Lawsuit: Pending Commonwealth of Redmont v. ToadKing_ [2026] FCR 34

[Superwoops]

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CRIMINAL ACTION


The Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

ToadKing_
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Prosecution alleges criminal actions committed by the Defendant as follows:

ToadKing_, serving as counsel for 12700k, has acted outside the bounds of the law during settlement negotiations with .Savannah212467 for [2026] DCR 1.


I. PARTIES
1. Commonwealth of Redmont
2. ToadKing_ (Defendant)

II. FACTS
1. On 2 or 3 January 2026, the Defendant and AbsInf were engaged in settlement proceedings regarding [2026] DCR 1. This settlement proceeding shall hereby be known as the ‘underlying settlement’.
2. Part of the conditions that the proposed underlying settlement brought up was that the Defendant and .Savannah212467 enter into another private agreement.
3. The Defendant was representing FTLCEO (12700k) in the underlying settlement.
4. On 3 January 2026, the Defendant and .Savannah212467 entered into a ‘Non-Disclosure Agreement’ as part of the 5th condition of the underlying settlement.
5. After the signage of the Non-Disclosure Agreement by both parties, the Defendant proposed another agreement which was the main private agreement of the 5th condition of the underlying settlement. This main private agreement shall hereby be known as ‘the Agreement’.
6. The Defendant said .Savannah212467 had “one (1) hour to review and sign” and attached to the message was the Agreement.
7. .Savannah212467 did not sign the Agreement.
8. After the one hour given to .Savannah212467 by the Defendant had passed, where .Savannah212467 did not sign the Agreement, the Defendant said “[c]ivil and [c]riminal action will be pursued against you, with criminal punishments for up to 1 month” and “a secondary Civil suit being filed against lustitia Law, making Absinf personally liable for damages?”
9. .Savannah212467 tried to add her lawyer, Sir_Dogeington, to the private DM channel on the forums, which was subsequently denied by the Defendant. The Defendant also said “If you have shared ANY details of this DM, you are liable under breach of contract”.
10. .Savannah212467 entered into conversations with FTLCEO.
11. In DMs between FTLCEO and .Savannah212467, FTLCEO said “My lawyer said he sent you a document. That is all he told me” and a few minutes later “yeah toad wont tell me what the thing he sent you is”
12. The content of the Agreement mainly aimed to restrict .Savannah212467’s ability to advocate for Platform Restriction Measures, where it was defined as: “(a) "Platform Restriction Measure" shall mean any bill, constitutional amendment, motion, resolution, policy, proposal, petition, rule change, executive order, or any other governmental or political action that would: (i) Require Discord usage as a condition for holding a seat in Congress; (ii) Require any specific communication platform as a condition for holding a seat in Congress; (iii) Remove, disqualify, suspend, or otherwise limit members of Congress based on their communication platform; (iv) Create barriers, penalties, or disadvantages for members of Congress who do not use Discord or any specific platform; (v) Amend the Constitution, statutes, or rules in any manner that would achieve any of the foregoing effects.”

III. CHARGES
The Prosecution hereby alleges the following charges against the Defendant:

1. One count of Conspiracy to commit Extortion:

Extortion, according to the Criminal Code Act, is committed where

A person or legal entity commits an offence if that person or legal entity (the “actor”):
(a) compels or induces another individual or entity to deliver funds or other property to the actor’s self or to a third person by means of instilling in that individual or entity a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will:
…
(iv) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against that person;

And Conspiracy to Commit a Crime is committed where a person “intends to commit a crime, even if it has not yet been carried out.”

As per Fact 8, the Defendant made it clear that due to failure of signing of the Agreement he will pursue criminal charges, and thus inducing such a fear.

The “or other property” is the voting rights, and .Savannah212467’s own opinion regarding policies that she would implement if she were elected to the office of Representative. These belonged to her and the Agreement asked her to waive it when it came to the topic of Platform Restriction Measures. (See fact 12)


2. One count of conspiracy to commit Involuntary Servitude:

Involuntary Servitude is committed, according to the CCA, when

A person commits an offence if the person:
(a) coerces another individual, organisation, or entity into performing labour or services against their will, through manipulation, threats (explicit or implicit), violence, or blackmail;

Under the threat of criminal charges being pressed against .Savannah212467 along with civil suits against her and her law firm, the Defendant had asked her to commit to a service of not advocating or voting for policies as defined in Fact 12.
3. One count of Disturbing the Peace:

Disturbing the Peace is committed, according to the CCA, when a person:

(a) engages in disorderly behavior toward an individual or group that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress.

The Defendant acted in a coercive way which included many threats likely to have caused distress to .Savannah212467.

IV. SENTENCING
The Prosecution hereby recommends the following sentence for the Defendant:
1. Conspiracy to commit Extortion - 250 Penalty Units & 60 minutes imprisonment.
2. Conspiracy to commit Involuntary Servitude - 125 Penalty Units & 60 minutes imprisonment.
3. Disturbing the Peace - 100 Penalty Units & 60 minutes imprisonment.

In total, 475 Penalty Units & 180 minutes imprisonment.

V. WITNESSES
1. .Savannah212467

Spoiler: P-001

Spoiler: P-002

Spoiler: P-003

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 2nd day of May 2026.

 

[Superwoops]

Let the Court please note that the Prosecutor handling this case is @TheSnowGuardian.

 

[Franciscus]

I recuse from this action voluntarily.

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO AMEND

The Prosecution would like to add the following exhibit:

Spoiler: P-004

See attached 'NON-DISCLOSURE AND NON-ADVOCACY AGREEMENT.pdf'

 

[Muggy21]

Writ of Summons

@ToadKing is hereby commanded to draw hither to the Federal Court for the case Commonwealth of Redmont v. ToadKing_ [2026] FCR 34

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

(A summons on discord will not be issued considering ToadKing_ is unavailable on Discord)

 

[ToadKing]

Writ of Summons

@ToadKing is hereby commanded to draw hither to the Federal Court for the case Commonwealth of Redmont v. ToadKing_ [2026] FCR 34

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

(A summons on discord will not be issued considering ToadKing_ is unavailable on Discord)

Present

 

[Muggy21]

Present

Please prepare a plea within 48 Hours

 

[ToadKing]

Please prepare a plea within 48 Hours

I am requesting an additional 72 hours due to both personal reasons and ongoing negotiations with the Commonwealth.

 

[Muggy21]

I am requesting an additional 72 hours due to both personal reasons and ongoing negotiations with the Commonwealth.

Granted, you have 120 Hours to prepare a plea.

 

[ToadKing]

Plea

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
PLEA

Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

ToadKing__
Defendant

1. Defendant pleads NOT GUILTY to the charge of Conspiracy to commit Extortion.
2. Defendant pleads NOT GUILTY to the charge of Conspiracy to commit Involuntary Servitude.
3. Defendant pleads NOT GUILTY to the charge of Disturbing the Peace.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 12th day of May 2026

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

Your Honour,

The Department of Justice has, it appears, acquired one of those little grabber toys - the kind with the long extending arm and the claw at the end - and is using it to reach as far as the laws of physics will permit. The three charges laid against me represent a remarkable feat of statutory gymnastics: taking words that plainly mean one thing, and then twisting, stretching, and contorting them until, if you squint hard enough in poor lighting, they might be made to cover conduct they were never designed to reach. A personification of this is supplied below:

Spoiler: D-001

This is an affront to the plain meanings within the Criminal Code Act (CCA) and an outlandish waste of taxpayer money. The Defendant was a lawyer conducting a settlement negotiation on behalf of his client in a live civil case. He made "legal threats" against another qualified legal professional (D-002) who had herself been accused of wrongdoing and was, at the time, a defendant in that very civil case (D-003). He proposed a private agreement to which the other party declined. No crime could have possibly been committed.

The Commonwealth has dressed up an aggressive, but entirely lawful, piece of legal negotiation as some criminal conspiracy to extort a now convicted criminal (D-004) of their "voting rights", to bind them unto forced servitude, as well as a campaign of harassment throughout negotiations. None of these charges survives contact with the actual text of the law. The Defence moves to dismiss all three counts pursuant to Rule 5.5, for failure to state a claim for relief on the basis that the pleaded facts and evidence are insufficient to support the charges as a matter of law.

​

I. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT EXTORTION​

The Prosecution alleges that the Defendant conspired to commit Extortion contrary to CCA, Part VIII, Section 13, by threatening criminal charges if .Savannah212467 declined to sign the Agreement. The Prosecution contends that .Savannah212467's "voting rights" and "political opinions" constitute "other property" within the meaning of the extortion provision.

Extortion requires that the actor compel or induce another to "deliver funds or other property" by instilling fear of a threatened consequence. The provision reads, in relevant part:

(a) compels or induces another individual or entity to deliver funds or other property to the actor’s self or to a third person by means of instilling in that individual or entity a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will:

(iv) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against that person;

To plead Extortion, the Prosecution must allege facts capable of proving all of the following elements:

1. The Defendant compelled or induced .Savannah212467;
2. to deliver funds or other property;
3. to the Defendant or a third person;
4. by instilling fear that criminal charges would be instituted.

The complaint fails at elements two and three, which prove fatal to the conspiracy framing. Conspiracy to commit extortion does not require the delivery to have occurred; it requires an intent to compel delivery - "intends to commit a crime, even if it has not yet been carried out" (CCA, Part X, Section 14). But one cannot form a criminal intent to compel the delivery of something that is not capable of being delivered. There is no "property" here. The Prosecution identifies only a request for political restraint - that .Savannah212467 refrain from advocating for certain measures. You cannot conspire to extract what does not exist as an extractable thing. The conspiracy charge, therefore, fails for the same reason the completed offence would: the central object of the alleged conspiracy - "funds or other property" - is entirely absent from the facts pleaded.

Property, understood in its ordinary and legal sense, is something that can be possessed, transferred, and delivered from one party to another. Money, company shares, items, animals, real estate, and vehicles are property. They can be taken, handed over, and received. A political opinion cannot. A voting intention cannot. A constitutional right to participate in the legislative process cannot. None of these things can be meaningfully "delivered to the actor's self or to a third person." They are inalienable attributes of a citizen's legal and political personality.

The Agreement, as drafted and attached to these proceedings, sought .Savannah212467's commitment to refrain from certain political advocacy and voting behaviour - specifically, refraining from any action that would constitute a "Platform Restriction Measure" as defined in the Agreement. This is a request for political forbearance: for abstention and silence. Silence is not property. What the Agreement sought to obtain was the suppression of future speech and political conduct. Now, granted, that may raise other questions entirely, but it does not raise a property question.

The placement of Extortion within Part VIII: PROPERTY OFFENCES is not accidental. It is grouped alongside Theft, Aggravated Theft, Theft from Containers, and other offences whose defining characteristic is interference with property rights. The Part's preamble states expressly that it "provides for offences involving the unlawful interference with, or deprivation of, property belonging to another person." Voting rights are not property belonging to a person in any sense that the legislature contemplated when drafting this Part. This principle of contextual interpretation is enshrined in the CCA itself:

2 - Purpose and Spirit of the Law
(1) This Code shall be interpreted to give effect to its purpose and the spirit of the law. Courts and enforcement bodies must avoid construing provisions in a manner that produces absurd, unjust, or unintended results.

If voting rights were truly "property" under the CCA, they would be subject to the entire suite of property offences. One could be charged with stealing someone's voting rights. A person could commit aggravated theft of a political opinion. A party could be sued for theft from containers if they somehow accessed another's political preferences without consent. The Court will appreciate that these propositions are self-evidently absurd. The Prosecution cannot have it both ways: either political rights are property for all purposes under the Code, or they are not property at all.

If the underlying conduct does not constitute extortion, then there is no crime to conspire to commit, and thus the conspiracy charge collapses entirely.

I submit that Count One has insufficient evidence to support the criminal charge and, therefore, must be dismissed.

​

II. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE​

The Prosecution alleges that the Defendant conspired to commit Involuntary Servitude contrary to CCA, Part X, Section 3, by threatening legal consequences to coerce .Savannah212467 into refraining from advocating for Platform Restriction Measures. The offence plainly reads:

(a) coerces another individual, organisation, or entity into performing labour or services against their will, through manipulation, threats (explicit or implicit), violence, or blackmail;
(b) the individual justifiably feels compelled to perform such services due to such coercion;

The complaint fails to plead any "labour or services," which are the central element of the offence, and must therefore be dismissed regardless of the facts.

Even accepting every pleaded fact as true, the Prosecution has not alleged that .Savannah212467 was required to perform work, render services, assist the Defendant, produce anything, appear anywhere, or do any task whatsoever. The complaint alleges only that she was asked to refrain from future political advocacy. Refraining from action is not a service. It is the opposite of a service. Because the central element of the offence is unpled on the facts as presented, the count fails as a matter of law.

The Involuntary Servitude provision requires coercion into performing "labour or services". Both words point in the same direction: affirmative performance. Labour is physical or mental work. Services are duties, functions, or performances rendered for another. The entire purpose of the offence - evident from its name - is to prohibit forced work or compelled active assistance against one's will.
Sections 2(a) through 2(j) of the Agreement each impose a prohibition: Party B agrees to refrain from advocating, refrain from voting in a particular way, refrain from speaking publicly or privately on defined topics. Every single operative obligation in the Agreement is a request for inaction. One cannot be in a state of servitude by doing nothing. It is clear this provision had compelled performance in mind: employment, forced assistance, coerced labour, not contractual silence clauses.

Under the interpretive principle of noscitur a sociis - words are known by the company they keep - "services" must be read in light of its neighbour, "labour." Both terms connote active, performative conduct. But there is a more fundamental point than statutory interpretation: the offence does not merely require "labour or services." It requires performing labour or services. The word performing is the operative verb. One performs actions. One does not perform inactions. Pure omission - not speaking, not voting, not advocating - is not a performance of anything. You cannot be compelled to perform a negative space. The choice of "performing" is deliberate, and that word is simply incompatible with the conduct alleged here.

This is further confirmed by the structure of the obligation itself. A service, by ordinary meaning, is something rendered to someone as an output delivered, or some kind of function performed; a product of work that passes from the person performing it to the person receiving it. Non-advocacy produces no output. The Defendant receives no deliverables, product, or result of performance. He receives only the absence of future speech. That is not a service in any sense the statute contemplates.

The consequences of the Prosecution's reading are instructive. Non-Disclosure Agreements are standard instruments of legal practice in Redmont. They impose obligations of silence, requiring refraining from disclosing information, abstaining from speaking on defined topics, and keeping particular matters confidential. If non-advocacy constitutes a "service" under this offence, then non-disclosure does too. Every NDA in Redmont would potentially constitute Involuntary Servitude. Notably, the initial Non-Disclosure Agreement in this very matter was signed voluntarily by .Savannah212467 herself, imposed precisely that kind of silence obligation on both parties. Under the Prosecution's own theory, .Savannah212467 was simultaneously coercing the Defendant into servitude by asking him to keep the contents of the DM confidential. The Court should reject an interpretation that produces that result.

The Prosecution moves as though .Savannah212467 were an innocent bystander ambushed by legal threats out of nowhere. She was not. She was a named defendant in 12700k v. .Savannah212467 [2026] DCR 1, a civil action filed against her. She was already subject to potential civil liability before any settlement discussion occurred. Crucially, however, 12700k had already reported the underlying matter to the Department of Justice on 1 January 2026, prior to the commencement of settlement negotiations, and was expressly told by the then Attorney General that criminal charges could follow if 12700k wished to pursue them (D-005). The threat of criminal proceedings was therefore not manufactured by the Defendant as a coercive instrument: it was a pre-existing and independently initiated legal reality that any competent lawyer would have communicated to the opposing party in the context of settlement.

Informing a counterparty that legal proceedings, both civil and criminal, are a real consequence of a breakdown in negotiations is not coercion. It is simple disclosure. It is what lawyers are supposed to do... no?

