Appeal: Accepted [2025] FCR 117 - Appeal

[ToadKing]

Username: ToadKing__

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: Anthony_Org

File(s) attached

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] FCR 117

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Dismissed - Anthony_Org v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 117

Basis for Appeal:

I. THE DISMISSAL DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS THE COURT'S OWN PRECEDENT ON STANDING​

The Federal Court dismissed this case for lack of standing, holding that "no harm was done to [the Plaintiff] personally" and that any harm "would be to the Congress as an institution, not to the individual members." This holding directly contradicts the same judge's decision in malka v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 87, where the Court cited another ruling in Ko531 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 33:

Members of the public can challenge the constitutionality of laws within the Federal Court. While they may not have specific damages related to the application of the law, they can challenge whether a law follows the parameters for being a law. In practice, it is considered a Check the public has on the government to ensure only legally acceptable laws are passed.

This holding establishes that citizens need not demonstrate personal damages to challenge the constitutionality of government actions. Individual citizens - including members of Congress - have standing to challenge whether executive actions comply with constitutional requirements. The Federal Court cannot simultaneously hold that:

- Any member of the public can challenge constitutionality without showing personal harm; but
- A member of Congress lacks standing to challenge an Executive Order that restricts a statutory body serving Congress

If ordinary citizens have standing to challenge constitutionality, then surely a member of Congress - whose institutional ability to legislate is directly affected by the challenged Executive Order - has at least equal standing. The Court's dismissal creates an absurd hierarchy where ordinary citizens have broader standing than legislators to challenge restrictions on legislative functions.
The Plaintiff brings this challenge both as a citizen exercising the public check described in [2025] FCR 87 and as a Senator, whose institutional responsibilities are directly affected by Executive Order 37/25's restriction on the Legislative Service Commission.

The Constitution does not require such procedural gymnastics before courts can address constitutional violations. Individual members of Congress, like all citizens under [2025] FCR 87, have standing to challenge whether executive actions comply with constitutional requirements.

II. THE FEDERAL COURT HAS EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION​

The Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that "the Supreme Court would be the proper venue as it is a dispute between government institutions." This holding misreads the Constitution's jurisdictional provisions.
Section 18(1)(a) of the Constitution grants the Federal Court original jurisdiction over "Questions of constitutionality."
This case presents a pure constitutional question: Does Executive Order 37/25 exceed the President's expressly granted powers under Section 42 of the Constitution?

Section 42 is unambiguous:

"Executive Orders must only be used as a mechanism by which the President can exert powers expressly granted to the Executive within the Constitution."

The Federal Court has express jurisdiction to decide whether the President exceeded this constitutional limitation. The fact that the case also involves two branches of government does not strip the Federal Court of its constitutional jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality.
Section 20(1)(b) grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction over "Resolving disputes between government institutions," but this jurisdiction is concurrent, not exclusive. Nothing in the Constitution strips the Federal Court of jurisdiction over constitutional questions merely because two branches are involved. If the drafters intended for all inter-branch disputes to go directly to the Supreme Court, Section 18(1)(a)'s grant of jurisdiction over constitutional questions would be meaningless in any case involving government parties.
The Federal Court has jurisdiction, declined to exercise it, and thereby committed reversible error.

III. THIS IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION​

The Court invoked the political question doctrine, stating this matter should be "resolved through the mechanisms that Congress has available to them (further legislation, oversight, or impeachment)." This represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the political question doctrine and the role of judicial review.

Whether the President exceeded constitutional authority under Section 42 is precisely the type of question courts exist to decide. Judicial review of executive actions for constitutional compliance is not a political question - it is the essence of the judicial power vested in the courts by Section 13 of the Constitution.
The Court's reasoning would immunise all executive actions from judicial review whenever Congress has theoretical alternative remedies. This cannot be correct. The Constitution establishes three coequal branches precisely so that each can check the others. The judiciary's check on executive overreach is judicial review, not abdication.

This is the second time this judicial officer has incorrectly invoked the political question doctrine to avoid deciding a justiciable legal question. In ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 106, the Court dismissed a challenge to Executive Orders that violated the State Commendations Act's timing requirements, holding:

When and how the Executive branch decides its Executive Honors is not something that this court will hear, as it is a political question.

That case presented a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: Did the President comply with Section 6(1) of the State Commendations Act? Whether executive action complies with statutory requirements is quintessentially justiciable. Yet the Federal Court declined to exercise jurisdiction, incorrectly labelling a legal question as "political."

The pattern is clear: this judicial officer has systematically expanded the political question doctrine beyond recognition, using it to avoid deciding cases that clearly fall within the court's jurisdiction. This approach undermines the separation of powers by immunising executive actions from judicial review.

IV. THE DISMISSAL ALLOWS CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS TO CONTINUE UNCHECKED​

The practical effect of the Court's dismissal is that Executive Order 37/25 remains in force despite serious constitutional concerns about whether it exceeds the President's authority under Section 42. The Executive Order purports to create a monopoly on legal advisory organisations, restricting the Legislative Service Commission that Congress created to support its constitutional functions.

If individual members of Congress lack standing, ordinary citizens lack standing under the Court's reasoning (contradicting [2025] FCR 87), and "Congress as an institution" must pursue alternative remedies, then no judicial review is available. This immunises executive actions from judicial scrutiny and upends the constitutional system of checks and balances.

V. CONCLUSION​

The Federal Court committed reversible error by:

1. Contradicting its own precedent in [2025] FCR 87 regarding standing to challenge constitutionality
2. Declining jurisdiction over a constitutional question within its express jurisdiction under Section 18(1)(a) of the Constitution
3. Misapplying the political question doctrine to avoid deciding a justiciable constitutional question
4. Creating an impossible requirement that "Congress as an institution" must sue, contradicting [2025] FCR 87's recognition that individual citizens can challenge constitutionality

This case presents a straightforward legal question: Does Executive Order 37/25 comply with the Constitution's Section 42 requirement that Executive Orders "must only be used as a mechanism by which the President can exert powers expressly granted to the Executive within the Constitution"?

The Federal Court has jurisdiction to answer this question and should have done so. The dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for decision on the merits.

Supporting Evidence: https://www.democracycraft.net/thre...alth-of-redmont-2025-fcr-87.31073/post-117121

Lawsuit: Adjourned Post in thread 'Ko531 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 33'

Mar 31, 2024

Motion for Sua Sponte dissmisal
​

Your Honor, under rule 2.1 of the court rules and procedures standing is defined as the following:

1. Suffered some injury caused by a clear second party; or is affected by an application of law.
2. The cause of injury was against the law.
3. Remedy is applicable under relevant law that can be granted by a favorable decision.

The defendent fails to fulfil the requists required by subsection 1 of the rule 2.1 and has provided no evidance nor claim that they themselves has received any personal injury from the enaction of the above...

• Nacho

Government Thread 'Constitution'

Apr 10, 2020

PREAMBLE

We the people, of the Commonwealth of Redmont, in order to form a more perfect country, establish this Constitution to guarantee the preservation and protection of Justice, promote the general welfare of our citizens, and secure the liberty of our participation in the governance of this country. All citizens and the Government of the Commonwealth of Redmont will abide by these here set principles to unite as an indissoluble nation, the Commonwealth of Redmont.

Redmont’s Government has three branches: the Legislative, Executive...

• DemocracyCraft
• Replies: 0
• Forum: Rules & Laws

• 
• 
• 

Executive Order Thread 'Executive Order 37/25 - The BAR, Bring it forth.'

Oct 30, 2025

By the authority vested in me as President under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Redmont, I, Pepecuu, the 23rd President of the Commonwealth of Redmont, do declare the following under this Executive Order:

Section 1. The Bar Association of Redmont (BAR)
(1) The BAR is hereby created as a public advisory organization for Redmont's legal sector.
(2) The BAR shall be the only government-endorsed public advisory legal organization that is allowed to operate within the territory of the Commonwealth of Redmont.
(3) The BAR shall encompass individuals that are licensed to...

• Pepecuu
• Replies: 0
• Forum: Executive Orders

Lawsuit: Dismissed Thread 'ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 106'

Oct 13, 2025

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

ToadKing
Plaintiff

v.

Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF

Between 11 October 2025 and 13 October 2025, the President of the Commonwealth of Redmont issued three Executive Orders awarding state commendations to numerous individuals. These Executive Orders - EO 34/25, EO 35/25, and EO 36/25 - were issued after the conclusion of the 15th Presidential Election...

• ToadKing
• Replies: 3
• Forum: Case Archive

• 

 

[Aladeen]

In a 3-0 decision, the Supreme Court has decided to grant this appeal.

The Appellant, has seventy-two hours to post their Appellant Brief.

@ToadKing

 

[ToadKing]

Appeal

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
APPELLANT BRIEF

This appeal presents a straightforward question: Can a Federal Court refuse to exercise its express constitutional jurisdiction over a challenge to executive overreach by invoking doctrines that directly contradict its own binding precedent? The answer must be no. The Federal Court's dismissal cannot stand because it creates irreconcilable contradictions in the law, strips citizens of their constitutional right to judicial review, and allows executive actions to escape scrutiny through legal reasoning that defies both logic and precedent.

