Lawsuit: In Session bigpappa140 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 81

[ToadKing]

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

bigpappa140
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF

I trusted the Department of Justice to protect me when I came forward as a whistleblower to report serious crimes. Instead, the very organization I turned to for protection betrayed that trust in the worst possible way. Dearev, the RBI Director responsible for keeping whistleblowers safe, carelessly exposed my identity to the very criminal I was reporting. For nearly two months, I lived unknowingly in danger while Dearev and the Department of Justice covered up their devastating mistake. I now face the terrifying reality that my safety has been compromised by the people who promised to protect me, leaving me vulnerable to retaliation, harassment, and worse from those I helped investigate.

I. PARTIES
1. bigpappa140
2. Commonwealth of Redmont
3. Dearev (Agent of Defendant)

II. FACTS
1. Dearev began employment with the Department of Justice on 18 February 2025 as an Investigator.
2. On 12 May 2025, Dearev was promoted to the position of RBI Director, giving him supervisory authority over all investigations and responsibility for maintaining departmental standards.
3. On 7 August 2025, Dearev was appointed as Acting Attorney General, the highest law enforcement position in the Commonwealth.
4. At all times relevant to this action, Dearev was acting within the scope of his official duties as an employee and agent of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
5. On or around 10 June 2025, Plaintiff approached the Department of Justice as a whistleblower with evidence of criminal activity involving player "Nim" and VMA (Vanguard Market Access).
6. When Plaintiff initially contacted Dearev in his capacity as RBI Director, Plaintiff explicitly requested whistleblower protection, stating "I have an NDA but want whistle blower protection" (P-001).
7. Dearev made explicit promises of anonymity and protection, stating: "we can give you anonimity from all reports you give us and protect u from punishment if the information given is valuable" and "We will give you protection if you assure us it is valuable" (P-001).
8. Relying on these promises, Plaintiff provided screenshots of private communications showing criminal activity, with Plaintiff's name visible as the recipient of the communications (P-002, P-003).
9. Dearev confirmed he would maintain confidentiality, stating "your name will be censored from all the evidence u provided btw" (P-002).
10. The communications were marked with official classification: "Classification applying to all previous and future messages: OFFICIAL" (P-004).
11. Plaintiff offered comprehensive cooperation, including a full video of the communications and additional evidence (P-003).
12. Under the Classification Act and subsequently the Classified Materials Act, OFFICIAL classified information is defined as material that "has the potential to cause minor collateral damage to the Government or National Security" and requires appropriate security clearance for access.
13. The unauthorised disclosure of OFFICIAL classified information constitutes "Breach of Integrity" under both classification laws.
14. On 19 June 2025, Dearev sent evidence obtained directly from the Plaintiff in an official investigation, directly to "Nim", indirectly exposing Plaintiff's identity (P-005).
15. Player "Nim" immediately "recognized his DMs with pappa," identifying Plaintiff as the source of the evidence (P-005).
16. When questioned about the exposure, Dearev admitted: "i did" [blur the name] "but he seems to recognize" and acknowledged his error: "yeah i messed up on that tbh" (P-005).
17. Another DOJ employee, T04DS74, correctly identified the problem: "Probably shouldn't have used the screenshots. You should have paraphrased the dms" (P-005).
18. Despite discovering the breach on 19 June 2025, Dearev failed to notify Plaintiff that his identity had been compromised (P-005).
19. Plaintiff remained completely unaware of the breach for nearly two months, from 19 June 2025 until 9 August 2025, leaving him vulnerable to potential retaliation from Nim without the ability to take protective measures.
20. During this extended period of concealment, Plaintiff continued to believe his anonymity was protected and remained exposed to unknown risks and potential retaliation.
21. The Department of Justice Policy Handbook requires evidence to be "stored properly and safely" and mandates that "all communication regarding ongoing and future investigations and cases are classified." (P-006)
22. The RBI Policy Handbook, which Defendant was responsible for implementing, requires "evidence integrity" and states that improper evidence handling "could end with evidence getting tampered with, leaked, or ruin established relationships between informants." (P-007)
23. The Whistleblowers Act provides statutory protection for individuals who report misconduct, which Defendant failed to uphold.
24. Dearev violated multiple departmental policies despite his position as RBI Director and later Acting Attorney General.
25. The breach exposed Plaintiff to potential retaliation, including harassment, intimidation, economic harm, and interference with his activities in the Redmont for nearly two months without his knowledge.
26. The Commonwealth's failure to notify Plaintiff of the breach prevented informed decision-making about safety and continued participation, representing a continuing and egregious violation of its duty of care.

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. Breach of Whistleblower Protection
Dearev, in his role as RBI Director, unlawfully violated the Plaintiff's whistleblower protection rights by exposing his identity despite explicit promises of anonymity. The Whistleblowers Act provides statutory protection for individuals who report misconduct, establishing a duty of care to protect cooperating witnesses. Dearev explicitly promised Plaintiff "anonimity from all reports you give us" and assured that "your name will be censored from all the evidence u provided btw" (P-001, P-002). These were not casual remarks but official assurances made by a senior law enforcement official to secure cooperation in a criminal investigation.

By using evidence that directly exposed Plaintiff's identity to the target "Nim" (P-005), the Commonwealth through its agent, materially breached these promises and committed the criminal offense of Whistleblower Anonymity Violation under the Criminal Code Act Part III, Section 8. This offence is defined as when "a person discloses or attempts to disclose the identity of a whistleblower without their consent,". Dearev's actions constitute a clear violation of this criminal statute, as he disclosed Plaintiff's identity as a whistleblower without consent through the use of classified evidence.

This breach was not accidental oversight but negligent disregard for established protocols. The Department of Justice Policy Handbook requires that evidence be "stored properly and safely" and mandates confidentiality of ongoing investigations (P-006). The Commonwealth's violation of these fundamental protections, combined with the criminal violation of whistleblower anonymity laws, undermines the entire whistleblower system and exposes cooperative citizens to retaliation.

The Criminal Code Act explicitly provides that "crimes may be used to seek damages" in civil proceedings. The Commonwealth's criminal violation of whistleblower anonymity laws creates an independent basis for civil liability and damages beyond the breach of promises made to Plaintiff.

