Lawsuit: Dismissed fluffywaafelz v. Department of Commerce [2026] DCR 132

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Case Filing


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


fluffywaafelz (represented by Mezimoří Law)
Plaintiff

v.

Department of Commerce
Defendant


COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:


I. WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF

The Plaintiff brings this action to challenge the unlawful denial of its application for registration as a financial institution by the Department of Commerce. The Plaintiff, fluffywaafelz, submitted an application pursuant to the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act seeking recognition of NMPTreasury as a financial institution for the limited purpose of facilitating currency exchange between the jurisdictions of Redmont and Alexandria on behalf of affiliated companies.

The Financial Institutions Enforcement Act grants the Department of Commerce broad authority to “create, define, recognise, license, and regulate new types or categories of financial institution” and expressly provides that this authority “is not limited by the types of financial institution named in this or any other Act.” Consistent with this statutory authority, the Department published a registration policy establishing the standards by which applications are to be evaluated. Those standards require that applicants be assessed based on their legal compliance, the suitability of their directors, and whether they have adequately explained their organizational structure and intended operations. The policy further requires that, where an applicant fails to satisfy any requirement, the Department identifies the deficiency and affords the applicant forty-eight hours to remedy it before denying the application.

Rather than evaluating the Plaintiff’s application under the criteria established by its own published policy, the Department denied the application on the basis that the registration “did not fit into any of the approved financial institution types.” Neither the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act nor the Department’s published registration policy imposes such a requirement. To the contrary, the governing statute expressly contemplates the recognition of new categories of financial institutions, and the Department’s policy directs officials to evaluate applications according to the published eligibility criteria rather than by reference to any predetermined list of approved institution types.

At no point did the Department identify any deficiency under its published criteria, notify the Plaintiff that any requirement had not been met, or provide the forty-eight-hour opportunity to address any perceived deficiency as required by its own procedures. Instead, the application was summarily denied on a ground unsupported by either the governing statute or the Department’s own policy. As a result, the Department failed to perform the duties imposed upon it by law and failed to follow the procedures governing its consideration of financial institution applications.

The Plaintiff submits that the Department’s actions constitute a failure to perform a statutory duty and a denial of due process by disregarding the mandatory procedures governing the evaluation of financial institution applications. The Plaintiff therefore seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Department of Commerce to reconsider the application in accordance with the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act and its published registration policy, reversal of the unlawful denial, and such further relief as this Court deems proper.​
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II. PARTIES

a) fluffywaafelz


b) Department of Commerce


III. FACTS
  1. The Plaintiff, known as “fluffywaafelz,” is a member of Democracy Craft and the applicant who sought registration of a financial institution under the name NMPTreasury through the Department of Commerce.​
  2. The Department of Commerce is the governmental department vested with authority to regulate and recognize financial institutions pursuant to the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.​
  3. §6(1) of the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act provides that the Department of Commerce “may, by regulation, create, define, recognise, license, and regulate new types or categories of financial institution, in addition to those recognised by the Commercial Standards Act.”​
  4. §6(2) of the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act further provides that the Department’s authority “is intended to be broad and is not limited by the types of financial institution named in this or any other Act.”​
  5. Pursuant to that statutory authority, the Department of Commerce published “Financial Institutions Registration” a policy governing applications for registration as a financial institution.​
  6. The published policy states that applications are to be assessed on a “strictly needs basis” and that all listed requirements must be satisfied before registration may be approved.​
  7. The published policy identifies the following requirements for applicants:
    • Whether the firm has, since its inception, complied with all legal obligations;​
    • Whether the firm’s directors are free from regulatory actions, legal proceedings, or other matters affecting the institution’s financial stability; and​
    • Whether the firm has clearly outlined its structure and intended operations.​
  8. The policy further directs Compliance Officers to determine whether an applicant satisfies the aforementioned requirements and, if not, to identify the specific deficiencies.​
  9. The policy further provides that where an applicant fails to satisfy any requirement, the applicant shall be notified of the deficiencies and afforded forty-eight (48) hours, unless additional time is requested, to make the necessary adjustments before a final denial is issued.​
  10. The policy further states that each application is to be assessed on its own individual merits and that prior decisions concerning other applicants are irrelevant to the determination.​
  11. The Plaintiff submitted an application seeking registration of NMPTreasury as a financial institution on the date of June 25th 2026. (See Exhibit P-01)​
  12. The Plaintiff identified the proposed institution’s name as NMPTreasury and described its intended purpose as: “NMPTreasury exists solely to exchange currency between Redmont and Alexandria for my other companies. It will make no profit, it just acts as part of the company structure.” (See Exhibit P-01)​
  13. The application did not include an answer to the field requesting the proposed “Company Type.” (See Exhibit P-01)​
  14. The plaintiff clarified this point, stating “I meant to put 'Other' for company type, apologies”, “This can also be classified as a payment processor, not sure if that changes anything.”(See Exhibit P-02, P-03)​
  15. The Department conducted a review of the plaintiff’s application.​
  16. Following review, the Department denied the Plaintiff’s application.​
  17. The reason provided by the Department for the denial was: “Registration denied due to registration not fitting into any of the approved financial institution types.”​
  18. The Department did not state that the Plaintiff had failed to satisfy any of the eligibility requirements identified within the published registration policy “Financial Institutions Registration”.​
  19. The Department did not identify any deficiency relating to the Plaintiff’s legal compliance, the suitability of its directors, or the clarity of the proposed organizational structure or operations.​
  20. The Department did not notify the Plaintiff that any portion of the application required correction or supplementation prior to issuing its decision. (See Exhibit P-01 through P-03)​
  21. The Department did not provide the Plaintiff with the forty-eight-hour period described within its published policy “Financial Institutions Registration” to address any alleged deficiencies before denying the application. (See Exhibit P-01 through P-03)​
  22. The Department’s stated basis for denial referenced the application’s failure to fit within “approved financial institution types.” (See Exhibit P-03)​
  23. The Financial Institutions Enforcement Act does not expressly require that an applicant fall within a preexisting category of financial institution and expressly authorizes the Department to recognize and regulate new categories of financial institution.​
  24. The Department’s published registration policy “Financial Institutions Registration” likewise does not list conformity with an existing or “approved” financial institution type as a criterion for approval or denial.​
  25. In SCR 14 [2021], the Supreme Court held that the Executive is required to adhere to and apply its own established policies where those policies are consistent with governing law, and may not disregard or act contrary to such policies in the exercise of its statutory discretion.​
  26. This principle has likewise been recognized in numerous Federal Court decisions, such as FCR 27 [2023].​
  27. The Plaintiff relied upon the Department’s published registration policy in preparing and submitting the application.​
  28. At no point prior to the denial was the Plaintiff informed that the proposed institutional structure was categorically ineligible for registration under the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.​
  29. At no point prior to the denial was the Plaintiff afforded an opportunity to respond to or address the Department’s stated basis for denial.​
  30. The Department’s denial prevented the Plaintiff from obtaining registration of NMPTreasury as a financial institution.​
  31. The Plaintiff thereafter retained legal counsel and commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Department’s decision, and a writ of mandamus compelling the Department to perform its statutory duties in accordance with law.​


IV. CLAIMS OF RELIEF

I. Failure to Perform Statutory Duty

The Department of Commerce committed a negligent failure to perform a statutory duty by failing to evaluate the Plaintiff’s application in accordance with the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act and the Department’s own published registration policy.

The Financial Institutions Enforcement Act expressly grants the Department broad authority to “create, define, recognise, license, and regulate new types or categories of financial institution” and further provides that this authority “is intended to be broad and is not limited by the types of financial institution named in this or any other Act.” The Act therefore contemplates that the Department may recognize financial institutions beyond any previously established classifications.

Pursuant to that statutory authority, the Department adopted and published “Financial Institutions Registration” establishing the criteria upon which applications are to be assessed. That policy requires applicants to be evaluated according to: (1) compliance with legal obligations, (2) the suitability of the institution’s directors, and (3) whether the applicant has adequately explained the institution’s structure and intended operations. The policy further requires that, where an applicant fails to satisfy any of those requirements, the applicant be notified of the deficiency and afforded forty-eight (48) hours to correct it before an application is denied, absent exceptional circumstances.

The Plaintiff’s application was not denied because it failed any of the published eligibility requirements. Rather, the Department denied the application because it allegedly “did not fit into any of the approved financial institution types.” Neither the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act nor the Department’s published registration policy identifies conformity with an existing financial institution type as a requirement for registration. To the contrary, the governing statute expressly authorizes the Department to recognize new categories of financial institutions.

As preceded in SCR 14 [2021] and repeatedly reaffirmed by the Federal Court, including FCR 27 [2023], the Executive is required to comply with and apply its own lawful policies. While the Department retains discretion in determining whether to approve or deny an application, that discretion must be exercised within the framework established by the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act and the Department’s own published policy. The Department may not deny an application on grounds outside that framework.

By relying upon a criterion absent from both the governing statute and the Department’s published policy, the Department failed to discharge the statutory duty entrusted to it. This failure directly deprived the Plaintiff of a lawful determination of the application and constitutes a violation of the Failure to Perform Statutory Duty provision.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Department of Commerce to reconsider the Plaintiff’s application in accordance with the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act and the Department’s published registration policy.​

II. Denial of Due Process

The Department of Commerce denied the Plaintiff due process by failing to follow the procedures governing the consideration of financial institution registration applications.

The Department’s published registration policy establishes the procedure by which applications are to be reviewed. Where an applicant fails to satisfy any of the stated requirements, the policy requires that the applicant be informed of the specific deficiency and afforded forty-eight (48) hours to make the necessary corrections before a final denial is issued, unless exceptional circumstances justify otherwise.

The Department did not identify any deficiency within the Plaintiff’s application under the published eligibility criteria. Nor did it notify the Plaintiff that the application required amendment or afford the Plaintiff the opportunity to cure any alleged deficiency. Instead, the Department summarily denied the application based upon a criterion not contained within either the governing statute or the Department’s own published policy.

By failing to follow the procedures governing financial institution applications, the Department denied the Plaintiff the process required by law before rendering a decision affecting the Plaintiff’s legal interests. The Department’s actions therefore constitute a denial of due process.​

V. PRAYER OF RELIEF

Writ of Mandamus:
The Department of Commerce failed to discharge the statutory duties entrusted to it under the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act by denying the Plaintiff's application on a basis neither authorized by statute nor contained within the Department's own published Financial Institution Registration Policy. Rather than evaluating the application under the criteria established by its own policy, the Department relied upon an extraneous requirement that an applicant fit within an "approved financial institution type," despite the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act expressly authorizing the Department to create, define, and recognize new categories of financial institutions. Furthermore, the Department failed to follow its own published procedures by neither identifying any deficiency under its stated eligibility requirements nor providing the Plaintiff the prescribed forty-eight-hour opportunity to remedy any such deficiency prior to denial.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Department of Commerce to vacate and set aside its denial of the Plaintiff's application, reconsider the application in strict accordance with the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act and the Department's published “Financial Institutions Registration”, evaluate the application solely under the criteria lawfully established by statute and policy, and fully comply with all procedural requirements governing financial institution registration, including providing notice of any identified deficiencies and affording the Plaintiff the opportunity to cure such deficiencies in accordance with the Department's published prFocedures before issuing any subsequent final determination.​

Legal Fees:
Pursuant to the Redmont Civil Code Act, the Plaintiff seeks legal fees in the amount of 30% of the total awarded relief, or no less than $3,000, to cover attorney costs and filing expenses associated with this action.​

VI. EVIDENCE

Exhibit P-01, P-02 & P-03
The plaintiff’s application to the DoC and their subsequent denial and reasoning.
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By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 13th day of July, 2026



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Last edited:
Hello, Attorney General Juniperfig here with a settlement offer.

I will give everyone in this case (lawyers, parties, judges) $2,500 each if you drop this case with prejudice.

Thank you for your time.
 

Writ of Summons



@Matthew100x, and the Department of Justice, is commanded to appear before the District Court

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

Answer to Complaint



IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

fluffywaafelz
Plaintiff

v.

Department of Commerce
Defendant

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

1. AFFIRMED.
2. AFFIRMED.
3. AFFIRMED.
4. AFFIRMED.
5. AFFIRMED.
6. AFFIRMED.
7. AFFIRMED.
8. AFFIRMED.
9. AFFIRMED.
10. AFFIRMED.
11. AFFIRMED.
12. AFFIRMED.
13. AFFIRMED.
14. NO CONTEST. The Defendant cannot determine with sufficient certainty what the Plaintiff intended to enter in the “Company Type” field when the application was originally submitted.
15. AFFIRMED.
16. AFFIRMED.
17. AFFIRMED.
18. DENIED. The Defendant informed the Plaintiff that the application failed to satisfy an eligibility requirement because the Plaintiff did not select or provide a valid registration type.(see D-001).
19. DENIED. The Defendant identified deficiencies concerning the Plaintiff’s proposed classification and attempted to provide the Plaintiff with an opportunity to correct those deficiencies. The Plaintiff did not make the correction requested by the Department.(see D-001).
20. DENIED. The Defendant informed the Plaintiff that the application required correction concerning the proposed financial-institution registration type. The Plaintiff did not select an available registration type and instead requested recognition under a category that had not been created or designated by regulation. (see D-001).
21. DENIED. The Defendant provided the Plaintiff with approximately seventy-two hours to correct or clarify the application, exceeding the forty-eight-hour period stated in the Financial Institutions Registration Policy.(see D-001).
22. AFFIRMED.
23. DENIED. The Financial Institutions Enforcement Act authorizes—but does not require—the Department to create or recognize new categories of financial institutions. Section 6 repeatedly uses the discretionary term “may” and provides that the Department may create a new category “by regulation.” It does not confer upon every applicant an entitlement to compel the creation of a requested category. (See Part II, § 6(1)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.)

The Plaintiff misstates the scope of judicial review applicable to departmental policy. Congress expressly authorized the Department to create and regulate categories of financial institutions, classify financial arrangements, and establish registration requirements. (See Part II, § 6(1)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.) Under Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont, courts may review whether an agency exceeded its delegated authority or infringed a constitutional or statutory right, but must otherwise afford reasonable deference to lawful agency determinations and may not substitute judicial policy preferences for those of the authorized department. (See Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal.)
24. DENIED. The absence of an existing, applicable registration category was not an extraneous consideration. Registration under the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act requires authorization for the relevant activity, while the creation of a new category remains within the Department’s regulatory discretion. The Department further denies that it disregarded its registration policy. (See Part II, §§ 5(1), 6(1)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.)
25. DENIED. The Plaintiff overstates the holding of Partypig678 v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2021] SCR 14. That decision recognized the validity of an agency policy consistent with governing law but also evaluated whether the agency acted reasonably and provided adequate notice. It did not hold that every alleged departure from agency policy creates a mandatory statutory duty or entitles an applicant to mandamus. (See Partypig678 v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2021] SCR 14, Lawsuit: Adjourned - Partypig678 v. Department of Construction and Transportation [2021] SCR 14.)
26. AFFIRMED.
27. NO CONTEST. The Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge to determine the extent to which the Plaintiff relied upon the policy when preparing the application.
28. DENIED. Before the final denial, the Defendant informed the Plaintiff that the proposed structure did not correspond to an approved financial-institution type and afforded the Plaintiff an opportunity to select or identify an applicable classification.(see D-001).
29. DENIED. The Plaintiff was afforded approximately seventy-two hours to correct or clarify the application but did not provide the requested correction or select an applicable registration type.(see D-001).
30. AFFIRMED.
31. NO CONTEST. The commencement of this proceeding and the Plaintiff’s retention of counsel are not material to whether the Department violated a statutory duty or denied the Plaintiff due process.

