Lawsuit: Adjourned RavenReap v. BrutalByteMC [2026] DCR 179

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Case Filing​



IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


RavenReap
Plaintiff

v.

BrutalByteMC
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF
"so i was given an investment opportunity in Marksman LLC for 50k ill get 33.5% of there Shares and i had told them to add the close for the repayment of the 50k if the firm stop working or it goes bankrupt and its been months now the CEO is offline and is not replying to anyone and the other management ppl of Marksman LLC left the firm"


I. PARTIES
1. RavenReap
2. Marksman LLC

II. FACTS
1. Recently, my client purchased 1/3 of Marksman LLC for 50,000 Redmont dollars
2. In the sale agreement, there is a clause that stipulates that the 50,000 Redmont dollars must be returned to my client if the company goes out of business
3. The company is now out of business, and has not paid back the 50,000 Redmont dollars to my client

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. By failing to uphold their side of the contract, Marksman LLC committed Breach of Contract as outlined in Section 6 Subsection 1 of the Redmont Civil Code Act. Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Defendant:
1. Full restitution equivalent to the amount promised in the contract. i.e. 50,000 dollars
2. By depriving my client of $50,000 of his own money, he was prevented in engaging in various pursuits which he otherwise would have been able to had he received his $50,000, thus constituting Loss of Enjoyment. For this we seek an additional $50,000
3. The payment of all legal fees

Sale Agreement:
Screenshot from 2026-09-12 10-45-51.png
Screenshot from 2026-09-12 10-48-09.png
Screenshot from 2026-09-12 10-48-19.png

Consent of Representation:
Screenshot from 2026-09-12 11-00-38.png


By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 11th day of September, 2026
 

Attachments

Last edited:
I would like to declare that I have made an edit to the original post. My client has informed me that Marksman LLC is not registered, and therefore is not a legal entity. I have amended my error
 
Your Honor,

I would like to inform the Court that I am changing my legal representation in this matter. Effective immediately, I have retained amah853 as my counsel and consent to him representing me in this case.

I respectfully request that the Court recognize amah853 as my counsel of record going forward.
 
Your Honor,

I, amah853 of KeystoneLaw, hereby enter my appearance as counsel of record for the Plaintiff in this matter.

The Plaintiff has expressly consented to my representation and requested that I replace prior counsel. All future filings, notices, and correspondence concerning this matter should be directed to me.

Respectfully submitted,
amah853
KeystoneLaw
Counsel for Plantiff
 

Court Order


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order to Show Cause


Plaintiff's sole claim rests on a provision requiring the full return of a $50,000 investment should Marksman LLC cease operations, while the Plaintiff simultaneously retains a 33.5% ownership interest in that enterprise. Such a provision appears to allocate the entire risk of the venture to the counterparty while preserving Plaintiff's share of any profits, and the Court has serious doubts as to whether it is enforceable. Pursuant to Contracts Act § 14(2) and the reasoning in KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104, the Court may void terms so one-sided as to be unconscionable, and a claim founded solely on a void provision cannot proceed. Plaintiff's counsel has 72 hours to show cause why the repayment provision is not unconscionable and, should it be voided, on what basis Plaintiff is entitled to relief.


So ordered,
Justice Mug in the District Court




@amah853
 
Your honor,
The plaintiff requests a 24 hour extension to the deadline due to personal reasons. Thank you.
 
Your Honor,

The Plaintiff submits this response to the Court’s order regarding the repayment clause.

1. The clause is not unconscionable

This situation is different from KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104.

In KingBOB, the contract required extremely high monthly returns and then added large penalties when those payments were not made. That is not what happened here.

RavenReap paid $50,000 for a 33.5% ownership interest in Marksman. The agreement simply stated that if Marksman stopped operating, the investment would be repaid.

The Plaintiff is not asking BrutalByteMC to personally come up with another $50,000.

Marksman itself currently has an in-game firm balance of $49,502.38. In other words, nearly the entire original investment is still sitting in the firm.

The Plaintiff is asking for those existing firm funds to be returned following the cessation of Marksman’s operations. This is not an attempt to receive an excessive profit or penalty. It is an attempt to recover the money that remains in the business RavenReap invested into.

2. If the repayment clause is invalid

Even if the Court finds that the repayment clause cannot be enforced, the Plaintiff submits that BrutalByteMC should not simply be allowed to retain control over the $49,502.38 currently sitting in Marksman.

RavenReap contributed $50,000 to the business and received a 33.5% ownership interest. Marksman is no longer operating, while $49,502.38 remains in the firm's in-game balance.

At minimum, those remaining funds should be addressed by the Court rather than left entirely under BrutalByteMC's control.

The Plaintiff therefore asks the Court to either enforce the repayment clause or otherwise order appropriate relief concerning the $49,502.38 remaining in Marksman.

Respectfully submitted,

amah853
Counsel for Plaintiff
 
amah853 said:
Your Honor,

The Plaintiff submits this response to the Court’s order regarding the repayment clause.

1. The clause is not unconscionable

This situation is different from KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104.

In KingBOB, the contract required extremely high monthly returns and then added large penalties when those payments were not made. That is not what happened here.

RavenReap paid $50,000 for a 33.5% ownership interest in Marksman. The agreement simply stated that if Marksman stopped operating, the investment would be repaid.

The Plaintiff is not asking BrutalByteMC to personally come up with another $50,000.

Marksman itself currently has an in-game firm balance of $49,502.38. In other words, nearly the entire original investment is still sitting in the firm.

The Plaintiff is asking for those existing firm funds to be returned following the cessation of Marksman’s operations. This is not an attempt to receive an excessive profit or penalty. It is an attempt to recover the money that remains in the business RavenReap invested into.

2. If the repayment clause is invalid

Even if the Court finds that the repayment clause cannot be enforced, the Plaintiff submits that BrutalByteMC should not simply be allowed to retain control over the $49,502.38 currently sitting in Marksman.

RavenReap contributed $50,000 to the business and received a 33.5% ownership interest. Marksman is no longer operating, while $49,502.38 remains in the firm's in-game balance.

At minimum, those remaining funds should be addressed by the Court rather than left entirely under BrutalByteMC's control.

The Plaintiff therefore asks the Court to either enforce the repayment clause or otherwise order appropriate relief concerning the $49,502.38 remaining in Marksman.

Respectfully submitted,

amah853
Counsel for Plaintiff
Click to expand...

Counselor, your response does not address the question the Court posed. The Order asked whether the repayment provision is unconscionable under Contracts Act § 14(2) given that your client retains a 33.5% equity interest alongside a guaranteed return of principal. You have instead argued that funds remain available to satisfy the clause, which speaks to satisfaction rather than enforceability. Your distinction of KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104 recites that case's facts without identifying the principle you say does not reach this agreement. Section 2 raises further difficulty: you have previously represented that Marksman LLC is unregistered, yet now ask the Court to order relief concerning firm assets, and you have cited no provision of the agreement or authority entitling a 33.5% owner to the entirety of a remaining balance.

Counsel has 48 hours to address the unconscionability question as framed.
 
Your Honor,

Sorry for the misunderstanding, the Plaintiff understands the Court's concern and will address the question directly.

The Plaintiff does not contend that RavenReap should receive repayment of his principal while also continuing to retain his 33.5% ownership interest in Marksman.

If the repayment provision is enforced, RavenReap is prepared to relinquish his 33.5% interest upon repayment. The Plaintiff's position is therefore not that RavenReap is entitled to both the return of his investment and continued ownership of the business.

With that clarification, the repayment provision does not create the type of excessively one-sided arrangement found unconscionable in KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104.

In KingBOB, the Court found the agreement unconscionable because it required a 50% monthly yield, amounting to $900,000 annually on a $150,000 investment, together with a five-times-default penalty. The Court specifically found those obligations excessively one-sided, economically unrealistic, and detached from what could reasonably be performed in Redmont.

That principle does not reach this agreement.

RavenReap was not promised an extraordinary monthly return, guaranteed profit, or multiplied penalty. He received a 33.5% interest in Marksman while the business operated. The repayment provision applied only if the business ceased operating.

Read in that context, the provision functions as an exit from the investment: RavenReap gives up the ownership interest and receives his principal back. It does not allow him to keep both benefits.

That is also why the Plaintiff submits the provision is consistent with the duty of fairness under Contracts Act § 14(2). RavenReap provided $50,000. While Marksman operated, he held a 33.5% interest in return. Once Marksman ceased operating, the agreement provided for repayment instead. Enforcing that arrangement does not provide RavenReap with an extraordinary return or place an impossible obligation on the Defendant.

