RavenReap v. BrutalByteMC [2026] DCR

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Desertstorm49
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Case Filing​



IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


RavenReap
Plaintiff

v.

BrutalByteMC
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF
"so i was given an investment opportunity in Marksman LLC for 50k ill get 33.5% of there Shares and i had told them to add the close for the repayment of the 50k if the firm stop working or it goes bankrupt and its been months now the CEO is offline and is not replying to anyone and the other management ppl of Marksman LLC left the firm"


I. PARTIES
1. RavenReap
2. Marksman LLC

II. FACTS
1. Recently, my client purchased 1/3 of Marksman LLC for 50,000 Redmont dollars
2. In the sale agreement, there is a clause that stipulates that the 50,000 Redmont dollars must be returned to my client if the company goes out of business
3. The company is now out of business, and has not paid back the 50,000 Redmont dollars to my client

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. By failing to uphold their side of the contract, Marksman LLC committed Breach of Contract as outlined in Section 6 Subsection 1 of the Redmont Civil Code Act. Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Defendant:
1. Full restitution equivalent to the amount promised in the contract. i.e. 50,000 dollars
2. By depriving my client of $50,000 of his own money, he was prevented in engaging in various pursuits which he otherwise would have been able to had he received his $50,000, thus constituting Loss of Enjoyment. For this we seek an additional $50,000
3. The payment of all legal fees

Sale Agreement:
Screenshot from 2026-09-12 10-45-51.png
Screenshot from 2026-09-12 10-48-09.png
Screenshot from 2026-09-12 10-48-19.png

Consent of Representation:
Screenshot from 2026-09-12 11-00-38.png


By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 11th day of September, 2026
 

Attachments

Last edited:
I would like to declare that I have made an edit to the original post. My client has informed me that Marksman LLC is not registered, and therefore is not a legal entity. I have amended my error
 
Your Honor,

I would like to inform the Court that I am changing my legal representation in this matter. Effective immediately, I have retained amah853 as my counsel and consent to him representing me in this case.

I respectfully request that the Court recognize amah853 as my counsel of record going forward.
 
Your Honor,

I, amah853 of KeystoneLaw, hereby enter my appearance as counsel of record for the Plaintiff in this matter.

The Plaintiff has expressly consented to my representation and requested that I replace prior counsel. All future filings, notices, and correspondence concerning this matter should be directed to me.

Respectfully submitted,
amah853
KeystoneLaw
Counsel for Plantiff
 

Court Order


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order to Show Cause


Plaintiff's sole claim rests on a provision requiring the full return of a $50,000 investment should Marksman LLC cease operations, while the Plaintiff simultaneously retains a 33.5% ownership interest in that enterprise. Such a provision appears to allocate the entire risk of the venture to the counterparty while preserving Plaintiff's share of any profits, and the Court has serious doubts as to whether it is enforceable. Pursuant to Contracts Act § 14(2) and the reasoning in KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104, the Court may void terms so one-sided as to be unconscionable, and a claim founded solely on a void provision cannot proceed. Plaintiff's counsel has 72 hours to show cause why the repayment provision is not unconscionable and, should it be voided, on what basis Plaintiff is entitled to relief.


So ordered,
Justice Mug in the District Court




@amah853
 
Your honor,
The plaintiff requests a 24 hour extension to the deadline due to personal reasons. Thank you.
 
Your Honor,

The Plaintiff submits this response to the Court’s order regarding the repayment clause.

1. The clause is not unconscionable

This situation is different from KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104.

In KingBOB, the contract required extremely high monthly returns and then added large penalties when those payments were not made. That is not what happened here.

RavenReap paid $50,000 for a 33.5% ownership interest in Marksman. The agreement simply stated that if Marksman stopped operating, the investment would be repaid.

The Plaintiff is not asking BrutalByteMC to personally come up with another $50,000.

Marksman itself currently has an in-game firm balance of $49,502.38. In other words, nearly the entire original investment is still sitting in the firm.

The Plaintiff is asking for those existing firm funds to be returned following the cessation of Marksman’s operations. This is not an attempt to receive an excessive profit or penalty. It is an attempt to recover the money that remains in the business RavenReap invested into.

2. If the repayment clause is invalid

Even if the Court finds that the repayment clause cannot be enforced, the Plaintiff submits that BrutalByteMC should not simply be allowed to retain control over the $49,502.38 currently sitting in Marksman.

RavenReap contributed $50,000 to the business and received a 33.5% ownership interest. Marksman is no longer operating, while $49,502.38 remains in the firm's in-game balance.

