ToadKing
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ToadKing__
Public Defender
- Joined
- Apr 4, 2025
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Username: ToadKing
I am representing a client
Who is your Client?: 12700k
File(s) attached
What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] DCR 87
Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - 12700k V. Aesyr_ [2025] DCR 87
Basis for Appeal:
The District Court committed legal error in finding 12700K guilty of Ex Parte Communication under Part III, Section 15 of the Criminal Code Act. The Court's finding fails on two critical legal grounds and represents an improper exercise of judicial authority to impose criminal penalties during civil proceedings.
At the time 12700K made the statement "dearev do my case", there was no public indication, announcement, or judicial assignment showing that Magistrate dearev would be presiding over this case. The communication occurred in a public forum before any presiding officer had been designated for the case. Magistrate dearev could not have been reasonably known to be "presiding over" the case at the moment of communication.
To interpret the statute as the District Court has done would criminalise any public statement directed toward a magistrate or judge before case assignment, effectively making it impossible for parties to make administrative inquiries or express preferences about judicial assignment without risking criminal liability. This interpretation is overly broad and inconsistent with the statute's plain language, which specifically targets improper communications with officers already assigned to preside over a matter.
However, the defendant in this case, Aesyr_, is permanently deported and therefore possesses no legal rights within Redmont. A permanently deported individual stripped of legal personhood, cannot constitute a "party" in the legal sense, whose knowledge or consent is required under the statute. The legislative intent behind requiring notice to "all parties" is to protect the due process rights of litigants - a protection that is meaningless when applied to an individual who has been formally excluded from the legal system.
Where one of the named parties lacks legal standing due to deportation, the "without the knowledge of all parties" element either becomes inapplicable or is automatically satisfied. To hold otherwise would create the absurd result that communications are more restricted in cases involving deported defendants than in cases involving parties with full legal rights.
The District Court's exercise of this authority to impose $15,000 in fines and 30 minutes of imprisonment appears punitive and disproportionate, particularly given the ambiguous circumstances surrounding whether an "ex parte communication" even occurred under the statutory definition.
Supporting Evidence:
I am representing a client
Who is your Client?: 12700k
File(s) attached
What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] DCR 87
Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Adjourned - 12700k V. Aesyr_ [2025] DCR 87
Basis for Appeal:
The District Court committed legal error in finding 12700K guilty of Ex Parte Communication under Part III, Section 15 of the Criminal Code Act. The Court's finding fails on two critical legal grounds and represents an improper exercise of judicial authority to impose criminal penalties during civil proceedings.
I. Failure to Establish Essential Elements of the Offence
The offence of Ex Parte Communication, as defined in the Criminal Code Act, requires that a person: "Makes direct or indirect communication about a specific case with the presiding officer that is presiding over that case." The critical language "the presiding officer that is presiding over that case" establishes a temporal requirement - the officer must already be presiding at the time of communication.At the time 12700K made the statement "dearev do my case", there was no public indication, announcement, or judicial assignment showing that Magistrate dearev would be presiding over this case. The communication occurred in a public forum before any presiding officer had been designated for the case. Magistrate dearev could not have been reasonably known to be "presiding over" the case at the moment of communication.
To interpret the statute as the District Court has done would criminalise any public statement directed toward a magistrate or judge before case assignment, effectively making it impossible for parties to make administrative inquiries or express preferences about judicial assignment without risking criminal liability. This interpretation is overly broad and inconsistent with the statute's plain language, which specifically targets improper communications with officers already assigned to preside over a matter.
II. Statutory Requirement of "All Parties" Not Applicable
The statute requires that the communication occur "without the knowledge of all parties (Plaintiff, defendant, counsel) in the case." This element presupposes that all parties possess legal standing and rights within the Commonwealth's judicial system.However, the defendant in this case, Aesyr_, is permanently deported and therefore possesses no legal rights within Redmont. A permanently deported individual stripped of legal personhood, cannot constitute a "party" in the legal sense, whose knowledge or consent is required under the statute. The legislative intent behind requiring notice to "all parties" is to protect the due process rights of litigants - a protection that is meaningless when applied to an individual who has been formally excluded from the legal system.
Where one of the named parties lacks legal standing due to deportation, the "without the knowledge of all parties" element either becomes inapplicable or is automatically satisfied. To hold otherwise would create the absurd result that communications are more restricted in cases involving deported defendants than in cases involving parties with full legal rights.
III. Inappropriate Exercise of Summary Offence Authority
While Section 6(3)(c) of the Criminal Code Act grants judicial officers authority to "impose punishments for any Summary Offense committed during proceedings," this power must be exercised judiciously and only when the offence clearly occurred within the context of active judicial proceedings. The communication at issue occurred in a public forum before proceedings had meaningfully commenced and before any judicial officer had been assigned to the case.The District Court's exercise of this authority to impose $15,000 in fines and 30 minutes of imprisonment appears punitive and disproportionate, particularly given the ambiguous circumstances surrounding whether an "ex parte communication" even occurred under the statutory definition.
Supporting Evidence:
