Matthew100x
Citizen
Education Department
Supporter
Legal Eagle
Impeached
Order of Redmont
Matthew100x
professor-department
- Joined
- Jul 14, 2020
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- #1
- Client Name: Gribble19_
- Counsel Name: Matthew100x
- Were you originally the plaintiff or the defendant: Defendant
- Reason for the Appeal: 19(4)(a) Applied an incorrect principle of law (see Government - Constitution)
This appeal involves 2025 FCR 78, GER v. DCT, which is an ongoing case (see Lawsuit: In Session - Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Department of construction and transportation [2025] FCR 78). In accordance with 20(1) of the Judicial Standards Act (see Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act), this appeal does not apply to the case at large, but instead to an adjudication of law made by the Honorable Ameslap for Perjury (see Lawsuit: In Session - Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Department of construction and transportation [2025] FCR 78, “Motions are Accepted. Counsel is hereby charged with 2 count of perjury and is ordered to pay a $15,000 fine, serve 10 minutes in jail, and to amend their answer to reflect.”)
The matter that we bring forth today argues several key points. Gribble makes a statutory interpretation and constitutional right argument in support of their position that an incorrect principle of law was applied against them.
To begin, Perjury is an indictable crime (see Part III, 1 - Perjury, “knowingly provides false testimony in a court of law,” Act of Congress - Criminal Code Act). “Indictable Offence means an offence that must be prosecuted through formal legal proceedings, where the accused is entitled to a fair trial and the opportunity to contest the charges before a judicial officer, and are prosecuted by the Department of Justice.” (See 7(3), Id.). The Court has jurisdiction over all indictable offenses. (see 6(2)(b), Id.). However, “Judicial Officers may impose punishments for any Summary Offense committed during proceedings.” (see 7(3)(c), Id.). “Punishments for an Indictable Criminal Offense must be proven at trial.” (see 7(3)(d), Id.).
There are two lines of cases that may apply to the situation. Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20 followed by Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21 and Lawsuit: Dismissed - winterwolf v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 6. We argue that the latter case applies.
In Matthew100x & xLayzur v. The Commonwealth of Redmont, the plaintiffs sued regarding an unconstitutional law. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider in support of an amicus brief written by the then Speaker of the House (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20). The Supreme Court found that the defendant had lied in the motion to reconsider and charged them with perjury. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20). The defendant objected and pointed that perjury is a criminal charge. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20). After an additional motion to reconsider, the Supreme Court granted relief and discharged the perjury charge, holding that “perjury must first be brought before the court through an objection from the opposing party.” (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20).
This was applied in [2022] SCR 21, Matthew100x v. xEndeavour, in which the plaintiff was suing the defendant attempting to conduct a private prosecution (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21). The defendant answered that case and subsequently deleted a post that they were self-representing so they can have representation, to which the plaintiff objected to perjury (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21). The Supreme Court found the defendant guilty of perjury, and ordered that the sentencing be laid down upon the conclusion of the trial.(see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21). The defendant objected to such sentencing (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21, Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21, Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21, Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21). The Supreme Court would ultimately hold that the plaintiff had no right to file a criminal case as a citizen and the defendant was never actually sentenced to Perjury. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21).
In these two cases, the Supreme Court created this action for perjury but then was not applied. The terminology used, such as “indictable offense” and “summary offense," survives into modern day via the Criminal Code Act’s acquisition of the language via the Standardized Criminal Code Act (see Repealed - Standardized Criminal Code Act), it should be noted that there are several distinct changes. These changes can be seen in how the legal principles are laid out. The law at the time simply held that “Punishments for an Indictable Criminal Offense must be proven in a trial.” (see 4(3)(c), Id.). The Criminal Code Act now explicitly states that the Judge “may impose punishments for any Summary Offense committed during proceedings.” (see 7(3)(c), Act of Congress - Criminal Code Act) in addition to keeping the language “Punishments for an Indictable Criminal Offense must be proven at trial.” (see 7(3)(d), Id.) This, in addition to a newly defined term of “Indictable Offense,” shows how Congress intended to change the law such that Indictable Offenses could not be used as punishment against a party in a court proceeding, thus overruling [2022] SCR 20 and [2022] SCR 21.