2. Breach of Integrity - Unauthorised Disclosure of Classified Information
The Defendant committed the criminal offence of Breach of Integrity by disclosing OFFICIAL classified information without proper authorisation. The communications between Plaintiff and Dearev were explicitly marked "Classification applying to all previous and future messages: OFFICIAL" (P-004), placing them under the protection of the Classification Act and subsequently the Classified Materials Act.

Under both classification laws, OFFICIAL information is defined as material that "has the potential to cause minor collateral damage to the Government or National Security." The unauthorised disclosure of such classified information constitutes Breach of Integrity. By using the unredacted classified communications in the investigation and exposing them to "Nim," Dearev violated the classification protections and committed this criminal offence under Criminal Code Act Part III, Section 10.

The Defendant's criminal violation of classification laws creates an independent basis for civil liability and damages. This violation was particularly egregious as it involved a senior law enforcement official who should have been acutely aware of classification requirements and the serious consequences of unauthorised disclosure.

The unauthorised disclosure not only violated the law but also undermined the integrity of the classification system and endangered national security by demonstrating that classified information cannot be "stored properly and safely".

3. Violation of Constitutional Rights
Defendant's conduct violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights under Section 32(14) of the Constitution, which guarantees that "[e]very citizen has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." By exposing Plaintiff's identity without following proper procedures and then concealing this breach, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of his security and liberty interests without due process.

The constitutional guarantee of security encompasses protection from government actions that expose citizens to harm or retaliation. Defendant's reckless handling of sensitive information and subsequent concealment violated these fundamental principles. The failure to notify Plaintiff of the breach further compounded this constitutional violation by denying him the opportunity to protect himself or seek redress.

The egregious nature of Defendant's conduct - promising protection, violating that promise, and then concealing the violation - represents a fundamental breach of the constitutional duty owed to citizens.

4. Breach of Official Duty of Care
Dearev, in his capacity as RBI Director, owed Plaintiff a statutory and constitutional duty of care to handle sensitive information properly and protect cooperating witnesses. As established in smokeyybunnyyy v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 103, "Every department within the executive branch has a duty of care to uphold its constitutional obligations," and when this duty "is not upheld, it is considered a breach, and the party who is obliged to uphold the duty can be liable for damages."

The RBI Policy Handbook explicitly requires investigators to "maintain confidentiality relating to cases/investigations" and prohibits "the release of sensitive information, or case-related information, to outside parties" (P-007). The Department of Justice Policy Handbook further mandates "Investigations must focus solely on the purpose of the investigation, never going outside the confines of the law nor disregarding the rights of any citizen" (P-006). As RBI Director, Dearev was personally responsible for ensuring these protocols were followed, yet the Commonwealth through its agent violated them.

This breach was not a mere technical violation but a fundamental failure to protect a vulnerable citizen who had placed his trust in law enforcement. The continuing nature of the breach - through the failure to notify Plaintiff of the compromise (P-005) - demonstrates ongoing negligence and disregard for official duties.

5. Negligent Investigation Practices
The Commonwealth failed to meet the standard of care required for criminal investigations by compromising evidence integrity and witness protection. As demonstrated in GnomeWhisperer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 11, courts will hold government officials accountable for negligent conduct that harms citizens, particularly when such conduct demonstrates "outrageous" disregard for proper procedures.

The RBI Policy Handbook warns that improper evidence handling "could end with evidence getting tampered with, leaked, or ruin established relationships between informants to the department, witnesses testifying on our behalf, and much more" (P-007). Despite Dearev's supposed training and senior position, the Defendant used evidence in a manner that immediately compromised the investigation's integrity (P-005).

When questioned by colleague T04DS74, who noted, "Probably shouldn't have used the screenshots. You should have paraphrased the dms," Dearev acknowledged his error with "yeah i messed up on that tbh" (P-005). This admission demonstrates awareness of proper procedures and conscious deviation from them. In [2025] FCR 11, the Federal Court treated the conduct and self-incriminating statements of a government official as persuasive evidence of negligence, warranting substantial damages.

The negligent investigation practices not only harmed Plaintiff but also potentially compromised future investigations by demonstrating that the Department cannot be trusted to protect cooperating witnesses.

6. Loss of Enjoyment
The manner in which the Commonwealth handled this matter significantly diminished Plaintiff's enjoyment of participation in the community. Under the Legal Damages Act, "Loss of Enjoyment in Redmont" covers situations where an "injured party loses, or has diminished, their ability to engage in certain activities in the way that the injured party did before the harm."

As established in RylandW v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 4, the Supreme Court recognised loss of enjoyment as a compensable harm, awarding $10,000 in consequential damages for such loss. While the Court did not elaborate extensively on its reasoning, the recognition supports the principle that when government error or misconduct diminishes a citizen’s ability to participate fully and freely in community life, consequential damages are warranted.

The breach of trust by a senior law enforcement official has created ongoing anxiety and fear about Plaintiff's safety and standing in the community. Plaintiff's willingness to cooperate with law enforcement - a civic duty that should be commended - instead resulted in his exposure and vulnerability.

This loss of enjoyment was compounded by the Commonwealth's failure to acknowledge the breach or take corrective action for nearly two months. From 19 June to 9 August 2025, Plaintiff remained in the position of being exposed without even knowing it, completely unable to take protective measures or address potential community misconceptions about his role in this investigation. During this entire period, Plaintiff has remained unknowingly vulnerable to retaliation from those he had helped investigate.

The shock of discovering that his safety had been compromised for nearly two months - by the very people who promised to protect him - has fundamentally altered Plaintiff's ability to participate freely and enjoyably in the Redmont community. Plaintiff now experiences anxiety about potential retaliation, questions whether he can trust law enforcement, and feels vulnerable in situations where he previously felt safe.

7. Failure to Disclose Security Breach
Even after discovering that Plaintiff's identity had been compromised on 19 June 2025, the Defendant failed in its continuing duty to notify Plaintiff of this critical security breach. This failure represents a separate and ongoing violation of the duty of care owed to cooperating witnesses and whistleblowers.

