Appeal: Accepted Appeal in re: [2026] DCR 68 | [2026] FCR 59

Writ of Summons

@3mkTalal You are commanded to appear in the case: Appeal in re: [2026] DCR 68 | [2026] FCR 56 on behalf of the Respondent.

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

Brief

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

IN RE: 2026 DCR 68
2026 FCR 56

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

The Appellant respectfully requests that the District Court's dismissal be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

The District Court erred in concluding that the Appellant failed to state any legally cognizable civil claim. While several causes of action referenced criminal statutes, the Complaint sought civil relief for the wrongful deprivation and retention of property. The Court adopted an overly narrow interpretation of the Redmont Civil Code by concluding that conduct constituting a criminal offense cannot also support a civil action absent an expressly codified civil cause of action.

The District Court further erred in dismissing the fraud claim. The Complaint alleged that company funds were transferred without authorization and retained by the Defendants. Accepting those allegations as true, as required under Rule 5.5, the Complaint plausibly alleged wrongful conduct sufficient to survive dismissal and proceed to adjudication on the merits. At the dismissal stage, all reasonable inferences should have been drawn in favor of the Plaintiff rather than against it.

Finally, dismissal with prejudice was unwarranted. Even if the Court believed the Complaint lacked sufficient specificity, the interests of justice favored permitting amendment rather than permanently foreclosing the claims. The deficiencies identified by the Court were pleading deficiencies, not findings that the underlying conduct could never give rise to civil liability.

Accordingly, the Appellant respectfully requests that the Federal Court reverse the dismissal, vacate the award of legal fees, and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

The Appellant respectfully moves for a Stay of Execution of the District Court's award of $16,500 in mandatory legal fees pending resolution of this appeal.

This appeal presents substantial questions regarding the interpretation of the Redmont Civil Code, the application of Rule 5.5, and whether dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. Immediate enforcement of the legal fee award would impose financial prejudice upon the Appellant before the Federal Court has had an opportunity to determine whether the underlying judgment should stand.

A temporary stay would preserve the status quo during the pendency of this appeal and would not materially prejudice the Appellees, who may still recover the award should the judgment be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the Appellant respectfully requests that this Court stay execution of the $16,500 legal fee award until final disposition of this appeal.

Motion

Your Honor,

The Respondents [hadethegod, wallavan, and HL-Bank] submit this brief in response to the Appellant's Brief
and respectfully request that the District Court's judgment be affirmed in full. The Appellant
raises three contentions, each directed to the merits of the dismissal. Each rests on a
misstatement of the District Court's holding, the standard it applied, or her own pleading. None
establishes reversible error.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the District Court's conclusions of law de novo and disturbs its factual
findings only where they could not be supported by the record. The District Court dismissed under
the failure-to-state-a-claim branch of Rule 5.5, a ruling decided on the face of the Complaint and
reviewed de novo. Whether a dismissal is with or without prejudice is a determination the Court
Rules commit to the presiding judge (Rule 5.16). On every ground she presses, the burden of showing
error is the Appellant's.

II. THE APPELLANT MISSTATES THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING

The Appellant's central argument attacks a holding the District Court never made. She asserts the
Court adopted an "overly narrow" rule that "conduct constituting a criminal offense cannot also
support a civil action absent an expressly codified civil cause of action."

The District Court adopted no such rule. It applied the standard set by the Civil Code itself: a
plaintiff seeking relief for a non-codified harm must show support in the Civil Code, in common
law, or in judicial precedent (Redmont Civil Code, Part II, § 3(1)(a)-(b)), and existing common
law torts remain actionable unless abolished by the Code. It further applied the settled rule that
a criminal violation supports civil damages where both the Civil Code and the Criminal Code
reference the underlying claim (Redmont Civil Code, Part II, § 4(3); Le9endz_ v. AussieBloke25
[2026] DCR 59; MMiqa v. ZachOfPotatoes10 [2026] DCR 67).

That is not a rule that criminal conduct can never support civil liability. It is a rule that the
plaintiff must identify a civil basis for the claim and plead it, and that the burden to do so is
hers (Part II, § 3(1)(a)). The Appellant has never carried it. She identified no civil cause of
action for embezzlement, aggravated theft, conspiracy, concealment of criminal proceeds, accomplice
liability, market manipulation, or false credentials, neither below nor in her Brief, and pleaded
the elements of none. Those offences are pleaded as criminal offences, and she has named no civil
claim in their place. Reviewed de novo, the District Court applied the correct rule and reached the
correct result.