The most glaring error is the Federal Court's contradictory application of standing. Just months ago, in malka v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 87, the same judicial officer who dismissed this case, held a previous ruling in another Federal Court case: "Members of the public can challenge the constitutionality of laws within the Federal Court. While they may not have specific damages related to the application of the law, they can challenge whether a law follows the parameters for being a law." The Court recognised this as "a Check the public has on the government to ensure only legally acceptable laws are passed." Yet when presented with this case - where a member of Congress challenges whether an Executive Order complies with constitutional requirements - the Court suddenly reversed course, holding that the Appellant suffered no personal harm and lacked standing. This is not just inconsistent; it creates an absurd legal hierarchy where ordinary citizens have broader standing to challenge executive actions than elected legislators whose institutional functions are directly affected. If a random citizen can challenge whether laws follow constitutional parameters without showing personal harm, surely a Senator can challenge an Executive Order that restricts a statutory body created to support Congress's constitutional lawmaking function. The [2025] FCR 87 precedent forecloses the standing objection, yet the Federal Court ignored its own ruling without explanation or justification.

The jurisdictional dismissal fares no better. Section 18(1)(a) of the Constitution grants the Federal Court original jurisdiction over "Questions of constitutionality." This case asks one pure question: Does Executive Order 37/25 exceed the President's expressly granted powers under Section 42 of the Constitution? Section 42 could not be clearer - Executive Orders "must only be used as a mechanism by which the President can exert powers expressly granted to the Executive within the Constitution." Whether the President complied with this constitutional limitation is exactly the type of question Section 18(1)(a) empowers the Federal Court to decide. The Court's assertion that only the Supreme Court can hear this case because it involves "a dispute between government institutions" ignores that Section 18(1)(a) and Section 20(1)(b) create concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction. Nothing in the Constitution strips the Federal Court of authority to decide constitutional questions merely because government parties are involved.

Perhaps most troubling is the Court's invocation of the political question doctrine. The Federal Court suggested this matter should be resolved through "further legislation, oversight, or impeachment" rather than judicial review. This represents a fundamental abdication of judicial responsibility. Determining whether executive action complies with constitutional limits is not a political question - it is the core function of judicial review. The Court's reasoning would immunise all executive overreach from judicial scrutiny whenever Congress has theoretical alternative remedies. But those alternatives are not remedies at all. Congress cannot cure a constitutional violation through new legislation; oversight involves monitoring, not nullification; and impeachment requires proof of crimes against the Constitution, which presupposes a judicial determination that a constitutional violation occurred. The Court's suggestion puts the cart before the horse and leaves unconstitutional actions unreviewable. Worse still, this is the second time this judicial officer has misapplied the political question doctrine to avoid deciding justiciable legal questions. In ToadKing v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 106, the Court dismissed a challenge to Executive Orders that violated statutory timing requirements, declaring that "when and how the Executive branch decides its Executive Honors" is a political question. Whether executive action complies with statutory requirements is quintessentially justiciable. The Federal Court has systematically expanded the political question doctrine to avoid exercising jurisdiction over cases challenging executive action, creating a zone of immunity for the Executive.

The practical consequence of the Federal Court's dismissal is that Executive Order 37/25 remains in force despite serious questions about whether it exceeds presidential authority under Section 42. The Executive Order purports to create a monopoly on legal advisory organisations, potentially restricting the Legislative Service Commission that Congress established to provide legal support for its constitutional lawmaking function. If individual legislators lack standing, ordinary citizens lack standing under the Court's reasoning (contradicting [2025] FCR 87), and institutional congressional action is required, then no judicial review is available. This immunises executive overreach from judicial scrutiny and collapses the constitutional system of checks and balances. The separation of powers requires that each branch can check the others - the judiciary checks executive overreach through judicial review, not through abdication dressed up as jurisdictional modesty.

The Federal Court committed multiple reversible errors by contradicting its own precedent on standing, declining jurisdiction over a constitutional question within its express authority, misapplying the political question doctrine to avoid a justiciable legal question, and creating impossible requirements for challenging executive actions. This case presents a straightforward constitutional question that the Federal Court had both jurisdiction and a duty to decide. The dismissal should be reversed, and this Court should provide clear guidance that the standing principles in [2025] FCR 87 apply with equal force to members of Congress challenging executive actions that affect legislative functions.

 

[Aladeen]

The Appellee will have 72 hours to present their brief.

@Kaiserin_

 

[ToadKing]

The Appellee will have 72 hours to present their brief.

@Kaiserin_

Objection

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

The Appellee was ordered to file their brief within seventy-two hours.
That deadline has now expired.

The Appellee requested no extension of time, nor made it apparent that they would be delayed.

It has been three hours since the deadline passed, and there is still no communication from the Appellee.

The Appellant is acting on instruction from a client - who has had justice delayed by the Appellee's seeming neglect for this Appeal.

This appeal is important to my client, and he doesn't appreciate or respect the Appellee's unjust and unwarranted inaction in this case.

The Appellant requests the Court:

1. Hold the Appellee (@Kaiserin_) in contempt for failing to file within the ordered timeframe;
2. Move this appeal to recess, pending a verdict.

