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ToadKing__
Public Defender
- Joined
- Apr 4, 2025
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Username: ToadKing__
I am representing myself
What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] SCR 18
Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 18
Basis for Appeal:
Section 5(3) provides that failure to disclose "shall disqualify the nominee from consideration." The statute operates on the nominee, rendering them ineligible, not on the Senate. The Senate retains full authority to confirm or reject any eligible nominee. But it cannot confirm someone who has been rendered ineligible by operation of law.
Congress has express authority to enact such legislation. Under the Constitution, Section 2(7):
The House does not unconstitutionally "influence" confirmations by participating in legislation that sets standards for officeholders; that is the normal operation of legislative power. The Court's principle, if applied consistently, would place the Senate above statutory law whenever it exercises constitutional functions. If the Senate can ignore COISA, can it ignore any statute establishing standards for other officeholders? Can any chamber nullify statutes simply by refusing to follow them? That cannot be correct - it would render Congress's law-making power meaningless.
The Court also held that "without any proved harm, there is no reason to alter their service." But Section 5(3) uses mandatory language: failure to disclose "shall disqualify" the nominee. This Court held in xEndeavour v. Commonwealth [2024] SCR 11 that "shall" creates a "mandatory requirement of law" distinct from discretionary terms like "should" or "may." When a statute mandates a consequence, courts must apply it - they cannot substitute a harm requirement that appears nowhere in the text. The Court effectively rewrote Section 5(3) to read: "Failure to provide disclosure shall disqualify the nominee unless no harm is shown." That is not what the statute says. The correct principle is that COISA establishes binding eligibility requirements under Congress's legislative powers, and failure to comply renders a nominee disqualified by operation of law, regardless of whether harm is shown.
This is not merely an academic point about accurate case summaries. The Court appears to have constructed a constitutional argument that neither party made, attributed it to the Defendant, and then used that argument as the basis for its ruling. This raises serious concerns about the integrity of the decision.
The Defendant's arguments focused on harmless error, de minimis, lack of conflicts, and practical consequences of removal. These are legitimate arguments that deserve consideration on their merits. But the Court did not rule on these arguments. Instead, it ruled on a constitutional separation-of-powers theory that the statute "cannot limit the Senate" and that enforcing it would let "the House influence the confirmation process."
Where did this theory come from? Not from the Defendant's Answer to Complaint. Not from the Defendant's Opening Statement. Not from the Defendant's Witness Testimony. Not from the Defendant's Closing Statement. The Appellant reviewed these filings thoroughly - the constitutional argument does not appear. It appears the Court itself originated this theory, placed it in the Defendant's mouth, and then adopted it as the ratio decidendi of the case.
This matters for three reasons:
First, it denied the Appellant any opportunity to respond to the actual basis for the ruling. The Appellant briefed the de minimis argument extensively. The Appellant addressed the "no harm" argument. The Appellant was never given the chance to address whether COISA unconstitutionally limits Senate power because no one argued that until the verdict appeared. Adversarial briefing exists for a reason - it helps courts reach correct decisions by testing arguments from both sides. That process was circumvented here.
Second, it produced a sweeping holding that goes far beyond what was necessary to decide the case. If the Court had addressed the arguments actually before it, the questions would have been narrow: Does "shall disqualify" permit a harm-based exception? Can de minimis apply to mandatory statutory language? Instead, the Court issued a broad constitutional ruling that statutes cannot bind the Senate when exercising confirmation power - a principle with implications far beyond this case.
Third, and most troublingly, it creates the appearance that the Court decided the outcome it wanted and then constructed a rationale to reach it. When a court attributes arguments to a party that the party never made, and then rules based on those attributed arguments, reasonable observers will question whether the decision reflects neutral application of law or something else. The Appellant does not make this observation lightly, but the record speaks for itself: the constitutional theory that decided this case appears nowhere in the Defendant's filings.
This constitutes a finding on an important issue - the nature of the legal dispute between the parties - that is not supported by the record of the Defendant's filings, and it materially shaped the Court's analysis in a way that denied the Appellant a fair opportunity to be heard on the actual grounds for the ruling.
The principle adopted by the Court, if left standing, effectively places the Senate above statutory law whenever it exercises constitutional functions. This undermines Congress's legislative power and creates an exemption from law that the Constitution does not provide.
Supporting Evidence: Government - Constitution
I am representing myself
What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] SCR 18
Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 18
Basis for Appeal:
I. INTRODUCTION
The Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its verdict in ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 18 pursuant to Constitution, Section 19(4), which permits appeal of a Supreme Court decision where the Court:The Appellant submits that both grounds are met here. The Court adopted an incorrect constitutional principle that effectively places the Senate above statutory law, and it attributed arguments to the Defendant that do not appear in the record of their filings.
II. INCORRECT PRINCIPLE OF LAW
The Court held that "a regular statute cannot limit the Senate in exercising a power the Constitution gives exclusively to it" and that treating COISA as binding "would allow the House to influence the confirmation process." This principle is incorrect. COISA does not limit the Senate's confirmation power - it establishes nominee eligibility.Section 5(3) provides that failure to disclose "shall disqualify the nominee from consideration." The statute operates on the nominee, rendering them ineligible, not on the Senate. The Senate retains full authority to confirm or reject any eligible nominee. But it cannot confirm someone who has been rendered ineligible by operation of law.