As established in smokeyybunnyyy v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 103, government departments have fundamental obligations to citizens, and when these obligations are not upheld, it constitutes a breach for which the government can be held liable. Law enforcement agencies have a fundamental obligation to inform cooperating witnesses when their safety or anonymity has been compromised. This allows the witness to make informed decisions about their continued cooperation, seek legal counsel, or take protective measures.

The RBI Policy Handbook explicitly establishes that "The RBI is led by the RBI director who is in charge of organizing and assigning Investigators on investigations. The rbi director holds the responsibility to maintain the upholding of rights for witnesses, suspects, and members of the public and ensuring their investigators do the same" (P-007). As RBI Director, Dearev had the explicit responsibility to protect witness rights and ensure his investigators followed proper protocols. His failure to maintain these protections and his subsequent concealment of the breach for nearly two months represents a fundamental violation of his core duties as outlined in the RBI handbook.

By concealing this breach, the Commonwealth deprived Plaintiff of these essential rights and protections for an unconscionably long period. During this time, Plaintiff remained exposed to unknown risks, unable to take any protective measures, and continued to operate under the false belief that his anonymity was secure. The concealment also prevented proper accountability and remedial action for almost two months.

This ongoing failure to disclose demonstrates a pattern of callous disregard for Plaintiff's welfare, and represents a continuing and egregious violation of the Commonwealth's duty of care to its citizens. The extended duration of this concealment makes the violation particularly severe and warrants substantial damages.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff, respectfully prays that this Honourable Court enter judgment in his favour and grant the following relief:

1. Removal from Office:
The Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the immediate removal of Dearev from the position of Acting Attorney General and RBI Director. Given the egregious nature of the violations - breach of whistleblower protection, violation of constitutional rights, criminal breach of classified information, criminal violation of whistleblower anonymity laws, and ongoing concealment of security breaches for nearly two months - Dearev has demonstrated unfitness for positions requiring public trust and adherence to legal protocols.

Both the RBI Policy Handbook and DOJ Policy Handbook explicitly warn of termination for such conduct. The RBI Policy Handbook states that violations of confidentiality rules "will result in disciplinary action, or if severe enough, termination of employment within the department" (P-007). Similarly, the DOJ Policy Handbook warns under "Confidentiality" that "leaking confidential communication will result in disciplinary action, up to and potential including termination of employment from the department" (P-006).

Dearev's conduct clearly meets the standard for "severe enough" violations warranting termination under both handbooks, as it involved:

• Criminal violation of classification laws (Breach of Integrity)
• Criminal violation of whistleblower anonymity laws (Whistleblower Anonymity Violation)
• Breach of constitutional rights of a cooperating citizen
• Violation of explicit promises made to secure whistleblower cooperation
• Leaking confidential communications in violation of DOJ policy
• Extended concealment of security breach
• Multiple violations of Department of Justice and RBI policy requirements

If the Commonwealth's own departmental policies - both RBI and DOJ handbooks - recognise that such violations warrant termination from employment, then judicial removal from positions of public trust is not only appropriate but necessary to maintain public confidence in law enforcement institutions. The DOJ handbook's specific warning about prosecuting and terminating employees who leak confidential communications directly applies to Dearev's conduct.

Such positions demand the highest standards of integrity and competence, which Dearev has fundamentally failed to meet through multiple serious violations. The Commonwealth cannot argue that someone whose conduct warrants termination under their own policies should continue to hold the highest law enforcement positions in the government. Removal is essential to protect future whistleblowers and ensure proper adherence to legal and ethical standards within the Department of Justice.

2. Compensatory Damages: The Plaintiff asks for an award of compensatory damages in the amount of $15,000 to fully compensate for the quantifiable harm suffered as a direct result of Defendant's breach of whistleblower protection. This includes the loss of anonymity, exposure to retaliation risk, and the ongoing anxiety and security concerns resulting from the breach.

3. Consequential Damages: The Plaintiff seeks consequential damages for the intangible but very real harms inflicted:

• Loss of Enjoyment Damages:$25,000 for the diminished ability to participate in the Redmont community due to safety concerns and loss of trust in law enforcement institutions

4. Punitive Damages: The Defendant's actions were not mere negligence but willful violations of established law and policy, demonstrating reckless disregard for Plaintiff's rights and safety. Punitive damages are warranted under Legal Damages Act §5(1)(a) "to punish [the defendant] for their outrageous conduct and to deter them and others like them from similar conduct in the future."

The conduct here was particularly egregious and outrageous: a senior law enforcement official made explicit promises of protection to secure cooperation, violated those promises through negligent evidence handling, admitted his wrongdoing ("yeah i messed up on that tbh"), and then concealed the breach from the very person who was harmed. This represents a fundamental betrayal of public trust and strikes at the heart of the whistleblower protection system that is essential to effective law enforcement.

The severity of this misconduct cannot be overstated. The Commonwealth, through its agent, not only violated the initial promise of protection but then compounded this harm by concealing the breach for almost two months, leaving Plaintiff exposed to unknown risks while believing he was safe. This extended concealment demonstrates a callous disregard for Plaintiff's welfare and transforms what could have been a single incident into months of ongoing harm and violation.

As established in Federal Court precedent, for damages that occurred as a result of criminal activities, courts may award punitive damages equal to the amount of fines that would be collected in a criminal proceeding (see MegaMinerM v. Blazora Corporation [2025] FCR 27). Additionally, treble damages serve as a strong deterrent to future wrongful conduct and are appropriate for heinous and outrageous actions by government defendants (see lucaaasserole v Naezaratheus et al. [2025] FCR 50).

The Plaintiff seeks punitive damages as follows:

• $175,000 for breach of constitutional rights, representing the fundamental nature of constitutional violations and treble damages for the constitutional harm
• $150,000 for violation of whistleblower protection laws and policies, reflecting the critical importance of protecting cooperative witnesses
• $20,000 for Breach of Integrity (criminal fine equivalent: maximum $20,000 for 200 penalty units)
• $2,000 for Whistleblower Anonymity Violation (criminal fine equivalent: maximum $2,000 for 20 penalty units)
• $100,000 for breach of official duty of care, accounting for the betrayal of public trust by a senior official
• $53,000 for failure to disclose security breach for nearly two months, representing the extended and egregious nature of this ongoing violation

Total punitive damages sought: $500,000

5. Injunctive Relief: The Plaintiff requests that this Court issue a permanent injunction requiring the Department of Justice to:

• Provide mandatory training on evidence handling and witness protection for all RBI personnel
• Establish clear procedures for notifying witnesses when their anonymity has been compromised

Legal Fees: An award of Plaintiff's legal fees and costs as mandated by the Legal Damages Act Section 9. Given the total value of damages sought and the complexity of constitutional and statutory violations involved, Plaintiff requests legal fees calculated at 30% of the total monetary relief obtained.