This brings us to the modern day. The current holding of the Supreme Court shows that, as a principle, the Courts should not charge someone with perjury. The Supreme Court has an opportunity to charge the now appellant with perjury in Lawsuit: Dismissed - winterwolf v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 6. The Court refused and referred the matter to the Attorney General. Id. Showing restraint and deferring the matter for a criminal trial, as comported with the law (it should be noted that the Criminal Code Act did pass after the decision in this case).
Based on the statutory interpretation alone, it is clear that Congress has overruled the Supreme Court with new law and mandated that trials be held for indictable offenses. The previous legal landscape, as demonstrated in Matthew100x & xLayzur v. The Commonwealth of Redmont ([2022] SCR 20) and Matthew100x v. xEndeavour ([2022] SCR 21), saw the Supreme Court asserting the authority to charge individuals with perjury during court proceedings. However, even in those cases, the application of sentencing for perjury was inconsistent or ultimately discharged.
The deliberate distinction between "Summary Offense" and "Indictable Criminal Offense" within the Criminal Code Act, coupled with the explicit requirement of a trial for indictable offenses, demonstrates a clear legislative intent to limit the power of judicial officers to summarily punish for serious crimes like perjury. By differentiating between offenses for which a judge may impose punishments during proceedings (summary offenses) and those that must be proven at trial (indictable offenses), Congress has effectively legislated away the judiciary's ability to directly charge and sentence for perjury without a formal criminal trial.
This legislative intent is further supported by the Supreme Court's own recent conduct in Winterwolf v. The Commonwealth of Redmont ([2025] SCR 6). This decision, made after the passage of the current Criminal Code Act, reflects an ongoing recognition of the principle of law by the judiciary that the power to prosecute and punish for indictable offenses like perjury vests with the Department of Justice, not with individual judicial officers during ongoing proceedings.
Therefore, the application of the Criminal Code Act through a plain reading of its text, and as evidenced by the Supreme Court's own recent actions, mandates that perjury, as an indictable offense, requires a full criminal trial for conviction and sentencing. The Honorable Ameslap's on-the-spot adjudication and punishment for perjury against Gribble directly contravene this statutory mandate, constituting an incorrect application of law.
To make this argument stronger, we will show the constitutional issues involved here. “(4) All accused are entitled to appeal a charge made against them by the state.” (see 32(4), Government - Constitution). “(5) Every citizen has the right to not produce self-incriminating evidence in any situation. In criminal matters, no adverse inferences may be made from this right being exercised, specifically such that the exercise of this right in itself shall not be weighted when determining a verdict in criminal Court.” (see 32(5), Id.). “(9) Any citizen, criminal or otherwise will have the right to a speedy and fair trial presided over by an impartial Judicial Officer, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted with the evidence against them, and to have the assistance of legally qualified counsel for their defence.” (see 32(9), Id.). “(13) Every citizen is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without unfair discrimination and, in particular, without unfair discrimination based on political belief or social status.” (see 32(13), Id.). “(14) Every citizen has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” (see 32(14), Id.). “(15) Every citizen has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” (see 32(15), Id.).
The core of Gribble's constitutional argument rests on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which were allegedly violated when the Honorable Ameslap imposed a punishment for perjury without a formal trial.
Firstly, the most direct violation stems from Section 32(4) of the Constitution, which states, "All accused are entitled to appeal a charge made against them by the state." By imposing a punishment for perjury without a trial, the right to appeal is harmed because the charge is not made by the state. In fact, the charges that were levied and accepted at trial creates a situation where Gribble has to create a unique cause of appeal by way of the constitution to try and reverse this application of law. The right to appeal was therefore circumvented, as the judge and not the state charged Gribble with perjury.
Furthermore, Section 32(9) guarantees that "Any citizen, criminal or otherwise will have the right to a speedy and fair trial presided over by an impartial Judicial Officer, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted with the evidence against them, and to have the assistance of legally qualified counsel for their defence." The summary imposition of a perjury charge and sentence by the Honorable Ameslap circumvented all these fundamental aspects of a fair trial. Gribble was not afforded a trial, was not fully informed of the specific nature and cause of the accusation in a trial setting, was not confronted with evidence in a formal proceeding, and did not have the opportunity to utilize counsel for their defense in a trial. The Judicial Standards Act explicitly states that "Punishments for an Indictable Criminal Offense must be proven at trial" (7(3)(d)), reinforcing that these constitutional rights are designed to be upheld through a formal trial process for such offenses.