III. NAMING A HARM IS NOT IDENTIFYING A CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION

The Appellant recharacterizes her suit as one seeking "civil relief for the wrongful deprivation
and retention of property." The Complaint does describe a harm in those terms. What it never does
is identify the civil cause of action that redresses that harm. Its operative claim alleges that
the Defendants' conduct "constitute Fraud, Embezzlement, Aggravated Theft, Conspiracy to Commit
a Crime, Concealment of Criminal Proceeds, Accomplice Liability, Market Manipulation, and False
Credentials," followed by a request for "all civil remedies available." Those are eight criminal
offences and a blanket request for relief. The Complaint identified no civil cause of action by
name and pleaded the elements of none.

That is the defect the District Court found. A grievance, however real, is not a cause of action.
Pointing again on appeal to the deprivation of property restates the injury; it does not supply the
civil claim the Complaint omitted. To the extent the Appellant now seeks to advance a civil cause
of action for the first time on appeal, none was pleaded or litigated below, and an appeal reviews
the decision and the claims that were before the trial court, not a claim framed after judgment.
The record is closed to new evidence as well: under Rule 1.7, no new evidence or witness testimony
may be introduced on appeal save for matters that could not have been found below with reasonable
diligence, which the Appellant's own transaction records are not. A court cannot have erred by
declining to sustain a claim the plaintiff never identified.

IV. THE FRAUD CLAIM WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED, AND THE APPELLANT STILL IDENTIFIES NO MISREPRESENTATION

Fraud was the sole claim the District Court treated as capable of proceeding as a civil wrong, and
it assessed that claim against fraud's settled elements. Redmont defines fraud as knowingly or
recklessly misrepresenting or omitting a material fact to another, causing that party to rely on
the misrepresentation, resulting in actual, quantifiable harm (Criminal Code Act, Part VII, § 7).
Its elements are a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, reliance upon it, and
resulting quantifiable harm. This is why fraud stood apart from the offences addressed in Section
II. The District Court's point was not that fraud cannot be pursued civilly, but that this
Complaint did not plead it.

The District Court found the Complaint pleaded a transfer and retention of funds, but no
misrepresentation, no omission, and no reliance. Measured against those elements, the finding was
correct. The Appellant answers that, "accepting those allegations as true" and drawing inferences
in her favor, the Complaint "plausibly alleged wrongful conduct." That misreads the verdict and the
standard. The District Court did accept the pleaded facts as true and did draw reasonable
inferences in her favor; that is the standard it applied (Ko531 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2026]
FCR 39). Accepting facts as true does not permit a court to supply an element the plaintiff never
pleaded, and drawing inferences does not mean reading in a misrepresentation and reliance that
appear nowhere in the Complaint. "Wrongful conduct" is not a cause of action. Fraud is, and an
unauthorized transfer of funds, taken as true, is not by itself a misrepresentation that induced
reliance.

The dispositive point is this. The District Court told the Appellant precisely what her fraud claim
lacked. With that defect identified for her, and with the benefit of the full record, the
Appellant's Brief still does not identify the misrepresentation, the omission, or the act of
reliance her claim requires. She has not named it in the Complaint, in her opposition below, or in
this appeal. A fraud claim whose central element cannot be identified even after the defect is
spelled out was correctly dismissed.

V. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE WAS PROPER AND REASONED

The Appellant argues the interests of justice favored amendment over dismissal with prejudice.
Whether a dismissal is with or without prejudice is committed to the presiding judge (Rule 5.16),
and the District Court made that determination with stated reasons: the Appellant had the
opportunity to develop the record and amend the pleading during discovery and did not cure the
defects. The Appellant identifies no error in those reasons.

The record bears the District Court out. Rule 3.3 permitted the Appellant to amend her Complaint,
including her Claims for Relief, at any time during discovery. She was placed on notice of the
precise defects in the Defence's Motion to Dismiss on June 15. From that point she never moved to
amend, never tendered a proposed amended complaint, and never identified the civil cause of action
she would plead. She used her response only to relabel exhibits, not to amend. A conditional
request for "leave to amend" embedded in a response brief is neither an amendment nor a motion to
amend.

Her position on appeal fares no better. Even now, with the defects identified and the benefit of
the full record, the Appellant still does not state what she would plead if the matter were
returned. A plaintiff who held the right to amend, was told what was missing, and declined to use
that right cannot show that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice.
A remand to permit an amendment the Appellant has never articulated, in any forum, would serve no
purpose she has identified. Declining it was no error.

VI. THE LEGAL FEE AWARD STANDS

The $16,500 award is a mandatory statutory fee flowing from the Respondents' status as the
prevailing party: thirty percent of the case value, which in a civil case the defendant wins is the
amount the plaintiff requested (Redmont Civil Code, Part III, § 7(2)(a), (e)). The Appellant
requested $55,000, and thirty percent is $16,500. The Appellant does not challenge the award
independently; she seeks vacatur only as a consequence of reversal. The stay of execution recently
granted pauses enforcement alone and does not disturb the award, which remains intact and becomes
collectible upon affirmance. Because the dismissal should be affirmed, the award stands.

