Appeal: Pending [2025] FCR 128 - Contempt of Court Charge - Appeal

[ToadKing]

Username: ToadKing__

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: Omegabiebel

File(s) attached

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] FCR 128 - Contempt of Court Charge

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Pending - Volt Bank, Inc. v. Alta Group Corporation [2025] FCR 128

Basis for Appeal:
The Federal Court erred as a matter of law in finding Appellant in Contempt of Court under Criminal Code Act Section 2(b) for making a second Discord notification to the presiding officer about a separate emergency matter in the same case.

The Court approved the first notification (regarding Plot s105 being auctioned) but held the second notification (regarding fraudulent transfer of three additional collateral plots) to be contempt because the judge felt "pestered" and had 11 other cases on the docket.

Making a second notification about a different urgent matter does not "obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice." Further, the penalty imposed ($1,000 and 10 minutes imprisonment) is grossly disproportionate to the penalties this same judge imposed for objectively worse conduct in prior cases.

I. The Court Applied an Incorrect Legal Standard for Contempt​

The Federal Court's ruling fundamentally misapplies this standard. The Court explicitly approved Appellant's first notification about Plot s105, stating that "Emergency action was absolutely warranted and Omega was right to ping me and opposing." However, the Court found contempt for Appellant's second notification about the discovery of three additional fraudulent plot transfers, reasoning that the judge had "11 cases presently on its docket" and would "review the EI in good course and not be pestered to hurry up."

The Court's ruling creates an arbitrary and legally unsupportable rule: a single notification is permissible, but two notifications constitute "pestering" and obstruction of justice. This standard has no basis in law. The Criminal Code Act does not limit litigants to a specific number of notifications per case, so long as those notifications are lawful. The question is not whether the judge felt "pestered" by being notified twice, but whether the second notification obstructed or interfered with justice. Personal judicial annoyance at being contacted multiple times about separate emergencies is not a legal basis for contempt.

Making a second notification about a separate emergency matter does not obstruct justice - it facilitates it. The two emergency injunctions addressed entirely different urgent matters: the first concerned Plot s105 being actively auctioned by the government, while the second concerned the discovery that Defendants had fraudulently transferred additional collateral plots to third parties. These were separate emergencies requiring separate notifications. To hold that the second notification constitutes obstruction of justice would mean litigants must remain silent about any subsequent emergencies for fear of "pestering" the judge, thereby actually obstructing justice.

II. The Court's Factual Premise Is Flawed​

The Court stated that "all of the alleged property transfers occurred last week," implying the matter was stale. This characterisation misses the point. While the transfers may have occurred last week, they were only discovered and documented by Appellant shortly before the second emergency injunction was filed. More critically, the transferred properties are currently in the possession of third parties, meaning the harm is ongoing and immediate action is necessary to prevent permanent loss of collateral.

The Court's reasoning that the second emergency injunction was less urgent because the transfers "occurred last week" is perverse: it suggests that once fraudulent transfers have occurred and properties are in third-party hands, the matter becomes less urgent rather than more urgent. The opposite is true. Plot s105 was seized by the government and could be recovered through government channels. Plots r101, r027, and c330 are now in the hands of private third parties (peuko, RylandW, and the Government), making immediate judicial intervention more critical, not less.

III. The Penalty Is Grossly Disproportionate​

Even if Appellant's conduct somehow constituted contempt, the penalty of $1,000 and imprisonment is grossly excessive and inconsistent with the Court's own precedent. In YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76, this same presiding officer found a party in contempt for "pinging the presiding officer and subsequently debating the Hon. Judge Ameslap regarding this case" - conduct that involved not only pinging but also engaging in substantive debate with the judge. The Court imposed only a $500 fine with no imprisonment.

Here, Appellant engaged in far less intrusive conduct: a single informational ping with no debate, no argument, and no challenge to judicial authority. Yet the penalty was doubled, and imprisonment was added. The only apparent explanation for this disparate treatment is the judge's subjective annoyance at being notified about a matter the judge deemed insufficiently urgent. Such an arbitrary application of penalties violates basic principles of equal justice and due process.

Supporting Evidence: