Lawsuit: Pending Commonwealth of Redmont v. corstkiller00 [2025] DCR 99

StyledTea

StyledTea

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la_dano_34
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Case Filing


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CRIMINAL ACTION


Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

corstkiller00
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Prosecution alleges criminal actions committed by the Defendant as follows:

PROSECUTING AUTHORITY REPORT
corstkiller00 sent multiple payments to Multiman155, a police officer, in an attempt to prevent his arrest due to his outstanding prison sentence. Repeatedly, Multiman155
asked him to stop, as bribery is illegal. However, he did not oblige to these repeated requests, and continued to make payments to Multiman155

I. PARTIES
1. Commonwealth of Redmont (Prosecution)
2. corstkiller00 (Defendant)
3. Multiman155 (Officer who the defendant attempted to bribe)

II. FACTS
1. The defendant sent multiple payments to Multiman155 (P-01, P-02, P-05)
2. These payments totaled to at least $285 (P-01, P-02, P-05)
3. The defendant said "thanks for leaving, ill send a tip" to Multiman155, followed by a payment of $50 (P-02)
4. Multiman155 did NOT leave due to the payments made to him, nor the promise of any
5. Multiman155 repeatedly asked the defendant to stop sending the payments (P-05)
6. The defendant continued to send money, even after Multiman155 had threatened to arrest the defendant (P-05)

III. CHARGES
The Prosecution hereby alleges the following charges against the Defendant:
1. Bribery, which is defined under Part II Section 5 of the Criminal Code Act as when a person "offers, gives, solicits, or receives an item or service of value to influence an individual holding public office or serving in a legal capacity." The defendant attempted to influence the decision of this officer to not arrest him with money

IV. SENTENCING
The Prosecution hereby recommends the following sentence for the Defendant:
1. 10 minutes in prison
2. 50 penalty points, equating to fine of $5000

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 30th day of November, 2025

 

Attachments

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I hereby RECUSE from this case due to my involvement during my time as as a Prosecutor at the Department of Justice.

This case will remain pending until Magistrate Dearev returns from his Leave of Absence.
 

Writ of Summons

@corstkiller00, is required to appear before the District Court in the case of Commonwealth of Redmont v. corstkiller00 [2025] DCR 99

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 
defendant has failed to appear, a PD will be assigned.
 
dearev said:
defendant has failed to appear, a PD will be assigned.
Click to expand...
I notify this esteemed and venerable Court that I am the Public Defender assigned to this case.
 
StyledTea said:

Case Filing


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CRIMINAL ACTION


Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

corstkiller00
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Prosecution alleges criminal actions committed by the Defendant as follows:

PROSECUTING AUTHORITY REPORT
corstkiller00 sent multiple payments to Multiman155, a police officer, in an attempt to prevent his arrest due to his outstanding prison sentence. Repeatedly, Multiman155
asked him to stop, as bribery is illegal. However, he did not oblige to these repeated requests, and continued to make payments to Multiman155

I. PARTIES
1. Commonwealth of Redmont (Prosecution)
2. corstkiller00 (Defendant)
3. Multiman155 (Officer who the defendant attempted to bribe)

II. FACTS
1. The defendant sent multiple payments to Multiman155 (P-01, P-02, P-05)
2. These payments totaled to at least $285 (P-01, P-02, P-05)
3. The defendant said "thanks for leaving, ill send a tip" to Multiman155, followed by a payment of $50 (P-02)
4. Multiman155 did NOT leave due to the payments made to him, nor the promise of any
5. Multiman155 repeatedly asked the defendant to stop sending the payments (P-05)
6. The defendant continued to send money, even after Multiman155 had threatened to arrest the defendant (P-05)

III. CHARGES
The Prosecution hereby alleges the following charges against the Defendant:
1. Bribery, which is defined under Part II Section 5 of the Criminal Code Act as when a person "offers, gives, solicits, or receives an item or service of value to influence an individual holding public office or serving in a legal capacity." The defendant attempted to influence the decision of this officer to not arrest him with money

IV. SENTENCING
The Prosecution hereby recommends the following sentence for the Defendant:
1. 10 minutes in prison
2. 50 penalty points, equating to fine of $5000

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 30th day of November, 2025

Click to expand...

