Contracts Act

[xXTheoryXx]

CONGRESS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
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A BILL TO

Establish a Stronger, Fairer, and More Comprehensive Framework for Contract Law in the Commonwealth of Redmont

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The people of the Commonwealth of Redmont, through their elected Representatives in the Congress and the force of law ordained to that Congress by the people through the constitution, do hereby enact the following provisions into law:
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PART I - PRELIMINARIES
1. Short Title and Enactment

(1) This Act may be cited as the 'Contracts Act'.
(2) This Act shall be enacted immediately upon its signing.
(3) This Act has been authored by Speaker of the House xXTheoryXx.
(4) This Act has been co-sponsored by TrueDarkLander.
(5) This Act repeals the following legislation:
(a) Contracts Act
(6) This Act coordinates with the following legislation:
(a) Property Lien Act - governs security interests and lien enforcement arising from contractual obligations.
(b) Legal Entity Act - governs the capacity, authority, and liability of Incorporated Entities.

2. Purpose

(1) Contracts are the backbone of Redmont's economy. The purpose of this Act is to make contract law clear, fair, and practically useful - so that players can do business confidently, courts resolve disputes consistently, and no one exploits legal vagueness.
(2) This Act governs every deal made in Redmont.

3. Definitions

(1) In this Act:
(a) Capacity. The legal ability to enter a binding contract.
(b) Consideration. Something of value exchanged between parties as part of a contract.
(c) Damages. Monetary compensation for loss caused by a breach of contract.
(d) Duress. Illegitimate pressure or threats that coerce a party into contracting against their genuine will.
(e) Force Majeure. An unforeseeable and unavoidable event entirely beyond a party's control that temporarily prevents performance.
(f) Frustration. An unforeseen event that permanently makes performance impossible or radically different from what was agreed, with neither party at fault.
(g) Good Faith. Honest, fair conduct in the performance of contractual obligations.
(h) Incorporated Entity. A corporation, LLC, or other legal entity formed under the Legal Entity Act.
(i) Injunction. A court order requiring a party to stop or start doing something.
(j) Invitation to Treat. An invitation for others to make an offer, which is not itself a binding offer.
(k) Liquidated Damages. A pre-agreed sum payable upon a specified breach.
(l) Material Breach. A fundamental failure going to the heart of a contract, depriving the innocent party of substantially the entire benefit they were due to receive.
(m) Misrepresentation. A false or misleading statement about a material matter that induces another party to enter a contract.
(n) Mistake. A fundamental false belief about a material fact at the time of contracting.
(o) Novation. The substitution of a new party for an existing party, with all parties' consent, extinguishing the original party's obligations.
(p) Rescission. Cancellation of a contract, restoring parties to their original positions.
(q) Security Agreement. A written agreement creating a lien over collateral to secure a contractual obligation, governed by the Property Lien Act.
(r) Severability. The principle that invalid clauses may be removed without voiding the remainder of the contract.
(s) Sole Proprietorship. An in-game business without an Incorporated Entity, where the owner bears personal liability.
(t) Specific Performance. A court order compelling a party to perform their contractual obligations.
(u) Standard Form Contract. A pre-written contract offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no meaningful opportunity to negotiate terms.
(v) Third Party. A person who is not a party to a contract but may be affected by it.
(w) Undue Influence. Improper pressure exploiting a position of power or trust to induce a party to contract against their genuine interests.
(x) Waiver. Voluntarily giving up a right under a contract.

PART II - CONTRACT FORMATION
4. Formation

(1) A valid and enforceable contract requires: Offer, Acceptance, Consideration, Intention to Create Legal Relations, and Capacity. Absence of any one element means no contract exists.

(2) Offer. An offer is a clear and definite proposal setting out the terms on which the offeror is willing to be bound. It must be communicated to the offeree and may be made in writing, verbally in-game, or through conduct a reasonable person would understand as an offer. A publicly displayed price, advertisement, or shop sign is an Invitation to Treat, not an offer, unless it expressly states otherwise. An offer lapses if:
(a) Not accepted within 14 days, or within any deadline stated in the offer, whichever is sooner;
(b) Rejected or countered by the offeree; or
(c) Withdrawn by the offeror before acceptance - withdrawal is only valid if communicated before acceptance occurs.

