Opening Statement
Good evening your honour, opposing counsel, and onlookers.
May it please the court,
If there is one thing that could be said of the plaintiff’s argument, it is that it is misguided. The plaintiff argues that the government exercising authority very clearly granted to the Department of Commerce is a breach of their constitutional rights. There is no misinterpretation here on the part of the Commonwealth - it is a simple, textual, and obvious reading of the law that grants the DOC broad authority to carry out actions such as the seizure of Vanguard’s banks.
The Authority to Seize
The Defence is quite honestly perplexed by the Plaintiff’s argument contained in the section “On the Taxation Act”, as it seems to be incomplete. Allow us to provide some illumination on a very crucial element that the Plaintiff has seemingly missed. § 8.(3).(c) and (d) of the Taxation Act reads as follows:
“(c) Commandeer: In extraordinary situations, the Department of Commerce has the power to commandeer and take temporary control of a financial institution. This authority is reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as insolvency, near insolvency, financial crises, or situations where the institution's continued operation poses a systemic risk to the financial system or depositors.
(d) Seizure and Sale. The Department of Commerce may consider commercial remedies such as selling a collapsed bank (or parts of a collapsed bank) to other interested financial institutions/parties. This may only take place when it is in the best interests of the depositors. Additionally, the Department may seize the assets of Directors/Owners of the Financial Institutions (with the least required disturbance to their estate) to recover debts.”
There it is. The Department of Commerce has the power to commandeer and take temporary control of a financial institution. This takes place in cases of insolvency, near insolvency, or financial crises. The DOC may sell or seize the assets of collapsed banks if it is in the best interests of depositors, including the assets of directors and owners.
Thus, we have established that the seizure of Vanguard’s bank was very clearly lawful. These powers are broad and discretionary by nature, and that is no accident. Not only that, but they are “non-exhaustive”. The authors of the Taxation Act tell us precisely why such vast power is granted to the Department:
“(1) Historical events have proven that strong regulatory powers are necessary for the adequate protection of the depositors of deposit-taking institutions.”
The Plaintiff may disagree politically with these broad, discretionary powers granted to the DOC, and that is their Tech-given right. The Commonwealth wholeheartedly encourages the Plaintiff to take this issue up with their representatives in the Congress. The Plaintiff may even contend that these provisions are
unconstitutional in a way that is unjustified in a free and democratic society. If that is the case, the Plaintiff should challenge the Taxation Act itself in court. But the truth is that there is simply no room for this argument in this particular case - the seizure was lawful in accordance with the Taxation Act, and that is clear beyond doubt. If there is any restriction of constitutional rights, then it is prescribed by law, not created by the DOC’s actions.
The Power to Interpret
The precedent cited by the Plaintiff, that of
[2022] FCR 97, is entirely inapplicable to the scenario at hand. The Plaintiff in that case alleges the unconstitutionality of a law
itself, not of an action taken by a Department which enacts that law. Perhaps the Plaintiff in this case could allege that the laws on the books currently grant powers which breach the separation of powers - and perhaps that argument could be given some heed - but they simply have not alleged that. The content of this case is the allegation that the seizure of Vanguard’s banks, not the passing of the provisions of the current Taxation Act many moons ago, was unconstitutional. Unless the Plaintiff wishes to challenge the law in a different lawsuit, this precedent holds no relevance.
It is true that the Executive’s job is not to interpret the law - that is an authority granted to the Courts and the Courts alone. But how could a government possibly function without some discretion being applied to the law? The Executive departments must necessarily be able to read the law and undertake their duties without the consultation of the Courts at every given step. Must the Department of Justice consult the Courts before even opening an investigation on an individual when it is clear that there is potential injustice? Must the Department of Homeland Security consult the Courts before arresting someone for a summary charge of Murder? Must the Department of Construction and Transportation receive a warrant every time they evict a property?
No - if any of these arguments were presented in Court, the alleger would be laughed out of the room. Why then must the Department of Commerce suddenly be required to consult the Courts in order to exercise the authority granted to it by the Taxation Act? A ruling in line with the thought presented by the Plaintiff would be entirely unreasonable, and would thoroughly cripple the ability of the government to do its job. The precedent would be earth-shattering not only for the Departments, but also for the Courts who would suddenly be required to weigh in on every single Departmental decision requiring even an ounce of interpretation of the law. It would be simply untenable.
