Appeal: Denied [2025] FCR 44 - Appeal 1

[End]

Username: xEndeavour

I am representing myself

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] FCR 44

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - End v Commonwealth [2025] FCR 44

Basis for Appeal: Point of Law

The Federal Court has erred in finding s5 of the Redmont Legal Code Act constitutional. Reasoning provided that because Congress retains legislative authority and the President theoretically retains the power to assent or veto legislation, there is no constitutional breach. This analysis fails to address the second order effect of s5, which enables Congress to unilaterally enact legislation by motion alone — bypassing the executive entirely.

This directly violates the doctrine of separation of powers, a core principle of Redmont’s constitutional framework. Under the Constitution, legislation requires bicameral passage and executive assent. s5 allows legislation to take effect without the assent of the executive, and the Court’s suggestion that the President may 'pre-emptively assent' to an unknown and undefined law is legally and absolutely absurd. Assent is a review mechanism - it must be granted after a bill is passed, not before it is proposed.

The Court further erred in suggesting that the Redmont Legal Code Act and the Legislative Standards Act (LSA) are of equal standing. To suggest that LSA - as the years old foundation of Redmont’s legislative system - is at the same level as the Legal Code Act is absurd. The LSA governs how laws are introduced, debated, passed, and enacted, and by implication, would certainly carry a higher structural significance. By holding that the Redmont Legal Code Act effectively amended the LSA by implication, the Court has allowed a procedural shortcut to override the entire legislative process without indicating any intention to do so in law.

The Court has effectively allowed and sanctioned:

The removal of Presidential assent from the legislative process;

The ability for Congress to delegate law making power to itself or to a committee without constitutional checks;

Changing the law making process without an express amendment to the LSA or the Constitution.

A precedent which conflicts with constitutional principles.

s5 of the Redmont Legal Code Act is an unconstitutional overreach on the separation of powers, and the Federal Court's respectfully must be overturned.

In making this appeal, I seek that the decision in End v. Commonwealth [2025] FCR 44 be overturned.

Supporting Evidence:

 

[Matthew100x]

Verdict

In a 3-0 vote by the Supreme Court, we have decided to decline this appeal.

§ 5 of the Legal Code Act (see Act of Congress - Redmont Legal Code Act) describes the transition to a "Legal Code" that is drafted by the LCC, which is defined in § 4 of the same act. §§ 4(2) and 9 both describe that the "Legal Code" that will be recommended by the LCC is the "final Legal Code." This code is what will be recommended to Congress for a super-majority vote for the passage. Afterwards, this law becomes inoperative because the Legal Code will exist.

The Honorable Ko found that under the principles set-out by Lawsuit: Adjourned - zLost v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2024] SCR 12 , the law amends the LSA. Since the LSA is no longer a constitutional amendment per the Legislative Standards Amendment Act (see Information - Legislative Standards Act), the LSA can be superseded by new law.

The major contention at issue in this appeal is whether or not the President can delegate his power. We disagree with that framing. The President has assented to this bill knowing full well that § 5 of the Legal Code Act would not require his presence and enact the "Legal Code" into law. Therefore, this is not an issue of delegation. The Supreme Court agrees with the decision that "The president in this instances has preemptively approved legistlation by congress instead of the normal legislative process defined in section 10(6) of the LSA." (see Lawsuit: Adjourned - End v Commonwealth [2025] FCR 44).

Per the Legal Code Act, this process will only happen once. There will only be the acceptance of one "final Legal Code." Therefore, the shortcut that the appellant is concerned about for avoiding presidential assent does not exist. Establishing the Legal Code is an extraordinary power that can only be used once. Before and after, the regular process of passing legislation shall continue requiring presidential assent.