Lawsuit: Dismissed Commonwealth of Redmont v. Stanley582 [2026] FCR 23

[Novakerbal]

Case Filing

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CRIMINAL ACTION

The Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

Stanley582
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Prosecution alleges criminal actions committed by the Defendant as follows:

On March 17th, 2026 the Defendant Stanley582 posted a campaign advertisement in the #campaign channel of the main DC discord server. This campaign advertisement made several claims, including the desire to abolish a sales tax, make the income tax progressive, provide free public healthcare, and exempting residential plots and town plots from the Auction Levy. Notably, each of these desires are already present in legislation, making it impossible for such promises to be fulfilled by the Defendants political party. This amounts to Misleading Advertising as the Defendant disseminated an advertisement with misleading substance and presentation pursuant to the Criminal Code Act Part VII §12(a).

I. PARTIES
1. Stanley582 (Defendant)(Forum Account: Hamilton3812)
2. Commonwealth of Redmont (Prosecution)

II. FACTS
1. On March 17th, 2026, Stanley582 posted a Campaign advertisement in the #campaign channel containing statements including "Abolish sales tax to keep goods affordable." "Make income tax progressive so the rich pay more and the poor pay less." "Exempt R-Plots and Town Plots from the auction levy." and "Provide free public healthcare." (P-001).
2. There is currently no Sales Tax, as the Taxation Act §11(1) sets the Sales Tax percentage at 0%.
3. Income Taxation is already progressive, as the Taxation Act §4(2) establishes a progressive taxation bracket system where poor players pay no taxes on balances, while rich players pay more.
4. Residential Plots and Town Plots are already exempt from the auction levy, as the Plot Regulations Act §3(1)(a) states "Town plots, wild plots, and residential plots shall be exempt from both the tax itself and the calculations for the tax."
5. Free Public Healthcare is already enshrined in legislation, as the Redmontian Health Services Act establishes a state-funded free public healthcare system, Medicare. Furthermore, the DOH Medicare Policy establishes full coverage of all non-pharmacy treatments, making them free for all citizens who participate in Medicare.
5. All the above listed statements are misleading, as it is impossible for a political party or individual to promise a policy or legislation change when the desired outcome is already law.

III. CHARGES
The Prosecution hereby alleges the following charges against the Defendant:
1. 1 Count of Misleading Advertising, given that the dissemination of misleading statements is illegal pursuant to The Criminal Code Act Part VII, §12.

IV. SENTENCING
The Prosecution hereby recommends the following sentence for the Defendant:
1. A 50 Penalty Unit Fine, and 0 minutes of imprisonment, with respect to One Count of Misleading Advertising.

Evidence List:

Spoiler: P-001

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 28th day of March, 2026

 

[Muggy21]

Court Order

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order to Show Cause

As per the Complaint, the Commonwealth alleges that Defendant made misleading statements in #campaign on the Discord. The Charter, as enshrined in §35 (6), permits the "Freedom of Political Communication." Without considering the specifics of what was misleading, the Court is concerned that Defendant's speech is otherwise covered under the Charter.


@Novakerbal The CW shall have 72 hours to express why this action does not conflict with Defendant's Charter rights.


The Federal Court in Commonwealth v. AtomicRedstoner [2026] FCR 6 dismissed charges for legal insufficiency, thus the District Court proceeds under a similar framework with a constitutional concern.


So ordered,
Judge Mug, in the District Court

 

[Novakerbal]

Your Honor,

May the Commonwealth have a 24 hour extension in order to properly respond?

Court Order

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order to Show Cause

As per the Complaint, the Commonwealth alleges that Defendant made misleading statements in #campaign on the Discord. The Charter, as enshrined in §35 (6), permits the "Freedom of Political Communication." Without considering the specifics of what was misleading, the Court is concerned that Defendant's speech is otherwise covered under the Charter.


@Novakerbal The CW shall have 72 hours to express why this action does not conflict with Defendant's Charter rights.


The Federal Court in Commonwealth v. AtomicRedstoner [2026] FCR 6 dismissed charges for legal insufficiency, thus the District Court proceeds under a similar framework with a constitutional concern.


So ordered,
Judge Mug, in the District Court

 

[Muggy21]

Your Honor,

May the Commonwealth have a 24 hour extension in order to properly respond?

