as outside the reach of government. "Wilderness worlds (End, Nether, Wild, Everwild, Outback) are all lawless, international lands outside the scope of government regulation and control" (Staff Vetos, Government Jurisdiction Limits). "Wilderness worlds are considered international zones and fall outside domestic jurisdiction" (Staff Intent, Jurisdiction). Congress has legislated to the same effect. The Wilderness and Alexandria Act, Part I, § 4(A), defines the Wilderness as "the area that neither Alexandria nor Redmont may govern," and provides that "[t]his area consists of the End, the Nether, the Wild, the Everwild, and the Outback." The National Borders Act, § 3(1)(a), defines Redmont as "an archipelagic nation consisting of the Reveille Isles."

1.2 This Court applies that limit
This Court has held that territory outside the Commonwealth as defined by the National Borders Act "falls within the lawless international zones beyond the reach of Redmont's government bodies," and that "[t]he Constitution and all laws borne from authorities arising from the Constitution do not apply in these lawless international zones" (roy405 v. Department of Homeland Security [2026] FCR 42, Post #10). The Redmont Civil Code Act is such a law. By its own terms it is "a non-exhaustive listing of civil violations within the jurisdiction of Redmont" (Part II, § 3(1)).

1.3 The Civil Code was enacted after staff barred legislation for the Wilderness
The Legislature once attempted the opposite. As amended, the Wilderness Laws Clarification 3.0 Act provided that "[a]ny/all laws not listed in this act hereby apply anywhere in the wilderness" (Wilderness Laws Clarification 3.0 Act, Post #6). Staff vetoed that Act with effect from 1 December 2025, and in doing so "denie[d] future legislation for laws on regulating international lands" (Post #13). The Redmont Civil Code Act received assent on 7 February 2026, after that veto took effect. It cannot be read as the legislation staff had already denied.

1.4 The Conversion exception does not imply the opposite
The Conversion exception in Part VII, § 7(d), which provides that Conversion "shall not occur where... the action occurs in the End, Nether wild, or everwild," is consistent with this. It does not carry any other violation into the Wilderness. An inference from the absence of a similar clause cannot do what staff have expressly denied the Legislature the power to do by enactment.

1.5 No exception reaches Breach of Academic Integrity
Staff preserved only two areas of government action in the Wilderness: import/export controls "where plugins allow," and claim evictions. Part XIII, § 8(a) is neither. Where answers are later used on a DOE-administered examination inside Redmont, Part XIII, § 8(b) already reaches that conduct, as the violation of a person who "purchases or receives cheated answers and uses them in a DOE-administered exam." Under § 8(a), the act of giving or selling takes place where the answers are given or sold.

1.6 Jurisdiction is for the Plaintiff to establish
Jurisdiction is part of the Plaintiff's case, not an affirmative defence. The Code reaches only violations "within the jurisdiction of Redmont," and in a civil case the burden of proof is held by the Plaintiff (Judicial Standards Act, Part II, § 2(1)(a)). Jurisdiction is also a threshold question the Court examines of its own motion. In roy405, the Court raised its own jurisdiction and ordered the plaintiff to show cause (Post #5). In LuccaVG v. Department of Homeland Security [2026] DCR 129, Post #3, the court dismissed sua sponte "as it lacks jurisdiction over the claims alleged." The Plaintiff here accepts that it does not rely on conduct outside Redmont as a cause of action. Any conduct shown to have occurred in the Wilderness cannot found liability for either Count.

2. The Plaintiff must prove each violation by clear and convincing evidence
Breach of Academic Integrity is an Administrative Violation. Part II, § 9(5) of the Redmont Civil Code Act sets "[t]he burden of proof... by clear and convincing evidence," as the Plaintiff accepts (Complaint, Count II, para 7). That burden applies to every element: that the Defendant committed each act, and that each act took place within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.

An allegation without evidence carries no weight, even when it is not contested. Where "no evidence has been included to support this factual claim in any manner," the Court "rejects to consider this factual allegation and will disregard it in its verdict" (RemyTheRatta v. Bernerd_madoff [2026] DCR 134, Post #8).

The Defendant denies any connection to the video channel described in the Complaint. The Plaintiff has not disclosed P-001. The Defendant reserves the right to respond to it in full once it is produced in discovery, and to amend this Answer under Rule 3.4. To the extent the Plaintiff relies on text logs, the Defendant challenges them under Rule 4.6. Challenged logs "must be corroborated by independent evidence" (Commonwealth of Redmont v. ImzaKRD [2025] SCR 20, Post #29).

3. Breach of Academic Integrity is not counted per answer, and offering is not a violation
Part XIII, § 8(a) provides that a person commits a violation if the person "gives or sells answers to DOE-admnistered exam questions." The statute uses the plural. The prohibited act is giving or selling answers, not each answer given. Counting every answer on a single examination as a separate violation is not supported by the text, and would turn one act into dozens of maximum penalties. Part II, § 2(1) requires the Code to be read to avoid "absurd, unjust, or unintended results."

The Plaintiff has not identified a single act of giving or selling, by date, place, or recipient. Its total of 123 violations counts questions, not acts.

Section 8(a) reaches only a person who "gives or sells" answers. Where the Code reaches conduct short of a completed transfer, it says so: Part XIII, § 7(a) covers a person who "solicits answers to DOE-administered exam questions." Section 8(a) has no equivalent for offering. The Complaint's allegations that the Defendant "offered" answers (Facts, para 9; Count II, para 3) state no violation.

4. Count I fails: examination questions are not property under Part VII
Nuisance requires "a substantial and unreasonable interference with another's use and enjoyment of their property" (Part VII, § 6(a)). Part VII "protects private rights in land and goods." Examination questions are neither land nor goods. They are content the Department of Education maintains in the exercise of a statutory function, and the Plaintiff identifies no land or goods whose use or enjoyment was interfered with.

Count I is pleaded as intentional. Part II, § 9(2) requires the Plaintiff to prove "that the defendant acted with the purpose of causing harm or with substantial certainty that harm would result from their conduct." The Complaint pleads no facts showing either.

Count I also seeks a second penalty for the conduct pleaded under Count II. The Legislature placed the giving or selling of examination answers in Part XIII, as an Administrative Violation with its own penalty. Within that Part it expressly prevents double liability for exam-related conduct: Academic Misconduct "shall not occur where... the person has already been found liable for Breach of Academic Integrity for the same conduct" (Part XIII, § 7(b)). The Plaintiff itself recognises that the same act should not be penalised twice (Facts, para 18). Read with Part II, § 2(1), the same conduct cannot also be brought under Part VII as a property tort.

5. Any penalty is for the Court, not the Plaintiff's assessment
Without admitting any violation: every penalty the Plaintiff seeks is the statutory maximum. Part II, § 5 leaves the remedy to the judicial officer, who "may impose a lesser remedy or penalty than the maximum provided for the violation" (§ 5(3)) after considering the factors in § 5(2). The Plaintiff's assessment of the maximum on every count does not bind the Court.

6. There is nothing to abate
The Defendant holds no materials of the kind described in the Complaint within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, and controls no video channel, posts or online account containing them.

7. Further defences
Under Rule 3.2, the Defendant's statement of defence will develop through discovery, once the Plaintiff's closed-court evidence has been disclosed.

III. EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES
Evidence and witnesses will be submitted during discovery.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 8th day of October, 2026.

 
Apologies I've filed this way too early, please do ignore me.
(I inform the courts that I have removed some questions I had ready for the defendant)
I would also like it to be made clear, that the plaintiff intends to call the defendant to the stand as a hostile witness.
 
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Your Honor,

The Defendant notes that the Plaintiff has withdrawn the interrogatories it filed in Post #26, and understands that no answer to them is required.

The Defendant submits the following discovery requests to the Plaintiff.

I. REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS
Pursuant to Rule 4.7 (Request for Discovery, Opposing Party Movement), the Defendant requests:

1. The record of every amount or item taken from the Defendant in connection with this matter, including the $48,000 fine for Breach of Academic Integrity dated 30 August 2026 and anything seized under the Emergency Injunction granted in Post #2, showing for each the date, the amount, and the number of violations it was assessed for.

II. INTERROGATORIES
Pursuant to Rule 4.8 (Interrogatories), the Defendant asks:

1. In how many separate videos does the Commonwealth allege the 123 answers in the Complaint were disclosed?

2. How many of those 123 answers were the correct answer to their question?

3. Does the Commonwealth hold any evidence that the Defendant sold examination answers anywhere other than the Everwild?

4. When the Commonwealth fined persons other than the Defendant for Breach of Academic Integrity in this investigation, how many violations did it assess against each person for each examination?

5. Did the Commonwealth reduce the penalty of any of those persons in return for their cooperation?

DATED: This 12th day of October, 2026.
 
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