Objection


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE, PERJURY

Your Honour,

The Prosecution references evidence P-01 and P-02 throughout their complaint, specifically in:

  • Fact 1: "The defendant sent multiple payments to Multiman155 (P-01, P-02, P-05)"
  • Fact 2: "These payments totaled to at least $285 (P-01, P-02, P-05)"
  • Fact 3: "The defendant said 'thanks for leaving, ill send a tip' to Multiman155, followed by a payment of $50 (P-02)"
However, the Prosecution has only attached three pieces of evidence: P-04, P-05, and P-06. Evidence items P-01 and P-02 do not exist in the case filing.

This constitutes a clear breach of court procedure under Rule 4.2 (Submission Required For Use), which states that "All material used in legal arguments must have either been included in the case prior to the submission." The Prosecution is citing evidence that has never been submitted to this Court.

This case was filed on 20 November 2025. It is now 20 December 2025. The Prosecution has had an entire month to provide this critical evidence and has utterly failed to do so. By confidently stating that payments "totaling $285" are evidenced by P-01, P-02, and P-05, when two of these three exhibits are entirely absent from the record, the Prosecution is knowingly making false statements to this Court. This is not a typographical error - the Prosecution has built their entire case on evidence they claim exists but have failed to provide for a full month.

I respectfully request Your Honour:
  1. Strike all facts relying on the non-existent P-01 and P-02 from the record
  2. Hold the Prosecution in contempt of court, and charge them with perjury for this egregious act

 
ToadKing said:
I notify this esteemed and venerable Court that I am the Public Defender assigned to this case.
Click to expand...
please present an answer to complaint within 48 hours.
 

Plea


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
PLEA

Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

corstkiller00
Defendant

I. ENTRY OF PLEA​

1. The Defendant pleads Not Guilty to 1x count of Bribery.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 21st day of December 2025



Motion


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

The Defence moves that the complaint in this case be dismissed with prejudice, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

INTRODUCTION​

This Court recently addressed the identical legal question presented here in Commonwealth of Redmont v. Destiny2Guru [2025] DCR 76, wherein this Honourable Court dismissed bribery charges against a defendant who allegedly attempted to bribe a police officer after arrest. The Court, by accepting the Motion to Dismiss, found that police officers do not serve in a "legal capacity" as required by the Criminal Code Act's definition of bribery, and that the officer was not "acting upon" any authority when passively receiving unwanted messages after an arrest was complete.

This current case presents materially indistinguishable facts and the identical legal issue. The Prosecution's case suffers from the same fatal defects that led to dismissal in [2025] DCR 76, and basic principles of judicial economy, consistency, and fairness compel the same result here.

I. RULE 5.5 - LACK OF CLAIM​

The Prosecution charges corstkiller00 with Bribery under Criminal Code Act, Part II, Section 5, alleging that payments made to Officer Multiman155 constituted "offering [...] an item or service of value to influence an individual [...] serving in a legal capacity."

The Prosecution's Fact 5 in [2025] DCR 76 asserted that "Rookieblue14 was serving in his legal capacity at the time of arrest and the time of the message." Here, the Prosecution similarly alleges that Multiman155 was serving in a legal capacity when corstkiller00 made payments to him, and that "the defendant attempted to influence the decision of this officer to not arrest him with money."

This complaint fails as a matter of law for two independent reasons, both established by this Court's recent ruling in [2025] DCR 76:

1. Police Officers Do Not Serve in "Legal Capacity" - Binding Precedent​

In [2025] DCR 76, an exhaustive analysis was conducted of whether police officers serve in a "legal capacity" under the Supreme Court's definition established in Commonwealth v. Milqy [2022] SCR 10. Police officers do not serve in a legal capacity because they fail all three elements of the Supreme Court's test:
  1. Police do not act upon "legal authority" - The Court in [2025] DCR 76 established that "legal authority" requires authority exercised in contexts involving legal interpretation, creation of binding obligations, or adjudication between parties. Police perform administrative and enforcement functions that are executive, not legal, in nature. As Justice Drew_Hall stated in [2022] SCR 10, acting in a legal capacity requires "a legal aspect of a legal nature to be present, like contractual negotiations or other similarly legal-related situations."
  2. Police cannot "undertake or maintain a certain legal status" - The Court in [2025] DCR 76 found that police lack the authority to create or modify legal determinations. They execute predetermined statutory consequences but cannot undertake the legal determinations that create those consequences.
  3. Police operate outside "the framework of the legal system" - The Court in [2025] DCR 76 held that police function within the executive enforcement system, not within "the system in which obligations backed by law are carried out" as defined in [2022] SCR 10.
This Court's determination in [2025] DCR 76 is precedent on the identical legal question presented here. Officer Multiman155, like Officer Rookieblue14 before him, was exercising executive enforcement authority under delegated administrative powers, not legal authority within the framework of the legal system.

The Constitution, Section 23 establishes that the Executive "administers and enforces the law respectively, as written by the legislature and interpreted by the judiciary." Police officers are part of this executive enforcement function. The Executive Standards Act, Section 7(1)(a), charges the Department of Homeland Security with "Maintaining the peace and good order of the nation, through lawfully exercising its power equally to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth of Redmont."

This statutory mandate is enforcement, not interpretation. Police officers do not perform acts that carry intrinsic legal effect within the legal system - they neither adjudicate disputes nor alter legal relationships between parties.

The legal analysis is identical. The outcome must be identical.

2. The Officer Could Not Exercise Legal Authority Over a Target in a Lawless Zone​

In [2025] DCR 76, the Defence argued that Officer Rookieblue14 was not "acting upon" any authority when the alleged bribery occurred because the arrest was complete and the defendant was already jailed. The Defence argued that [2022] SCR 10 requires "acting upon their legal authority" and the ability to "engage in a particular situation" - both phrases requiring active exercise of authority in an ongoing matter.

According to the Prosecution's own evidence, corstkiller00 was in the wilderness when the payments were made. P-04 contains the explicit server message: "You are entering the wilderness. You can now PvP and break/place blocks. Rules apply, laws do not." Corstkiller00 remained in this lawless zone, specifically in what Officer Multiman155 described as "an impenetrable bunker" within a wild plot. (P-06)

This creates an insurmountable legal problem for the Prosecution's case:

The fundamental premise of bribery is influencing someone to act contrary to their legal duties. But what legal duties exist in a lawless zone? The server explicitly declares that in the wilderness, "laws do not" apply. If laws do not apply where corstkiller00 was located, then Officer Multiman155 had no legal authority to enforce at that location. You cannot bribe someone to refrain from exercising authority they do not possess.

[2022] SCR 10 defined "legal capacity" as operating "within the framework of the legal system," defined as "the system in which obligations backed by law are carried out." If laws do not apply in the wilderness, then by definition, there is no "legal system" operating in that space. There are no "obligations backed by law" being carried out where law itself does not exist. An officer cannot be "serving in a legal capacity" when dealing with a target in a location where the legal framework does not exist.

The Executive Standards Act, Section 7(1)(a), charges the DHS with "lawfully exercising its power equally to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth of Redmont." If laws do not apply where the target is located, there are no laws to enforce. The officer's statutory mandate - enforcement of law - cannot be exercised where law does not exist.

Officer Multiman155's own statement confirms he could not exercise legal authority over corstkiller00 without a warrant. The warrant request came after the first payment and was necessary, as Multiman stated, "largely to get staff to break blocks to allow me to enter the wild plot and arrest him." (P-06) When an officer must petition the judiciary for authorisation to act, the officer is not "acting upon" legal authority in the present - the officer is seeking permission to obtain that authority in the future.

