Lawsuit: In Session MMiqa v. Department of Homeland Security [2026] DCR 77

[Ebborsnam]

Don't worry, I won't.

The Court finds you in Contempt of Court, x2 for their continued outbursts and disrespectful behaviour. This behaviour must be corrected and the Court sees reason to impose the maximum penalties.

You shall pay a fine of $24,000, face 20 minutes imprisonment and x1 Conduct Strike shall be issued. If you have a problem with my ruling appeal, every post you make in my thread, I'll slap another Contempt charge.

I can't pay that, any possibility this could be less money?

 

[Muggy21]

I can't pay that, any possibility this could be less money?

+1 Contempt of Court charge. Another $12,000 fine, 10 minutes in jail;

You clearly have an issue with following the Court's instructions. Read what I wrote again.

 

[MMiqa]

Brief

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

Your Honour,

The Plaintiff respectfully opposes the Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and submits the following response.

The Plaintiff has referred to the relevant provision throughout these proceedings using the shorthand "§6(b)" for ease of reference, since he had used it multiple times in this court before. The full and correct citation is Part I §6(10)(b) of the Criminal Code Act. This shorthand does not alter the substance of the provision or its application to the facts of this case - it refers to the same statutory text quoted throughout the Plaintiff's filings: "Crimes committed can be appealed under a claim of self defence, at which point all punishments are to be delayed until after the appeal."

I. THE DEFENDANT'S OWN ANSWER ESTABLISHES MISFEASANCE

The Defendant argues there is no evidence of intentional misuse of power. The Plaintiff does not need to prove this from scratch - the Defendant has already admitted it. Answer Fact 5, the Defendant affirms the Plaintiff invoked §6(10)(b) at least 8 times. The Defendant affirmed Robbe Haegi conditioned the Plaintiff's dispute on proof at 22:12, a condition found nowhere in §6(10)(b). Answer Fact 13, the Defendant affirms Vuda Sage was actively present in the ticket from 00:14 onward, a full 40 minutes before release. Answer Fact 7, the Defendant affirms the Plaintiff was released only after sustained and repeated pressure.These are not the Plaintiff's characterisations. They are the Defendant's own admissions. A public official who is told the law eight times, who imposes a condition that does not exist in that law, who is present and engaged for 40 minutes while the citizen demands compliance, and who only complies after sustained pressure, has not made an honest mistake. The Defendant's own words describe intentional conduct, not negligence.

II. ROBBE HAEGI'S OWN TESTIMONY CONFIRMS THE ELEMENTS OF MISFEASANCE

Beyond the Answer, Robbe Haegi's testimony before this Court removes any doubt. Robbe Haegi confirmed that they did not consult a superior before deciding not to release the Plaintiff. This was a unilateral decision, made without authority, made without guidance, and made in direct response to a citizen invoking their statutory rights. Robbe Haegi confirmed under oath that they were unaware of §6(10)(b), despite the Plaintiff citing that exact provision to Robbe Haegi directly, in the same ticket, on multiple occasions. A DHS officer who is handed the text of the law by the very person it protects, and still does not apply it, cannot claim good faith ignorance. They knew, because the Plaintiff told them. And they ought to have known regardless, because the Defendant's own interrogatory response confirms that DHS procedure required release upon submission of a self-defence claim. The Defendant knew what its own officers were required to do. Its own officers did not do it.

§6(10)(b) states, "Crimes committed can be appealed under a claim of self defence, at which point all punishments are to be delayed until after the appeal." The Plaintiff served almost all of his sentence before he was released, and as the Defendent affirmed, they released him after pressure from the Plaintiff.

III. P-006 AND P-007 CORROBORATE EVERY ELEMENT

P-007, the full transcript of Ticket #32935, is a DHS record, not the Plaintiff's own creation. It shows Robbe Haegi's statement at 22:12 requiring proof before accepting the dispute, and it shows no release instruction issued at any point by Robbe Haegi.P-006 shows Vuda Sage's typing indicator active at 00:35, 00:38, and 00:41, confirming Vuda Sage was reading the Plaintiff's messages and drafting responses throughout the period the Plaintiff was demanding release, rather than simply releasing the Plaintiff as required. None of this evidence originates from the Plaintiff. It originates from DHS's own systems and the Defendant's own witness. The Defendant is not disputing facts it has never seen. It is disputing the legal consequences of facts it created and confirmed itself.

IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES REQUIRE ONLY ONE CRITERION AND THE DEFENDANT'S OWN RECORD SATISFIES THREE

RCCA §3(2)(b) requires only one of six criteria to be met for conduct to be outrageous. The Defendant's own Answer satisfies three simultaneously.(ii) Acting with knowledge that conduct would disadvantage another, satisfied by Answer Fact 5, the eight invocations DHS read and did not act on.(iv) Abuse of trust or power, satisfied by Answer Fact 12, the invented condition imposed by Robbe Haegi with no statutory basis, and by Vuda Sage's 40 minutes of visible engagement without release. (v) Persistent misconduct or failure to change conduct after becoming aware of consequences - satisfied by Answer Fact 7, the Defendant's own admission that release came only after sustained and repeated pressure. This Court has already found DHS liable for punitive damages on a weaker record. In Dr_Eksplosive v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 17, DHS failed once, without being told its obligation in advance, and did not even appear to contest the case, and this Court awarded $10,000 in punitive damages. Here, DHS was told eight times, by two separate officers, over 72 minutes, and still did not comply. If a single silent failure warranted $10,000, by this logic a repeated and informed failure warrants at least the $15,000 the Plaintiff requests.