Even if this Court were to find that some form of service was sought, the count still fails on an entirely separate and independent basis. Element (b) of the offence is an independent and standalone basis for dismissal, regardless of how this Court rules on "labour or services." The offence requires that:

(b) the individual justifiably feels compelled to perform such services due to such coercion;

The complaint does not plead this element. It makes no allegation that .Savannah212467 justifiably felt compelled to perform any service. Nor could it on the available facts. The evidence before this Court shows that .Savannah212467 read the Agreement, immediately characterised it as "very illegal," declined to sign it, and sought to bring her own counsel into the discussion. That is the conduct of a person who felt entirely capable of refusing, not someone justifiably compelled. A person who says no, gets up, and calls a lawyer is not in a state of compulsion.

Conspiracy requires intent to commit the completed offence, not merely intent to attempt it. The completed offence of Involuntary Servitude requires, as its second element, that the complainant justifiably feel compelled to perform the relevant services. That is a subjective mental state in .Savannah212467. The evidence before this Court is that she read the Agreement, immediately described it as "very illegal," declined to sign it, and sought to bring her own counsel into the discussion. She was not compelled. Nor was she even close to being considered "compelled." She was confident in her assertion, legally engaged with a lawyer, and, ultimately, exercising free choice throughout.

A conspiracy to commit Involuntary Servitude, therefore, required an intention to produce a specific subjective mental state - compulsion - in a third party. The evidence shows that the mental state was never going to arise. One cannot form a criminal conspiracy to achieve an outcome that the other party's own conduct makes clear they would not submit to. The conspiracy charge fails not merely because the underlying offence was not completed, but because the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that the critical subjective element of the completed offence was never within reach.

I submit that Count Two has insufficient evidence to support the criminal charge and, therefore, must be dismissed.

​

III. DISTURBING THE PEACE​

The Prosecution alleges that the Defendant committed Disturbing the Peace, contrary to CCA, Part V, Section 1, by engaging in disorderly conduct toward .Savannah212467, that was likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress. The offence reads:

(a) engages in disorderly behavior toward an individual or group that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress.

The offence has two cumulative requirements: first, the conduct must be disorderly; second, it must cause or be likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress. The complaint does not plead disorderly conduct. It pleads a settlement negotiation. Because the threshold element fails on the pleaded facts, it does not matter whether .Savannah212467 experienced any particular emotional state. The count fails before the distress question is even reached.

The conduct alleged consists of: presenting a legal agreement, imposing a deadline, communicating the legal consequences of non-compliance, declining to add third parties to a private negotiation channel, and informing the other party that settlement had failed. Even accepting these facts entirely, they describe a settlement negotiation - not disorderly conduct in any recognised legal sense.

The jurisprudence of this Commonwealth has consistently required that "disorderly behaviour" bear some hallmark of unlawfulness, violence, public aggression, or unprovoked verbal abuse. In Commonwealth of Redmont v. Hzxpy and N3ghtmare [2021] FCR 116, the Court held that "patient conversation" and a single private message did not constitute disorderly behaviour. In snow_crp v. FearlessNacktmul [2025] DCR 33, liability arose from "obscene messages, racially charged messages, repeated insults." In Toadking v. Culls [2025] DCR 82, liability required "public, targeted, and unwanted physical contact and verbal fixation." The theme clearly shows that disorderly conduct involves a breakdown of law-abiding behaviour, not the vigorous exercise of legal rights.

The then Vice President's Amicus Curiae brief in related proceedings on this offence put the matter squarely:

What is clear from this is simple: concluding that "disorderly behavior" has occurred requires a finding of some violation of the natural right to peace, or alternatively some breakdown in law-abiding behavior on behalf of the offending party.

The Vice President's brief supplies the correct test: disorderly conduct requires "a violation of the natural right to peace, or a breakdown in law-abiding behavior." That test draws a clear line: conduct that subverts or abandons law-abiding behaviour through violence, abuse, harassment, threats without legal basis, falls on one side. Conduct that uses the legal system, i.e. communicating legal consequences, asserting legal rights, warning of litigation, falls on the other. The Defendant was not breaking down law-abiding behaviour. He was telling an opposing party in active litigation that his client's legal remedies would be pursued. That is the lawful exercise of the legal system, which cannot be disorderly conduct, because it is the conduct the legal system is designed to accommodate and facilitate. Because the Prosecution cannot plead facts constituting objectively disorderly conduct, the offence is not made out, and the distress element is never reached. The private nature of the conduct further confirms this conclusion.