At minimum, those remaining funds should be addressed by the Court rather than left entirely under BrutalByteMC's control.

The Plaintiff therefore asks the Court to either enforce the repayment clause or otherwise order appropriate relief concerning the $49,502.38 remaining in Marksman.

Respectfully submitted,

amah853
Counsel for Plaintiff
 
amah853 said:
Your Honor,

The Plaintiff submits this response to the Court’s order regarding the repayment clause.

1. The clause is not unconscionable

This situation is different from KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104.

In KingBOB, the contract required extremely high monthly returns and then added large penalties when those payments were not made. That is not what happened here.

RavenReap paid $50,000 for a 33.5% ownership interest in Marksman. The agreement simply stated that if Marksman stopped operating, the investment would be repaid.

The Plaintiff is not asking BrutalByteMC to personally come up with another $50,000.

Marksman itself currently has an in-game firm balance of $49,502.38. In other words, nearly the entire original investment is still sitting in the firm.

The Plaintiff is asking for those existing firm funds to be returned following the cessation of Marksman’s operations. This is not an attempt to receive an excessive profit or penalty. It is an attempt to recover the money that remains in the business RavenReap invested into.

2. If the repayment clause is invalid

Even if the Court finds that the repayment clause cannot be enforced, the Plaintiff submits that BrutalByteMC should not simply be allowed to retain control over the $49,502.38 currently sitting in Marksman.

RavenReap contributed $50,000 to the business and received a 33.5% ownership interest. Marksman is no longer operating, while $49,502.38 remains in the firm's in-game balance.

At minimum, those remaining funds should be addressed by the Court rather than left entirely under BrutalByteMC's control.

The Plaintiff therefore asks the Court to either enforce the repayment clause or otherwise order appropriate relief concerning the $49,502.38 remaining in Marksman.

Respectfully submitted,

amah853
Counsel for Plaintiff
Click to expand...

Counselor, your response does not address the question the Court posed. The Order asked whether the repayment provision is unconscionable under Contracts Act § 14(2) given that your client retains a 33.5% equity interest alongside a guaranteed return of principal. You have instead argued that funds remain available to satisfy the clause, which speaks to satisfaction rather than enforceability. Your distinction of KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104 recites that case's facts without identifying the principle you say does not reach this agreement. Section 2 raises further difficulty: you have previously represented that Marksman LLC is unregistered, yet now ask the Court to order relief concerning firm assets, and you have cited no provision of the agreement or authority entitling a 33.5% owner to the entirety of a remaining balance.

Counsel has 48 hours to address the unconscionability question as framed.
 
Your Honor,

Sorry for the misunderstanding, the Plaintiff understands the Court's concern and will address the question directly.

The Plaintiff does not contend that RavenReap should receive repayment of his principal while also continuing to retain his 33.5% ownership interest in Marksman.

If the repayment provision is enforced, RavenReap is prepared to relinquish his 33.5% interest upon repayment. The Plaintiff's position is therefore not that RavenReap is entitled to both the return of his investment and continued ownership of the business.

With that clarification, the repayment provision does not create the type of excessively one-sided arrangement found unconscionable in KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104.

In KingBOB, the Court found the agreement unconscionable because it required a 50% monthly yield, amounting to $900,000 annually on a $150,000 investment, together with a five-times-default penalty. The Court specifically found those obligations excessively one-sided, economically unrealistic, and detached from what could reasonably be performed in Redmont.

That principle does not reach this agreement.

RavenReap was not promised an extraordinary monthly return, guaranteed profit, or multiplied penalty. He received a 33.5% interest in Marksman while the business operated. The repayment provision applied only if the business ceased operating.

Read in that context, the provision functions as an exit from the investment: RavenReap gives up the ownership interest and receives his principal back. It does not allow him to keep both benefits.

That is also why the Plaintiff submits the provision is consistent with the duty of fairness under Contracts Act § 14(2). RavenReap provided $50,000. While Marksman operated, he held a 33.5% interest in return. Once Marksman ceased operating, the agreement provided for repayment instead. Enforcing that arrangement does not provide RavenReap with an extraordinary return or place an impossible obligation on the Defendant.

The Plaintiff therefore respectfully submits that the repayment provision is not unconscionable when enforced as the parties' agreed exit mechanism, with RavenReap relinquishing his 33.5% interest upon repayment.

For clarity, the Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the repayment provision and does not seek to retain the 33.5% interest following repayment.

Respectfully submitted,

amah853
Counsel for Plaintiff
 
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