Lawsuit: Dismissed Culls v. Anthony_org [2025] DCR 63

Writ of Summons

@anthony_org, is required to appear before the District Court in the case of Culls v. Anthony_org [2025] DCR 63

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

The plaintiff only provided a crime the plaintiff allegedly committed as a claim for relief. Under Criminal Code Act Part 1, Section 6(1)(a), “damages are not presumed” for crimes, even as “crimes may be used to seek damages” in civil lawsuits. The Plaintiff does not appear to provide any evidence that specific damages occurred as a result of these crimes and, therefore, the Plaintiff asks that this be dismissed for lack of claim consistent with Rule 5.5 (“A Motion to Dismiss may be filed for failure to state a claim for relief, or against an[y] claim for relief that has insufficient evidence to support the civil or criminal charge”; emphasis ours).

In the event of dismissal, the Defense seeks compensation for legal fees in the amount of $2,000, consistent with the Legal Damages Act.

Answer to Complaint

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. The Defendant AFFIRMS that anthony_org had said “post proof", but DENIES that this occurred at around 07:45 Eastern Standard Time.
2. The Defendant AFFIRMS that anthony_org had said “Or I will sue for false advertising", but DENIES that this occurred at around 07:45 Eastern Standard Time.
3. The Defendant DENIES that this breaks the law, for extortion and threats, and is considered illegal.

II. DEFENSES

1. In the Plaintiff’s counsel’s reading of the law and precedents, the alleged actions do not violate CCA Part V, Section 4 to state that legal action will be taken absent specific performance and these do not constitute threats under the law. Applying it as a violation of the Criminal Code Act is absurd and inconsistent with congressional intent, original public meaning, and court precedent:
   1. Congressional Intent. Congress has, in certain circumstances, required individuals to send notification of impending legal action absent specific actions taken by the recipient party. In the context of intellectual property, as laid out Intellectual Property Act Section 7(1), providing a letter to cease and desist is an explicit requirement before taking legal action under the law. The CCA does not transform this requirement into an illegal threat. Likewise, it would be inconsistent with the intent of congress in voting to approve the CCA for similar actions for other alleged violations (false advertising, etc.) would not transform into “threats” under the law.
      
      What’s more, the CCA was intended as a consolidation of the laws in order “to provide a single source of truth” (see: CCA Section 2(2)). Where small definition changes occurred without explanation or debate, it should be reasoned that the Congress understood the crimes in the same or similar way as was prior to the passage of the law. Under the Section 2 of the predecessor Verbally Threatening Act, the intent of the Congress’s scope of the crime that was incorporated into the CCA becomes quite clear: the crime is intended to be a verbal equivalent to the crime of assault, when words spoken put someone else “in danger”. The allegations plainly do not meet this when interpreted through congressional intent.
   2. Original Public Meaning. The original public meaning of “threats” under the CCA, as understood by the Department of Homeland Security tasked with enforcing the crime, plainly does not include the behavior alleged by the Defendant. Through discovery, the Defense will show that the “threats” under the CCA was publicly understood at the time of the bill’s passing to mean violent threats, such as those which would put an individual in fear of safety.
      
      This original public meaning is a continuation of the meaning under the Verbally Threatening Act, under which the Plaintiff’s allegations would clearly fail.
   3. Judicial Precedent. Under the Precedent in [2021] SCR 16, “Plaintiffs should have utilized all exhaustive measures… before filing a lawsuit”. While this is not a case involving the Commonwealth, the principle that exhaustive measures (such as sending a message asking for someone to recant false statements prior to filing of a lawsuit) would be both ordinary and lawful; it would be dangerous and absurd to declare this act to be criminal under the law on the basis of the CCA’s text.
2. The alleged crime of “extortion” does not appear in the Criminal Code Act and does not serve as a basis for relief; under Part 1, Section 3(1) of the CCA, the “Code constitutes the exclusive and exhaustive listing of criminal offences within the jurisdiction of Redmont” (emphasis mine), so the first prayer for relief should be excluded.
3. Even if the alleged actions were a criminal offense, the alleged prayer for relief for “extortion” does not have any basis in any valid claim for relief when the Plaintiff is also seeking relief for “threats”. Under the precedent set in The Commonwealth of Redmont v. Ko531 [2025] FCR 3, which is binding on the District Court, multiple criminal claims cannot be pursued for the same act, and there is only one alleged act by the Defendant here.
4. No actual damages have been shown. Under Criminal Code Act Part 1, Section 6(1)(a), “damages are not presumed” in a civil matter even if the alleged crime is proven to have occurred. The Plaintiff must show how he was actually damaged by these actions in order for any relief to be granted, but the Complaint and included evidence do not prove this.