II. DEFENCES

1. No Failure to Perform a Statutory Duty
The Defendant denies that it failed to perform a duty required by law.

A claim for failure to perform a statutory duty requires a government officer or body to have failed to perform a duty that the law affirmatively requires. The applicable remedy is a writ of mandamus. (See Part XI, § 7(a)–(c), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act.)

The Financial Institutions Enforcement Act does not require the Department to create a new category of financial institution whenever an applicant requests one. Instead, the Act provides that the Department “may, by regulation,” create, define, recognize, license, and regulate new categories. The statutory language grants regulatory discretion; it does not impose a ministerial duty owed to each prospective applicant. (See Part II, § 6(1)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.)

The Plaintiff’s interpretation would improperly convert the Department’s discretionary regulatory authority into a mandatory obligation to create a new institutional category on demand. Neither the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act nor the Department’s policy imposes such an obligation.

The Defendant reviewed the application, identified the classification problem, afforded the Plaintiff time to correct or clarify the application, and ultimately denied the application when the deficiency was not resolved. The Defendant therefore did not fail to perform a statutory duty.

2. No Denial of Due Process
The Defendant denies that it failed to provide the process required by law.

A denial-of-due-process claim requires a decision affecting the Plaintiff’s rights or interests and either a failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard or a failure to follow procedures required by law. No violation occurs where there is no statutory requirement to provide notice or an opportunity to be heard. (See Part XI, § 6(a)–(d), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act.)

The Department informed the Plaintiff that the proposed registration did not fit an available financial-institution category and afforded the Plaintiff approximately seventy-two hours to correct or clarify the application. That period exceeded the forty-eight-hour period identified in the Department’s policy. "But I do have one question, would you be willing to change the type ofyour financial institution from "other" to another type" (D-001, Message of geobeeuser, 01/07/2026.)

The Plaintiff did not provide the correction requested by the Department. The subsequent denial therefore followed notice and an opportunity to address the identified deficiency. The Department did not deny the application summarily or without process.

3. Judicial Deference to Lawful Departmental Policy
The Department’s Financial Institutions Registration Policy constitutes an exercise of authority expressly delegated by Congress through the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act. Congress authorized the Department to create, define, recognize, license, and regulate categories of financial institutions; classify financial arrangements according to their economic substance; and determine the registration requirements applicable to each category. (See Part II, § 6(1)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.)

In Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont, the Supreme Court held that agency action may be overturned, absent a statutory framework establishing broader judicial review, only where the agency exceeds the authority granted to it or improperly infringes a constitutional or statutory right or interest. The Court explained: “Agency action, absent a statute from Congress creating a framework for judicial review, may only be overturned if that agency acted outside of its granted powers, or if a constitutional or statutory right or interest was improperly abridged.” (See Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal.) The Supreme Court further held that reviewing courts must afford reasonable deference to an agency acting within its lawful authority: “Reviewing courts should give reasonable deference to an agency acting within its own legal bounds. Without any statutory framework for properly reviewing agency determinations, it is not possible for a reviewing court to intervene in a final agency determination in any way if that determination does not either exceed its statutory boundaries or infringe on a right or interest of a regulated party.” (See Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal.)