Prior successful Disturbing the Peace charges have involved a public dimension, such as public insults, physical intimidation, sustained multi-interaction targeting, or verbal abuse directed at a person in public settings. The conduct alleged here occurred entirely within a private Direct Message forum thread, between two parties to an active legal dispute. There was no public humiliation, no campaign of harassment across days or weeks, no sustained targeting. A single tense negotiation session does not become a criminal act merely because the counterparty found it uncomfortable.

.Savannah212467 was not some uninitiated layperson. At the time of these events, she held all barrister qualifications (D-002), and her conduct in the underlying case had already been the subject of civil proceedings and a DOJ investigation. She engaged a lawyer of her own (Sir_Dogeington) and understood the legal landscape she was operating in. A qualified legal professional receiving a legal letter of demand from opposing counsel, for example, is not, in any meaningful sense, a victim of harassment. She knew, as any lawyer knows, that the alternative to settlement is litigation. That is the entire point of settlement negotiations.

To hold otherwise would be to criminalise one of the most fundamental acts in legal practice: telling an opposing party that your client will pursue their legal remedies if an agreement is not reached. If a lawyer saying "we will see you in court" constitutes Disturbing the Peace, then no settlement negotiation in Redmont can ever be conducted. One can imagine the absurdity: a murder victim sues their murderer, the murderer's lawyer threatens to countersue, and now the victim is charged with Disturbing the Peace because the murderer found the lawsuit distressing. The Court should reject any interpretation that produces that result.

I submit that Count Three has insufficient evidence to support the criminal charge and, therefore, must be dismissed.

​

VI. CONCLUSION​

The Defence respectfully submits that all three counts in this prosecution have insufficient evidence to support the criminal charge under Rule 5.5.

The Extortion count fails because political forbearance and voting restraint are not "funds or other property" capable of delivery - the complaint fails at the second and third elements of the offence before any disputed fact matters. The placement of Extortion within the property offences Part confirms it was never designed to reach political rights.

The Involuntary Servitude count fails because the complaint pleads abstention and silence, not labour or services, which is the opposite of performative conduct. It further fails because element (b) of the offence, requiring that the individual justifiably feel compelled to perform services, is neither pleaded nor supported by the facts: .Savannah212467 refused the Agreement, engaged her own counsel, and demonstrated no compulsion whatsoever. The conspiracy charge independently fails because one cannot conspire to produce a subjective state of compulsion in a third party who demonstrably was not compelled.

The Disturbing the Peace count fails because the pleaded conduct - a private settlement negotiation between two legal professionals - does not constitute "disorderly behaviour" as that term is understood in the statute or prior case law. Legal pressure is not disorder. Unpleasantness is not criminality. Because the threshold element fails, the question of distress is never reached.

The Defence prays that the Court dismiss all three counts with prejudice, and that this prosecution, brought in pursuit of conduct that is plainly lawful on its own pleaded facts, be brought to its overdue end.

​

V. EVIDENCE​

Spoiler: D-002

Spoiler: D-003

Lawsuit: Dismissed Thread '12700k v. .Savannah212467 [2026] DCR 1'

Jan 1, 2026

Case Filing

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

12700k (represented by ToadKing)
Plaintiff

v.

.Savannah212467 (@Savannah)
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complain against the Defendants as follows:

The Defendant breached Attorney-Client Privilege by publicly disclosing confidential attorney-client communications from a legal ticket to a public Discord channel without the written permission of the client, in direct violation of the Criminal Code Act and Modern Legal Reform Act.

I. PARTIES​

1. 12700k
2. .Savannah212467...