V. THE $4,100 PAYMENT DOES NOT SHIELD THE DEFENDANT FROM PUNISHMENT

The Defendant argues the $4,100 payment bars further recovery. That payment was made under Judicial Standards Act Part II §6(1)(b), which compensates for time spent in jail on unproven charges. It is a compensation mechanism, not a punishment mechanism. It addresses the time the Plaintiff lost. It says nothing about the conduct of the two officers who caused that time to be lost unlawfully.The Plaintiff has never asked for the $4,100. The Plaintiff asks for punitive damages, which punish the conduct, and Misfeasance damages, which address the intentional misuse of power by Robbe Haegi and Vuda Sage. These are different remedies for a different wrong. Accepting the Defendant's argument would mean any officer could detain a citizen unlawfully, pay the statutory minimum afterward, and face no consequence for the decision to ignore the law in the first place.


VI. CONCLUSION

Every fact necessary to this motion comes from the Defendant. The Defendant's Answer admits the invocations, the invented condition, the 40 minutes of presence, and the release only under pressure. The Defendant's interrogatory response admits the legal obligation. The Defendant's own witness admits the unilateral decision and the absence of any legal authority for it. The Plaintiff is not asking this Court to accept the Plaintiff's version of events. The Plaintiff is asking this Court to hold the Defendant to its own.

This Court's own precedent points firmly in one direction. In Dr_Eksplosive v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 17, DHS arrested a citizen without informing them of the nature or cause of the accusation and without advising them of their rights, violating the Miranda Warning Act and the Constitution. DHS did not even appear before the Court to contest the case. On that record alone, the Federal Court awarded $5,000 in emotional damages and $10,000 in punitive damages, totalling $15,000, and further ordered DHS to unfine the Plaintiff and issued a Writ of Mandamus compelling DHS to provide information about the arrest. In Lawanoeseper v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 69, DHS invented a punishment not found in any statute and applied it against a citizen. The Federal Court held that "The executive as a whole is responsible for enforcing the law, not inventing laws to be enforced" found this to be a breach of DHS power, and awarded $21,750 in damages.

Both cases involved a single instance of DHS failing to follow the law, in one case without any warning from the citizen involved, and in the other without the citizen repeating themselves at all. Here, the Plaintiff told DHS the law eight times. Two separate officers read those invocations and did not comply for 72 minutes. If a single, unrepeated failure warranted $15,000 in Dr_Eksplosive and $21,750 in Lawanoeseper, a repeated and directly communicated failure by two officers over 72 minutes warrants at least the $15,000 the Plaintiff requests here.

The Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny the Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and enter judgment for the Plaintiff on Claim II, Misfeasance in Public Office, together with $15,000 in punitive damages.

Respectfully submitted,
MMiqa

 

[MMiqa]

Your Honour,

The Plaintiff wishes to clarify certain references made in prior filings to avoid any confusion regarding the Defendant's Answer. In prior submissions, the Plaintiff referred to certain facts as having been affirmed by the Defendant when, more precisely, the Defendant neither affirmed nor denied them. The Plaintiff clarifies that this distinction does not change the outcome. Pursuant to Court Rule 3.2.3, "a lawyer who answers a pleading by neither confirming nor denying pleads no contest to a fact for the purposes of a Verdict or Summary Judgment." Whether a fact was affirmed outright or met with no contest under Rule 3.2.3, it stands as established for the purposes of this case. This includes portions of Facts 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, and the entirety of Fact 14 of the Defendant's Answer.

The Plaintiff wished to clearify it to be precise.

 

[Matthew100x]

Your honor,

I acknowledge that I missed the deadline to make a response. I am making another request for an extension of 24 hours to get this done by tomorrow.

Yours truly,
Matthew100x
Attorney General

 

[Muggy21]

Your honor,

I acknowledge that I missed the deadline to make a response. I am making another request for an extension of 24 hours to get this done by tomorrow.

Yours truly,
Matthew100x
Attorney General

Granted, you have until 8/16/26 at 9pm EDT.

 

[Matthew100x]

Motion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

MMiqa
Plaintiff

v.

Department of Homeland Security
Defendant

MMiqa v. Department of Homeland Security [2026] DCR 77

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Your Honor,

The Defendant respectfully submits this Response in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiff's motion should be denied. First, the motion is procedurally improper under Rule 9.1 because it was filed after opening statements had closed and after the Court had received evidence and witness testimony.

Second, even if the Court reaches the merits, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated the absence of a genuine dispute concerning the material facts necessary to establish intentional Misfeasance in Public Office or punitive damages.

At most, the record establishes a dispute concerning DHS's administration and interpretation of a self-defense appeal. It does not conclusively establish intentional misuse of governmental power, bad faith, or outrageous conduct.

I. THE PLAINTIFF'S RULE 9.1 MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER​

Rule 9.1 provides that summary judgment may be requested "at any time prior to the close of opening statements" and may be granted where there is no real disagreement concerning a material fact. (see § 9.1, Information - Court Rules and Procedures).