(3) Acceptance. Acceptance is unconditional and unambiguous agreement to all terms of the offer. Any proposed change to terms is a counteroffer, not acceptance. Silence is not acceptance. Acceptance must be communicated to the offeror - it may be in writing, verbally, or by conduct clearly indicating agreement such as beginning performance, provided that conduct-based acceptance is communicated to the offeror within a reasonable time.

(4) Consideration. Each party must give something of value - tangible (money, items, land) or intangible (services, labour, a promise not to act). Consideration need not be equal in value; courts will not void a bad deal freely entered. Past consideration is not valid consideration.

(5) Intention. Both parties must intend their agreement to be legally binding. Commercial and business agreements are presumed binding. Casual or clearly joke arrangements are presumed not binding unless there is strong evidence otherwise.

(6) Capacity.
(a) A player with fewer than 6 hours of total server playtime at the time of contracting is presumed to lack capacity, and the contract is voidable at their option. They may affirm the contract once they reach 6 hours, making it binding on both parties. Affirmation does not waive any other vitiating factor the player could otherwise raise.
(b) A party acting under duress, undue influence, or clearly not of sound judgement may also lack capacity at the court's discretion.
(c) Incorporated Entities have full capacity subject to their formation instrument and the Legal Entity Act. A contract on behalf of an Incorporated Entity binds the entity where the individual had actual or apparent authority. See Legal Entity Act, Part III Section 8 (Agency).
(d) A sole proprietorship's contractual obligations are the personal obligations of its owner.

PART III - FORM AND TERMS
5. Form and Terms

(1) Form. Contracts may be written or verbal. Written contracts receive greater evidentiary weight. A written contract is required for:
(a) Transfers of land or property valued over $5,000 - value determined by the agreed contract price, or where none is stated, fair market value at the time of contracting as assessed by the court;
(b) Employment agreements lasting longer than 7 days; or
(c) Any agreement where a party specifically requests a written record.
A written contract includes forum posts, Discord or forum direct messages, in-game signs or books, or any persistent text medium accessible to both parties. Verbal agreements may be corroborated by witnesses, screenshots, or circumstantial evidence of performance.

(2) Standard Form Contracts. A Standard Form Contract is binding where the accepting party had a reasonable opportunity to read the terms before agreeing. The presenting party must make terms accessible before the other party commits and must not bury material terms. A term is unenforceable if the accepting party had no reasonable opportunity to read it, or if it is so unusual or onerous it would not ordinarily be expected in such a contract and was not specifically drawn to the accepting party's attention.

(3) Express and Implied Terms. All terms explicitly stated by the parties form part of the contract. A court may imply a term where it is necessary to give the contract business sense, so obvious both parties would have agreed without hesitation, or required by law. Implied terms may not override express terms. Where a contract term is ambiguous, it is interpreted against the party who drafted it.

(4) Unfair Terms. A term is unfair if it creates a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of one party who had no real ability to negotiate it out. A court may strike or modify such a term under Section 14 (Severability). No term may exclude liability for fraud, deliberate misconduct, or a party's own criminal conduct.

PART IV - VITIATING FACTORS
6. Vitiating Factors

(1) Misrepresentation. Misrepresentation occurs when a party makes a false or misleading statement about a material matter, inducing the other to contract. Types:
(a) Fraudulent - made knowingly, recklessly, or without belief in its truth. Courts may void the contract and award additional damages.
(b) Negligent - made carelessly, without reasonable grounds for believing it true.
(c) Innocent - made honestly and with reasonable belief it was true.
The remedy is rescission and, where appropriate, damages. A party who made a false or misleading statement cannot escape liability by claiming ignorance where they had the means to verify the truth before making the statement.

(2) Duress. A contract is voidable where a party was induced by duress - including physical threats, threats to property, or economic duress where the party had no reasonable alternative. Hard bargaining or stronger negotiating power alone is not duress. A party who affirms the contract after duress ends loses the right to rescind.

(3) Undue Influence. A contract is voidable where a party exploited a position of power, trust, or dependence to procure the other's agreement. Undue influence may be actual or presumed from the relationship (e.g. employer/employee in a personal capacity, dominant/junior business partners). Where presumed, the burden shifts to the party in the position of power to show the other contracted freely and with independent judgement.