The egregious nature of Defendant's conduct - promising protection, violating that promise, and concealing the violation - demands strong judicial intervention to vindicate Plaintiff's rights and ensure public confidence in the Department of Justice. The requested relief will not only compensate Plaintiff for his injuries but also establish important precedent protecting future whistleblowers and cooperative witnesses.

V. WITNESSES
1. Dearev
2. Juniperfig
3. Kaiserin
4. Gribble19
All witnesses represent named parties present in the Evidence.

VI. EVIDENCE

Spoiler: P-001

Spoiler: P-002

Spoiler: P-003

Spoiler: P-004

Spoiler: P-005

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 10th day of August 2025.

Spoiler: Proof of Representation

 

[Smallfries]

Writ of Summons

@Attorney General's Office is required to appear before the Supreme Court in the case of bigpappa140 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 11.

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

[dearev]

The commonwealth is present your honor.

 

[Smallfries]

The Commonwealth shall have forty-eight hours to present its Answer to the Complaint.

 

[Dogeington]

Objection

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE

Evidence P-001, P-002, P-003, P-004, and P-005 are all classified at the OFFICIAL level, as seen in P-004. These messages being shared publicly in this case is therefore a breach of confidentiality, and makes these screenshots illegally obtained. Therefore the Defense moves that they be stricken from evidence.

 

[ToadKing]

Objection

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE

Evidence P-001, P-002, P-003, P-004, and P-005 are all classified at the OFFICIAL level, as seen in P-004. These messages being shared publicly in this case is therefore a breach of confidentiality, and makes these screenshots illegally obtained. Therefore the Defense moves that they be stricken from evidence.

Response

TO OBJECTION

The Plaintiff respectfully opposes the Commonwealth's objection regarding Evidence P-001 through P-005 as follows:

1. The Commonwealth's objection fails as a matter of law because "breach of confidentiality" is not a recognised legal standard for excluding evidence. Neither the Classification Act nor the Classified Materials Act creates an evidentiary exclusion rule for classified materials properly disclosed in court proceedings.

2. The "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" doctrine excludes evidence obtained illegally or through illegal methods, but this doctrine does not apply because the evidence was obtained entirely through lawful means. The evidence was lawfully obtained through Plaintiff's counsel's prior employment with the Department of Justice, where counsel had proper authorisation and clearance to access these materials in the normal course of their official duties as a DOJ employee. Counsel was a direct participant in these communications as part of their authorised employment responsibilities - there was no illegal search, unauthorised access, or violation of any law in obtaining this evidence. The Commonwealth cannot claim evidence is "illegally obtained" when it was acquired by their own employee acting within the scope of their authorised duties, and the mere fact that materials are classified does not make their lawful acquisition by authorised personnel "illegal" under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

3. The Classification Act explicitly contemplates the use of classified materials in court proceedings. Section 8(1) provides judicial privilege whereby "information being used in court as evidence is exempt from Breach of Integrity." This statutory exception demonstrates legislative intent that classified materials may be properly introduced in court when relevant to legal proceedings.

4. The Constitution Section 32(9) guarantees every citizen "the right to a speedy and fair trial presided over by an impartial Judicial Officer, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted with the evidence against them." Excluding evidence of the Commonwealth's own misconduct based on classification would deny Plaintiff's constitutional right to present evidence of government wrongdoing.

5. Classification cannot be used to conceal government wrongdoing. The Classified Materials Act Section 8(9) explicitly prohibits classification "to cover up breaches of laws, rules or regulations" or "to prevent or reduce reputational damage." The evidence shows clear violations of law by a senior government official, which cannot be shielded from litigation through classification.

6. The Commonwealth's objection is an attempt to use classification as a shield to prevent accountability for the serious violations presented here.

This case involves fundamental questions of government accountability that require full disclosure of the relevant evidence. The Court should deny the objection and admit all evidence as properly obtained and essential to adjudicating Plaintiff's claims.

 

[Dogeington]

Your honor,
I would respectfully ask for a 24 hour extension to the commonwealths Answer to Complaint.

 

[ToadKing]

Your honor,
I would respectfully ask for a 24 hour extension to the commonwealths Answer to Complaint.

Your Honour,

The Plaintiff vehemently opposes any further delay in these proceedings and respectfully urges this Court to deny the Commonwealth's request for extension.

The Commonwealth has had ample time to prepare their response and has provided no adequate justification for this delay. Moreover, the Commonwealth has recently undertaken a massive recruitment drive, hiring six new prosecutors, bringing their total prosecutorial staff to eleven individuals who can potentially work on this case. With such substantial resources at their disposal, there is no legitimate basis for delay.

Most importantly, the Plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to "a speedy and fair trial" under Section 32(9) of the Constitution. Granting unnecessary extensions undermines this fundamental right and prolongs the injustice already suffered by the Plaintiff.

The Commonwealth should not be permitted to further delay justice when they possess more than adequate resources to respond timely.

 

[ToadKing]

Objection

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Your Honour,

The Commonwealth has violated court procedures by failing to submit their Answer to Complaint within the court-ordered timeframe of forty-eight hours. Rule 6.6 (Response Times) establishes "Answer to Complaint & Plea (within Criminal Court): 48 hours" and this Court specifically directed that:

The Commonwealth shall have forty-eight hours to present its Answer to the Complaint.

The deadline has expired, constituting a clear breach of court procedure that undermines the integrity of these proceedings and delays the Plaintiff's constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court hold the Commonwealth in contempt of court for this willful disregard of court-mandated deadlines.

Motion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff moves for Default Judgment against the Commonwealth, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

1. The Commonwealth has failed entirely to provide any Answer to Complaint despite the court-ordered forty-eight-hour deadline having expired.