Further, the Plaintiff mischaracterises the situation regarding the Vanguard seizure. The Plaintiff stated that “[the DOC lacks] the Constitutional Authority to decide when and where a financial institution has broken the law.” While this may be true - the DOC could not rule of its own accord that a financial institution had committed a crime - this is simply not what has occurred. Being insolvent is not a crime. It is simply a state of being that requires intervention on the part of the DOC in accordance with its lawful duties.
On the Evidence
We now turn to the justification for the DOC’s actions, but it is important to note that the discretion of whether or not a bank must be seized is placed almost entirely in the hands of the DOC. We touch on it to shatter the narrative that Vanguard’s seizure was somehow random, unreasonable, or without justifying evidence.
The Taxation Act is clear that the DOC’s extraordinary powers must come in cases of ”insolvency, near insolvency, financial crises, or situations where the institution's continued operation poses a systemic risk to the financial system or depositors”. Vanguard was insolvent or near-insolvent at the very least, and its continued operation posed a systemic risk to depositors.
The Plaintiff has repeatedly stated that the DOC failed to provide evidence of insolvency to the public to justify its actions as they occurred. I cannot state enough that it would have been
unlawful for the Department to release any of this evidence prior to the passage of the
Commercial Confidence Amendment Act. The Taxation Act dictated prior to that amendment that the information of financial institutions was to be treated as commercial-in-confidence, with no exceptions. The amendment was proposed to Congress by the Commerce Secretary as soon as the Vanguard situation became clear to the DOC, and it was passed by the Congress as quickly as possible, being placed under urgent consideration. As soon as it was passed, the DOC released a lengthy document outlining the insolvency, non-compliance, and systemic risks associated with Vanguard’s banks [D-006]. This included ineptitude in managing and accounting funds, unwillingness to cooperate with the DOC, incredibly low liquidity rates and very high numbers of deposits, and most concerningly, the use of foreign cash to support domestic deposits. We cannot stress enough that foreign nations
are not recognised by Redmont, and cannot be, by staff decree. Money in CityRP, Stratham, or any other server might as well be monopoly money to the Redmont authorities, and cannot be included in estimates of liquidity.
The report created and published by the DOC is thirteen pages long, and contains more than enough details to justify the Department’s actions. We will not overstep the report by rehashing all of its contents, and we instead implore your honour to read it in its entirety, alongside pondering the other evidence provided by the Plaintiff. This should be more than sufficient in showing that Vanguard was insolvent or near-insolvent, and that its continued operation posed a systemic risk to depositors.
On Defamation
The claim of defamation baffles the defence. The actions taken by the DOC were legal, the information it stated was demonstrably true, and it divulged as much information as it could at every step of the way. Even if the actions were illegal, and even if the justification for them was untrue, the DOC still had a
duty to inform the public of the actions they took and the reasoning used behind them. To claim that doing so was somehow a defamation on Vanguard’s reputation rather than a simple carrying out of a necessary duty is laughable.
On Damages
The damages alleged by the Plaintiff are likewise ridiculous.
Sixteen million dollars is an amount so unfathomable for a court case that it shocks the conscience to even imagine requesting it. The primary account of the Redmont government currently holds $11.76 million, as of the writing of this statement. It should be excessively clear that no amount even approaching the requested figure could possibly be justified as compensation for
any action. A full granting of these damages would put Redmont’s government into a massive deficit of over four million dollars, single handedly putting our nation in debt for the first time in living memory. The Plaintiff alleges one million dollars in damages for the violation of three separate constitutional rights, none of which occurred. The plaintiff alleges another million for “reputational harm”, which is not even a valid form of damages, and yet another million for the alleged violation of the No More Defamation Act, which would
far exceed the damages of any prior defamation case. These numbers are seemingly pulled from the aether, and no attempt is made in either the initial complaint or the Plaintiff’s opening statement to justify them. It could be no clearer through this prayer for relief that this case is motivated by pure greed, not by a desire for justice.
In Conclusion,
This case is nothing more than a disagreement-turned-cash-grab. The Plaintiff has seemingly failed to read the relevant law, makes repeated allegations with no backing, and targets the government for doing nothing except that which it is lawfully and constitutionally required to do. This case is a ridiculous attempt at not only limiting the government’s power through misapplied principles, but also at engorging the Plaintiff to pull itself out of the financial vortex that it has placed itself in - that very financial vortex which necessitated the government’s actions.
As this trial continues, we will hear witness testimony which will speak to the necessity and legality of the DOC’s seizure of Vanguard’s banks. This will serve to even further disprove the ridiculous allegations brought against the government today.
Thank you for your time, and good night.
