Lawsuit: Pending 12700k V. The Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 121

[12700k]

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

12700k
Plaintiff

v.

The Commonwealth of Redmont
Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

The Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Section 2(3) of the Constitution, which states that Congress may override a Presidential veto "with the exception of appropriation bills." This provision directly contradicts Section 2(4), which vests Congress with exclusive control over "taxation, government spending, appropriations, and borrowing." These provisions cannot coexist without rendering one meaningless or creating an unconstitutional concentration of power in the Executive branch. The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment clarifying that the appropriations veto exception in Section 2(3) is either void as unconstitutional or must be read narrowly to preserve congressional control over the purse.

I. PARTIES
1. 12700k
2. The Commonwealth of Redmont

II. FACTS
1. Section 2(3) of the Constitution grants Congress the power to "Override Vetoes" and states: "Congress may override a Presidential veto on all legislation, with the exception of appropriation bills."
2. Section 2(4) of the Constitution grants Congress the "Power of the Purse" and states: "Congress controls taxation, government spending, appropriations, and borrowing."
3. These two constitutional provisions create an irreconcilable contradiction regarding who ultimately controls appropriations in the Commonwealth of Redmont.
4. If Section 2(3) is given full effect, the President possesses an absolute and unreviewable veto over all appropriation bills, meaning the President can indefinitely block all government spending, including:

1. Salaries for Congressional members, Judicial Officers, and Executive employees;
2. Funding for the Department of Justice, Courts, and all government operations.

5. If Section 2(4) is given full effect, Congress possesses exclusive control over appropriations, which necessarily includes the power to override Presidential vetoes on appropriation bills, rendering the exception in Section 2(3) void.
6. This constitutional contradiction creates a scenario where either:

1. The Executive can hold the entire government hostage by vetoing appropriations and forcing Congress to capitulate to Presidential demands in order to fund basic government operations; or
2. Congress's constitutional power over the purse is supreme and cannot be circumvented by an unreviewable Presidential veto.

7. The Constitution provides no guidance on how to resolve this internal contradiction, leaving the Commonwealth vulnerable to a constitutional crisis.
8. This is not a hypothetical concern. The appropriations process is fundamental to democratic governance, and the current constitutional text creates uncertainty about the balance of power between the Legislative and Executive branches.

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. Irreconcilable Constitutional Contradiction
Section 2(3) and Section 2(4) of the Constitution are in direct and irreconcilable conflict. Section 2(4) explicitly grants Congress control over "appropriations" - not shared control, not conditional control, but full control. The plain language of this provision is unambiguous: Congress controls appropriations.

However, Section 2(3) strips Congress of this very power by exempting appropriation bills from veto override. If the President can veto an appropriation bill and Congress cannot override that veto, then Congress does not "control" appropriations in any meaningful sense. The President controls appropriations through negative authority - the power to block any spending Congress authorizes.

These provisions cannot both be given full effect. One must yield to the other, or both must be harmonized through judicial interpretation. The current constitutional text is internally contradictory and creates legal uncertainty that threatens the functioning of government.

2. Violation of Separation of Powers
The appropriations veto exception in Section 2(3) concentrates excessive power in the Executive branch and violates the fundamental principle of separation of powers embedded throughout the Constitution.

The Constitution establishes three co-equal branches of government. The power of the purse is the Legislature's most important check on Executive power. By giving the President an absolute veto over appropriations, Section 2(3) allows the Executive to:

1. Defund the Judiciary, preventing the courts from functioning as an independent check on Executive power;
2. Defund Congress itself, preventing the Legislature from carrying out its constitutional duties;
3. Defund any Executive department or agency that refuses to follow Presidential directives, consolidating all Executive power in the President personally;
4. Extract concessions from Congress by threatening to veto appropriations unless Congress passes the President's preferred legislation.

This concentration of power is fundamentally incompatible with the separation of powers doctrine. No single branch should have the power to shut down the other two branches by withholding funding. Yet Section 2(3) grants exactly this power to the President.

3. Undermining of Democratic Governance
The appropriations veto exception undermines the basic premise of democratic governance: that the people, through their elected representatives in Congress, control how public funds are raised and spent.

Section 2(4) reflects this democratic principle by vesting control over appropriations in Congress, the branch most directly accountable to the people through regular elections. The House of Representatives, which originates all bills, is elected every two months. The Senate is elected on staggered four-month terms. This ensures maximum democratic accountability over spending decisions.

Section 2(3) subverts this democratic accountability by allowing the President - a single individual elected every four months - to override the collective will of 17 elected Representatives and Senators by vetoing appropriations. Worse, Congress has no recourse. The people's representatives are powerless to fund the government if the President refuses to assent.

This creates a form of constitutional dictatorship where one person can shut down government operations, deny salaries to public servants, and halt the government indefinitely. This is antithetical to democratic governance and inconsistent with the Constitution's Preamble, which establishes the Constitution to "promote the general welfare of our citizens, and secure the liberty of our participation in the governance of this country."

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Declare that Section 2(3)'s exception for appropriation bills is void and unenforceable, as it directly contradicts Section 2(4)'s grant of appropriations control to Congress;
2. In the alternative, declare that Section 2(3)'s exception for appropriation bills must be read narrowly to apply only to appropriations funding the President's office, preserving Congress's power to override Presidential vetoes on all other appropriation bills;
3. Declare that Congress may override Presidential vetoes on appropriation bills by the same supermajority vote required for overriding other vetoes, consistent with Section 2(4)'s grant of appropriations control to Congress;
4. Grant the Plaintiff $6,000 in legal fees.

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 9th day of November 2025