The Plaintiff filed the present Rule 9.1 motion after pleadings, discovery, opening statements, evidence, and witness testimony had already occurred. Indeed, the Defendant's pending Rule 9.2 motion was filed precisely because the relevant issues had already been fully heard.

The Plaintiff's motion further recites the incorrect standard for Rule 9.1. The motion states that summary judgment is proper where the Court has "fully heard an issue" and finds "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis" for the opposing party. That is the standard contained in Rule 9.2 governing judgment as a matter of law, not Rule 9.1 governing summary judgment. (see § 9.2, Information - Court Rules and Procedures).

The Defendant therefore preserves its objection that a Rule 9.1 motion is no longer procedurally available at this stage of the proceedings.

Nevertheless, should the Court consider the Plaintiff's motion on its merits, it should still be denied.

II. THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE ABSENCE OF A GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT​

The Defendant does not dispute every chronological fact identified by the Plaintiff. That is not enough to entitle the Plaintiff to summary judgment.

The material dispute concerns what those facts establish regarding the officers' intent, knowledge, purpose, and use of governmental power.

For example, the Plaintiff characterizes Robbe Haegi's request for evidence as an intentional condition placed upon the Plaintiff's release. Robbe Haegi testified differently. Robbe Haegi stated that proof was necessary before accepting the self-defense dispute and expressly denied stating that release itself was conditioned upon the production of proof.

Likewise, the Plaintiff relies upon evidence showing that Vuda Sage was present in the ticket and was typing during portions of the dispute. That evidence may establish presence and activity. It does not independently establish why the Plaintiff had not yet been released, what Vuda Sage was reviewing, what conclusions Vuda Sage had reached, or that Vuda Sage was intentionally refusing to comply with a known legal obligation.

The Plaintiff repeatedly converts evidence of presence, review, and delay into a purportedly undisputed finding of deliberate misconduct. That is an inference advanced by the Plaintiff, not an undisputed fact. This distinction is particularly important because the Plaintiff bears the burden of proof in this civil proceeding and must establish the elements of his claims on a balance of probabilities. (see Part II, § 2(1)(a), § 3(1)(a), Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act).

The existence of genuine disagreement regarding the intent and purpose behind the officers' conduct independently defeats summary judgment.

III. SECTION 6(10)(b) DOES NOT ESTABLISH INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT AS A MATTER OF LAW​

The Plaintiff repeatedly refers generally to § 6(10), and portions of his filings alternatively reference "§ 6(b)." The operative provision is Part I, § 6(10)(b) of the Criminal Code Act.

It provides that crimes "can be appealed under a claim of self defense, at which point all punishments are to be delayed until after the appeal." (see Part I, § 6(10)(b), Repealed - Criminal Code Act). The statute does not contain the phrase "upon submission," notwithstanding the Plaintiff's repeated use of that phrase throughout these proceedings.

The statute establishes a right to appeal a crime under a claim of self-defense and requires punishment to be delayed during that appeal. It does not expressly define the administrative process by which a self-defense appeal is initiated, what information must accompany the appeal, or how DHS must determine whether the asserted dispute constitutes a proper self-defense appeal. Instead, those process are informed by DHS policy on the matter. The department was following established policy when it was processing Plaintiff’s self-defense claim. (see https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/department-ticket-guide.21641/).

DHS's request for evidence was therefore part of reviewing whether the criminal charges were properly subject to the asserted defense. DHS subsequently reviewed the evidence, cleared charges where appropriate, released the Plaintiff, revoked the applicable fines, and compensated the Plaintiff for time spent incarcerated as required under the law.

The Defendant recognizes that the Court may ultimately interpret § 6(10)(b) differently and determine that release should have occurred sooner. But even if the Court reaches that conclusion, an incorrect statutory interpretation does not automatically establish intentional misuse of public office.

The Plaintiff must prove the civil violation actually pleaded.

IV. THE RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE AS A MATTER OF LAW​

Misfeasance in Public Office is classified as an Intentional violation. It requires proof that:

(a) a public official intentionally misused their power;
(b) the misuse caused harm to the Plaintiff; and
(c) the official knew or ought to have known that the conduct was unlawful.

(see Part XI, § 3(a)–(c), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).

The classification of this violation as intentional is independently significant. The RCCA defines an Intentional Violation as one where the violator acts "with the purpose of causing harm or with substantial certainty that harm will result from their conduct." (see Part II, § 7(2), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). Intentional violations therefore require proof that the Defendant acted with the purpose of causing harm or with substantial certainty that harm would occur. (see Part II, § 9(2), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).

The Plaintiff's motion does not eliminate the factual dispute concerning this element. The fact that the Plaintiff repeatedly communicated his interpretation of § 6(10)(b) does not establish that DHS officers necessarily shared that interpretation, knew their own interpretation was unlawful, and intentionally misused governmental authority despite that knowledge. Nor does the evidence establish a purpose to harm the Plaintiff.

The record instead establishes that DHS processed the Plaintiff's dispute, reviewed evidence concerning the underlying charges, cleared charges where appropriate, released the Plaintiff, revoked fines, and paid $4,100 relating to the time the Plaintiff spent incarcerated. Those actions are inconsistent with the Plaintiff's contention that the only permissible inference is intentional misuse of governmental authority. At minimum, reasonable disagreement exists concerning the officers' intent and state of mind. Because intent is an essential element of the Plaintiff's chosen cause of action, Rule 9.1 summary judgment for the Plaintiff cannot properly be entered.

V. THE $4,100 PAYMENT DOES NOT ESTABLISH BAD FAITH OR AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY​

The Plaintiff repeatedly characterizes DHS's $4,100 payment as an admission that DHS intentionally acted unlawfully. After reviewing the Plaintiff's self-defense dispute, DHS cleared applicable charges, revoked fines, and compensated the Plaintiff for time spent incarcerated. (see Part II, § 6(1)(b), Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act). Providing compensation after review is remedial conduct. It does not establish that the officers originally acted with an unlawful purpose, in bad faith, or with the intent necessary for Misfeasance in Public Office.

The RCCA itself recognizes the distinction between compensation and punitive liability. "Double Recovery" means receiving compensation for the same loss more than once, and compensation previously received for a loss must be credited against any subsequent award for that same loss. (see Part II, § 7(13), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). The Defendant does not contend that the $4,100 payment categorically bars every conceivable punitive award. Rather, it means that the Plaintiff has already been compensated for the detention-based pecuniary loss represented by that payment and may not recover compensation for that same loss twice. Furthermore, when considering punitive damages, the RCCA expressly provides that punitive damages may be reduced where the Defendant has "demonstrated genuine remorse or taken steps to remedy the harm." (see Part III, § 3(3)(a), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).

DHS did precisely that: it reviewed the dispute, cleared charges, released the Plaintiff, revoked fines, and provided compensation. The Plaintiff cannot simultaneously characterize those remedial actions as evidence of additional bad faith and ask the Court to disregard the RCCA's express recognition that efforts to remedy harm mitigate punitive liability.

VI. THE RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT WARRANTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS A MATTER OF LAW​

Punitive damages require outrageous conduct—a substantial departure from acceptable standards reflecting wilful, dishonest, oppressive, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for the rights or interests of another. (see Part III, § 3(2)(a)–(b), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).

The Plaintiff invokes several statutory criteria, including knowledge of likely harm, bad faith or abuse of power, and repeated misconduct. Each depends upon the same disputed premise: that DHS officers knew § 6(10)(b) required the Plaintiff's instantaneous release, intentionally refused to comply with that requirement, and prolonged the Plaintiff's detention for an improper purpose. The record does not compel that conclusion.

This case concerns DHS's administration of a self-defense appeal while officers reviewed whether the underlying murder charges were supported by the evidence. Even if the Court ultimately concludes that DHS interpreted the timing requirement incorrectly, an erroneous legal interpretation during an active administrative review is not necessarily outrageous conduct. Moreover, punitive damages require the Court to consider "the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm, and the defendant's wealth." (see Part III, § 3(2)(d), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). Those considerations further demonstrate why the Plaintiff is not entitled to a $15,000 punitive award as a matter of summary judgment.

VII. THE PLAINTIFF'S AUTHORITIES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE​

The Plaintiff principally relies upon Lawanoeseper v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 69 and Dr_Eksplosive v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 17. Neither compels judgment for the Plaintiff.

In Lawanoeseper, DHS did not merely interpret an existing statutory procedure incorrectly. The officer created an entirely new basis for punishment, identified as "pandemic-starting-command-disabling-jail," and imposed an effectively indefinite detention until the officer personally determined that release was appropriate. The Federal Court held that the Executive may enforce laws but may not invent crimes and punishments reserved to the Legislature. The Court also expressly declined to make findings concerning the alleged Criminal Code violations because the proceeding was civil. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - lawanoesepr v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 68).

That is materially different from this case. The Plaintiff here was arrested pursuant to existing murder charges carrying statutory punishments. No DHS officer invented a new crime or created an indefinite punishment. The controversy concerns how an existing statutory self-defense appeal mechanism operated after those charges had already been imposed.

Likewise, Dr_Eksplosive involved an uncontested violation of an express constitutional and statutory obligation to inform an arrestee of the nature of the accusation and their Miranda rights. The Commonwealth failed to timely appear, and the Court proceeded through summary judgment without an adversarial factual record comparable to the one before this Court. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Dr_Eksplosive v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 17).

Neither precedent establishes that a disputed interpretation of § 6(10)(b), followed by investigation, release, charge correction, fine revocation, and compensation, constitutes intentional Misfeasance in Public Office or outrageous conduct as a matter of law.

VIII. TO THE EXTENT THE PLAINTIFF SEEKS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM I, POLICE MISCONDUCT IS NOT ESTABLISHED AND CANNOT BE USED IN THIS CIVIL ACTION BECAUSE IT A CRIMINAL CHARGE​

Although the Plaintiff's introductory language references both claims, the Prayer for Relief expressly requests summary judgment only on Claim II, Misfeasance in Public Office.

To the extent the Plaintiff nevertheless seeks judgment on Claim I, that request must also fail. We refer to our argument in our Motion For Judgment as a Matter of Law.

Police Misconduct is an indictable criminal offense. A person commits Police Misconduct where that person “issues punishments inconsistent with the specific penalties outlined in law.” (see Part III, § 7(a), https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/criminal-code-act.26344/).

The Plaintiff has not established that any DHS officer issued a punishment inconsistent with the specific statutory penalties applicable to the Plaintiff's murder charges. The underlying murder charges resulted from wanted points assigned to the Plaintiff based upon alleged murders. DHS subsequently arrested the Plaintiff pursuant to those charges. The Plaintiff's present disagreement instead concerns what occurred after the Plaintiff asserted self-defense and, specifically, how quickly DHS was required to suspend the resulting punishment while reviewing that assertion.

That is materially different from proving that an officer “issue[d] punishments inconsistent with the specific penalties outlined in law,” as required by Police Misconduct. (see Part III, § 7(a), https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/criminal-code-act.26344/).

The relevant self-defense provision states that crimes “can be appealed under a claim of self defense, at which point all punishments are to be delayed until after the appeal.” (see Part I, § 6(10)(b), https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/criminal-code-act.26344/). The statute does not use the word “upon,” nor does it expressly state that the mere submission of a Discord ticket instantaneously converts an otherwise lawful punishment into Police Misconduct. The parties have instead litigated the meaning and operation of the statutory appeal process.

Even assuming, arguendo, that DHS incorrectly interpreted § 6(10)(b) and that the Plaintiff should have been released sooner, an erroneous interpretation concerning the timing of suspension does not itself establish the separate statutory elements of Police Misconduct. The Plaintiff must prove the offense actually pleaded.

Redmont precedent further establishes that a criminal offense does not, merely because damages are requested, automatically become an independent private civil cause of action. In instances where a singular act fulfills the elements of both a criminal offense and a civil violation, a plaintiff remains entitled to seek redress through civil code remedies, criminal code damages, or a combination thereof, provided such recovery does not constitute prohibited double recovery. (see MMiqa v. ZachOfPotatoes10 [2026] DCR 67 (citing Redmont Civil Code, Part II, § 4(3)(a)–(c), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act); see also Le9endz_ v. AussieBloke25 [2026] DCR 59 ("The Redmont Civil Code Act ("RCCA") does indeed allow for civil action regarding a criminal violation, but typically only supports that action where both the RCCA and the Criminal Code Act ("CCA") reference the underlying claim")). Here, however, Police Misconduct is a criminal charge only.

The Defendant does not contend that criminal conduct can never be relevant to civil damages. The Redmont Civil Code Act clarifies that its provisions do not constitute an exhaustive list of civil violations. Consequently, a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking redress for injuries not explicitly codified, provided that such claims are supported by common law principles or existing judicial precedent. (see Redmont Civil Code, Part II, § 3(1)(a), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). Furthermore, the Code expressly preserves established common law torts unless they have been specifically abolished by statutory authority. (see Redmont Civil Code, Part II, § 3(1)(b), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). As we’ve already pointed out, there’s no history or common law of police misconduct being used as a civil claim in the common law. (see Defendant’s Opening Statement, Lawsuit: In Session - MMiqa v. Department of Homeland Security [2026] DCR 77). As such, the Plaintiff is not able to pursue the claim as a civil tort in this Court.

The Defendant submits that Police Misconduct cannot independently sustain Claim I merely by virtue of being alleged, and the evidence in this case does not establish the statutory elements of that offense in any event.

Claim I therefore cannot support summary judgment for the Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION​

The Plaintiff's motion attempts to convert disputed questions of statutory interpretation and intent into supposedly undisputed facts.

The Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff asserted self-defense, that review took time, or that the Plaintiff ultimately received release, charge corrections, fine reimbursement, and $4,100 in compensation.

What the Defendant disputes, and what is dispositive, is the Plaintiff's assertion that these circumstances conclusively establish intentional misuse of governmental power, bad faith, and outrageous conduct. They do not.

Accordingly, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court:

1. DENY the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 9.1; and
2. Resolve the outstanding questions of law through the Defendant's pending Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Rule 9.2.
3. Alternatively, find that genuine disputes of material fact exist concerning the intent, knowledge, purpose, and conduct necessary to establish Misfeasance in Public Office and punitive damages; and
4. DENY summary judgment on Claim I to the extent the Plaintiff seeks such relief;
5. DENY summary judgment on Claim II to the extent the Plaintiff seeks such relief;
6. DENY the Plaintiff's request for $15,000 in punitive damages on summary judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

Matthew100x
Attorney General

DATED: This 16th day of August 2026

 

[Matthew100x]

Requesting to make a slight modification. I reused the same text from the motion for judgment as a matter of law. The text should be "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT" and not "MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW."

 

[MMiqa]

Motion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

MMiqa
Plaintiff

v.

Department of Homeland Security
Defendant

MMiqa v. Department of Homeland Security [2026] DCR 77

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Your Honor,

The Defendant respectfully submits this Response in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiff's motion should be denied. First, the motion is procedurally improper under Rule 9.1 because it was filed after opening statements had closed and after the Court had received evidence and witness testimony.

Second, even if the Court reaches the merits, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated the absence of a genuine dispute concerning the material facts necessary to establish intentional Misfeasance in Public Office or punitive damages.

At most, the record establishes a dispute concerning DHS's administration and interpretation of a self-defense appeal. It does not conclusively establish intentional misuse of governmental power, bad faith, or outrageous conduct.

I. THE PLAINTIFF'S RULE 9.1 MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER​

Rule 9.1 provides that summary judgment may be requested "at any time prior to the close of opening statements" and may be granted where there is no real disagreement concerning a material fact. (see § 9.1, Information - Court Rules and Procedures).

The Plaintiff filed the present Rule 9.1 motion after pleadings, discovery, opening statements, evidence, and witness testimony had already occurred. Indeed, the Defendant's pending Rule 9.2 motion was filed precisely because the relevant issues had already been fully heard.

The Plaintiff's motion further recites the incorrect standard for Rule 9.1. The motion states that summary judgment is proper where the Court has "fully heard an issue" and finds "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis" for the opposing party. That is the standard contained in Rule 9.2 governing judgment as a matter of law, not Rule 9.1 governing summary judgment. (see § 9.2, Information - Court Rules and Procedures).

The Defendant therefore preserves its objection that a Rule 9.1 motion is no longer procedurally available at this stage of the proceedings.

Nevertheless, should the Court consider the Plaintiff's motion on its merits, it should still be denied.

II. THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE ABSENCE OF A GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT​

The Defendant does not dispute every chronological fact identified by the Plaintiff. That is not enough to entitle the Plaintiff to summary judgment.

The material dispute concerns what those facts establish regarding the officers' intent, knowledge, purpose, and use of governmental power.

For example, the Plaintiff characterizes Robbe Haegi's request for evidence as an intentional condition placed upon the Plaintiff's release. Robbe Haegi testified differently. Robbe Haegi stated that proof was necessary before accepting the self-defense dispute and expressly denied stating that release itself was conditioned upon the production of proof.

Likewise, the Plaintiff relies upon evidence showing that Vuda Sage was present in the ticket and was typing during portions of the dispute. That evidence may establish presence and activity. It does not independently establish why the Plaintiff had not yet been released, what Vuda Sage was reviewing, what conclusions Vuda Sage had reached, or that Vuda Sage was intentionally refusing to comply with a known legal obligation.

The Plaintiff repeatedly converts evidence of presence, review, and delay into a purportedly undisputed finding of deliberate misconduct. That is an inference advanced by the Plaintiff, not an undisputed fact. This distinction is particularly important because the Plaintiff bears the burden of proof in this civil proceeding and must establish the elements of his claims on a balance of probabilities. (see Part II, § 2(1)(a), § 3(1)(a), Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act).

The existence of genuine disagreement regarding the intent and purpose behind the officers' conduct independently defeats summary judgment.

III. SECTION 6(10)(b) DOES NOT ESTABLISH INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT AS A MATTER OF LAW​

The Plaintiff repeatedly refers generally to § 6(10), and portions of his filings alternatively reference "§ 6(b)." The operative provision is Part I, § 6(10)(b) of the Criminal Code Act.

It provides that crimes "can be appealed under a claim of self defense, at which point all punishments are to be delayed until after the appeal." (see Part I, § 6(10)(b), Repealed - Criminal Code Act). The statute does not contain the phrase "upon submission," notwithstanding the Plaintiff's repeated use of that phrase throughout these proceedings.

The statute establishes a right to appeal a crime under a claim of self-defense and requires punishment to be delayed during that appeal. It does not expressly define the administrative process by which a self-defense appeal is initiated, what information must accompany the appeal, or how DHS must determine whether the asserted dispute constitutes a proper self-defense appeal. Instead, those process are informed by DHS policy on the matter. The department was following established policy when it was processing Plaintiff’s self-defense claim. (see https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/department-ticket-guide.21641/).

DHS's request for evidence was therefore part of reviewing whether the criminal charges were properly subject to the asserted defense. DHS subsequently reviewed the evidence, cleared charges where appropriate, released the Plaintiff, revoked the applicable fines, and compensated the Plaintiff for time spent incarcerated as required under the law.

The Defendant recognizes that the Court may ultimately interpret § 6(10)(b) differently and determine that release should have occurred sooner. But even if the Court reaches that conclusion, an incorrect statutory interpretation does not automatically establish intentional misuse of public office.

The Plaintiff must prove the civil violation actually pleaded.

IV. THE RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE AS A MATTER OF LAW​

Misfeasance in Public Office is classified as an Intentional violation. It requires proof that:

(a) a public official intentionally misused their power;
(b) the misuse caused harm to the Plaintiff; and
(c) the official knew or ought to have known that the conduct was unlawful.

(see Part XI, § 3(a)–(c), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).

The classification of this violation as intentional is independently significant. The RCCA defines an Intentional Violation as one where the violator acts "with the purpose of causing harm or with substantial certainty that harm will result from their conduct." (see Part II, § 7(2), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). Intentional violations therefore require proof that the Defendant acted with the purpose of causing harm or with substantial certainty that harm would occur. (see Part II, § 9(2), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).

The Plaintiff's motion does not eliminate the factual dispute concerning this element. The fact that the Plaintiff repeatedly communicated his interpretation of § 6(10)(b) does not establish that DHS officers necessarily shared that interpretation, knew their own interpretation was unlawful, and intentionally misused governmental authority despite that knowledge. Nor does the evidence establish a purpose to harm the Plaintiff.