The Court accordingly established that, where an agency’s decision is legally valid but reasonable disagreements remain concerning the preferable policy, “a court should not supplant an agency’s judgment for its own.” (See Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal.) That principle controls here. Congress expressly entrusted the Department of Commerce with the authority to classify financial institutions, establish registration requirements, and determine whether new categories should be created by regulation. The Plaintiff does not identify any provision of the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act requiring the Department to recognize every proposed institutional structure or create a new category at an applicant’s request. The Department’s determination that the Plaintiff’s proposed institution did not correspond to an existing registration category was therefore an exercise of delegated administrative judgment. The Court may determine whether the Department acted beyond the authority granted by Congress, violated an applicable statute, or infringed a protected right. It may not, however, substitute its preferred financial-regulatory policy for the Department’s judgment merely because the Plaintiff disagrees with the Department’s classification decision.

The Supreme Court also held that a reviewing court may direct an agency to alter its policies only to bring those policies into conformity with law, “and nothing more.” (See Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 78, 15 (appeal), Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal.) Consequently, the Court cannot order the Department to create a new category, prescribe the contents of a future regulation, or direct the Department to classify the Plaintiff’s proposed entity in a particular manner unless the existing policy or decision contradicts governing law. Because the Department acted within the regulatory authority expressly granted by Congress, and because the Plaintiff has not established the infringement of a statutory or constitutional right, judicial intervention into the Department’s policy determination is unwarranted.

4. Mandamus Is Unavailable
Mandamus is available only where a government officer or body has failed to perform a duty required by law. (See Part XI, § 7(a)–(c), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act.)

The Plaintiff cannot identify a statutory provision requiring the Department to create, define, or recognize the particular financial-institution category requested in the application. Section 6 of the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act grants the Department discretion to create categories by regulation. It does not require the Department to create a category for every proposed arrangement. (See Part II, § 6(1)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.)

The Court therefore cannot issue mandamus compelling the Department to exercise discretionary regulatory authority in a particular manner. The Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 27 similarly recognized that a court may adjudicate the legality of executive conduct while declining to compel a discretionary executive investigation. (See The Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 27, Lawsuit: Adjourned - The Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2023] FCR 27.)

The Court may not use mandamus to create a regulatory category, dictate the contents of a Department regulation, or require the Department to approve an institution that does not satisfy an existing registration classification.

5. The Department Acted Within Its Statutory Discretion
The Financial Institutions Enforcement Act authorizes the Department to classify financial arrangements according to their economic substance and to determine the registration requirements applicable to designated types of institution. (See Part I, § 4(1)(a)–(e); Part II, § 6(3)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.) The Plaintiff’s proposed arrangement involved currency exchange between jurisdictions for affiliated companies. The Department was authorized to determine whether that arrangement corresponded to an existing registration type and whether a new regulatory classification was appropriate. Nothing in the Act guarantees approval merely because a proposed activity may fall within the broad subject matter of financial regulation.

By making this submission, I agree that I understand the penalties for lying in court and that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 3rd day of August, 2026.



Motion


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION

fluffywaafelz
Plaintiff

v.

Department of Commerce
Defendant


MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 5.12

The Defendant moves that the Complaint be dismissed under Rule 5.12 of the Court Rules and Procedures for lack of sufficient standing. In support of this Motion, the Defendant respectfully alleges as follows:

I. APPLICABLE STANDARD

A motion to dismiss must identify the specific rule under which dismissal is requested and apply that rule using the law, facts in the case, evidence in the case, or previous decisions of the Court. (See Rule 5.1, Information - Court Rules and Procedures.) Rule 5.12 authorizes dismissal where “the plaintiff fails to have sufficient standing in order to pursue the case.” (See Rule 5.12, Information - Court Rules and Procedures.)

Standing requires the Plaintiff to establish:

a. An injury caused by a clearly identifiable second party, or an effect caused by an application of law;​
b. That the cause of the injury was against the law; and​
c. That a remedy applicable under relevant law can be granted through a favorable decision.​
(See Rule 2.1(1)–(3), Information - Court Rules and Procedures.)

Failure to satisfy every element of Rule 2.1 is grounds for dismissal. (See Rule 2.2, Information - Court Rules and Procedures.)

II. THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PLEADED AN INJURY CAUSED BY UNLAWFUL CONDUCT

The Plaintiff alleges injury arising from the denial of its application to register NMPTreasury as a financial institution. Although the denial constitutes an identifiable governmental action, the Plaintiff must also establish that the cause of the alleged injury was unlawful. The mere existence of an adverse administrative decision does not satisfy the second element of standing. The Plaintiff’s theory depends upon the assertion that the Department was legally required to create or recognize a new financial-institution category corresponding to the Plaintiff’s proposed arrangement.

The Financial Institutions Enforcement Act imposes no such requirement. It provides that the Department “may, by regulation, create, define, recognise, license, and regulate new types or categories of financial institution.” (See Part II, § 6(1), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.) The same section authorizes the Department to classify financial instruments, determine their regulatory treatment, and establish applicable registration requirements. Each of those powers is expressed in discretionary terms. (See Part II, § 6(2)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.)

The word “may” grants the Department authority to act by regulation. It does not impose a mandatory duty to create a new category whenever an applicant proposes an arrangement that does not correspond to an existing category. The Department informed the Plaintiff that its proposed registration did not correspond to an approved financial-institution type and provided approximately seventy-two hours for correction or clarification. The Plaintiff did not select an applicable registration type or otherwise resolve the deficiency identified by the Department. Because the Department acted within the discretion granted by the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act and provided the Plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to respond, the Complaint does not establish that the cause of the alleged injury was against the law.
The Plaintiff therefore fails the second element of standing under Rule 2.1(2).

III. THE REQUESTED WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY

The Plaintiff must also establish that a remedy applicable under relevant law can be granted through a favorable judgment. (See Rule 2.1(3), Information - Court Rules and Procedures.) The Plaintiff principally seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Department to vacate its denial and reconsider the application in a manner that would require the Department to disregard the absence of an existing applicable registration category. Under the Redmont Civil Code Act, mandamus is the remedy for a government officer or body’s failure to perform “a duty required by law.” (See Part XI, § 7(a)–(c), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act.) The Plaintiff has not identified any duty required by law that the Department failed to perform. In particular, the Plaintiff has not identified any provision requiring the Department to:

a. Create a new financial-institution category upon application;​
b. Promulgate a new regulation for the benefit of a particular applicant;​
c. Classify the Plaintiff’s arrangement as a payment processor or any other requested type;​
d. Approve an application that does not correspond to an existing registration category; or​
e. Exercise its discretionary regulatory authority in the manner preferred by the Plaintiff.​

Section 6 of the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act expressly delegates to the Department the authority to create, define, recognize, license, and regulate financial-institution categories; classify financial arrangements according to their economic substance; and determine applicable registration requirements. These powers are discretionary and are to be exercised through departmental regulation. (See Part II, § 6(1)–(5), Act of Congress - Financial Institutions Enforcement Act.) In Galactic Empire of Redmont v. Commonwealth of Redmont, the Supreme Court held that, absent a statutory framework authorizing broader review, an agency action may be overturned only where the agency exceeds its delegated powers or improperly infringes a constitutional or statutory right or interest. (See Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal.) The Supreme Court further held that reviewing courts must give “reasonable deference” to an agency acting within its lawful boundaries and that, where an agency decision is legally valid but reasonable policy disagreements exist, “a court should not supplant an agency’s judgment for its own.” (See Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal.)

The Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating that the Department acted outside the authority granted by § 6. Instead, the Plaintiff asks the Court to substitute its judgment for the Department’s concerning whether the Plaintiff’s proposed arrangement should be recognized under an existing category or whether a new category should be created. That requested relief is unavailable. The Supreme Court held that a reviewing court may direct an agency to amend its policies only to bring those policies into conformity with law, “and nothing more.” A court therefore cannot prescribe the content of a new financial-institution regulation or compel the Department to exercise delegated policymaking authority in favor of a particular applicant. (See Appeal: Accepted - [2025] FCR 78 - Appeal.) Because the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act does not require the creation or recognition of the Plaintiff’s requested category, the Court cannot redress the alleged injury through mandamus without converting discretionary regulatory power into a mandatory duty. The Plaintiff therefore fails to identify a remedy applicable under governing law and cannot satisfy Rule 2.1(3). (See Rule 2.1(3), Information - Court Rules and Procedures.)