 

[Aladeen]

Objection overruled, you now have 72 hours to present your response brief.

@ToadKing

 

[ToadKing]

Objection overruled, you now have 72 hours to present your response brief.

@ToadKing

The Appellant cannot respond to something which was never filed to begin with.

The Appellant opts not to file a response and requests this appeal is now ruled on.

This Court doesn't seem to want to hold parties accountable for their inaction.
The Appellee has already wasted mine and my clients time.

 

[Aladeen]

Thank you for your remarks, this appeal is now in recess pending verdict.

 

[Smallfries]

Verdict

Associate justice Smallfries4 writes the majority opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Aladeen22. Associate Justice Matthew100x concurs as to sections two and three.

Appellant Anthony_Org appeals sua sponte dismissal from the Federal Court of Redmont in the matter of Anthony_Org v. Commonwealth of Redmont. Anthony_org v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 117 (“FCR 117”). Appellant alleges four errors of law from the trial court’s ruling, which we construe into three. These are: (1) an incorrect application of standing standards, (2) an incorrect denial of proper jurisdiction, and (3) an incorrect assertion of political question doctrine.

In a unanimous vote, the Supreme Court of Redmont granted certiorari.

​

I. Standing​

The law regarding standing is entirely court-ordained, defined by the general Court Rules and Procedures authored by the Supreme Court. See Court R. & Proc., Rule 2. The court rules state that all cases must meet three elements to be fully pursued: (1) that the party suffered some injury caused by a clear second party, or is affected by an application of law, (2) that the cause of the injury was against the law, and (3) that the remedy requested is applicable under relevant law and can be granted by the instant court. Id. Legislative power is constitutionally vested in Congress. R.C. Const. Part I, § 1.

The trial court dismissed FCR 117 on the basis of standing because it believed Appellant did not fulfill element one. Even if element one were to be fulfilled, it would only be filled as to Congress itself. Because Appellant was not Congress or authorized to sue on the behalf of Congress, they lacked standing.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred because precedent has held that members of the public may challenge the viability of laws themselves despite a lack of damages related to the application of the law. Ko531 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] FCR 33 ("FCR 33"). We disagree, holding this interpretation a misstatement of the law.

Provided that standing is met, individuals may sue for any number of reasons. It has been held that individuals may sue for “public interest” cases, where necessary checks of the public on the Government are upheld through judicial intervention from time to time. See FCR 33; Malka v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 87. Appellant, and the dissent, misunderstands the law as to this point.

Public interest does not exist so as to totally ignore the issue of standing. Nor too does a law or government action being potentially illegitimate as to its formation immediately and unquestionably give all citizens in the Commonwealth unrestricted standing to sue the government. This is absurd.

A law or Government action being potentially illegitimate in some respect—be it procedural or constitutional in nature—provides a cause for an action, but it does not immediately provide standing. The historical confusion between these concepts lies in the nature of suing over an illegitimate law. Typically, laws or Government actions impose duties, liabilities, or obligations, grant privileges or rights, or otherwise confer some harm or benefit onto one or more parties. This is an injury, or an affect via application of law. In the case of such a harm or benefit conferral being done by a defective law, the defectiveness of the law gives cause to sue (or perhaps more accurately, enables the court to pursue a remedy under element three of the standing test), while the harm or benefit conferral (or lack thereof) to a party creates an injury (element one of the standing test).

It is important that these two concepts are not confused, and great care must be taken to evaluate the differences as it is easy to misunderstand. Typically, an illegitimate law or Government action being litigated also conferred a benefit or harm to a party, and thus also gave the court an injury to work with. The mere fact that a law or action on its face may be illegitimate is not immediately sufficient to fill both the first and third elements, though in practice often is. This distinction is self-evident when you think of two mutually exclusive scenarios.

Imagine first a law which is properly enacted and is not unconstitutional, but confers some harm or benefit (perhaps it raises taxes, or gives an expanded right to a certain class of citizen in a proper and legal way). It should be obvious that citizens would lack standing to sue over this law. Though the citizen may be harmed (either by the increased taxes, or not being a part of that certain class that is benefitted), there is no applicable remedy by the court. The court cannot overturn a law simply because a citizen dislikes it. There must be a legal reason for the law to be overturned.

In the second scenario, imagine a law is passed that is totally inert, but is passed illegitimately in some manner. This law likewise could not be struck down in court. If a law saying that the President was a citizen of Redmont was passed and signed into law, but it required a super-majority vote and only received a simple majority, it would be clear the law was illegitimate on its face. However, a legal decree that the President—who surely was already a citizen—is a citizen does nothing. No benefit or harm is conferred to any party. No party is burdened, and no party has been relatively deprived of benefits due to another party receiving such a benefit. Therefore, there has been no injury under such a law. Element one of standing has not been met.