(4) Mistake. A contract may be void or voidable where one or both parties entered it under a fundamental false belief about a material fact, and that belief was either shared by both parties or was known to, caused by, or exploited by the other party. Where the mistake renders the subject matter of the contract non-existent, the contract is void. In all other cases it is voidable at the court's discretion. A genuine disagreement about value alone is not a Mistake in law.

(5) Illegality. A contract is void where its object or performance requires an unlawful act under Redmont law or server rules. No court shall enforce or award remedies for an illegal contract. Where only an illegal portion is severable, the rest stands under Section 14. Where the illegal purpose is central, the whole contract is void. Property transferred under an illegal contract generally cannot be recovered, except where one party was actively deceived by the other into the illegal arrangement.

PART V - BREACH
7. Breach

(1) A breach occurs when a party fails, without lawful excuse, to perform any obligation required of them. Each individual failure to perform is a separate breach for the purposes of the limitation period in Section 15.

(2) Actual Breach. Failure to perform by the time performance is due.

(3) Anticipatory Breach. Where a party makes clear by words or conduct that they will not perform, the innocent party may treat the contract as terminated immediately and seek remedies without waiting. A party who has committed an anticipatory breach may retract it once, provided the innocent party has not yet elected to terminate and has not materially changed their position in reliance on the breach. Retraction may only be used once - repeated announcements of non-performance followed by retraction constitute bad faith.

(4) Material and Minor Breach. A Material Breach is a fundamental failure depriving the innocent party of substantially the entire benefit they were due. A Minor Breach is a partial or technical failure that does not undermine the core of the contract. In determining which applies, a court shall consider the proportion of the obligation unfulfilled, the value of the loss to the innocent party, and whether the failure can be remedied. Only a Material Breach entitles the innocent party to terminate. A Minor Breach entitles the innocent party to damages only.

PART VI - REMEDIES
8. Remedies

(1) Damages. Damages compensate the innocent party to put them in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed. Expectation damages cover the expected benefit; reliance damages cover losses incurred in preparing to perform. Damages must be foreseeable. The innocent party must take reasonable steps to mitigate their loss. Liquidated Damages may be pre-agreed provided the amount is a genuine pre-estimate of likely loss and not a punitive sum.

(2) Specific Performance. A court may order specific performance where damages are inadequate - for example, for a unique item, land, or one-of-a-kind service.

(3) Rescission. Where misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, operative mistake, or a sufficiently serious breach is established, a court may rescind the contract, restoring both parties to their original positions as nearly as possible.

(4) Injunction. A court may order a party to stop doing something that breaches the contract or would cause irreparable harm pending resolution of a dispute.

(5) Lien Enforcement. Where a contract includes a Security Agreement, enforcement of that security interest is governed by the Property Lien Act. A lienholder may pursue lien enforcement and a breach claim simultaneously but may not recover twice for the same loss.

PART VII - PRIVITY, ASSIGNMENT AND NOVATION
9. Privity, Assignment and Novation

(1) Privity. Only parties to a contract may enforce or be bound by it. Exceptions:
(a) A Third Party expressly conferred a benefit by the contract, where the parties clearly intended that Third Party to be able to enforce it, may bring a claim to do so. That right cannot be extinguished or varied without the Third Party's consent once they have relied upon or accepted it.
(b) Valid assignment under subsection (2).
(c) Novation under subsection (3).

(2) Assignment. A party may assign their contractual rights - but not obligations - to a Third Party only with the written consent of the other contracting party, unless the contract expressly permits assignment without consent. Assignment must be communicated to the other contracting party in writing, taking effect from that date. The assignee takes rights subject to any defences the other party could have raised against the original party.

(3) Novation. Obligations may only be transferred by novation, requiring the consent of all parties. A valid novation must be in writing and acknowledged by all - the departing party, the incoming party, and the remaining party. Upon novation, the departing party is fully released and the incoming party assumes all obligations as if an original party. Novation is required for entity contract transfers in mergers, consolidations, or business sales, unless the Legal Entity Act provides for automatic succession. A clause purporting to grant advance consent to any future novation is void.

PART VIII - GOOD FAITH, TERMINATION AND FORCE MAJEURE
10. Good Faith, Termination and Force Majeure

(1) Good Faith. Every contract carries an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Parties must act honestly and must not deliberately undermine each other's ability to enjoy the benefits of the contract. Good faith does not require a party to sacrifice their own legitimate interests; it prohibits deliberately dishonest, manipulative, or obstructive conduct. Manipulative conduct means conduct designed to prevent or undermine the other party's ability to exercise their contractual rights; it does not include legitimate commercial negotiation, the exercise of contractual rights, or driving a hard bargain. A party acting in bad faith may face additional damages at the court's discretion.