Section 32(5) of the Constitution protects citizens with the right "to not produce self-incriminating evidence in any situation." By being summarily charged with perjury and punished, Gribble was effectively forced into a position where the judicial officer acted as both accuser and judge, without the protective framework of a trial where this right could be properly exercised. In a typical criminal trial, the accused has the opportunity to remain silent without adverse inference. In this case, the immediate judgment removed any possibility of exercising this crucial right within the due process framework.
Section 32(14) declares that "Every citizen has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." The imposition of jail time directly infringes upon the right to liberty. Forfeiture of funds, while not directly addressed by the specific wording of this section, can also be argued as a deprivation of security of the person's economic well-being without fundamental justice, especially given the lack of a trial. The principles of fundamental justice, in this context, clearly necessitate a formal trial for an indictable offense like perjury.
Finally, Section 32(13) states that "Every citizen is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without unfair discrimination." When a judicial officer imposes a punishment for an indictable offense without adhering to the statutory requirements of a trial, it creates an unequal application of the law. Other citizens accused of indictable offenses would be entitled to a trial, while Gribble was not, thus denying equal protection and benefit of the law. The precedent set by Winterwolf v. The Commonwealth of Redmont, where the Supreme Court referred a perjury matter to the Attorney General for a criminal trial, further underscores this point, demonstrating how similarly situated individuals are now afforded due process that was denied to Gribble.
In conclusion, the on-the-spot adjudication of perjury and subsequent punishment against Gribble constitute a clear violation of multiple foundational constitutional rights, specifically the right to appeal, the right to a fair and speedy trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right to liberty and security of the person, and the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. This, in addition to the statutory issues, shows that my client clearly had an incorrect principle of law applied against them. Thus, we pray for the Supreme Court to reverse the decision made by the Honorable Ameslap.
- Counsel Name: Matthew100x
- Were you originally the plaintiff or the defendant: Defendant
- Reason for the Appeal: 19(4)(a) Applied an incorrect principle of law (see Government - Constitution)
This appeal involves 2025 FCR 78, GER v. DCT, which is an ongoing case (see Lawsuit: In Session - Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Department of construction and transportation [2025] FCR 78). In accordance with 20(1) of the Judicial Standards Act (see Act of Congress - Judicial Standards Act), this appeal does not apply to the case at large, but instead to an adjudication of law made by the Honorable Ameslap for Perjury (see Lawsuit: In Session - Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Department of construction and transportation [2025] FCR 78, “Motions are Accepted. Counsel is hereby charged with 2 count of perjury and is ordered to pay a $15,000 fine, serve 10 minutes in jail, and to amend their answer to reflect.”)
The matter that we bring forth today argues several key points. Gribble makes a statutory interpretation and constitutional right argument in support of their position that an incorrect principle of law was applied against them.
To begin, Perjury is an indictable crime (see Part III, 1 - Perjury, “knowingly provides false testimony in a court of law,” Act of Congress - Criminal Code Act). “Indictable Offence means an offence that must be prosecuted through formal legal proceedings, where the accused is entitled to a fair trial and the opportunity to contest the charges before a judicial officer, and are prosecuted by the Department of Justice.” (See 7(3), Id.). The Court has jurisdiction over all indictable offenses. (see 6(2)(b), Id.). However, “Judicial Officers may impose punishments for any Summary Offense committed during proceedings.” (see 7(3)(c), Id.). “Punishments for an Indictable Criminal Offense must be proven at trial.” (see 7(3)(d), Id.).
There are two lines of cases that may apply to the situation. Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20 followed by Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21 and Lawsuit: Dismissed - winterwolf v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 6. We argue that the latter case applies.
