This case brings into question the extent of authority the executive, in particular the president by-way of executive orders, maintains in relation to towns and government leadership within. I recognize the constitutional challenges this case holds, and will deliver the verdict with detailed explanations behind the decisions I have made and what led me to them.
To start off I will address executive orders and the functions and extent of them. An executive order, as defined under the constitution, is a “...lawful directive issued by the President…” and a lawful directive is then defined as one which does not “...amend the Constitution or any law outside the Constitution.” The question in this case is if Executive Order 19/23 amended the constitution, therefore deeming it an unlawful directive, or if Executive Order 19/23 was lawful and only used to further exert the executive’s authority given under the Constitution. In the Constitution under Part III Section 27 the Cabinet is given the authority to oversee all government-owned assets, which includes, but is not limited to, towns. Furthermore, under Part III Section 29, the Department of State is tasked with the “Administration, facilitation of, and communications with towns.”
It is quite clear that the executive and town governments have a strong constitutional connection, and that the executive is largely responsible for administering the functions within them. However, this alone does not grant the executive the ability to remove town officials, it only grants the ability on how leadership is determined within the town. This is also affirmed in Executive Order 19/23, setting the new requirement for towns to “..host fair elections for at least the mayor position.” In order for the executive to have the power to remove a mayor, the position must be an executive position. The defendant referenced the “Financial Standards Act,” which I believe they meant the “Financial Services Act,” which states that “Towns are an extension of the Executive…” This bill has since been rescinded after the “Banking Act” was signed into law, and as such can no longer be considered in the final decision making of this court. As it stands currently, there is no law existing which has reaffirmed that section mentioned above.
Having said this however, there is a long precedent that has been set affirming time and again the position of mayor in relation to the executive, and that is one of being an extension of the executive. Mayors work directly with the president and their cabinet, and, while not serving as direct members of the President’s Cabinet, maintain a position that forces close collaboration with the executive. There cannot be total independence from the executive by town governments, towns would simply cease to function. Mayors are undoubtedly subjected to the same procedure as any other executive officer would be in terms of removal, which is a vote by cabinet members with no conflicting interests in the matter. While mayors and the towns which they represent enjoy a certain level of independence, ultimately a mayor answers to the executive, it is outlined within the constitution. If the executive is tasked with the administration of towns, and a mayor’s duty is to administer the town which they are mayor of and the functions within it, then they must answer to the executive.
I will finally address the plaintiff’s claims of bribery. I simply do not see a strong enough argument to satisfy the legal parameters for this. The evidence presented shows an idea that then-President LilDigiVert had, but does not show any unlawful actions or even intent, as later it was shown the President said they would check with their Attorney General before any final decision making happened.