Absolutely,

 

[Novakerbal]

Court Order

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order to Show Cause

As per the Complaint, the Commonwealth alleges that Defendant made misleading statements in #campaign on the Discord. The Charter, as enshrined in §35 (6), permits the "Freedom of Political Communication." Without considering the specifics of what was misleading, the Court is concerned that Defendant's speech is otherwise covered under the Charter.


@Novakerbal The CW shall have 72 hours to express why this action does not conflict with Defendant's Charter rights.


The Federal Court in Commonwealth v. AtomicRedstoner [2026] FCR 6 dismissed charges for legal insufficiency, thus the District Court proceeds under a similar framework with a constitutional concern.


So ordered,
Judge Mug, in the District Court

Brief

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

Your Honor,

The Commonwealth believes that the constitutional right to "Freedom of Political Communication" does not protect the Defendant from prosecution in this case. In support of this, the Commonwealth would like to examine past precedent surrounding Freedom of Political Communication and limitations on certain categories of speech. For the time being, the Commonwealth will focus on arguing whether false and misleading speech is broadly restricted within political advertisements, rather than the specifics of this case, which can be properly litigated if this case is allowed to proceed.

Freedom of Political Communication Precedent

The Honorable Judge asks whether the Defendant's speech is covered by the right to Freedom of Political Communication, in order to address this we must examine the framework established by the Supreme Court. In [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the protections enshrined by the right to Freedom of Political Communication, particularly the court determined that "The mere fact that political communication may be impacted by an eviction of a plot does not create a constitutional claim of political communication. For such a claim to exist, a government entity must be directly targeting political communication itself, or the restriction imposed on the communicator so egregious and widespread (regardless of government intent) that the restriction serves as to totally suppress the communicator". In this we can see two criteria that can establish a valid claim of Political Communication, "directly targeting political communication itself" and "restriction serves as to totally suppress the communicator".

In examining the first criteria for Freedom of Political Communication to apply, we must also examine prior statements by the court. Particularly, the Supreme Court stated that "Therefore it is clear that the DCT has not specifically targeted the plots for political reasons, and thus cannot be the basis for any constitutional claim of political communication" and "We uphold the trial court’s determination that any policy that is broad and non-specific, or “neutral” (such as height limits, safety codes, material restrictions, etc.) are fully enforceable.". At no point has the DOJ, or the legislature in enacting the Part VII §12 of Criminal Code Act, directly targeted communication for political reasons. The Criminal Code Act is decidedly neutral in its handling of misleading advertising, and furthermore the DOJ retains full neutrality and equality in bringing suit based upon legislation. Unless the Honorable Judge believes that either the Criminal Code Act, or the actions of the DOJ, directly and maliciously targeted political communication, this criteria would not apply.

On the second criteria for Freedom of Political Communication, we must examine the sentencing sought under the Criminal Code Act, and its material effects upon political communication. In this case, the Commonwealth seeks the maximum penalty applicable under the Criminal Code Act, a 50 Penalty Unit fine. This fine is based solely upon specific misleading and outright false statements made, not the whole act of engaging with Political Communication as is the right of the defendant. The Commonwealth has not requested any material restriction on the defendants ability to post Political Communication in the future, and a fine derived from a specific false statement cannot reasonably serve to "totally suppress the communicator". This suit is a narrow and targeted fine, not an egregious and widespread restriction on communication. Even if the judge were to grant the requested sentencing, the defendant would have no restriction preventing future political communication.

Overall we can see that past Supreme Court precedent swings strongly towards the actions taken by the defendant not being protected by the right to Freedom of Political Communication. This application of the law would neither directly target political communication, nor would it impose any widespread or egregious restrictions. Therefore the Commonwealth maintains that in this instance, this prosecution does not conflict with the Defendants Charter Rights.

Limitations on Speech

Furthermore, the Commonwealth would like to examine past instances where legislation has restricted certain categories of speech, without infringing upon any right to Freedom of Political Communication. In particular, the Commonwealth seeks to examine xLayzur & Krix v. Politico [2023] FCR 62, where the Federal Court ruled that "Because these are specific, false claims about specific actions and results, the court believes that it is not protected by these Constitutional rights". Past precedent clearly shows that the Freedom of Political Communication is not absolute, and that laws regulating slander and libel can override these protections. It stands to reason that if the Judiciary has established that certain acts of slander and libel are not protected by Freedom of Political Communication, that other laws regulating published falsehoods would follow the same framework. The objective false nature of the statements made can be litigated during the proper course of this case. However the Commonwealth is confident that it is entirely lawful to prosecute an individual for publishing false statements, and that the constitution does not provide protection for those individuals.

Summary

The objective framework of Freedom of Political Communication is clear. The Judiciary has established that Freedom of Political Communication is not absolute, there are limitations on when it applies. While the Commonwealth believes that there is sufficient evidence to pursue this case, it understands that this is an untested law being prosecuted before this court. Should your honor find issue with the constitutionality of the law beyond our argumentation, the Commonwealth would find such a ruling immensely beneficial not only for this case but others it wishes to pursue.

 

[Muggy21]

Brief

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

Your Honor,

The Commonwealth believes that the constitutional right to "Freedom of Political Communication" does not protect the Defendant from prosecution in this case. In support of this, the Commonwealth would like to examine past precedent surrounding Freedom of Political Communication and limitations on certain categories of speech. For the time being, the Commonwealth will focus on arguing whether false and misleading speech is broadly restricted within political advertisements, rather than the specifics of this case, which can be properly litigated if this case is allowed to proceed.

Freedom of Political Communication Precedent

The Honorable Judge asks whether the Defendant's speech is covered by the right to Freedom of Political Communication, in order to address this we must examine the framework established by the Supreme Court. In [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the protections enshrined by the right to Freedom of Political Communication, particularly the court determined that "The mere fact that political communication may be impacted by an eviction of a plot does not create a constitutional claim of political communication. For such a claim to exist, a government entity must be directly targeting political communication itself, or the restriction imposed on the communicator so egregious and widespread (regardless of government intent) that the restriction serves as to totally suppress the communicator". In this we can see two criteria that can establish a valid claim of Political Communication, "directly targeting political communication itself" and "restriction serves as to totally suppress the communicator".

In examining the first criteria for Freedom of Political Communication to apply, we must also examine prior statements by the court. Particularly, the Supreme Court stated that "Therefore it is clear that the DCT has not specifically targeted the plots for political reasons, and thus cannot be the basis for any constitutional claim of political communication" and "We uphold the trial court’s determination that any policy that is broad and non-specific, or “neutral” (such as height limits, safety codes, material restrictions, etc.) are fully enforceable.". At no point has the DOJ, or the legislature in enacting the Part VII §12 of Criminal Code Act, directly targeted communication for political reasons. The Criminal Code Act is decidedly neutral in its handling of misleading advertising, and furthermore the DOJ retains full neutrality and equality in bringing suit based upon legislation. Unless the Honorable Judge believes that either the Criminal Code Act, or the actions of the DOJ, directly and maliciously targeted political communication, this criteria would not apply.

On the second criteria for Freedom of Political Communication, we must examine the sentencing sought under the Criminal Code Act, and its material effects upon political communication. In this case, the Commonwealth seeks the maximum penalty applicable under the Criminal Code Act, a 50 Penalty Unit fine. This fine is based solely upon specific misleading and outright false statements made, not the whole act of engaging with Political Communication as is the right of the defendant. The Commonwealth has not requested any material restriction on the defendants ability to post Political Communication in the future, and a fine derived from a specific false statement cannot reasonably serve to "totally suppress the communicator". This suit is a narrow and targeted fine, not an egregious and widespread restriction on communication. Even if the judge were to grant the requested sentencing, the defendant would have no restriction preventing future political communication.

Overall we can see that past Supreme Court precedent swings strongly towards the actions taken by the defendant not being protected by the right to Freedom of Political Communication. This application of the law would neither directly target political communication, nor would it impose any widespread or egregious restrictions. Therefore the Commonwealth maintains that in this instance, this prosecution does not conflict with the Defendants Charter Rights.

Limitations on Speech

Furthermore, the Commonwealth would like to examine past instances where legislation has restricted certain categories of speech, without infringing upon any right to Freedom of Political Communication. In particular, the Commonwealth seeks to examine xLayzur & Krix v. Politico [2023] FCR 62, where the Federal Court ruled that "Because these are specific, false claims about specific actions and results, the court believes that it is not protected by these Constitutional rights". Past precedent clearly shows that the Freedom of Political Communication is not absolute, and that laws regulating slander and libel can override these protections. It stands to reason that if the Judiciary has established that certain acts of slander and libel are not protected by Freedom of Political Communication, that other laws regulating published falsehoods would follow the same framework. The objective false nature of the statements made can be litigated during the proper course of this case. However the Commonwealth is confident that it is entirely lawful to prosecute an individual for publishing false statements, and that the constitution does not provide protection for those individuals.

Summary

The objective framework of Freedom of Political Communication is clear. The Judiciary has established that Freedom of Political Communication is not absolute, there are limitations on when it applies. While the Commonwealth believes that there is sufficient evidence to pursue this case, it understands that this is an untested law being prosecuted before this court. Should your honor find issue with the constitutionality of the law beyond our argumentation, the Commonwealth would find such a ruling immensely beneficial not only for this case but others it wishes to pursue.

I'm going to issue a long-form order, but are you specifically requesting that I rule on the constitutionality of the act? If so, the CW may seek to remove this action to the Federal Court if it wishes; I won't do that sua sponte.

 

[Novakerbal]

I'm going to issue a long-form order, but are you specifically requesting that I rule on the constitutionality of the act? If so, the CW may seek to remove this action to the Federal Court if it wishes; I won't do that sua sponte.

The Commonwealth does wish for a ruling on the constitutionality of this act, and whether it can be enforced. We would seek to remove this action to the Federal Court if necessary.

 

[Muggy21]

Case removed to the Federal Court, now under [2026] FCR 23.

I'll retain the case as Judge.

 

[Muggy21]

Court Order

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order - Dismissal with Prejudice


SUMMARY OF PROSECUTION

This matter comes before the Federal Court on the Commonwealth’s Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, filed originally in the District Court and subsequently removed to this Court at the Commonwealth’s request for a ruling on the constitutionality of applying Part VII, §12 of the Criminal Code Act with respect to political speech. The Commonwealth charges the Defendant, Stanley582, with one count of Misleading Advertising under the Criminal Code Act for publishing campaign promises in the #campaign channel of the main DemocracyCraft Discord server. The Commonwealth alleges that the Defendant’s promises were misleading because the policies he advocated already exist in current law.

Upon initial review, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause, directing the Commonwealth to explain why this prosecution does not conflict with the Defendant’s Charter right to Freedom of Political Communication as enshrined in §35(6).

GOVERNMENT'S ALLEGATION

On March 17, 2026, the Defendant posted a campaign advertisement in the #campaign channel containing the following policy aspirations: abolishing the sales tax, making the income tax progressive, exempting residential and town plots from the auction levy, and providing free public healthcare. The Commonwealth contends that each of these policy goals is already reflected in existing legislation. The Taxation Act sets the sales tax at 0%. The income tax is already progressive under §4(2) of the Taxation Act. Residential and town plots are already exempt from the auction levy under §3(1)(a) of the Plot Regulations Act. And free public healthcare is already established through the Redmontian Health Services Act and the DOH Medicare Policy.

The Commonwealth charges that because these policy positions already exist in law, the Defendant’s campaign statements constitute Misleading Advertising under Part VII, §12(a) of the Criminal Code Act. The Commonwealth seeks a 50 Penalty Unit fine.

​

THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAWS

THE GER STANDARD
The Charter, at §35(6), guarantees the Freedom of Political Communication. This right is the bedrock upon which democratic self-governance is built. The controlling authority on the scope of this protection is the Supreme Court’s decision in Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78 (appeal) (hereafter “GER Appeal”). In that case, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged framework for when a constitutional claim of political communication arises. Writing for a unanimous Court, Associate Justice Smallfries4 held:

“The mere fact that political communication may be impacted by [government action] does not create a constitutional claim of political communication. For such a claim to exist, a government entity must be directly targeting political communication itself, or the restriction imposed on the communicator so egregious and widespread (regardless of government intent) that the restriction serves as to totally suppress the communicator.”
GER Appeal at 12.
​

The Court upheld that “any policy that is broad and non-specific, or ‘neutral’ (such as height limits, safety codes, material restrictions, etc.) are fully enforceable,” and that “a claim of political communication does not exempt any plot from compliance with [these] neutrally designed, neutrally applied, and neutrally upheld determinations.” Id. Critically, GER Appeal concerned the DCT’s regulatory authority over physical building standards, where the government’s interest in municipal aesthetics and property compliance is well established, where the regulation at issue was neutral on its face and in application, and where the incidental impact on political communication was a secondary consequence of a legitimate regulatory purpose. That factual context shapes and constrains the holding.