IV. THE DUE-PROCESS CLAIM DOES NOT SUPPLY STANDING

The Plaintiff separately alleges that the Department failed to provide notice and an opportunity to cure deficiencies in the application. The Redmont Civil Code Act recognizes a denial-of-due-process claim where a government body makes a decision affecting a person’s rights or interests and either fails to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard or fails to follow procedures required by law. (See Part XI, § 6(a)–(c), Act of Congress - Redmont Civil Code Act.) The facts demonstrate that the Department notified the Plaintiff of the classification deficiency and afforded approximately seventy-two hours for the Plaintiff to correct or clarify the application. (see D-001). The Plaintiff therefore received more than the forty-eight-hour period identified in the Department’s policy. Because the Department provided notice and an opportunity to address the deficiency, the Complaint does not establish an unlawful denial of process capable of supporting the second element of standing. Nor can the Plaintiff obtain reversal of the decision under the due-process provision where the process allegedly omitted was, in fact, provided.

V. THE REQUEST FOR LEGAL FEES DOES NOT CURE THE STANDING DEFECT

The Plaintiff additionally seeks legal fees equal to thirty percent of the awarded relief or no less than $3,000. Legal fees are derivative of a viable underlying claim and do not independently establish an injury, unlawful cause, or legally available substantive remedy. Where the Plaintiff cannot establish entitlement to mandamus or reversal, the request for legal fees cannot independently satisfy Rule 2.1(3).

VI. CONCLUSION
  • The Plaintiff cannot establish all three elements of standing.
  • The Plaintiff has not established that the denial resulted from conduct against the law because the Department acted within its discretionary statutory authority and provided notice and an opportunity to correct the application.
  • The Plaintiff has not identified a mandatory statutory duty that can be enforced through mandamus.
  • The Court cannot compel the Department to create a new category of financial institution, promulgate a particular regulation, or exercise its discretionary classification authority in the Plaintiff’s favor.
  • The Plaintiff therefore fails Rules 2.1(2) and 2.1(3), and dismissal is authorized under Rule 5.12.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests that the Court:
  1. Grant this Motion under Rule 5.12;
  2. Dismiss the Complaint without prejudice;
  3. Deny the requested writ of mandamus, reversal, and legal fees; and
  4. Grant such other relief as the Court considers proper.
By making this submission, I agree that I understand the penalties for lying in court and that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 3rd day of August, 2026.



The Defendant submits the following evidence:

D-001: Attached PDF File of Ticket-34726 verified in by Staff in the ticket staff-37408.

The Defendant reserves the right to submit further admissible evidence during discovery in accordance with the Court Rules and Procedures.
 

Attachments

Court Order


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Order of Dismissal- fluffywaafelz v. Department of Commerce [2026] DCR 132

On review of the Commonwealth's dispositive motion, this case is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 6 of the Financial Institutions Enforcement Act grants the Department discretionary authority to create, define, recognize, license, and regulate new categories of financial institution. That authority is expressed in permissive terms and does not impose upon the Department a mandatory duty to create or recognize a category for any particular applicant; Furthermore, common law generally permits government departments general discretion in the conduct of their mandates as defined under law.

Without regard to the remedy discussions made by the Commonwealth, the action fails for lack of standing under Rule 2.1 (b). Plaintiff has not identified any provision requiring the Department to classify the proposed institution as requested. Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the government's alleged failure to act caused harm. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff lacks standing and the action is dismissed without prejudice.

All other arguments made by the Commonwealth in its Rule 5.12 motion are not considered.


So ordered,
Justice Mug in the District Court

 
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