The record instead establishes that DHS processed the Plaintiff's dispute, reviewed evidence concerning the underlying charges, cleared charges where appropriate, released the Plaintiff, revoked fines, and paid $4,100 relating to the time the Plaintiff spent incarcerated. Those actions are inconsistent with the Plaintiff's contention that the only permissible inference is intentional misuse of governmental authority. At minimum, reasonable disagreement exists concerning the officers' intent and state of mind. Because intent is an essential element of the Plaintiff's chosen cause of action, Rule 9.1 summary judgment for the Plaintiff cannot properly be entered.

V. THE $4,100 PAYMENT DOES NOT ESTABLISH BAD FAITH OR AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY​

The Plaintiff repeatedly characterizes DHS's $4,100 payment as an admission that DHS intentionally acted unlawfully. After reviewing the Plaintiff's self-defense dispute, DHS cleared applicable charges, revoked fines, and compensated the Plaintiff for time spent incarcerated. (see Part II, § 6(1)(b), Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act). Providing compensation after review is remedial conduct. It does not establish that the officers originally acted with an unlawful purpose, in bad faith, or with the intent necessary for Misfeasance in Public Office.

The RCCA itself recognizes the distinction between compensation and punitive liability. "Double Recovery" means receiving compensation for the same loss more than once, and compensation previously received for a loss must be credited against any subsequent award for that same loss. (see Part II, § 7(13), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). The Defendant does not contend that the $4,100 payment categorically bars every conceivable punitive award. Rather, it means that the Plaintiff has already been compensated for the detention-based pecuniary loss represented by that payment and may not recover compensation for that same loss twice. Furthermore, when considering punitive damages, the RCCA expressly provides that punitive damages may be reduced where the Defendant has "demonstrated genuine remorse or taken steps to remedy the harm." (see Part III, § 3(3)(a), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).

DHS did precisely that: it reviewed the dispute, cleared charges, released the Plaintiff, revoked fines, and provided compensation. The Plaintiff cannot simultaneously characterize those remedial actions as evidence of additional bad faith and ask the Court to disregard the RCCA's express recognition that efforts to remedy harm mitigate punitive liability.

VI. THE RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT WARRANTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS A MATTER OF LAW​

Punitive damages require outrageous conduct—a substantial departure from acceptable standards reflecting wilful, dishonest, oppressive, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for the rights or interests of another. (see Part III, § 3(2)(a)–(b), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act).

The Plaintiff invokes several statutory criteria, including knowledge of likely harm, bad faith or abuse of power, and repeated misconduct. Each depends upon the same disputed premise: that DHS officers knew § 6(10)(b) required the Plaintiff's instantaneous release, intentionally refused to comply with that requirement, and prolonged the Plaintiff's detention for an improper purpose. The record does not compel that conclusion.

This case concerns DHS's administration of a self-defense appeal while officers reviewed whether the underlying murder charges were supported by the evidence. Even if the Court ultimately concludes that DHS interpreted the timing requirement incorrectly, an erroneous legal interpretation during an active administrative review is not necessarily outrageous conduct. Moreover, punitive damages require the Court to consider "the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm, and the defendant's wealth." (see Part III, § 3(2)(d), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). Those considerations further demonstrate why the Plaintiff is not entitled to a $15,000 punitive award as a matter of summary judgment.

VII. THE PLAINTIFF'S AUTHORITIES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE​

The Plaintiff principally relies upon Lawanoeseper v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 69 and Dr_Eksplosive v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 17. Neither compels judgment for the Plaintiff.

In Lawanoeseper, DHS did not merely interpret an existing statutory procedure incorrectly. The officer created an entirely new basis for punishment, identified as "pandemic-starting-command-disabling-jail," and imposed an effectively indefinite detention until the officer personally determined that release was appropriate. The Federal Court held that the Executive may enforce laws but may not invent crimes and punishments reserved to the Legislature. The Court also expressly declined to make findings concerning the alleged Criminal Code violations because the proceeding was civil. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - lawanoesepr v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 68).

That is materially different from this case. The Plaintiff here was arrested pursuant to existing murder charges carrying statutory punishments. No DHS officer invented a new crime or created an indefinite punishment. The controversy concerns how an existing statutory self-defense appeal mechanism operated after those charges had already been imposed.

Likewise, Dr_Eksplosive involved an uncontested violation of an express constitutional and statutory obligation to inform an arrestee of the nature of the accusation and their Miranda rights. The Commonwealth failed to timely appear, and the Court proceeded through summary judgment without an adversarial factual record comparable to the one before this Court. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Dr_Eksplosive v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 17).

Neither precedent establishes that a disputed interpretation of § 6(10)(b), followed by investigation, release, charge correction, fine revocation, and compensation, constitutes intentional Misfeasance in Public Office or outrageous conduct as a matter of law.

VIII. TO THE EXTENT THE PLAINTIFF SEEKS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM I, POLICE MISCONDUCT IS NOT ESTABLISHED AND CANNOT BE USED IN THIS CIVIL ACTION BECAUSE IT A CRIMINAL CHARGE​

Although the Plaintiff's introductory language references both claims, the Prayer for Relief expressly requests summary judgment only on Claim II, Misfeasance in Public Office.