The Plaintiff therefore respectfully submits that the repayment provision is not unconscionable when enforced as the parties' agreed exit mechanism, with RavenReap relinquishing his 33.5% interest upon repayment.

For clarity, the Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the repayment provision and does not seek to retain the 33.5% interest following repayment.

Respectfully submitted,

amah853
Counsel for Plaintiff
 

Writ of Summons



@Brutalbytemc is commanded to appear in the District Court in the case of Ravenreap v. Brutalbytemc [2026] DCR 179

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 
Muggy21 said:

Writ of Summons



@Brutalbytemc is commanded to appear in the District Court in the case of Ravenreap v. Brutalbytemc [2026] DCR 179

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

Click to expand...
This deadline has now passed, Your Honor.
 
We proceed in inquest.

Inquest expiration date shall be the minimum prescribed by the Rules.


@amah853 Inquest Discovery is open until 10/5/26 at 9pm EDT. Please inform the Court how you wish to prove your case. You may offer more evidence, witnesses and legal briefs including your arguments.

The Court will not accept expert witnesses on contracts or on the law.
 
Muggy21 said:
We proceed in inquest.

Inquest expiration date shall be the minimum prescribed by the Rules.


@amah853 Inquest Discovery is open until 10/5/26 at 9pm EDT. Please inform the Court how you wish to prove your case. You may offer more evidence, witnesses and legal briefs including your arguments.

The Court will not accept expert witnesses on contracts or on the law.
Click to expand...
Apologies for the delay Your Honor, I had some personal stuff I had to deal with. Can we have an extension for discovery?
 

Motion


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
DISCOVERY SUBMISSION

The Plaintiff submits the following additional evidence for discovery. The Plaintiff further submits the following witness.

P-001.png

P-003.png

P-006.png

P-007.png

P-018.png

P-016.png

P-025.png

WITNESS LIST:
1. RavenReap

Signed,
amah853
KeystoneLaw
Counsel for Plaintiff



Could the Court please clarify the deadline by which the Plaintiff must inform the Court how he intends to prove his case?
 
amah853 said:

Motion


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
DISCOVERY SUBMISSION

The Plaintiff submits the following additional evidence for discovery. The Plaintiff further submits the following witness.

View attachment 101346

View attachment 101347

View attachment 101348

View attachment 101349

View attachment 101350

View attachment 101351

View attachment 101352

WITNESS LIST:
1. RavenReap

Signed,
amah853
KeystoneLaw
Counsel for Plaintiff



Could the Court please clarify the deadline by which the Plaintiff must inform the Court how he intends to prove his case?
Click to expand...

You have 48 Hours to produce a brief.
 
Muggy21 said:
You have 48 Hours to produce a brief.
Click to expand...

Brief


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
PLAINTIFF'S INQUEST BRIEF

Your Honor,

The Plaintiff submits this brief pursuant to the Court's order directing the Plaintiff to present his case following the Defendant's failure to appear.

I. Formation of the Contract

  1. On July 9, 2026, the Plaintiff entered into negotiations concerning a $50,000 investment in Marksman in exchange for a 33.5% ownership interest.
  2. Exhibits P-07 and P-08 establish that the Plaintiff negotiated directly with Marksman's management, including the Defendant, BrutalByteMC, who was consulted in his capacity as CEO.
  3. During these negotiations, the Plaintiff expressly requested a provision requiring the return of his investment should Marksman become bankrupt. The Defendant was informed of this condition and subsequently approved the proposed transaction.
  4. The parties proceeded to execute a written Investment Agreement, submitted as Exhibits P-01 through P-03. Section 2 specifies the $50,000 investment and corresponding 33.5% ownership interest.
  5. Exhibit P-09 establishes that the agreement was formally accepted by Will on behalf of Marksman. The Plaintiff also expressly accepted its provisions.
  6. The Plaintiff subsequently provided the agreed investment, as documented by Exhibits P-05 and P-11. Exhibit P-10 further supports the recognition of the Plaintiff's ownership interest.
  7. The Plaintiff submits that these exhibits establish an agreement supported by consideration, accepted by the parties, and performed by the Plaintiff.
II. The Repayment Obligation
  1. Section 3 of the Investment Agreement establishes the circumstances under which the initial investment must be repaid.
  2. Specifically, the provision requires Marksman and its directors to prioritize repayment of the initial $50,000 investment where Marksman becomes insolvent, files for bankruptcy, ceases viable operations, or is liquidated.
  3. These are alternative circumstances under which the repayment obligation arises. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is not required to establish that Marksman formally declared bankruptcy if the Court finds that the business ceased viable operations.
  4. The Plaintiff maintains that Marksman has ceased viable operations. Its management departed, its leadership became unresponsive, and the business ceased carrying out its intended activities.
  5. The Plaintiff therefore submits that the cessation of Marksman's operations triggered the repayment provision under Section 3 of the agreement.
  6. Despite the Plaintiff's performance of his obligations, the initial investment has not been repaid.
III. Liability of the Defendant
  1. The Defendant was directly involved in the negotiations preceding the execution of the agreement.
  2. Exhibit P-07 establishes that the Defendant was consulted regarding the Plaintiff's proposed investment and approved the transaction after the Plaintiff raised the repayment condition.
  3. Exhibit P-08 further demonstrates the Defendant's involvement, including his confirmation of the agreement and his instruction that payment could be made to himself or Will.
  4. The written Investment Agreement was subsequently accepted on behalf of Marksman, as demonstrated by Exhibit P-09.
  5. Section 3 expressly places the responsibility to prioritize repayment upon Marksman and its directors. The Plaintiff submits that this language is relevant to the Defendant's responsibilities as CEO and his involvement in authorizing the transaction.
  6. The Plaintiff previously informed the Court that Marksman LLC was not registered as a separate legal entity. The Plaintiff requests that the Court consider the Defendant's role, the company's registration status, and the express obligations imposed upon directors when determining the Defendant's liability.
  7. The Plaintiff does not contend that Section 3 necessarily creates an unconditional personal guarantee of the entire investment. Rather, the Plaintiff submits that the Defendant's responsibility for prioritizing repayment must be assessed in light of the agreement and his control over the business.
IV. Enforceability of the Repayment Provision
  1. The Court previously raised concerns regarding whether the repayment provision was unconscionable under Section 14(2) of the Contracts Act, particularly because the Plaintiff received a 33.5% ownership interest alongside the repayment protection.
  2. As clarified in the Plaintiff's submission of September 20, 2026, the Plaintiff is prepared to relinquish his 33.5% ownership interest upon repayment of his initial investment.
  3. Accordingly, the Plaintiff does not seek both the full return of his principal and continued ownership of Marksman.
  4. The present agreement is distinguishable from KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104. Unlike the agreement considered in that case, the investment agreement here does not require extraordinary monthly returns, guaranteed profits, or multiplied penalties.
  5. Instead, the repayment provision concerns the return of the Plaintiff's original investment upon the occurrence of a specified event affecting the company's viability.
  6. The Plaintiff acknowledges that the provision offers protection against investment losses. However, the existence of such protection does not, by itself, establish that the agreement is so excessively one-sided as to be unconscionable.
  7. The Plaintiff therefore submits that the repayment provision can be enforced consistently with Section 14(2), particularly where the Court conditions repayment upon the Plaintiff's relinquishment of his ownership interest.
V. Breach of Contract
  1. Part VI, Section 1 of the Redmont Civil Code Act provides for liability where a party fails to fulfill an obligation under a valid and enforceable contract without lawful excuse.
  2. The Plaintiff submits that the investment agreement was validly formed and that the repayment provision is enforceable for the reasons outlined above.
  3. The Plaintiff fulfilled his obligations by providing the agreed $50,000 investment.
  4. The Plaintiff maintains that Marksman's cessation of viable operations triggered the contractual repayment obligation.
  5. No repayment has been received. The Defendant has also failed to appear before the Court to provide an explanation or evidence of lawful excuse.
  6. The Plaintiff therefore submits that the failure to fulfill the repayment obligation constitutes Breach of Contract, subject to the Court's determination of the Defendant's liability under the agreement.
VI. Damages and Relief
  1. The Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the contractual repayment obligation in the amount of $50,000, with a corresponding relinquishment of his 33.5% ownership interest.
  2. The Plaintiff previously identified a remaining in-game firm balance of $49,502.38. This amount is relevant to the availability of company funds that may be applied toward satisfying the repayment obligation.
  3. Section 3 of the Investment Agreement expressly provides that repayment of the Plaintiff's investment takes priority over distributions of remaining assets to other equity holders.
  4. Accordingly, the Plaintiff submits that the Court should consider the remaining firm balance when determining the appropriate means of enforcing the repayment provision.
  5. The Plaintiff additionally maintains the request for loss-of-enjoyment damages made in the original complaint, subject to the Court's determination of whether the evidence establishes those damages.
  6. The Plaintiff further requests an award of reasonable legal fees to the extent permitted under the Redmont Civil Code Act.
VII. Conclusion
  1. The Plaintiff submits that the evidence establishes the formation and acceptance of the investment agreement, payment of the agreed investment, and the existence of a contractual repayment obligation.
  2. The Defendant was directly involved in authorizing the transaction, while Section 3 expressly places obligations upon Marksman and its directors concerning repayment.
  3. The Plaintiff maintains that Marksman's cessation of viable operations triggered the repayment provision and that the failure to honor that obligation constitutes a breach of contract.
  4. The Plaintiff therefore requests that the Court:
a. Find that the investment agreement was validly formed,