In [2025] DCR 76, the arrest was complete, and the officer was passively receiving messages after the fact. This Court found that insufficient to constitute "acting upon" authority or "serving in a legal capacity." Here, the target was in a lawless zone where the officer had no legal authority to enforce laws without judicial authorisation. If an officer who has completed an arrest and is passively receiving messages cannot be "serving in a legal capacity," then an officer dealing with a target in a zone where "laws do not" apply certainly cannot be "serving in a legal capacity."

3. Conclusion on Lack of Claim​

The Prosecution cannot prove the essential elements of bribery as a matter of law because:
  1. Police officers do not serve in "legal capacity" under precedent from this Court in [2025] DCR 76 and the Supreme Court in [2022] SCR 10.
  2. Critically, Officer Multiman155 was not "acting upon" any authority when the payments were made.

​

II. RULE 5.9 - COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL​

Rule 5.9 provides:

Rule 5.9 (Collateral Estoppel)​

A Motion to Dismiss may be filed if a case with a similar or, more exceptionally, same fact set has already been previously litigated.
Click to expand...
This case presents a nearly identical fact pattern to [2025] DCR 76, which this Court dismissed with prejudice.

In [2025] DCR 76, the Prosecution charged a defendant with bribery for attempting to influence a police officer after a law enforcement interaction. The defendant sent messages to Officer Rookieblue14 via /msg after being arrested and jailed, offering money and requesting assistance. The officer repeatedly declined these offers. The Prosecution argued this constituted bribery under the Criminal Code Act because the officer was "serving in a legal capacity."

In the instant case, the Prosecution charges corstkiller00 with bribery for attempting to influence a police officer during a law enforcement interaction. The defendant sent payments to Officer Multiman155 via /pay after the officer had attempted to arrest him, offering money that the officer interpreted as an attempt to prevent arrest. The officer repeatedly asked the defendant to stop sending payments. The Prosecution argues this constitutes bribery under the Criminal Code Act because the officer was "serving in a legal capacity."

Both cases involve the same charge - bribery of a police officer. Both cases involve the same legal question - whether a police officer serves in "legal capacity" for purposes of the bribery statute. Both cases involve similar conduct - a defendant attempting to influence an officer through offers of monetary value. Both cases involve officers who did not accept the offers and asked the defendant to stop. Both cases are being prosecuted in the same court, before the same judicial officer.

The only differences are cosmetic: one defendant used /msg while the other used /pay; one officer was contacted after completing an arrest, while the other was contacted during an attempted arrest; one case involved offers of future payment while the other involved actual payments. These superficial factual distinctions do not change the core legal question that this Court already decided.

This Court has already determined that police officers do not serve in "legal capacity" under materially identical circumstances. Permitting the Prosecution to re-litigate this identical legal question with only cosmetic factual differences would waste judicial resources, create the risk of inconsistent rulings from the same court, undermine the value of this Court's decisions, and allow the Prosecution unlimited attempts to obtain a favourable ruling on settled law.

Rule 5.8 (Res Judicata) would not apply here because the parties are different - Destiny2Guru was the defendant in the prior case, while corstkiller00 is the defendant here. The Supreme Court in [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal explained that res judicata "prevents the same parties from litigating the same issue over and over again." The Court stated that res judicata requires "claims that were (or could have been) raised by the same facts, situation, and parties in that previous case." However, Rule 5.9 (Collateral Estoppel) applies precisely to this situation - where a different defendant raises the same legal issue that has already been decided. Collateral estoppel recognises that once a court has decided a legal question, that legal question should not be endlessly re-litigated simply because a new defendant is charged.

The SCR recognised that "judicial economy and consistency are important values in our legal system." While that case involved res judicata, the principle applies with even greater force to collateral estoppel. If courts were required to re-analyse the same legal question every time a new defendant was charged, it would waste judicial resources, create the risk of inconsistent rulings, and undermine the precedential value of judicial decisions. The Prosecution should not be permitted to relitigate whether police officers serve in "legal capacity" simply because they have found a different defendant with slightly different facts.