It is indeed true that individuals do not need to prove they have been specifically harmed in some discrete, tangible manner—but they still must prove some injury occurred. It should be noted that the bar for this is extremely low.

Among the two possibilities above, it is clear that we are in the second scenario. Assuming that the government action at issue was indeed illegitimate—we do not rule as to that question at this time—it is evident that no benefit or harm has been conferred to any party. The Appellant seems to understand the two discussed elements above, and to meet them suggests first that he is exercising the “public interest” check to fulfill the third element, and an alleged harm to Congress for the first element.

Because this case was dismissed before trial, we do not evaluate the merits of these claims beyond their face. It is clear that there is a possibility that reasonable minds could find that this government action was illegitimate in its creation. Therefore, the third prong is satisfied, and the trial court erred when it found that even if a harm existed, only Congress (or an agent authorized by them) could sue. It should be noted that on this issue we do not rule that the action was necessarily illegitimate, only that it seems plausible it could have been.

However, as to the first element, we uphold the trial court’s reasoning. Though standing does not require harm to them personally and specifically, we do not see a clear possibility that any harm has occurred to Appellant or any individual or institution within the Commonwealth at all.

Appellant asserts, without evidence, that the harm necessary for this case to proceed is fulfilled by his allegation that Congress’s “institutional ability to legislate” is burdened by the executive order at issue. Appellant alleges that the Executive Order restricts the Legislative Service Commission (“LSC”), and therefore causes harm.

We are not convinced. The government action at issue—Executive Order 37/25—creates the Bar Association of Redmont (“BAR”), a “public advisory organization” for the legal sector. See generally, E.O. 37/25 (“the Order”). The Order speaks only to the BAR’s general purpose and structure, and does not appear to give it any power to promulgate rules or binding adjudications on any party in the Commonwealth, as would be expected by an agency granted decision-making ability. Specifically, the Order declares that enrollment in the BAR is not mandatory for those wishing to practice law, nor does the Order seem to confer—or even indicate a desire to confer—any adjudicatory or otherwise binding authority on the BAR.

Nowhere is the LSC mentioned in the Order. Congress is only mentioned twice in the Order: once when the Order says the BAR “are to abide by” Congress’s limits placed on the organization, and once when it encourages Congress to define limits for the BAR. The Order seems explicitly deferential to Congress, acting merely as a little push to create an organization with an existing structure so as to encourage Congress to act on it and give the BAR real power.

The latter mention may be interpreted by some as saying that the BAR has no limits at this time to its power, and therefore is all-powerful, but this is unreasonable. It is far more reasonable and natural to say power does not exist unless it is obviously granted or implied. Here, “encouraged to define the regulatory and legal limits” seems more to read that the Order wishes Congress to give them power in the first instance through giving them limits. Reading the Order instead to say that the Order grants the BAR unchecked power until Congress creates limits is not a reasonable interpretation.

Indeed, the BAR (at the time of writing) lacks any real power at all. They cannot do anything that impacts any individual, institution, or industry in any real way. Any guidelines or rules pushed by the BAR would have no authority or persuasive sway. It seems to exist at this moment as a political instrument to try to encourage Congress to write further legislation. Regardless of the legality of creating such an organization, it is clear that this organization, as it stands, confers no harm or benefits to any individuals.

Appellant argues that the LSC is restricted because the Order states that the BAR “shall be the only government-endorsed public advisory legal organization allowed [within Redmont.]” He argues that because the LSC is “unquestionably” a government-endorsed public advisory legal organization, the order has the effect of nullifying an act of Congress—specifically, the one that created the LSC. See Legislative Service Commission Act.

To support this apparent clash of definitions, Appellant presents a “joint motion of endorsement” from Congress, passed 10/31/2025, which states that the LSC shall be recognized by Congress as a “public advisory legal organization.” Ignoring the fact that the joint motion was introduced—by the Appellant, no less—a day after the Order was announced, and that the legal ramifications of this “joint motion” are flimsy at best, it is not clear that Appellant’s argument withstands any scrutiny. Though true that both the BAR and the LSC share definitions by their respective creators—perhaps intentionally so, on the part of the latter of the two definitions—these definitions do not arise from the same institutions, and do not deal with the same law.

Though perhaps confusing, there is no reason to believe that the Order intended to abrogate Congress’s authority by destroying the LSC. Indeed, we find it difficult to imagine this to be the case where the BAR’s definition was created before the LSC’s was. Even if the two organizations conflicted in their duties in some meaningful way and the BAR’s definition was created after the LSC’s, there is no real reason to believe that the Order was meant—or has served to—abridge the LSC’s (and therefore Congress’s) power in any way.