• ToadKing
• Replies: 13
• Forum: Case Archive

Spoiler: D-004

M

Lawsuit: Adjourned Post in thread 'Commonwealth of Redmont v. .Savannah212467 [2026] FCR 3'

Feb 26, 2026

Verdict

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Verdict - Commonwealth of Redmont v. .Savannah212467 [2026] FCR 3


Summary of Controversy

The facts are straightforward. 12700k opened ticket with Iustita Law, a firm founded and managed by Defendant, to ask about employee poaching laws. Before sharing details, 12700k confirmed that attorney-client privilege applied, and Savannah affirmed it did. Shortly afterward, on January 1, 2026, Savannah posted screenshots from that private ticket into the public #Legal channel on the DemocracyCraft Discord server. 12700k never...

• Muggy21

Spoiler: D-005

 

[Muggy21]

@Superwoops The Government has 72 Hours to respond to the Motion.

The Court grants extra time considering the length of the filing.

 

[TheSnowGuardian]

Brief

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS

The Prosecution respectfully asks the Court to deny the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

1. On Count One, the Defendant argues that political advocacy, voting conduct, or a contractual promise not to support certain measures cannot be “property.” The Prosecution submits that this is too narrow. The alleged Agreement sought to obtain a valuable legal concession from .Savannah212467 for the benefit of the Defendant’s client. A binding promise to refrain from political action is not meaningless; it is the very thing the Defendant allegedly attempted to secure through threats of civil and criminal action. Whether that concession qualifies as “other property,” and whether the threats were made for an improper coercive purpose, should not be resolved before trial.


2. On Count Two, the Defendant argues that the alleged conduct cannot be involuntary servitude because it required inaction rather than labor. The Prosecution submits that the Agreement imposed an ongoing obligation for the benefit of another party: to refrain from advocacy, voting, or political participation on a specific issue. That continuing restraint can plausibly constitute a service or compelled obligation. Further, because this is charged as conspiracy, the Prosecution need not show that the offense was completed, only that the Defendant attempted or agreed to pursue coercive compliance.

3. On Count Three, the Defendant characterizes the matter as ordinary settlement negotiation. The Prosecution submits that the complaint alleges more than hard bargaining. It alleges a one-hour deadline, threats of civil and criminal action, pressure not to involve counsel, and warnings that disclosure could create liability. Legal negotiations are not immune from criminal law when they become coercive, threatening, or likely to cause alarm or distress. Whether the Defendant’s conduct crossed that line is a factual question for trial.

4. The Defendant’s motion also relies on disputed facts and favorable interpretations of the evidence. A Motion to Dismiss is not the proper stage for the Court to weigh evidence, determine intent, or decide whether the Defendant’s conduct was justified. The complaint alleges sufficient facts which, if proven, could support the charges.

All of the Plaintiff's Points for a Motion to Dismiss would either be suited to resolve at the end of trial or at the end of discovery.

See Lawsuit: Dismissed - ToadKing v. AsexualDinosaur [2026] FCR 5,

Lawsuit: In Session Post in thread 'mar_milk v. Plura72 and Social Democrat Party [2026] FCR 32'

May 1, 2026

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

Your Honour,
the Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the co-defendant under Rule 5.12 of the Court Rules and Procedures and in support thereof respectfully alleges:

I. Overview of the information shared
For the breach to take place, the Plaintiff must have acted knowing that the information would be confidential. An application for party membership isn't by itself considered confidential.

A. The information was shared in a public setting
The Privacy...

• Franciscus

M

Lawsuit: Adjourned Post in thread 'Vendeka Inc. and Pepecuu v. Department of Commerce [2025] FCR 107'

Jan 5, 2026

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order - On Reconsideration for Commonwealth's Motion for Dismissal

Movant requests reconsideration from this Court's previous order denying the dismissal order. Movant states Court misapprehended arguments and seeks clarification.

Clarification of the Court's Original Order (#19)

On review of this Court's previous finding in Justice Compass Ltd. v. Commonwealth [2025] FCR 98, the Court found that Defendant may be immune from the ongoing prosecution as a result of "immunity." On...

• Muggy21

• 
• 

For these reasons, the Prosecution respectfully requests that the Motion to Dismiss be denied.