(2) Termination. A contract may be terminated by:
(a) Mutual agreement;
(b) Full performance by all parties;
(c) Material breach - the innocent party elects to terminate;
(d) Frustration - an unforeseen event beyond any party's control has permanently made performance impossible or radically different, and neither party is at fault;
(e) Rescission for a vitiating factor; or
(f) Expiry of a term specifying an end date or condition.

(3) Force Majeure. A Force Majeure event is an unforeseeable and unavoidable circumstance entirely beyond a party's control that temporarily prevents performance. Where the obstacle is permanent rather than temporary, the doctrine of Frustration under subsection (2)(d) applies instead. On DemocracyCraft this may include unexpected server events, game-breaking bugs, or administrative actions directly affecting performance. The following are not Force Majeure events:
(a) Poor business decisions leading to insolvency;
(b) Losing items through personal negligence;
(c) Forgetting the contract; or
(d) Being banned for rule violations the party was responsible for. A party subject to a wrongful or erroneous ban beyond their control may invoke Force Majeure for its duration.
The affected party must notify the other within 7 days of becoming aware of the event and take all reasonable steps to minimise the impact. If the event persists for more than 30 days, either party may terminate without liability.

PART IX - INCORPORATED ENTITIES
11. Incorporated Entities

(1) A contract with an Incorporated Entity is enforceable against that entity as a separate legal person. Liability is strictly distinct from its shareholders, members, and agents unless personal liability is expressly assumed under the Legal Entity Act. Where an Incorporated Entity is used as a vehicle for deliberate fraud, a court may hold the individuals responsible personally liable.

(2) Where an Incorporated Entity is wound up, dissolved, or placed in receivership:
(a) Contractual claims are treated as creditor claims in the winding up process;
(b) The innocent party must notify the entity, its directors, and the Department of Commerce within 14 days of any public announcement of dissolution, or their claim may be waived. Where no public announcement is made, the 14-day period runs from the date the innocent party first became aware, or ought reasonably to have become aware, of the dissolution; and
(c) A receiver must elect to affirm or disclaim the contract within 14 days of appointment. Failure to elect within this period is treated as affirmation.

(3) A contract that purports to dissolve, wind up, or fundamentally alter an Incorporated Entity without following the Legal Entity Act procedures is void to that extent.

(4) Fiduciary duty obligations of directors and officers under the Legal Entity Act are separate from and additional to their contractual obligations.

PART X - MISCELLANEOUS
12. Modification of Contracts

(1) Parties may modify a contract at any time by mutual agreement.
(2) A modification of a contract that required writing to form must itself be in writing, acknowledged by all parties, to be enforceable.
(3) A modification of a verbal contract is binding where supported by fresh consideration or recorded in writing acknowledged by all parties.
(4) A party may not unilaterally vary the terms of a contract. Any purported unilateral variation is void.

13. Prohibition of Binding Arbitration

(1) No contract may require parties to submit disputes exclusively to private, binding arbitration in place of the court system. Any such clause is void. This does not prohibit voluntary non-binding mediation or settlement agreements freely reached after a dispute has arisen.

14. Severability

(1) Every provision of a contract is severable unless the contract states otherwise. An invalid, unlawful, or unenforceable clause is removed; the remainder stands. A court may modify a severed clause to the minimum extent necessary to make it enforceable rather than removing it entirely, if that better reflects the parties' original intentions.

15. Limitation Period

(1) A claim for breach of contract must be filed within 60 days of becoming aware of the breach, or within 90 days of the breach occurring - whichever is later.
(2) Where a party actively concealed the breach, the limitation period runs from the date the breach was or reasonably could have been discovered, with no absolute cap.
(3) A court may extend this period where exceptional circumstances prevented timely filing.
(4) Claims filed outside this window may be dismissed.

16. Court's General Power

(1) A court may grant such remedy as is just and equitable in the circumstances, whether or not expressly provided for in this Act.
(2) In exercising any power under this Act, a court shall have regard to the relative knowledge and experience of the parties, and may interpret ambiguous terms and apply remedies in a manner that prevents the exploitation of a less informed party by a more informed one.