We are confused as to how exactly the LSC’s operations, or Congress’s power, is necessarily infringed by the BAR or the Order. Neither Appellant nor the dissent have cited any moment where Congress has been unable to operate in a space where it otherwise would have without the Order. Appellant further has not theorized any specific instance where the Order has, would, or even could restrict Congress’s constitutional legislative power at all. We are simply told it does.

This is obviously untrue. The Constitution grants Congress legislative power. Congress may delegate this power to agencies, as it has before. See Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78, 6–7 (appeal). No instance has, to the best of our research abilities, ever been produced where the legislative abilities of Congress have been restricted by any entity that is not Congress itself. It should be self-evident that no entity can restrict the legislative abilities of Congress besides Congress. Despite the Appellant and the dissent saying otherwise, the mere insinuation that a party has actually tried to usurp legislative authority does not make that assertion true.

To insinuate that any entity, party, or organization could unilaterally restrict Congress’s constitutional power is incorrect. Such a restriction would not only be illicit, but would instantly evaporate and have no legal consequence. Even if the Order or the BAR somehow did limit Congress’s legislative or the LSC’s statutory authority, those limits are legally unenforceable and evaporate immediately upon observation, struck down by this Court or others without hesitation. However, given that we do not see any such limits, we find that no harm is present.

Similarly, it is unreasonable to suggest that even if the Order limited Congress’s power as it currently stands, that power could not be instantly reclaimed by an act of Congress. Were the Order to grant the BAR some power—power that would be, as discussed, illegitimate—Congress could simply pass any act creating the BAR (or a like institution) and it would immediately supersede the Order. Unless Congress were to explicitly say that they adopted and legitimized the BAR as it was created by the Order, the Order has no legal weight on any future act of Congress. It is incorrect in every way to say otherwise. The Executive cannot limit Congress’s supreme legislative power.

Our brother in dissent raises several cases that propose to support the assertion that our decision here is in error. These cases attempt to prove that current precedent stands saying that the mere fact that a law or government action being illegitimate in its passing necessarily creates a harm. However, upon further investigation, each of the listed cases meets the above criteria and would succeed in standing under our framework today. (We do not comment on any legal issue or question of ongoing case(s)). Without exhaustively listing them all, it is clear that the cases cited by the dissent do not contradict, in any way, the framework set out today.

Because there has been no reasonable argument presented as to how the Order or the BAR could possibly infringe upon the constitutional authority of Congress or statutory authority given to the LSC and there is no obvious power that the BAR has otherwise, there is no reasonable argument to suggest any harm has been committed. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it ruled that the Appellant lacked standing as to the first element of the standing test.

The dissent’s fear regarding this non-review is unfounded. The Court’s upholding of the trial court’s determination today squarely defends the legislative power of Congress, and places a firm barrier against the Executive and the President. Though some may think the Court’s decision empowers the Executive, in actuality today we stand firmly against aggrandizement of rightful Congressional power by the Executive. The Executive cannot (and here, has not) restrict the legislative power of Congress, nor usurp it by any means. In the world of legislation, Congress is supreme and inviolable.

​

II. FCR Jurisdiction​

Jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Redmont includes original jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality. R.C. Const. Part II, § 18(1). Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Redmont includes cases involving disputes between government institutions. Id., Part II, § 20(1).

The trial court found that in the instant case, the forum selected for the suit was improper. Because the trial court found that only Congress (or an individual appointed on their behalf) could sue for this issue, only the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction, as this was a dispute between government institutions.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the controlling constitutional provision in this instance is section eighteen, not section twenty. We agree.

It is clear that the Appellant, even as a member of Congress, was not suing on behalf of any government entity. There is no evidence that any government entity sponsored this suit or asked him to sue on their behalf. Therefore, Appellant did not create a dispute between government institutions.

Further, it is possible that without inviting such a circumstance, a case can be—by its very nature—a dispute between government institutions. We do not find this is the case here. Though vague, disputes between government institutions should involve more than mere disagreements. Disputes should involve tangible effects or conflicts of law or applications thereof. As discussed supra, the Order had no tangible effect in law. There is nothing to conflict with. This case could not have possibly been a dispute between organizations. Further, even if the Order had some effect, because that effect could not have actively impeded another government agency (as discussed supra) it is impossible for this to rise to an internal government dispute.

Because of the above, we rule in favor of the Appellant in this matter. The Federal Court of Redmont was the proper forum for this case.

​

III. Political Question​

The trial court found that the nature of the instant case was political and that it would be improper for a judicial answer here. Because Congress had a wide array of mechanisms and processes open to it, the political question would be best answered through Congress, and therefore should not be answered by the court.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the issue in the instant case was not a political question, but an important legal question that needed to be answered. Appellant argues that a refusal to use judicial review in this instance would grant the Executive branch broad immunity.

The arguments relevant to this case do not appear to be fully litigated or discussed in any real detail. In the instant case, we refuse to discuss the issue of the political question doctrine. We hold that because we have already upheld the trial court’s decision in part, it is not necessary to comment on this immature and undeveloped area of law at the current moment.