This Court analysed and decided the legal question of whether police officers serve in "legal capacity" in [2025] DCR 76. That decision should be given collateral estoppel effect here to prevent wasteful and duplicative litigation on settled law.

This Court got it right the first time. The Defence respectfully requests that this Court apply the same reasoning and grant dismissal with prejudice.

 
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ToadKing said:

Plea


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
PLEA

Commonwealth of Redmont
Prosecution

v.

corstkiller00
Defendant

I. ENTRY OF PLEA​

1. The Defendant pleads Not Guilty to 1x count of Bribery.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 21st day of December 2025



Motion


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

The Defence moves that the complaint in this case be dismissed with prejudice, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

INTRODUCTION​

This Court recently addressed the identical legal question presented here in Commonwealth of Redmont v. Destiny2Guru [2025] DCR 76, wherein this Honourable Court dismissed bribery charges against a defendant who allegedly attempted to bribe a police officer after arrest. The Court, by accepting the Motion to Dismiss, found that police officers do not serve in a "legal capacity" as required by the Criminal Code Act's definition of bribery, and that the officer was not "acting upon" any authority when passively receiving unwanted messages after an arrest was complete.

This current case presents materially indistinguishable facts and the identical legal issue. The Prosecution's case suffers from the same fatal defects that led to dismissal in [2025] DCR 76, and basic principles of judicial economy, consistency, and fairness compel the same result here.

I. RULE 5.5 - LACK OF CLAIM​

The Prosecution charges corstkiller00 with Bribery under Criminal Code Act, Part II, Section 5, alleging that payments made to Officer Multiman155 constituted "offering [...] an item or service of value to influence an individual [...] serving in a legal capacity."

The Prosecution's Fact 5 in [2025] DCR 76 asserted that "Rookieblue14 was serving in his legal capacity at the time of arrest and the time of the message." Here, the Prosecution similarly alleges that Multiman155 was serving in a legal capacity when corstkiller00 made payments to him, and that "the defendant attempted to influence the decision of this officer to not arrest him with money."

This complaint fails as a matter of law for two independent reasons, both established by this Court's recent ruling in [2025] DCR 76:

1. Police Officers Do Not Serve in "Legal Capacity" - Binding Precedent​

In [2025] DCR 76, an exhaustive analysis was conducted of whether police officers serve in a "legal capacity" under the Supreme Court's definition established in Commonwealth v. Milqy [2022] SCR 10. Police officers do not serve in a legal capacity because they fail all three elements of the Supreme Court's test:
  1. Police do not act upon "legal authority" - The Court in [2025] DCR 76 established that "legal authority" requires authority exercised in contexts involving legal interpretation, creation of binding obligations, or adjudication between parties. Police perform administrative and enforcement functions that are executive, not legal, in nature. As Justice Drew_Hall stated in [2022] SCR 10, acting in a legal capacity requires "a legal aspect of a legal nature to be present, like contractual negotiations or other similarly legal-related situations."
  2. Police cannot "undertake or maintain a certain legal status" - The Court in [2025] DCR 76 found that police lack the authority to create or modify legal determinations. They execute predetermined statutory consequences but cannot undertake the legal determinations that create those consequences.
  3. Police operate outside "the framework of the legal system" - The Court in [2025] DCR 76 held that police function within the executive enforcement system, not within "the system in which obligations backed by law are carried out" as defined in [2022] SCR 10.
This Court's determination in [2025] DCR 76 is precedent on the identical legal question presented here. Officer Multiman155, like Officer Rookieblue14 before him, was exercising executive enforcement authority under delegated administrative powers, not legal authority within the framework of the legal system.

The Constitution, Section 23 establishes that the Executive "administers and enforces the law respectively, as written by the legislature and interpreted by the judiciary." Police officers are part of this executive enforcement function. The Executive Standards Act, Section 7(1)(a), charges the Department of Homeland Security with "Maintaining the peace and good order of the nation, through lawfully exercising its power equally to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth of Redmont."