In Matthew100x & xLayzur v. The Commonwealth of Redmont, the plaintiffs sued regarding an unconstitutional law. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider in support of an amicus brief written by the then Speaker of the House (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20). The Supreme Court found that the defendant had lied in the motion to reconsider and charged them with perjury. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20). The defendant objected and pointed that perjury is a criminal charge. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20). After an additional motion to reconsider, the Supreme Court granted relief and discharged the perjury charge, holding that “perjury must first be brought before the court through an objection from the opposing party.” (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x & xLayzur v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] SCR 20).
This was applied in [2022] SCR 21, Matthew100x v. xEndeavour, in which the plaintiff was suing the defendant attempting to conduct a private prosecution (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21). The defendant answered that case and subsequently deleted a post that they were self-representing so they can have representation, to which the plaintiff objected to perjury (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21). The Supreme Court found the defendant guilty of perjury, and ordered that the sentencing be laid down upon the conclusion of the trial.(see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21). The defendant objected to such sentencing (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21, Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21, Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21, Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21). The Supreme Court would ultimately hold that the plaintiff had no right to file a criminal case as a citizen and the defendant was never actually sentenced to Perjury. (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - Matthew100x v. xEndeavour [2022] SCR 21).
In these two cases, the Supreme Court created this action for perjury but then was not applied. The terminology used, such as “indictable offense” and “summary offense," survives into modern day via the Criminal Code Act’s acquisition of the language via the Standardized Criminal Code Act (see Repealed - Standardized Criminal Code Act), it should be noted that there are several distinct changes. These changes can be seen in how the legal principles are laid out. The law at the time simply held that “Punishments for an Indictable Criminal Offense must be proven in a trial.” (see 4(3)(c), Id.). The Criminal Code Act now explicitly states that the Judge “may impose punishments for any Summary Offense committed during proceedings.” (see 7(3)(c), Act of Congress - Criminal Code Act) in addition to keeping the language “Punishments for an Indictable Criminal Offense must be proven at trial.” (see 7(3)(d), Id.) This, in addition to a newly defined term of “Indictable Offense,” shows how Congress intended to change the law such that Indictable Offenses could not be used as punishment against a party in a court proceeding, thus overruling [2022] SCR 20 and [2022] SCR 21.
This brings us to the modern day. The current holding of the Supreme Court shows that, as a principle, the Courts should not charge someone with perjury. The Supreme Court has an opportunity to charge the now appellant with perjury in Lawsuit: Dismissed - winterwolf v. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] SCR 6. The Court refused and referred the matter to the Attorney General. Id. Showing restraint and deferring the matter for a criminal trial, as comported with the law (it should be noted that the Criminal Code Act did pass after the decision in this case).
Based on the statutory interpretation alone, it is clear that Congress has overruled the Supreme Court with new law and mandated that trials be held for indictable offenses. The previous legal landscape, as demonstrated in Matthew100x & xLayzur v. The Commonwealth of Redmont ([2022] SCR 20) and Matthew100x v. xEndeavour ([2022] SCR 21), saw the Supreme Court asserting the authority to charge individuals with perjury during court proceedings. However, even in those cases, the application of sentencing for perjury was inconsistent or ultimately discharged.
The deliberate distinction between "Summary Offense" and "Indictable Criminal Offense" within the Criminal Code Act, coupled with the explicit requirement of a trial for indictable offenses, demonstrates a clear legislative intent to limit the power of judicial officers to summarily punish for serious crimes like perjury. By differentiating between offenses for which a judge may impose punishments during proceedings (summary offenses) and those that must be proven at trial (indictable offenses), Congress has effectively legislated away the judiciary's ability to directly charge and sentence for perjury without a formal criminal trial.
This legislative intent is further supported by the Supreme Court's own recent conduct in Winterwolf v. The Commonwealth of Redmont ([2025] SCR 6). This decision, made after the passage of the current Criminal Code Act, reflects an ongoing recognition of the principle of law by the judiciary that the power to prosecute and punish for indictable offenses like perjury vests with the Department of Justice, not with individual judicial officers during ongoing proceedings.
Therefore, the application of the Criminal Code Act through a plain reading of its text, and as evidenced by the Supreme Court's own recent actions, mandates that perjury, as an indictable offense, requires a full criminal trial for conviction and sentencing. The Honorable Ameslap's on-the-spot adjudication and punishment for perjury against Gribble directly contravene this statutory mandate, constituting an incorrect application of law.