Were we to do so, we would be casting a line into the great void of jurisprudence with little precedent, fact patterns, or caselaw to guide us. We do not feel comfortable with this. The court will delay answering this issue to another day, when we have a full case with sufficient facts and record to deliberate on. In the present, our refusal to rule on this issue does not impact the outcome of this appeal.

​

IV. Conclusion​

We uphold the trial court’s ruling in relevant part. Though the Federal Court was the correct forum, and the third element of the standing test was surely fulfilled, the trial court did not err when it found that the first element of the standing test was unfulfilled. Because of this, we do not overturn the trial court’s decision.​

Associate Justice Matthew100x dissents in part as to section one and concurs as to sections two and three.
​

Spoiler: Matthew100x Dissent

I. Introduction​

Standing, as a part of the court rules, is the codification and derivation of what have been the common practice of the Judiciary to accept and deny cases. The legal issue in this appeal is whether the application of law is indeed enough to satisfy standing, or if there needs to be a clear injury. The legal issue of the FCR case is whether the Executive Order 37/25, "The BAR, Bring it forth," is a constitutional executive order.

The case was initially presented to the FCR, where it was immediately dismissed by the Honorable Judge Ameslap. (see Lawsuit: Dismissed - Anthony_Org v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 117). Ameslap dismissed for three reasons: 1) Standing on the grounds that there was no harm done individually; 2) Political Question because Congress has available other mechanisms to change the EO; and 3) Jurisdiction, because litigation between government institutions goes to the Supreme Court.

For the reasons set henceforth in this opinion, I dissent on the judgment and would have granted the appeal.
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II. Rules​

Standing is defined as follows:

Suffered some injury caused by a clear second party; or is affected by an application of law.
The cause of injury was against the law.
Remedy is applicable under relevant law that can be granted by a favorable decision.

(see Information - Court Rules and Procedures). Standing, as a concept, was made with the Court Rules. Standing, prior to its codification as Court Rule 2.1, was a broad concept of whether a case was accepted. (see generally Lawsuit: Adjourned - JB3335 v. Mebis [2020] DCR 3 (A case was accepted with minimal facts and damages because the plaintiff was coughed on); Lawsuit: Adjourned - CorbinJc v. Department of Justice [2020] FCR 30 (accepting a case where the claims for relief is not well-defined and prayer for relief was minimal); Lawsuit: Dismissed - Aladeen22 v. the Department of Health [2021] FCR 27 (case that was accepted and dismissed for reasons other than AG’s request for dismissal on standing grounds)). Standing, as a matter of constitutionality, was granted for instances of the operation of law being illegal ( Lawsuit: Adjourned - Prodigium & Partners at Law v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 1 (Granting standing despite no correlation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, ultimately holding that the constitutional amendments were unconstitutional); Lawsuit: Adjourned - xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 3 (Granting standing on the constitutional question of the constitutional amendment, ultimately holding that properly passed constitutional amendments are inherently constitutional); Lawsuit: Dismissed - hugebob23456 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 6). Standing has also been granted for Courts to define the proper definitions of properly passed law, despite any clear injury. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - AlexanderLove v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2021] SCR 13 and Lawsuit: Adjourned - Inknet v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 86 (case still pending decision, but standing was accepted)).

The Court has made an error on this issue previously. In End v. COR [2023] SCR 22, the question in this case was whether the decision to dissolve the House can be undone. (see Lawsuit: Dismissed - xEndeavour v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] SCR 22). Here, standing was not granted. I as an associate Justice wrote that the injury lacked a clear second party and therefore did not have standing. This was error. While it is incredibly unlikely that the cause of the injury was against the law (and determining that would be a political question), the operation of law clearly occurred. The operation of law, in this case, was the physical action of all House members losing their rank and the triggering of a special election. By holding the definition that an application of law is either an illegal operation of law or defining what is a legal application of law, I would override the precedent on standing in this decision.

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III. Application​

A. Standing Existed in the FCR Because There Was an Application of Law.
Standing should not have been decided against the Appellant in the FCR. As can be gleaned from the rules, there are two distinct pathways for the first portion of standing. There can be an injury caused by a clear second party, or it can be caused by an application of law. Our Judiciary has graciously allowed many plaintiffs to come forth and argue their case. While the standing doctrine is now two years old, and the point of it was to clarify what cases could or could not bring forward; there is no reason to have it be a bar to all cases. The standing rule took into account actions that did not cause an injury by a clear second party, which is why “or affected by an application of law” is part of the rule. Here, the Appellant was affected by an application of law.