VII. CONCLUSION

The Appellant has shown no error in the District Court's judgment. She misstates the holding she
attacks, restates a harm as though it were a pleaded civil claim, and still cannot name the
misrepresentation her fraud claim requires. The Respondents respectfully request that this Court
affirm the District Court's judgment in full and deny the requested reversal, vacatur, and remand.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT


APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF


The Appellant respectfully submits this Reply Brief in response to the Respondents' Brief and, in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

1. The Respondents mischaracterize the basis of this appeal. The Appellant does not merely challenge the District Court's interpretation of the Complaint but rather the procedural errors committed before dismissal, including the denial of the opportunity to amend under Rule 3.3, the dismissal with prejudice without a finding of futility, and the failure to address pending motions prior to final judgment.
2. The Respondents concede that Rule 3.3 permitted amendment during discovery. Their argument that the Appellant "could have amended earlier" is not a legal basis to extinguish the express right granted by Rule 3.3 while discovery remained open. No Rule requires a plaintiff to amend immediately upon receipt of a Motion to Dismiss, nor does any Rule provide that the right to amend is waived by choosing to oppose the motion instead.
3. Rule 5.16 grants discretion regarding whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice, but that discretion is not unlimited. The District Court made no finding that amendment would have been futile, that the Appellant acted in bad faith, repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies, or otherwise engaged in conduct warranting the harsh sanction of dismissal with prejudice. Without such findings, dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.
4. The Respondents incorrectly characterize the Appellant's request for leave to amend as legally insignificant. Once leave to amend was requested, the District Court was required to exercise its discretion by considering that request. The judgment contains no meaningful analysis explaining why amendment should be denied or why dismissal with prejudice was appropriate.
5. The Respondents improperly conflate notice pleading with proof. As recognized in Ko531 v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2026] FCR 39, a Rule 5.5 motion requires the Court to accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. The Complaint alleged the wrongful transfer and retention of the Appellant's property. Whether those facts ultimately support fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, or another cognizable civil claim is an issue appropriately resolved after amendment and litigation, not by dismissal with prejudice before amendment is permitted.
6. The Respondents' argument that the Complaint failed to identify an appropriate civil cause of action merely reinforces why amendment should have been permitted. The Civil Rules favor resolution of disputes on their merits wherever reasonably possible. The District Court instead foreclosed that opportunity without allowing amendment under Rule 3.3.
7. The Respondents rely extensively upon legal arguments that were not relied upon by the District Court itself. Appellate review concerns whether the judgment entered below was legally correct under the applicable Rules and the reasoning employed by the District Court. New legal theories advanced for the first time on appeal cannot cure procedural defects in the judgment under review.
8. The Respondents acknowledge that the award of legal fees is entirely dependent upon affirmance of the underlying judgment. Accordingly, should this Court reverse or remand the dismissal, the legal fee award under Part III, Section 7 of the Civil Code must likewise be vacated.

WHEREFORE, the Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the District Court, vacate the dismissal with prejudice, vacate the accompanying legal fee award, and remand this matter with instructions that the Appellant be permitted to amend the Complaint pursuant to Rule 3.3 so that this matter may be resolved on its merits.

Motion

Your Honor,

The Appellant's Reply names, for the first time in this litigation, civil causes of action:
conversion, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. No civil cause of action by these names
was pleaded in the Complaint, raised in her opposition below, or advanced in her opening
Brief. Because they surface only in a reply, the Respondents have had no opportunity to
address them. The Respondents are mindful that further briefing is not available as of right;
the Appellant's Reply itself was filed by leave of this Court, and the Respondents seek the
same accommodation, confined solely to the new matter. The brief response below is submitted
conditionally should the Court grant it.

RESPONSE

An appeal reviews the claims that were before the trial court. These theories were never
pleaded, argued below, or raised in the opening Brief; a reply, to which the Respondents have
no right of answer, is the last place new claims may be introduced. The District Court cannot
have erred as to claims it was never shown.

The Respondents do not dispute that conversion is a codified civil tort. That is the point. If
these claims were available to the Appellant throughout, nothing prevented her from pleading
them. She was on notice of the exact defects from June 15, held the right to amend for all of
discovery under Rule 3.3, and pleaded none of them, naming them only now, after judgment and
after briefing. Indeed, the leave to amend she conditionally requested below sought only
"additional factual specificity" — it did not propose to plead any civil cause of action,
which was the defect the District Court found. Their availability does not show that amendment
was wrongly denied; it shows a plaintiff who had every opportunity to use a right she held and
declined. That is the reasoned discretion Rule 5.16 commits to the trial judge, and it is why
the dismissal with prejudice should be affirmed in full.