To the extent the Plaintiff nevertheless seeks judgment on Claim I, that request must also fail. We refer to our argument in our Motion For Judgment as a Matter of Law.

Police Misconduct is an indictable criminal offense. A person commits Police Misconduct where that person “issues punishments inconsistent with the specific penalties outlined in law.” (see Part III, § 7(a), https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/criminal-code-act.26344/).

The Plaintiff has not established that any DHS officer issued a punishment inconsistent with the specific statutory penalties applicable to the Plaintiff's murder charges. The underlying murder charges resulted from wanted points assigned to the Plaintiff based upon alleged murders. DHS subsequently arrested the Plaintiff pursuant to those charges. The Plaintiff's present disagreement instead concerns what occurred after the Plaintiff asserted self-defense and, specifically, how quickly DHS was required to suspend the resulting punishment while reviewing that assertion.

That is materially different from proving that an officer “issue[d] punishments inconsistent with the specific penalties outlined in law,” as required by Police Misconduct. (see Part III, § 7(a), https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/criminal-code-act.26344/).

The relevant self-defense provision states that crimes “can be appealed under a claim of self defense, at which point all punishments are to be delayed until after the appeal.” (see Part I, § 6(10)(b), https://www.democracycraft.net/threads/criminal-code-act.26344/). The statute does not use the word “upon,” nor does it expressly state that the mere submission of a Discord ticket instantaneously converts an otherwise lawful punishment into Police Misconduct. The parties have instead litigated the meaning and operation of the statutory appeal process.

Even assuming, arguendo, that DHS incorrectly interpreted § 6(10)(b) and that the Plaintiff should have been released sooner, an erroneous interpretation concerning the timing of suspension does not itself establish the separate statutory elements of Police Misconduct. The Plaintiff must prove the offense actually pleaded.

Redmont precedent further establishes that a criminal offense does not, merely because damages are requested, automatically become an independent private civil cause of action. In instances where a singular act fulfills the elements of both a criminal offense and a civil violation, a plaintiff remains entitled to seek redress through civil code remedies, criminal code damages, or a combination thereof, provided such recovery does not constitute prohibited double recovery. (see MMiqa v. ZachOfPotatoes10 [2026] DCR 67 (citing Redmont Civil Code, Part II, § 4(3)(a)–(c), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act); see also Le9endz_ v. AussieBloke25 [2026] DCR 59 ("The Redmont Civil Code Act ("RCCA") does indeed allow for civil action regarding a criminal violation, but typically only supports that action where both the RCCA and the Criminal Code Act ("CCA") reference the underlying claim")). Here, however, Police Misconduct is a criminal charge only.

The Defendant does not contend that criminal conduct can never be relevant to civil damages. The Redmont Civil Code Act clarifies that its provisions do not constitute an exhaustive list of civil violations. Consequently, a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking redress for injuries not explicitly codified, provided that such claims are supported by common law principles or existing judicial precedent. (see Redmont Civil Code, Part II, § 3(1)(a), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). Furthermore, the Code expressly preserves established common law torts unless they have been specifically abolished by statutory authority. (see Redmont Civil Code, Part II, § 3(1)(b), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act). As we’ve already pointed out, there’s no history or common law of police misconduct being used as a civil claim in the common law. (see Defendant’s Opening Statement, Lawsuit: In Session - MMiqa v. Department of Homeland Security [2026] DCR 77). As such, the Plaintiff is not able to pursue the claim as a civil tort in this Court.

The Defendant submits that Police Misconduct cannot independently sustain Claim I merely by virtue of being alleged, and the evidence in this case does not establish the statutory elements of that offense in any event.

Claim I therefore cannot support summary judgment for the Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION​

The Plaintiff's motion attempts to convert disputed questions of statutory interpretation and intent into supposedly undisputed facts.

The Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff asserted self-defense, that review took time, or that the Plaintiff ultimately received release, charge corrections, fine reimbursement, and $4,100 in compensation.

What the Defendant disputes, and what is dispositive, is the Plaintiff's assertion that these circumstances conclusively establish intentional misuse of governmental power, bad faith, and outrageous conduct. They do not.

Accordingly, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court:

1. DENY the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 9.1; and
2. Resolve the outstanding questions of law through the Defendant's pending Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Rule 9.2.
3. Alternatively, find that genuine disputes of material fact exist concerning the intent, knowledge, purpose, and conduct necessary to establish Misfeasance in Public Office and punitive damages; and
4. DENY summary judgment on Claim I to the extent the Plaintiff seeks such relief;
5. DENY summary judgment on Claim II to the extent the Plaintiff seeks such relief;
6. DENY the Plaintiff's request for $15,000 in punitive damages on summary judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

Matthew100x
Attorney General

DATED: This 16th day of August 2026

Your Honor, the Plaintiff respectfully requests a permission to reply to this motion.

 

[MMiqa]

Your Honor, I retract my message that I sent here:

Your Honor, the Plaintiff respectfully requests a permission to reply to this motion.

The Plaintiff wishes to clearify it, since the Defendant has cleared the confusion of the title and it was changed, and this is no longer seen as a new motion, and it is now clear that it is the the Defendant's response. The Plaintiff saw the Defendant's message after the Plaintiff sent theirs. The Plaintiff had no intention to hurt the integrity of this Court.