The Appellant, in the complaint on the FCR case, alleged the following facts:

9. Section 1(2) of Executive Order 37/25 states: "The BAR shall be the only government-endorsed public advisory legal organization that is allowed to operate within the territory of the Commonwealth of Redmont." (P-003)
10. Section 1(3) of Executive Order 37/25 states that the BAR "shall encompass individuals that are licensed to represent other individuals before the Courts of Redmont, and those who act as Judicial Officers of those Courts, on an opt-in basis." (P-003)...
15. The Congressional endorsement was officially announced on 31 October 2025, stating: "Congress recognizes the Legislative Service Commission as a public advisory legal organization established to support the Congress of the Commonwealth of Redmont." (P-006)

An application of law can be one of two things under existing precedent. An illegal operation of law or defining a legal application of law. The executive order does two things that creates an application of law.

First is that its language abridges Congress’s ability to create law. Following with the first claim of relief, the EO creates the initial framework, including the choice of governing style of the BAR. This clearly creates law that overrides a choice for Congress if it were to remake the RBA, which it has the power to do. Congress has the power to create the law on a bar association, as evidence as having done so repeatedly in Redmont’s history (see Rescinded - Legal Board Act, Rescinded - Modern Legal Board Act, Repealed - Super Modern Legal Board Act, Act of Congress - Legal Reform Act). The Legal Reform Act is presently in power, and it prevents the RBA from being reformed (but potentially not the BAR). The EO creation of the BAR also allows it power by allowing it to create “terms, rules, and structure of organization.” The EO attempts to circumvent this issue by allowing Congress to create “predefined regulatory and legal limits.” However, there are no limits placed thus far. This allows the BAR a hypothetical unlimited amount of power, as the lack of limits could be read by lawyers to mean no limits, instead of having no power. It is Congress’s choice on how to create and structure the BAR, and the President’s EO acts as an operation of law that potentially overreaches the President’s constitutional power, and thus a citizen would have standing to sue as this would be an illegal operation of law.

Second is that there appears to be a clash of law that needs defining. The BAR, per the EO, is defined as the “only government-endorsed public advisory legal organization.” (Executive Order - Executive Order 37/25 - The BAR, Bring it forth.) The Legislative Service Commission Act, creates the Legislative Service Commission, which is an “an independent, non-partisan body… [that] operate as the principal legal and drafting… [is] accountable to Congress collectively, not to any single party, chamber, or member.” (see 3(1)(a)-(b), Act of Congress - Legislative Service Commission Act). At issue would be what is a “government-endorsed public advisory legal organization.” If this definition were to fit the Legislative Service Commission, then the EO would override Congress in violation of the Constitution; as EOs can only exert powers expressly granted to the Executive within the Constitution (see 42. Executive Order, Government - Constitution). Thus, a citizen would have standing to sue as this would be requesting a definition of a properly passed law.

None of this is to say that I, or this Court, believe that the Executive Order is actually unconstitutional but that it instead, on “first-basis,” passes the sniff test of standing for the first and second claims for relief. There is an application of law that is potentially against the law which can be remedied by a favorable decision. These issues can be fully tried, and the Federal Court would be able to come up with a conclusion on the issues of the case. I however, do concur that there is not a clear injury by a second party nor an application of law, for the third and fourth claims for relief. Thus, I would reverse the decision of the case being dismissed for standing on the first and second claims for relief.

B. Jurisdiction is Proper in the Federal Court Because the Issue is a Constitutional Question and a Private Citizen is Suing.
The issue here is a legal question of whether the EO overrides Congress’s power. The Plaintiff/Appellant in no instance of fact or claim says that they are representing the interest of Congress, even if they are a member of the Senate. Not once did the Plaintiff invoke their status of being a Senator or being in the Senate. This case is not the Legislative v. The Executive; or the Senate v. the President; or Anthony_Org (in their capacity as a Senator) v. Pepecuu (in their capacity as the President). This case is Anthony_Org v. The Commonwealth of Redmont.

If this were a dispute between branches of government, the Federal Court would be correct in dismissing for want of jurisdiction. That said, this is a case between a citizen and the government over the constitutionality of an application of law. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the case being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

C. The Issue at Hand is a Constitutional Question, not a Political Issue.
The definition laid by End in his amicus brief makes some sense, “A political question arises when an issue is more appropriately resolved by another branch of government due to the lack of judicial standards or because it is inherently tied to political discretion.” (see Lawsuit: Dismissed - AlexanderLove v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 7). However, the issue of whether “a[] [political question] is more appropriated resolved by another branch of government due to lack of judicial standards…” is not quite accurate. As I stated above in part A, I believe that this issue more appropriately fits the definition of a constitutional question. While I disagree with the decision made by the Honorable Ameslap here, I concur with the majority that this case is the incorrect forum to be deciding the issue of political question. Thus, I reserve judgment and do not make any decision on the issue of political question.

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IV. Conclusion​

I dissent as to the question of Standing and concur on Political Question and Jurisdiction.​