2. Rule 3.6 (Default Judgment, Failure to Submit Defense) provides that "Defendants must amend any answer to have affirmations or denials on all facts in addition to having defenses under the law or fact prior to the end of discovery. Failure to include the necessary information is grounds for plaintiffs to request the presiding judge to grant default judgment against the defendant."

3. The Commonwealth's failure to provide any answer, affirmations, denials, or defences constitutes grounds for default judgment under established court rules.

4. This breach is particularly egregious as the Commonwealth is represented by the Solicitor General, an experienced attorney serving since 16 May 2025, who should understand basic procedural requirements as the second-highest legal officer in the Commonwealth.

5. The Department of Justice has recently undertaken a massive recruitment drive and is now staffed with numerous prosecutors, providing the Commonwealth with ample resources to respond in a timely manner to this case.

6. The Defendant, Dearev, as alleged in the complaint, can be argued to have reasonably known about the actions forming the basis of this lawsuit, as he was personally involved in the communications and events described. Therefore, this case should not come as a surprise to the Commonwealth, and they should have been easily able to respond within the required timeframe.

7. The Commonwealth's procedural failures delay the Plaintiff's right to "a speedy and fair trial" under Section 32(9) of the Constitution and warrant default judgment with full relief as requested in the Prayer for Relief.

 

[Smallfries]

By unanimous decision, this court finds the plaintiff lacks standing to sue before the Supreme Court. As with ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 80, the court believes that removal from office is only available as a judicial remedy for the State itself to pursue in cases where the defendant obtained their office illicitly.

As the plaintiff here neither is the State, nor are they alleging defendant-agent Dearev obtained their office unlawfully, we find under Court Rule 2.1(3) the only remedy for which this court may have original jurisdiction—the removal of Dearev from office—is unavailable to the plaintiff. Therefore, we remand this case to the Federal Court for further proceedings. We further order the removal of the plaintiff's first prayer for relief.

 

[Dogeington]

Just to clarify, this means that the plantiff will need to re file this case in the Federal Court, and that all action here is concluded?

 

[Nyeogmi]

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

bigpappa140
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

REQUEST FOR EXTENSION

Plaintiff has not filed a valid complaint. Defense requests an extension until 72 hours after Plaintiff amends their original filing as required by the Supreme Court.

This is in line with Rule 3.6 (so long as the defense shows up, the court cannot grant default judgment prior to the end of discovery) and Rule 3.7. (discovery cannot end until 72 hours after last revision of Plaintiff's complaint)

Defense additionally wishes to know whether the objection in #9 (about Defense's previous request for extension) is live and requires a response.

 

[ToadKing]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - PERJURY

The Commonwealth's statement that:

Plaintiff has not filed a valid complaint.

constitutes perjury as it is a knowing false statement made to this Court.

If the Complaint were invalid, proceedings would never have commenced, the Commonwealth would never have been summoned, and the Supreme Court would not have remanded this case to the Federal Court for "further proceedings." The Defense knows this complaint is valid and procedurally proper, yet deliberately misrepresents this fact to justify unnecessary delays. This intentional falsehood to the Court constitutes perjury and undermines the integrity of these proceedings.

Furthermore, this false statement undermines the Plaintiff's legitimate complaint against the Department of Justice and their supposedly incompetent RBI Director, who now sits as the head of the entire DOJ.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

The Commonwealth continues to violate court procedures by failing to provide their Answer to Complaint. It has now been 79 hours since the Defence were ordered to provide their Answer to Complaint. The Defence has even exceeded their own requested 24-hour extension by 31 hours.

Rule 6.6 (Response Times) mandates "Answer to Complaint & Plea (within Criminal Court): 48 hours" and the Commonwealth has grossly exceeded this timeframe without justification.

The Commonwealth has still not provided any valid justification for this extensive delay, instead relying on false claims about the complaint's validity. After 79 hours, no legitimate reason exists for the Commonwealth's continued failure to respond, particularly given its substantial legal resources and the straightforward nature of providing basic affirmations and denials required under Court Rules. This willful disregard of court deadlines constitutes contempt of court. The Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court hold the Commonwealth in contempt of court for this continuing breach of procedure that delays the Plaintiff's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

 

[Nyeogmi]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

The "WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM PLAINTIFF" is a set of testimony from Plaintiff specifically (not Plaintiff's counsel) about the case.

That kind of thing procedurally cannot be entered at this point in the case. If Plaintiff wants to enter this, Plaintiff's counsel should call Plaintiff as a witness or should amend the complaint to allege these statements as facts.

 

[Nyeogmi]

Answer to Complaint

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

bigpappa140
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant
I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