This statutory mandate is enforcement, not interpretation. Police officers do not perform acts that carry intrinsic legal effect within the legal system - they neither adjudicate disputes nor alter legal relationships between parties.

The legal analysis is identical. The outcome must be identical.

2. The Officer Could Not Exercise Legal Authority Over a Target in a Lawless Zone​

In [2025] DCR 76, the Defence argued that Officer Rookieblue14 was not "acting upon" any authority when the alleged bribery occurred because the arrest was complete and the defendant was already jailed. The Defence argued that [2022] SCR 10 requires "acting upon their legal authority" and the ability to "engage in a particular situation" - both phrases requiring active exercise of authority in an ongoing matter.

According to the Prosecution's own evidence, corstkiller00 was in the wilderness when the payments were made. P-04 contains the explicit server message: "You are entering the wilderness. You can now PvP and break/place blocks. Rules apply, laws do not." Corstkiller00 remained in this lawless zone, specifically in what Officer Multiman155 described as "an impenetrable bunker" within a wild plot. (P-06)

This creates an insurmountable legal problem for the Prosecution's case:

The fundamental premise of bribery is influencing someone to act contrary to their legal duties. But what legal duties exist in a lawless zone? The server explicitly declares that in the wilderness, "laws do not" apply. If laws do not apply where corstkiller00 was located, then Officer Multiman155 had no legal authority to enforce at that location. You cannot bribe someone to refrain from exercising authority they do not possess.

[2022] SCR 10 defined "legal capacity" as operating "within the framework of the legal system," defined as "the system in which obligations backed by law are carried out." If laws do not apply in the wilderness, then by definition, there is no "legal system" operating in that space. There are no "obligations backed by law" being carried out where law itself does not exist. An officer cannot be "serving in a legal capacity" when dealing with a target in a location where the legal framework does not exist.

The Executive Standards Act, Section 7(1)(a), charges the DHS with "lawfully exercising its power equally to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth of Redmont." If laws do not apply where the target is located, there are no laws to enforce. The officer's statutory mandate - enforcement of law - cannot be exercised where law does not exist.

Officer Multiman155's own statement confirms he could not exercise legal authority over corstkiller00 without a warrant. The warrant request came after the first payment and was necessary, as Multiman stated, "largely to get staff to break blocks to allow me to enter the wild plot and arrest him." (P-06) When an officer must petition the judiciary for authorisation to act, the officer is not "acting upon" legal authority in the present - the officer is seeking permission to obtain that authority in the future.

In [2025] DCR 76, the arrest was complete, and the officer was passively receiving messages after the fact. This Court found that insufficient to constitute "acting upon" authority or "serving in a legal capacity." Here, the target was in a lawless zone where the officer had no legal authority to enforce laws without judicial authorisation. If an officer who has completed an arrest and is passively receiving messages cannot be "serving in a legal capacity," then an officer dealing with a target in a zone where "laws do not" apply certainly cannot be "serving in a legal capacity."

3. Conclusion on Lack of Claim​

The Prosecution cannot prove the essential elements of bribery as a matter of law because:
  1. Police officers do not serve in "legal capacity" under precedent from this Court in [2025] DCR 76 and the Supreme Court in [2022] SCR 10.
  2. Critically, Officer Multiman155 was not "acting upon" any authority when the payments were made.

​

II. RULE 5.9 - COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL​

Rule 5.9 provides:

This case presents a nearly identical fact pattern to [2025] DCR 76, which this Court dismissed with prejudice.

In [2025] DCR 76, the Prosecution charged a defendant with bribery for attempting to influence a police officer after a law enforcement interaction. The defendant sent messages to Officer Rookieblue14 via /msg after being arrested and jailed, offering money and requesting assistance. The officer repeatedly declined these offers. The Prosecution argued this constituted bribery under the Criminal Code Act because the officer was "serving in a legal capacity."