To make this argument stronger, we will show the constitutional issues involved here. “(4) All accused are entitled to appeal a charge made against them by the state.” (see 32(4), Government - Constitution). “(5) Every citizen has the right to not produce self-incriminating evidence in any situation. In criminal matters, no adverse inferences may be made from this right being exercised, specifically such that the exercise of this right in itself shall not be weighted when determining a verdict in criminal Court.” (see 32(5), Id.). “(9) Any citizen, criminal or otherwise will have the right to a speedy and fair trial presided over by an impartial Judicial Officer, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted with the evidence against them, and to have the assistance of legally qualified counsel for their defence.” (see 32(9), Id.). “(13) Every citizen is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without unfair discrimination and, in particular, without unfair discrimination based on political belief or social status.” (see 32(13), Id.). “(14) Every citizen has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” (see 32(14), Id.). “(15) Every citizen has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” (see 32(15), Id.).
The core of Gribble's constitutional argument rests on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which were allegedly violated when the Honorable Ameslap imposed a punishment for perjury without a formal trial.
Firstly, the most direct violation stems from Section 32(4) of the Constitution, which states, "All accused are entitled to appeal a charge made against them by the state." By imposing a punishment for perjury without a trial, the right to appeal is harmed because the charge is not made by the state. In fact, the charges that were levied and accepted at trial creates a situation where Gribble has to create a unique cause of appeal by way of the constitution to try and reverse this application of law. The right to appeal was therefore circumvented, as the judge and not the state charged Gribble with perjury.
Furthermore, Section 32(9) guarantees that "Any citizen, criminal or otherwise will have the right to a speedy and fair trial presided over by an impartial Judicial Officer, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and to be confronted with the evidence against them, and to have the assistance of legally qualified counsel for their defence." The summary imposition of a perjury charge and sentence by the Honorable Ameslap circumvented all these fundamental aspects of a fair trial. Gribble was not afforded a trial, was not fully informed of the specific nature and cause of the accusation in a trial setting, was not confronted with evidence in a formal proceeding, and did not have the opportunity to utilize counsel for their defense in a trial. The Judicial Standards Act explicitly states that "Punishments for an Indictable Criminal Offense must be proven at trial" (7(3)(d)), reinforcing that these constitutional rights are designed to be upheld through a formal trial process for such offenses.
Section 32(5) of the Constitution protects citizens with the right "to not produce self-incriminating evidence in any situation." By being summarily charged with perjury and punished, Gribble was effectively forced into a position where the judicial officer acted as both accuser and judge, without the protective framework of a trial where this right could be properly exercised. In a typical criminal trial, the accused has the opportunity to remain silent without adverse inference. In this case, the immediate judgment removed any possibility of exercising this crucial right within the due process framework.
Section 32(14) declares that "Every citizen has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." The imposition of jail time directly infringes upon the right to liberty. Forfeiture of funds, while not directly addressed by the specific wording of this section, can also be argued as a deprivation of security of the person's economic well-being without fundamental justice, especially given the lack of a trial. The principles of fundamental justice, in this context, clearly necessitate a formal trial for an indictable offense like perjury.
Finally, Section 32(13) states that "Every citizen is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without unfair discrimination." When a judicial officer imposes a punishment for an indictable offense without adhering to the statutory requirements of a trial, it creates an unequal application of the law. Other citizens accused of indictable offenses would be entitled to a trial, while Gribble was not, thus denying equal protection and benefit of the law. The precedent set by Winterwolf v. The Commonwealth of Redmont, where the Supreme Court referred a perjury matter to the Attorney General for a criminal trial, further underscores this point, demonstrating how similarly situated individuals are now afforded due process that was denied to Gribble.
In conclusion, the on-the-spot adjudication of perjury and subsequent punishment against Gribble constitute a clear violation of multiple foundational constitutional rights, specifically the right to appeal, the right to a fair and speedy trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right to liberty and security of the person, and the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. This, in addition to the statutory issues, shows that my client clearly had an incorrect principle of law applied against them. Thus, we pray for the Supreme Court to reverse the decision made by the Honorable Ameslap.
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