b. Find that the repayment provision is enforceable under Section 14(2) of the Contracts Act,

c. Find the Defendant liable for Breach of Contract to the extent established by the agreement and the evidence,

d. Order repayment of the Plaintiff's initial $50,000 investment, conditioned upon relinquishment of his 33.5% ownership interest,

e. Award any further damages established by the evidence and permitted by law, and,

f. Award reasonable legal fees as permitted by law.

Signed,

amah853
KeystoneLaw
Counsel for Plaintiff

 

Verdict


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Verdict- RavenReap v. BrutalByteMC [2026] DCR 179


Summary of Controversy
Plaintiff invested $50,000 in Marksman in exchange for a 33.5% ownership interest. During negotiations, Plaintiff required a provision for the return of his investment should the business fail, and Defendant, as CEO, approved the transaction on that condition. Section 3 of the resulting Investment Agreement requires Marksman and its directors to prioritize repayment of the $50,000 if Marksman becomes insolvent, ceases viable operations, or is liquidated. Defendant has become unresponsive, and the investment has not been repaid. Marksman is not a registered legal entity.

Findings of Fact
Defendant having defaulted, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s uncontested submissions where supported by evidence. The Court finds that Defendant negotiated and approved the agreement as CEO and directed that payment be made to himself or Will (P-07, P-08), that the agreement was formally accepted on behalf of Marksman (P-09), and that Plaintiff paid the $50,000 and received recognition of his 33.5% interest (P-05, P-10, P-11). The Court further finds that Marksman has ceased viable operations, its management having departed and its leadership having become unresponsive, while $49,502.38 remains in its firm balance (P-06).


Findings of the Court
Enforceability of the Repayment Provision - DENIED. Section 3 guarantees the return of Plaintiff’s principal while Plaintiff retains his full equity interest, allocating the entire risk of the venture to the counterparty while preserving Plaintiff’s share of any profit. Consistent with KingBOB99878 v. truffleboy123 [2025] FCR 104, a term so one-sided is void under Contracts Act §14(2).


Rescission - GRANTED. The record establishes that Plaintiff required the repayment provision as a condition of investing (P-07). The provision was therefore essential to the bargain, and the agreement cannot stand without it. The Investment Agreement is rescinded, and the parties are restored to their positions before it was made. Because Marksman is not a registered legal entity, the obligation to restore Plaintiff’s funds falls on its directors, including Defendant, who approved the agreement and directed receipt of the funds.


Breach of Contract - DISMISSED as moot, the agreement having been rescinded.
Loss of Enjoyment - DENIED for want of evidentiary basis.

Order of the Court
The Investment Agreement is rescinded, and Plaintiff’s 33.5% interest in Marksman is extinguished.


The Court awards the following against Defendant:
Restitution of $50,000, being the return of Plaintiff’s investment.
Legal fees are awarded at 30% of the total award, being $15,000.


The $49,502.38 held in Marksman’s firm balance shall be applied first toward satisfaction of the restitution, with the remainder payable by Defendant personally.


So ordered,
Justice Mug in the District Court

 
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