Congress has express authority to enact such legislation. Under the Constitution, Section 2(7):
Establishing conflict-of-interest standards and disclosure requirements for judicial officers is necessary and proper to ensure a functional, impartial judiciary. COISA is a proper exercise of these constitutional powers.
The House does not unconstitutionally "influence" confirmations by participating in legislation that sets standards for officeholders; that is the normal operation of legislative power. The Court's principle, if applied consistently, would place the Senate above statutory law whenever it exercises constitutional functions. If the Senate can ignore COISA, can it ignore any statute establishing standards for other officeholders? Can any chamber nullify statutes simply by refusing to follow them? That cannot be correct - it would render Congress's law-making power meaningless.
The Court also held that "without any proved harm, there is no reason to alter their service." But Section 5(3) uses mandatory language: failure to disclose "shall disqualify" the nominee. This Court held in xEndeavour v. Commonwealth [2024] SCR 11 that "shall" creates a "mandatory requirement of law" distinct from discretionary terms like "should" or "may." When a statute mandates a consequence, courts must apply it - they cannot substitute a harm requirement that appears nowhere in the text. The Court effectively rewrote Section 5(3) to read: "Failure to provide disclosure shall disqualify the nominee unless no harm is shown." That is not what the statute says. The correct principle is that COISA establishes binding eligibility requirements under Congress's legislative powers, and failure to comply renders a nominee disqualified by operation of law, regardless of whether harm is shown.
III. UNSUPPORTED FINDING OF FACT
The Court stated the Defendant's position as:The Defendant's actual arguments, as set forth in their filings, were:
- Judge Amity has no actual conflicts of interest
- No harm was caused by the omission
- The doctrine of de minimis applies - the error was "technical" and "trifling"
- The Court has discretion over whether to order removal
- Removal would cause practical harm to the judiciary
- The dissenting opinion in zLost v. Commonwealth [2025] SCR 10 supports acknowledging the error without imposing severe remedies
This is not merely an academic point about accurate case summaries. The Court appears to have constructed a constitutional argument that neither party made, attributed it to the Defendant, and then used that argument as the basis for its ruling. This raises serious concerns about the integrity of the decision.
The Defendant's arguments focused on harmless error, de minimis, lack of conflicts, and practical consequences of removal. These are legitimate arguments that deserve consideration on their merits. But the Court did not rule on these arguments. Instead, it ruled on a constitutional separation-of-powers theory that the statute "cannot limit the Senate" and that enforcing it would let "the House influence the confirmation process."
Where did this theory come from? Not from the Defendant's Answer to Complaint. Not from the Defendant's Opening Statement. Not from the Defendant's Witness Testimony. Not from the Defendant's Closing Statement. The Appellant reviewed these filings thoroughly - the constitutional argument does not appear. It appears the Court itself originated this theory, placed it in the Defendant's mouth, and then adopted it as the ratio decidendi of the case.
This matters for three reasons:
First, it denied the Appellant any opportunity to respond to the actual basis for the ruling. The Appellant briefed the de minimis argument extensively. The Appellant addressed the "no harm" argument. The Appellant was never given the chance to address whether COISA unconstitutionally limits Senate power because no one argued that until the verdict appeared. Adversarial briefing exists for a reason - it helps courts reach correct decisions by testing arguments from both sides. That process was circumvented here.
Second, it produced a sweeping holding that goes far beyond what was necessary to decide the case. If the Court had addressed the arguments actually before it, the questions would have been narrow: Does "shall disqualify" permit a harm-based exception? Can de minimis apply to mandatory statutory language? Instead, the Court issued a broad constitutional ruling that statutes cannot bind the Senate when exercising confirmation power - a principle with implications far beyond this case.
Third, and most troublingly, it creates the appearance that the Court decided the outcome it wanted and then constructed a rationale to reach it. When a court attributes arguments to a party that the party never made, and then rules based on those attributed arguments, reasonable observers will question whether the decision reflects neutral application of law or something else. The Appellant does not make this observation lightly, but the record speaks for itself: the constitutional theory that decided this case appears nowhere in the Defendant's filings.
This constitutes a finding on an important issue - the nature of the legal dispute between the parties - that is not supported by the record of the Defendant's filings, and it materially shaped the Court's analysis in a way that denied the Appellant a fair opportunity to be heard on the actual grounds for the ruling.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's verdict rests on an incorrect principle - that statutes cannot bind the Senate when exercising its confirmation power - and attributes to the Defendant constitutional arguments that do not appear in the record. Both errors warrant reconsideration.The principle adopted by the Court, if left standing, effectively places the Senate above statutory law whenever it exercises constitutional functions. This undermines Congress's legislative power and creates an exemption from law that the Constitution does not provide.
Supporting Evidence: Government - Constitution
Lawsuit: Dismissed Thread 'xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] SCR 11'
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