 

[Franciscus]

Veto

This bill would repeal and replace the old Contracts Act, a simpler law that has guided our contract formation for around 2 years. There has been a lot of common law built around that act, so this bill attempts to write in a good bit of detail into statute. Because it changes so much, the bill has substantive reasons both for supporting it and to be skeptical of it.

In support of the bill, this law makes a lot of questions previously held merely at common law to have codified answers, which can provide some clarity to newer lawyers and non-lawyers. It brings in privity of contract, duties of incorporated entities, special statutes of limitations for contractual breaches, and makes a number of policy choices to prevent unfair contracts. It also provides for more nuance as it pertains to breach of contract and requires certain terms be spelled out in writing, and other protections for parties to ensure good faith and equal terms in contracts.

In short, this act is substantially more complete and detailed than the old Contracts Act, though this does come with changing a number of items from our existing common law of contracts.

Against this bill, certain sections rely upon the Property Lien Act, which was vetoed. The old Contracts Act is substantially simpler and straightforward. The statute of frauds imposed by the law, while it might make sense for truly verbal contracts in the real world, plays a bit weirder in a Minecraft setting where things are inherently basically always written down. Certain parts are eclipsed by Redmont Civil Code Act, Part II, Section 3(2), which holds that "[a]ny civil violation purportedly created by another Act of Congress shall be null and void unless incorporated as an amendment to this Code", and RCCA, Part II, Section 4(1) ("Where any other Act, regulation, directive, or rule conflicts with a provision of this Code, [the RCCA] shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency").

Against this are also potential constitutional issues in application, since this new contracts act does not contain a transition or grandfather clause. While the bill author has written elsewhere that "[g]oing forward, [the Contracts Act] only affects new property deals above the threshold", it's not so clear to me that this bill actually does that; it relies upon common law to achieve this.

This opens up a legal can of worms. The assumption is consistent with Federal Court in [2025] FCR 107:

The Constitution does not contain an express ex post facto clause, yet retroactive civil legislation of that kind is generally constitutionally impermissible by reference to several foundational provisions. The analysis begins with R. Const § 35(14), which guarantees every citizen the right to liberty and security of the person, not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Fundamental justice is not a hollow phrase. It imports the principle that law must be knowable and certain at the time a citizen acts upon it. A person who enters into a bond contract, purchases a financial security, or litigates a dispute to judgment does so in reliance on the legal framework as it exists at that moment. Retroactive legislation that alters, extinguishes, or restructures those rights after the fact deprives that citizen of something they lawfully acquired without affording them any opportunity to conform their conduct to the new legal reality. This is the essential constitutional injury of ex post facto civil law, and it is squarely captured by the fundamental justice guarantee of Section 35(14).

This could be avoided by applying the law as it was at the time of a contract's formation (see also: Superwoops v. Trentrick_Lamar [2026] DCR 18, Section III.II.I, which applies the above quoted FCR decision).

But the case law doesn't quite stop there. The Federal Court and Supreme Court have also cared about the law at the time of the breach (Commonwealth of Redmont Vs CHUD.Inc [2026] FCR 19, Verdict, Section III.1.A, "the law at the time of the alleged breach of law is the applicable law"; In re [2026] FCR 8 | [2026] SCR 8, finding that an old law "is the controlling law because the alleged breach of law occurred under the old law").

Which one is correct, when there is a difference, would require some further litigation and clarity from the Courts. While the FCR in [2025] FCR 107 was pretty clear, it also doesn't horizontally bind other FCR judges, and the Supreme Court's reasoning in [2026] SCR 8 (which stated that the correct law is the law at the time of breach, but did not go into a constitutional analysis on it) creates uncertainty around what law would govern already existing contracts at common law should this bill be signed. The current Supreme Court's statement in dicta that "one should take caution before unambiguously applying the highest level of deference to Federal Court precedent" (In re [2026] FCR 7 | [2026] SCR 7) further destabilizes our ability to rely upon the FCR's prior rulings. Without getting too much into internal tension within the judiciary that I saw during my time as a judge, this kind of language from the Supreme Court is indicative that the assumptions of the bill writer here as it comes to continuity-of-law for existing contracts may not be in line with how the uppermost levels of the judiciary has been thinking and acting.