1. AFFIRM dearev's employment history.
2. AFFIRM dearev's employment history.
3. AFFIRM dearev's employment history.
4. AFFIRM that dearev was acting as an agent of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
5. AFFIRM that the Department of Justice was approached with information. DENY that the information was "evidence." Although dearev at the time thought that it was, Plaintiff's own counsel rejected the characterization that this set of submissions could be used to establish any crime. (see exhibit D-001)
6. AFFIRM that Plaintiff said that.
7. DENY that this was a promise. dearev's statement about "anonimity" is a description of the protections already given by the Whistleblowers Act, not an independent promise. The statement about "protection" is a description of conditions that Pappa did not even attempt to meet, under which the government might have made a promise in the future.
8. DENY that bigpappa relied on "promises."
9. DENY that dearev promised to maintain confidentiality. dearev said that under the terms of the Whistleblowers Act, he would maintain "anonimity" -- he would not repeat Plaintiff's name.
10. AFFIRM that the messages were so labeled.
11. AFFIRM that Plaintiff submitted two doctored screenshots and one undoctored video.
12. AFFIRM that the cited laws use that phrase.
13. NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that this would count as a Breach of Integrity -- that is a question of law, not of fact.
14. AFFIRM that dearev did not directly expose the Plaintiff's identity. DENY that the documents were evidence.
15. AFFIRM that this was Nim's reaction. DENY that the documents were evidence.
16. AFFIRM that dearev said those words. DENY that these words evidence "his error."
17. AFFIRM that T04DS74 said that. DENY the conclusion of law that T04DS74 has "correctly" identified a problem or its solution.
18. DENY that any breach existed, and therefore the implication that Defense had an obligation to notify Plaintiff of it. Defense had a counterobligation not to do so, as it would have served no investigative purpose and the relevant discussion was classified.
19. AFFIRM that Plaintiff could have had no knowledge of the "breach" as there was no breach. NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY comments on other aspects of the Plaintiff's mental state. (of which Defense has no direct knowledge)
20. NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY comments onother the Plaintiff's mental state. (of which Defense has no direct knowledge)
21. AFFIRM that the handbook contains those sentences.
22. AFFIRM that the handbook contains those sentences.
23. AFFIRM that the Whistleblowers Act provides a narrow protection (anonymity) to some individuals who report misconduct. DENY that the Whistleblowers Act is intended to provide some more generalized form of protection beyond that which is provided for in its literal text -- as well as the inappropriate conclusory statement of law that Defendant failed to uphold it.
24. DENY that Dearev violated "multiple departmental policies." Any conclusion on this would be (1) a matter of law (2) dependent on an exact list of policies supposedly violated.
25. AFFIRM that none of these potential dangers happened. DENY that these dangers existed to begin with.
26. DENY that a "breach" existed, that Commonwealth failed to notify Plaintiff about it, that Redmont had any legally recognizable duty of care to begin with, and that Redmont could have violated any duty of care if one existed. No harm came to Plaintiff, so any judgment that no notification was required because the plaintiff was at no genuine personal risk was sound. Because the Plaintiff was never at any risk, the Defense could not have been violating any duty of care.

II. Defenses

The Defense at this time makes the following list of defenses:

1. The Plaintiff cannot bring two identical causes of action for the same acts.
2. Department policy does not inherently create a private cause of action.
3. Parties to the case could have mitigated their damages but chose not to.
4. The cited policies on evidence are irrelevant to these documents which were not evidence.
5. No policy requiring notification in case of a breach existed.
6. It was not a Breach of Integrity or a Breach of Anonymity for dearev to show the documents to Nimq.
7. If there was a Breach of Integrity, Plaintiff was not injured by it.
8. Defendant had no viable alternate course of action or remedy.
9. Plaintiff did not cause Pappa miscellaneous counterfactual and hypothetical harms. In particular, Pappa had no reason to fear retaliation, did not fear retaliation at the time, was not in any danger, and experienced no loss of enjoyment until August 9th when his attorney caused his mental state to induce him to file this lawsuit.
10. Even if all facts were interpreted in the Plaintiff's favor, the only supported claim as a matter of law would be the Whistleblowers Act claim. While criminal acts can sometimes incur civil damages, the alleged fact pattern is standard for a bare Whistleblowers Act claim. There is no case for civil damages greater than this fine at all, let alone 350 times greater.

DATED: This 13th day of August 2025

 

[Nyeogmi]

Objection

MOTION TO STRIKE - RELEVANCE

The following facts from the amended Complaint are irrelevant and should be amended or struck.

1. Fact 3 alleges that dearev became the Acting Attorney General on August 9th. This is two months after all misconduct supposedly took place and cannot establish any crime.
2. Fact 12 invokes the Classified Materials Act, which was not law at the time misconduct supposedly took place.
3. Fact 13 also invokes the Classified Materials Act.
4. Fact 17 cites a legally irrelevant source (an apparently random employee of the Department of Justice) to support a legal intepretation.
5. Fact 21 cites a policy from P-006 which, asserts that evidence must be stored "properly" and that the Attorney General has to get a look at it before the public does. Plaintiff does not specifically allege any violation of these conditions or explain how these conditions would support any cause of action.
6. Fact 22 cites the RBI policy against evidence-tampering. There are no questions regarding tampering of evidence, other than accusations that Dearev did not "adequately" tamper with it. To the extent that it refers to improper consequences of "improper evidence handling," another term that Plaintiff has not bothered to introduce a foundation for, the manual is purely speculating.

Objection

MOTION TO STRIKE - AMBIGUITY

The following facts from the amended Complaint are ambiguous and should be amended for clarity:

1. Fact 16 uses the phrase "his error" but fails to describe the nature of the error.
2. Fact 25 alleges that dearev "violated multiple departmental policies" without listing or explaining the policies that were supposedly violated.

 

[ToadKing]

Answer to Complaint

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

bigpappa140
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant
I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

1. AFFIRM dearev's employment history.
2. AFFIRM dearev's employment history.
3. AFFIRM dearev's employment history.
4. AFFIRM that dearev was acting as an agent of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
5. AFFIRM that the Department of Justice was approached with information. DENY that the information was "evidence." Although dearev at the time thought that it was, Plaintiff's own counsel rejected the characterization that this set of submissions could be used to establish any crime. (see exhibit D-001)
6. AFFIRM that Plaintiff said that.
7. DENY that this was a promise. dearev's statement about "anonimity" is a description of the protections already given by the Whistleblowers Act, not an independent promise. The statement about "protection" is a description of conditions that Pappa did not even attempt to meet, under which the government might have made a promise in the future.
8. DENY that bigpappa relied on "promises."
9. DENY that dearev promised to maintain confidentiality. dearev said that under the terms of the Whistleblowers Act, he would maintain "anonimity" -- he would not repeat Plaintiff's name.
10. AFFIRM that the messages were so labeled.
11. AFFIRM that Plaintiff submitted two doctored screenshots and one undoctored video.
12. AFFIRM that the cited laws use that phrase.
13. NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that this would count as a Breach of Integrity -- that is a question of law, not of fact.
14. AFFIRM that dearev did not directly expose the Plaintiff's identity. DENY that the documents were evidence.
15. AFFIRM that this was Nim's reaction. DENY that the documents were evidence.
16. AFFIRM that dearev said those words. DENY that these words evidence "his error."
17. AFFIRM that T04DS74 said that. DENY the conclusion of law that T04DS74 has "correctly" identified a problem or its solution.
18. DENY that any breach existed, and therefore the implication that Defense had an obligation to notify Plaintiff of it. Defense had a counterobligation not to do so, as it would have served no investigative purpose and the relevant discussion was classified.
19. AFFIRM that Plaintiff could have had no knowledge of the "breach" as there was no breach. NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY comments on other aspects of the Plaintiff's mental state. (of which Defense has no direct knowledge)
20. NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY comments onother the Plaintiff's mental state. (of which Defense has no direct knowledge)
21. AFFIRM that the handbook contains those sentences.
22. AFFIRM that the handbook contains those sentences.
23. AFFIRM that the Whistleblowers Act provides a narrow protection (anonymity) to some individuals who report misconduct. DENY that the Whistleblowers Act is intended to provide some more generalized form of protection beyond that which is provided for in its literal text -- as well as the inappropriate conclusory statement of law that Defendant failed to uphold it.
24. DENY that Dearev violated "multiple departmental policies." Any conclusion on this would be (1) a matter of law (2) dependent on an exact list of policies supposedly violated.
25. AFFIRM that none of these potential dangers happened. DENY that these dangers existed to begin with.
26. DENY that a "breach" existed, that Commonwealth failed to notify Plaintiff about it, that Redmont had any legally recognizable duty of care to begin with, and that Redmont could have violated any duty of care if one existed. No harm came to Plaintiff, so any judgment that no notification was required because the plaintiff was at no genuine personal risk was sound. Because the Plaintiff was never at any risk, the Defense could not have been violating any duty of care.

II. Defenses

The Defense at this time makes the following list of defenses:

1. The Plaintiff cannot bring two identical causes of action for the same acts.
2. Department policy does not inherently create a private cause of action.
3. Parties to the case could have mitigated their damages but chose not to.
4. The cited policies on evidence are irrelevant to these documents which were not evidence.
5. No policy requiring notification in case of a breach existed.
6. It was not a Breach of Integrity or a Breach of Anonymity for dearev to show the documents to Nimq.
7. If there was a Breach of Integrity, Plaintiff was not injured by it.
8. Defendant had no viable alternate course of action or remedy.
9. Plaintiff did not cause Pappa miscellaneous counterfactual and hypothetical harms. In particular, Pappa had no reason to fear retaliation, did not fear retaliation at the time, was not in any danger, and experienced no loss of enjoyment until August 9th when his attorney caused his mental state to induce him to file this lawsuit.
10. Even if all facts were interpreted in the Plaintiff's favor, the only supported claim as a matter of law would be the Whistleblowers Act claim. While criminal acts can sometimes incur civil damages, the alleged fact pattern is standard for a bare Whistleblowers Act claim. There is no case for civil damages greater than this fine at all, let alone 350 times greater.

DATED: This 13th day of August 2025

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - IMPROPER EVIDENCE

The Commonwealth's statement in Fact #11 that "Plaintiff submitted two doctored screenshots and one undoctored video" constitutes improper evidence.

The Defence is introducing new factual claims about document authenticity without any supporting evidence. This allegation of "doctored screenshots" was not part of the original case facts and represents a technical claim about document manipulation. The Defence cannot make conclusory statements about document authenticity without a proper evidentiary foundation.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - SPECULATION

The Commonwealth's statements in Defence #9 regarding Plaintiff's mental state constitute speculation. The Defence claims "Pappa had no reason to fear retaliation, did not fear retaliation at the time, was not in any danger, and experienced no loss of enjoyment until August 9th." This is improper speculation as the Defence has no direct knowledge of Plaintiff's mental state, feelings, or experiences during the relevant time period. The Defence is testifying about matters they have not directly observed and making conclusory statements about another person's internal thoughts and emotions without any factual basis.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - ASSUMES FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE

The Commonwealth's repeated denials in Facts 5, 14, and 15 that the documents constituted "evidence" assume facts not in evidence. The Defence is presuming a specific legal definition of "evidence" that has not been established by this Court.

The question of whether materials used by RBI Director Dearev in an official criminal investigation constitute "evidence" has not been determined, yet the Defense repeatedly bases their denials on this unestablished legal premise.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - ARGUMENTATIVE

The Commonwealth's response to Fact 16 is argumentative rather than a proper factual denial.

Instead of simply affirming or denying whether they failed to notify Plaintiff of the breach, the Defence argues "Defense had a counterobligation not to do so, as it would have served no investigative purpose and the relevant discussion was classified." This constitutes legal argument and advocacy rather than the required factual admissions and denials mandated by Court Rules for Answer to Complaint responses.

 

[ToadKing]

Objection

MOTION TO STRIKE - RELEVANCE

The following facts from the amended Complaint are irrelevant and should be amended or struck.

1. Fact 3 alleges that dearev became the Acting Attorney General on August 9th. This is two months after all misconduct supposedly took place and cannot establish any crime.
2. Fact 12 invokes the Classified Materials Act, which was not law at the time misconduct supposedly took place.
3. Fact 13 also invokes the Classified Materials Act.
4. Fact 17 cites a legally irrelevant source (an apparently random employee of the Department of Justice) to support a legal intepretation.
5. Fact 21 cites a policy from P-006 which, asserts that evidence must be stored "properly" and that the Attorney General has to get a look at it before the public does. Plaintiff does not specifically allege any violation of these conditions or explain how these conditions would support any cause of action.
6. Fact 22 cites the RBI policy against evidence-tampering. There are no questions regarding tampering of evidence, other than accusations that Dearev did not "adequately" tamper with it. To the extent that it refers to improper consequences of "improper evidence handling," another term that Plaintiff has not bothered to introduce a foundation for, the manual is purely speculating.

Response

Your Honour, this Court should deny the Commonwealth's objections for the following reasons:

Fact 3: This fact is directly relevant to establishing Defendant's current position of authority and the ongoing nature of the harm. Additionally, this demonstrates the Commonwealth's continued confidence in someone who supposedly violated whistleblower protection laws.

Facts 12-13: The Classification Act was in effect at the time of the misconduct (June 2025), establishing the legal framework for classified information. The Classified Materials Act's transition provisions (Section 10) explicitly state that existing OFFICIAL classifications remain valid, making both Acts relevant to the legal analysis of Dearev's disclosure of classified materials.

Fact 17: T04DS74's statement is highly relevant as contemporaneous recognition by another DOJ employee that Dearev's conduct was improper. The evidence (P-005) shows T04DS74 stating "Probably shouldn't have used the screenshots. You should have paraphrased the dms" immediately followed by Dearev's admission "yeah i messed up on that tbh." This is not legal interpretation but factual evidence of how knowledgeable DOJ personnel viewed Dearev's actions in real-time. T04DS74's criticism and Dearev's immediate acknowledgement of error demonstrate that proper DOJ protocol should have been paraphrasing rather than using direct screenshots from the Plaintiff, establishing both the standard of care and Dearev's breach of it. This contemporaneous exchange between DOJ officials is directly relevant to proving negligent investigation practices and policy violations.

Fact 21: This fact establishes the policy framework that Dearev violated. The violation is specifically alleged - Dearev disclosed classified evidence to unauthorised parties (Nim) without proper authorisation, directly contravening the requirement that classified information be properly stored and controlled.

Fact 22: The Commonwealth's objection to Fact 22 fundamentally mischaracterises both the policy and the violation. The RBI Policy Handbook provision cited does not concern "evidence tampering" as the Commonwealth falsely suggests. Rather, it establishes the standard of care for "evidence integrity" and warns against "improper evidence handling" that could result in leaking information or compromising investigations.

The Commonwealth's claim that there are "no questions regarding tampering of evidence" is correct - because that's not what Fact 22 alleges. The policy warns against improper evidence handling that could "end with evidence getting tampered with, leaked, or ruin established relationships between informants." Dearev's actions directly fulfilled this warning by leaking Plaintiff's identity, ruining the relationship with the informant (Plaintiff), and compromising the investigation.

The foundation for "improper evidence handling" is clearly established throughout the Complaint: Dearev used screenshots that exposed Plaintiff's identity instead of paraphrasing the information, directly violating proper investigative protocols. T04DS74's contemporaneous statement that Dearev "Probably shouldn't have used the screenshots. You should have paraphrased the dms" (P-005) establishes the proper procedure Dearev should have followed.

Objection

MOTION TO STRIKE - AMBIGUITY

The following facts from the amended Complaint are ambiguous and should be amended for clarity:

1. Fact 16 uses the phrase "his error" but fails to describe the nature of the error.
2. Fact 25 alleges that dearev "violated multiple departmental policies" without listing or explaining the policies that were supposedly violated.

Response

Your Honour, this Court should deny the Commonwealth's objections for the following reasons:

Fact 16: The nature of Dearev's error is clear from context - his admission "yeah i messed up on that tbh" directly followed T04DS74's criticism about using screenshots instead of paraphrasing. The error is Dearev's improper evidence handling that exposed Plaintiff's identity.

Fact 25: The specific policy violations are detailed throughout the Complaint, including violations of DOJ confidentiality requirements (P-006), RBI evidence integrity standards (P-007), and classification protocols (P-010). The Commonwealth's own Answer to Complaint acknowledges these policies exist by affirming the handbook language.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - PERJURY

The Commonwealth's claim that Fact 25 "alleges that dearev 'violated multiple departmental policies' without listing or explaining the policies that were supposedly violated" constitutes perjury as it is a knowingly false statement.

The Complaint explicitly details multiple specific policy violations throughout, including:

1. DOJ Policy Handbook requirements that evidence be "stored properly and safely" and that "all communication regarding ongoing and future investigations and cases are classified" (Fact 21, P-006);
2. RBI Policy Handbook requirements for "evidence integrity" and warnings that improper evidence handling "could end with evidence getting tampered with, leaked, or ruin established relationships between informants" (Fact 22, P-007);
3. Classification requirements under both the Classification Act and Classified Materials Act regarding OFFICIAL classified information (Facts 12-13)

The Commonwealth has read these specific policy citations throughout the Complaint, and their own Answer to Complaint affirms the existence of these very policies. This false statement to the Court undermines the integrity of these proceedings and constitutes intentional perjury.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - PERJURY

The Commonwealth's objection claiming that Evidence P-001 through P-005 should be stricken because "these messages being shared publicly in this case is therefore a breach of confidentiality, and makes these screenshots illegally obtained" constitutes perjury.

The Commonwealth simultaneously attached their own screenshot from the same classified channel as Exhibit D-001, directly contradicting its claim that sharing these messages constitutes illegal conduct.

The Commonwealth cannot argue that Plaintiff's evidence should be excluded for sharing classified communications while simultaneously introducing their own evidence from the identical classified source. This knowing contradiction demonstrates the Commonwealth's awareness that their legal argument is false, making their objection a deliberate misrepresentation to this Court that constitutes perjury.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

The "WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM PLAINTIFF" is a set of testimony from Plaintiff specifically (not Plaintiff's counsel) about the case.

That kind of thing procedurally cannot be entered at this point in the case. If Plaintiff wants to enter this, Plaintiff's counsel should call Plaintiff as a witness or should amend the complaint to allege these statements as facts.

Response

Your Honour,

The Commonwealth's objection demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of Redmont court procedures and filing requirements. The "WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM PLAINTIFF" is explicitly included in the official court templates provided to all litigants and is accessible in Templates.

This standard format has been used in countless cases before this Court and is an established part of Redmont's civil procedure. The Commonwealth's suggestion that this constitutes improper testimony reveals either a concerning lack of familiarity with basic Redmont court procedures or a frivolous attempt to delay proceedings.

Perhaps the Commonwealth's counsel practices under different procedural rules elsewhere, but in Redmont, written statements from Plaintiffs explaining their case are not only permitted but encouraged through the Court's own official templates. Given the Commonwealth's massive recruitment drive that has brought numerous new prosecutors into the Department of Justice, perhaps they should focus their efforts on properly training these attorneys in fundamental Redmont court procedures rather than allowing them to make such basic errors before this Court.

It is a worrying sight that the DOJ, under Dearev's leadership, would allow prosecutors to make such elementary mistakes that waste judicial resources and demonstrate unfamiliarity with basic procedural requirements.

The Court should deny this meritless objection, which seeks to eliminate a standard case format that has been consistently accepted by Redmont courts and is explicitly provided in official court-provided templates.

 

[Nyeogmi]

(Defense is waiting for a judge so as to avoid making the already-cluttered record even more cluttered.)