HOLDINGS OF THIS COURT

The judiciary has addressed the boundaries of political speech in several other contexts. In Nacholebraa v. Milkcrack [2024] FCR 10, the Federal Court held that criticism of the government, regardless of one’s position, is expressly protected under the Constitution. In Canadian Union v. Vanquish_AP [2021] FCR 74, the Court recognized that freedom of political speech is protected under the law and that defendants cannot be held liable for damages arising from political expression. In Vernicia v. Tonga1 [2025] FCR 24, the Federal Court found that broad ideological characterizations and political opinions are protected, noting that political candidates are subject to heightened public scrutiny and critique. And in Bardiya_King & JustA_Dumpling v. CrackedAmoeba1 [2024] FCR 60, the Court dismissed defamation claims rooted in political disagreement, holding that opinions and political speech are not actionable absent proof of actual, provable damages.
The Commonwealth in the instant action relies on xLayzur & Krix v. Politico [2023] FCR 62 for the proposition that specific, false claims about specific actions and results are not protected by constitutional free speech rights. In summary, there exists a plethora of holdings related to political speech and the Commonwealth's interest in its policing.

​

OPINION OF THE COURT

THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST MUST BE NARROW


A. This Is a Content-Based Prosecution, Not a Neutral Regulation
In GER 78 Appeal, the Supreme Court upheld neutral building regulations that incidentally impacted political expression. The regulation targeted physical building characteristics, not communicative content. Here, the Commonwealth's charge rests entirely on what the Defendant said. This is not a neutral regulation incidentally affecting speech; it is a prosecution predicated on the substance of political communication itself. Under the first prong of GER 78 Appeal, "a government entity must [not] be directly targeting political communication itself." GER 78 Appeal at 12. A prosecution premised on the content of a campaign advertisement is precisely that.

B. Campaign Speech Is Not Commercial Advertising
Part VII, Section 12 of the Criminal Code Act addresses Misleading Advertising, a provision designed for commercial contexts. Campaign promises are categorically different. They are aspirational commitments to voters, not warranties of fact. "Abolish the sales tax" can reasonably be read as a pledge to formalize the current 0% rate permanently, not as a false claim that a sales tax currently exists. Applying a commercial advertising statute to political rhetoric extends the government's regulatory interest far beyond its legitimate scope.

C. The Politico Precedent Is Distinguishable
xLayzur & Krix v. Politico [2023] FCR 62 held that specific, false claims about specific actions are unprotected. That case involved verifiable factual assertions about named individuals in a journalistic context. The present case involves forward-looking policy aspirations in a campaign setting. The alleged "falsity" here is a matter of interpretive framing, not objective falsehood. The Commonwealth has identified no victim and no concrete harm.

D. Political Actors Require Breathing Room
Redmontian law already insulates political actors from legal liability in the exercise of democratic functions. In RealImza v. Plura72 [2025] DCR 74, the District Court recognized that parliamentary immunity shields legislators from undue judicial interference with their constitutional duties. If legislators are protected when speaking in official proceedings, the same logic extends to campaign speech, the mechanism by which candidates seek the mandate to enter those proceedings. The government's interest in regulating that speech must be correspondingly narrow.

E. The Electorate Is the Proper Check
The Supreme Court in GER Appeal, in its dicta, reminded that citizens that the remedy for disagreeable government action lies in democratic participation: lobbying, petitions, and "the most obvious act of peaceful democratic power, vot[ing] out politicians who abide by policies the citizens dislike." GER Appeal at 16. If the Defendant's promises are misleading, the remedy is the ballot box, not a criminal prosecution. Placing the DOJ in the role of arbiter of political truth is incompatible with democratic self-governance.

THE STANLEY STANDARD
Having discussed why the Government's interest must be narrow, the Court now synthesizes the foregoing analysis into a formal test governing all future prosecutions or civil actions in which a statute of general applicability is invoked against political speech. When the government seeks to impose criminal or civil liability for speech that is political in nature, the prosecution or claimant must satisfy each of the following factors. Failure to satisfy any one factor is fatal to the action.

Factor 1: Lawful Government Interest
The government must demonstrate a lawful interest independent of suppressing political communication, grounded in a statute or constitutional provision and directed at conduct, commercial fraud, public safety, or another recognized category of harm.

Factor 2: Non-Governmental Victim
There must be a non-state identifiable party who suffered concrete, demonstrable harm; this harm need not be economic. The government, or any holder of Federal Office or any holder of public office in his or her official capacity, cannot be the sole injured party. In criminal actions, the government need not prove harm in the traditional sense, but must identify a concrete interest beyond the content of the speech itself that the prosecution serves to protect. Where the government alone claims injury from political speech, the action is the state punishing a citizen for speaking about the state. For the purposes of this factor, the electorate or a cognizable subset thereof may constitute an identifiable injured party where the prosecution demonstrates that the speech was calculated to corrupt the electoral process itself, as distinct from speech that merely advocates policies the government considers redundant or undesirable.

Factor 3: Assertions of Fact
The statement(s) must be a specific, verifiable assertion of fact, not a policy aspiration, opinion, or rhetorical expression. Campaign promises are expressions of values and intended future action, not representations of existing fact.

Factor 4: Objective Falsity Required
The falsity must be objective and demonstrable, not a product of interpretive framing. Where a statement is reasonably susceptible to a truthful reading, the government may not select the false reading and prosecute on that basis. The burden rests on the prosecution to demonstrate that no reasonable interpretation is truthful.

Factor 5: Statutory Neutrality
The statute must be genuinely neutral in application. A facially neutral statute may not serve as a vehicle for content-based regulation of political speech. Where the sole trigger for prosecution is the content of political speech, facial neutrality is irrelevant.

Factor 6: No Less Restrictive Alternative
The government must demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative exists. The democratic process, including voter judgment, political opposition, and press scrutiny, is in nearly all cases the appropriate check on campaign speech. Criminal prosecution is the most coercive instrument the state possesses and may not be deployed when democratic remedies remain available.​

ORDER OF THE COURT

In applying the Stanley Standard, the Court finds as follows:

Factor 1 is potentially satisfied. The Commonwealth may have an interest if it can identify a cognizable government interest, such as commercial fraud, public safety concerns, or other harms.
Factor 2 is not demonstrated sufficiently for the Court to make a determination.
Factor 3 is NOT satisfied. The statements appear to be campaign promises, not factual statements.
Factor 4 is satisfied. The statements may be false.
Factor 5 is satisfied. The Criminal Code Act, Misleading Advertising is facially neutral. The Government's application of it is not itself problematic.
Factor 6 is NOT satisfied. The Commonwealth must make a showing that no less restrictive alternative is available. The democratic process, including voter judgment, political opposition, and press scrutiny, is in nearly all cases the appropriate check on campaign speech. Criminal prosecution is the most coercive instrument the state possesses and may not be deployed when democratic remedies remain available.

Thus, the Court holds as follows:
1. The Stanley Standard is established and should be used as the governing test for any prosecution where a general statute is invoked against political speech.
2. Part VII, §12 of the Criminal Code Act, as applied to political campaign speech, is unconstitutional to the extent that it criminalizes campaign promises or policy aspirations on the basis that they are redundant with existing law. Its application to the substantive content of political campaign speech, however, directly targets political communication and conflicts with the Freedom of Political Communication guaranteed by §35(6) of the Charter, as interpreted through the framework established in GER Appeal.
3. The charge of Misleading Advertising against Stanley582 is dismissed with prejudice.
4. This ruling does not foreclose the possibility that a political statement could, in an appropriate case, fall outside the protection of Freedom of Political Communication. Consistent with Politico, specific, verifiable, and objectively false assertions of fact, made with demonstrable intent to deceive and causing identifiable harm, may remain subject to legal consequence. However, the prosecution must demonstrate that the statement at issue is a factual assertion rather than a policy aspiration, that the falsity is objective rather than a product of interpretive framing, that the government’s interest is narrow and compelling, and that no less restrictive means would serve that interest. The present case meets none of these requirements.
5. Nothing in this order limits the Commonwealth’s authority to enforce Part VII, §12 of the Criminal Code Act against genuinely misleading commercial advertising or for any other lawful government interest. The holding is confined to the application of that provision to campaign speech protected by §35(6) of the Charter.

So ordered,
Judge Mug