Legal analysis aside, the policy considerations that trouble me the most are that:

1. New players with under 6 hours of playtime can always void a contract at their option. This will change how businesses hire newer players and how institutions interact with new players, as any contract becomes binding only inasmuch as the new player would want it to bind. The Courts would not do a holistic fact-finding mission of discovering whether someone had capacity; it would be a bright line.
2. The statute of frauds makes a lot less sense in Minecraft. The real-world purpose of a statute of frauds is to require that certain kinds of contracts be written down in order to avoid disputes in which people are likely to perjure themelves or become victims of fraudulent claims.
   
   In Minecraft, every time I send a /msg, that is recorded somewhere. Every time I pay in-game, that is recorded somewhere. Every time I transfer my own property, that is recorded somewhere. The audit log, in essence, becomes the plugin.
   
   I also think that a statute of frauds may hurt newer players, who won't have the requisite knowledge to know the limits and business rules in that regard. If they pay someone $12,000 for a plot, and that other party never delivers that plot, that doesn't convert to a written contract under the record if the deal was done in ephemeral chats that only one of the two parties would have locally logged (even if the staff team does have those logs). Can't go for breach of contract; would have to go for some other thing.
   
   The expansion of requirements for written contracts to "[a]ny agreement where a party specifically requests a written record" also would empower certain scammers to ask for a written record of a contract, then back out of an oral contract and claim that the underlying contract was not valid for lack of written record.
   
   
3. There is still some reliance upon the Property Lien Act, which was vetoed. This means that part of the law would kinda be void with respect to the Property Lien Act, and we still have the gap in liens.

As to (1), this is a policy choice that is defensible. I would prefer that judicial officers be able to use a holistic examination to find whether or not capacity exists, but the rule is at least clear enough now.

As to (2), I maintain that the statute of frauds does not make sense here, in this context, in this game. Basically everything is written in some form, but the definition of a written contract here would appear to exclude in-game dms. Even our in-game "verbal" communication with one another can be screenshotted and recorded for posterity's sake. We ought build laws around the material conditions of Redmont, not merely importing outside concepts in. If people want to haggle over a house, or golden drill, or other thing over $5,000 via in-game dms, I would say we ought let them form contracts this way. And we especially ought let people sue for breach of contract if a scammer decides to not deliver on a contract that would have been formed by in-game dms; I do not want scammers going around and offering $6,000 goods and then arguing in Court that no contract was formed because verbal contracts over $5,000 are voided. I especially do not want this requirement to apply to existing contracts.

As to (3), the Congress is advancing another property lien bill with the same title, but that does not fix the gap we'd be immediately creating now.

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This bill has taken me a while back and forth as to whether to sign it or veto it. I've talked with various members of the judiciary, my own cabinet, individual congresspeople, and generally with the public in public voice chats. As a general rule, I think that overhauls to foundational/important laws (like our entire contract law) have to be done with an abundance of care and polish. Government is not about moving fast and breaking things.

This bill is written clearly, though it contains a lot of policy changes baked in when compared to our existing common law of contracts. The bill does not have a grandfather and/or transition clause for existing contracts, and this will likely create instability with respect to existing agreements (particularly so if Courts choose to apply the newer law at the time of an alleged breach of contract rather than the older law that was in place at the time of a contract's formation). This instability is particularly acute for existing contracts that were formed via in-game dms. And while many of the bill's policy changes are good (clarifying anticipatory breach, for example), some are more questionable (requiring a contract be written for goods over $5,000, while excluding in-game direct messages). On top of that, some of the things the law attempts to do ultimately relies upon a bill that did not become law (i.e. the Property Lien Act).

Because the state of our contract law is not in need of an emergency fix, and because the changes in this law so substantially affects every aspect of commerce in Redmont, we must move deliberately and carefully here. We should pass a law with a clear grandfather/transition clause to preserve existing deals as-is, where we allow people to make contracts through written in-game DMs, and where we don't rely upon laws that have not been enacted. In the meantime, the old Contracts Act and the common law at this time can continue to serve us without much disruption so long as we don't have to deal with questions of which law would apply should we change our law of contracts in the absence of a transition clause.

As such, I believe it is best to veto this law and send it back to the Congress for further consideration and development. There's room for improvement in our Contract law, but we must do so in a way that establishes a clear transition from old-to-new, refrains from citing to bills that did not become law as sources of legal authority, and better accounts for the material conditions of Redmont with respect to handling of "verbal" contracts.