- Joined
- Jun 1, 2026
- Messages
- 184
- Thread Author
- #1
Appeal
Client & counsel name: MMiqa, Self-Represented
Appealed case name & style: MMiqa v. Bar Association of Redmont [2026] DCR 142
Appealed Court Order: [2026] DCR 142
Were you originally the plaintiff or the defendant: Plaintiff
Reason for appeal:
I. THERE IS NO PROOF OF PRIVATELY CONTACTING THE PRESIDING OFFICER, A REQUIREMENT FOR AN EX PARTE COMMUNICATION STATED IN THE LAW
The Order to Show Cause directed the appellant to answer why the Court should not find them guilty of Ex Parte Communication under the Criminal Code Act. The appellant answered that specific charge, addressing each element of the offence.
The conduct the Court identified as contemptuous was the appellant's statement, made in reply to the presiding officer's own message, "I have already made a complaint about this, he has said this in the lawsuit," followed by a link to a post already on the public record in this case.
This exchange began when the appellant sent a message intended for President Theory Fontaine, entirely unrelated to the presiding officer. The presiding officer, Judge Superwoops, had not posted in the #legal channel for days. He then inserted himself into that conversation, unprompted, replying to the appellant with the single word "legal." The appellant had no way of knowing that the presiding officer randomly posts the word "legal" without context, as the Court later explained; at the time, the appellant reasonably believed this was a response directed at them, since the PO Superwoops replied one minute after the Plaintiff had sent their message. The appellant, not understanding what this word meant or was intended to convey, asked for clarification: "its... legal?", effectively asking whether the presiding officer was confirming that what had just been discussed was itself legal. The appellant then understood the word as possibly meaning that the proper course was to raise the matter through legal, official channels, and clarified that this had already been done, by pointing to a complaint already on the record in this case. At every step, the appellant was responding to the presiding officer's own unprompted, unexplained message, seeking to understand what the presiding officer meant and confirming that the matter had already been properly raised through a filing. This was not an attempt to argue the merits of the case, influence the Court, or obstruct any proceeding.
It was Judge Superwoops, not the appellant, who subsequently tagged CreeperTD directly in the same channel, bringing the Defense into an exchange the presiding officer himself had initiated by inserting himself into a conversation that did not involve him.
II. THE GOVERNING STATUTES REQUIRE PRIVACY OR CONCEALMENT, NEITHER OF WHICH IS PRESENT HERE
Two statutory sources govern ex parte communication in this jurisdiction, and both require an element of privacy or concealment that is absent from this exchange.
The Judicial Code of Ethics, Section 3.3, defines ex parte communication as:
- "Ex parte communication (private discussion with one party about a case) is prohibited except where expressly authorized by procedure."
The Judicial Standards Act's definition of the offence requires that the communication occur "without the knowledge of all parties" to the case.
There is no law that states the Ex Parte Communication still applies if the message was sent in an publc inofficial channel, a channel that could be seen by the Defendant and the Plaintiff and the PO. On top of that, the Judge had pinged the Defendant to the messages to make sure they see them. This completely destroys any basis for an Ex Parte Communication claim.
Both are statutory sources; a guide or standards document that departs from this requirement cannot override the plain text of the governing Act and Code. The exchange at issue here occurred entirely in #legal, a public Discord channel, and the presiding officer himself notified the Defense of it within the same exchange. Under the statutory definitions actually governing this jurisdiction, no ex parte communication occurred.
Any precedent that departs from the plain text of the governing statute is not binding, and the Court is obligated to apply the law as written to the best of its ability.
III. ANY CONCERN RAISED BY THIS EXCHANGE ATTACHES TO THE PRESIDING OFFICER, NOT THE APPELLANT
The Judicial Standards Act itself confirms where the concern in this exchange properly lies. It defines "interest," for purposes of recusal, to include "ex parte communication from the Judicial Officer." It was the presiding officer, not the appellant, who inserted himself unprompted into a conversation the appellant was having with someone else, and who subsequently brought the Defense into that exchange. If this exchange raises any concern under the doctrine of ex parte communication, that concern is directed by the Act's own terms at the conduct of the presiding officer, not at the appellant, who neither initiated the exchange nor addressed the presiding officer.
IV. NO STANDING ORDER PROHIBITING COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDING OFFICER WAS EVER ISSUED IN THIS CASE
Where conduct falls outside the specific elements of the Ex Parte Communication offence, a Contempt of Court finding for extrajudicial communication with a presiding officer must instead be grounded in the lawful-order prong of Contempt, which requires a prior order the party is alleged to have violated. This is ordinarily accomplished by a standing order, issued at the outset of a case, directing the parties not to initiate communications with the presiding officer regarding the ongoing matter. No such order was issued at any point in this case. Absent a predicate order of this kind, there was no lawful order for the appellant to have violated, and the lawful-order prong required to sustain a Contempt finding on this theory was never satisfied.The Supreme Court has already addressed this exact question and reached the same conclusion.
In the appeal of Volt Bank, Inc. v. Alta Group Corp [2025] FCR 128, the Supreme Court held that a lower court commits reversible error when it convicts a party of Contempt under the obstruction-or-interference clause for extrajudicial communication with the presiding officer, where no standing order against such communication was ever issued. The Court there explained that a presiding officer who wishes to prevent parties from initiating communications about an ongoing case "can be done simply, effectively, and uniformly by attaching an order at the beginning of every case saying that all parties are ordered to not initiate communications with the judicial officer regarding an ongoing case," and that "with this order submitted, a judicial officer would be free to pursue contempt charges." If the presiding officer in this case did not want the appellant, or any party, communicating with him publicly about this matter, he could simply have written such an order at the outset of this case. He did not. Having issued no such order, the presiding officer was not free, under this Court's own precedent, to convict the appellant of Contempt on this basis.
There were no private communications between the Plaintiff and their PO. All the Ex Parte Communication claims the Plaintiff is showing here in the evidence is a side privately messaging the PO, and it does not include any message from the public discord #legal channel. If the Judge did not wish to talk about the case with the Plaintiff, they could give the order to not to speak it ever again with them.
Are you requesting oral argument: No
Additional Information or evidence (see appellate rules):
Proof of Superwoops's first text message in days was "legal" and the Plaintiff was responding to "legal" after Superwoops themselves intervened into the conversation.