In the instant case, the Prosecution charges corstkiller00 with bribery for attempting to influence a police officer during a law enforcement interaction. The defendant sent payments to Officer Multiman155 via /pay after the officer had attempted to arrest him, offering money that the officer interpreted as an attempt to prevent arrest. The officer repeatedly asked the defendant to stop sending payments. The Prosecution argues this constitutes bribery under the Criminal Code Act because the officer was "serving in a legal capacity."

Both cases involve the same charge - bribery of a police officer. Both cases involve the same legal question - whether a police officer serves in "legal capacity" for purposes of the bribery statute. Both cases involve similar conduct - a defendant attempting to influence an officer through offers of monetary value. Both cases involve officers who did not accept the offers and asked the defendant to stop. Both cases are being prosecuted in the same court, before the same judicial officer.

The only differences are cosmetic: one defendant used /msg while the other used /pay; one officer was contacted after completing an arrest, while the other was contacted during an attempted arrest; one case involved offers of future payment while the other involved actual payments. These superficial factual distinctions do not change the core legal question that this Court already decided.

This Court has already determined that police officers do not serve in "legal capacity" under materially identical circumstances. Permitting the Prosecution to re-litigate this identical legal question with only cosmetic factual differences would waste judicial resources, create the risk of inconsistent rulings from the same court, undermine the value of this Court's decisions, and allow the Prosecution unlimited attempts to obtain a favourable ruling on settled law.

Rule 5.8 (Res Judicata) would not apply here because the parties are different - Destiny2Guru was the defendant in the prior case, while corstkiller00 is the defendant here. The Supreme Court in [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal explained that res judicata "prevents the same parties from litigating the same issue over and over again." The Court stated that res judicata requires "claims that were (or could have been) raised by the same facts, situation, and parties in that previous case." However, Rule 5.9 (Collateral Estoppel) applies precisely to this situation - where a different defendant raises the same legal issue that has already been decided. Collateral estoppel recognises that once a court has decided a legal question, that legal question should not be endlessly re-litigated simply because a new defendant is charged.

The SCR recognised that "judicial economy and consistency are important values in our legal system." While that case involved res judicata, the principle applies with even greater force to collateral estoppel. If courts were required to re-analyse the same legal question every time a new defendant was charged, it would waste judicial resources, create the risk of inconsistent rulings, and undermine the precedential value of judicial decisions. The Prosecution should not be permitted to relitigate whether police officers serve in "legal capacity" simply because they have found a different defendant with slightly different facts.

This Court analysed and decided the legal question of whether police officers serve in "legal capacity" in [2025] DCR 76. That decision should be given collateral estoppel effect here to prevent wasteful and duplicative litigation on settled law.

This Court got it right the first time. The Defence respectfully requests that this Court apply the same reasoning and grant dismissal with prejudice.

Click to expand...
the defense shall have 24 hours to respond if they wish.
 
dearev said:
the defense shall have 24 hours to respond if they wish.
Click to expand...
Your Honour,

I must begin with an observation that struck me earlier this evening while leaving the cinema after watching Avatar: Fire and Ash. The critical consensus reads: "Remaining on the cutting edge of visual effects, Fire and Ash repeats the narrative beats of its predecessors to frustrating effect, but its grand spectacle continues to stoke one-of-a-kind thrills."

Specifically, the phrase "repeats the narrative beats of its predecessors to frustrating effect" resonates rather pointedly with the present proceedings.

In Commonwealth of Redmont v. Destiny2Guru [2025] DCR 76, the Defence filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Prosecution did not respond. This Court granted the motion with prejudice.

In the instant case, the Defence has filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Prosecution has again failed to respond.

Your Honour granted the Prosecution 24 hours to respond if they wished. That deadline has now expired. The Prosecution has remained silent - just as they did in [2025] DCR 76.

The Defence respectfully requests that this Court grant the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice, just as it did when faced with the same arguments and the same prosecutorial silence.

This Court got it right the first time. The narrative beats may repeat, but so too should the outcome.
 
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