Appeal: Pending [2026] DCR 92 - Appeal

[Nacho]

Username: Nacholebraa

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: The Commonwealth of Redmont

What Case are you Appealing?: [2026] DCR 92

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - Slime_Mario v. Department of Commerce [2026] DCR 92

Basis for Appeal: - Client & counsel Name: The Commonwealth of Redmont

- Appealed case name: 2026 DCR 92

- Were you originally the plaintiff or the defendant: Defendant

- Reason for appeal: Under Rule 8.2 due to clear or apparent nature the Trial Court errored in it's judgement in clear or plain under the constitution the commonwealth has an equal protection and benefit as any citizen. Under equal protection of the law we are given agency powers which were violated but are granted by the Supreme Court of the commonwealth. Therefore the Commonwealth makes this appeal under 8.3.1 because the error was plain and is protected under the law. (Information - Court Rules and Procedures)

Error of law
- Trial court Erred in supplanting it's own determination over that of the agency
- Trial court Erred in overruling and not explaining the issue with Congress's delegated authority to the agency over optional May provisions of the 'Certificate of Formation' within 'Legal Entity Act'
- Trial court Erred treating shall as the only thing needed rather than accepting May.

- Are you requesting oral argument: No

- Additional Information or evidence (see appellate rules): See attached from 2025 FCR 78

Supporting Evidence: "It is important that agencies are granted proper discretion in their administration. Without any statutory framework in place for what this discretion is limited to, it is presumed that agencies act with full congressional power and authority. The only limits to agency authority and discretion are checks upon an agency’s action that lay outside of their enabling statutes, and protections specifically granted in law to regulated parties."

"Further, there is no legislation creating a framework for judicial review of agency action. There are no standards set to be applied, no requirements for rulemaking or adjudication, no necessity of a record to be produced per decision. This means that the reviewing power of the judiciary is no stronger than the common-law requirements of first ensuring that action taken by an agency is within the power delegated to them by Congress, and then ensuring that that action was constitutional and in line with other law or interests legally obtained. (To see an example of a system of judicial review for agency action, please see a very small portion of American administrative law here. This law lays out a number of reasons a court may find an agency’s action unlawful. Further, enabling statutes for various agencies contain guidelines, frameworks, and standards for that agency’s actions, allowing the reviewing court to properly weigh the legality and permissibility of that action.)"

"With this in mind, it is clear that the Appellant misstates the law. Upon appeal, the DCT argues that the trial court could not have reviewed the regulation at issue in the way it did at all because it was of a specific character. This specific character, the argument goes, protects the regulation from review due to any perceived broadness or subjectivity. The DCT alleges these qualities are in fact desirable and necessary for the good administration of the department, and thus the regulation cannot be overturned merely because it is subjective."

"Courts should not supplant their own judgment for that of an agency"

"As discussed in the section above, the trial court acted improperly when it vacated the regulation and evictions at issue. Further comment on that matter is not necessary. However, it is important to note that in its holding, the trial court further directed the DCT to amend its policies to include “clear, objective, and neutrally applicable” standards."

"On appeal, the DCT took issue with this. The DCT contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it directed the DCT to amend its policies towards a specific (and more “objective”) alternative. Because the court created new standards, it acted with legislative power and impermissibly breached the separation of powers."

"A reviewing court may direct an agency to amend its policies to become in line with what the law states, and nothing more. As discussed supra, Congress has not given any reviewing frameworks or standards for the judiciary to follow when evaluating agency determinations. Thus, while we may still evaluate those determinations, we may only do so as long as they contradict the law or abridge statutory or constitutional rights or interests of the citizenry."

"Reviewing courts should give reasonable deference to an agency acting within its own legal bounds. Without any statutory framework for properly reviewing agency determinations, it is not possible for a reviewing court to intervene in a final agency determination in any way if that determination does not either exceed its statutory boundaries or infringe on a right or interest of a regulated party. In matters where an agency action is legally valid, but there are reasonable differences as to different choices in policy, a court should not supplant an agency’s judgment for its own."

"The outcome here then is clear. We hold that the trial court erred when it directed the DCT to amend its policies in the way that it did. The directive by the trial court was unnecessary, because (as discussed above) the policies of the DCT were not outside of their statutory bounds. Were the policies outside the bounds authorized by Congress, perhaps the trial court’s order would not have been in error. We do not rule as to the specifics of the directed rule changes."

(Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal)