Appeal: Accepted [2025] FCR 128 - Contempt of Court Charge - Appeal

Status
Not open for further replies.
ToadKing

ToadKing

Illegal Lawyer
Public Defender
Supporter
5th Anniversary Change Maker Popular in the Polls Statesman
ToadKing__
ToadKing__
Public Defender
Joined
Apr 4, 2025
Messages
345
Username: ToadKing__

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: Omegabiebel

File(s) attached

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] FCR 128 - Contempt of Court Charge

Link to the Original Case: Lawsuit: Pending - Volt Bank, Inc. v. Alta Group Corporation [2025] FCR 128

Basis for Appeal:
The Federal Court erred as a matter of law in finding Appellant in Contempt of Court under Criminal Code Act Section 2(b) for making a second Discord notification to the presiding officer about a separate emergency matter in the same case.

The Court approved the first notification (regarding Plot s105 being auctioned) but held the second notification (regarding fraudulent transfer of three additional collateral plots) to be contempt because the judge felt "pestered" and had 11 other cases on the docket.

Making a second notification about a different urgent matter does not "obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice." Further, the penalty imposed ($1,000 and 10 minutes imprisonment) is grossly disproportionate to the penalties this same judge imposed for objectively worse conduct in prior cases.

I. The Court Applied an Incorrect Legal Standard for Contempt​

The Federal Court's ruling fundamentally misapplies this standard. The Court explicitly approved Appellant's first notification about Plot s105, stating that "Emergency action was absolutely warranted and Omega was right to ping me and opposing." However, the Court found contempt for Appellant's second notification about the discovery of three additional fraudulent plot transfers, reasoning that the judge had "11 cases presently on its docket" and would "review the EI in good course and not be pestered to hurry up."

The Court's ruling creates an arbitrary and legally unsupportable rule: a single notification is permissible, but two notifications constitute "pestering" and obstruction of justice. This standard has no basis in law. The Criminal Code Act does not limit litigants to a specific number of notifications per case, so long as those notifications are lawful. The question is not whether the judge felt "pestered" by being notified twice, but whether the second notification obstructed or interfered with justice. Personal judicial annoyance at being contacted multiple times about separate emergencies is not a legal basis for contempt.

Making a second notification about a separate emergency matter does not obstruct justice - it facilitates it. The two emergency injunctions addressed entirely different urgent matters: the first concerned Plot s105 being actively auctioned by the government, while the second concerned the discovery that Defendants had fraudulently transferred additional collateral plots to third parties. These were separate emergencies requiring separate notifications. To hold that the second notification constitutes obstruction of justice would mean litigants must remain silent about any subsequent emergencies for fear of "pestering" the judge, thereby actually obstructing justice.

II. The Court's Factual Premise Is Flawed​

The Court stated that "all of the alleged property transfers occurred last week," implying the matter was stale. This characterisation misses the point. While the transfers may have occurred last week, they were only discovered and documented by Appellant shortly before the second emergency injunction was filed. More critically, the transferred properties are currently in the possession of third parties, meaning the harm is ongoing and immediate action is necessary to prevent permanent loss of collateral.

The Court's reasoning that the second emergency injunction was less urgent because the transfers "occurred last week" is perverse: it suggests that once fraudulent transfers have occurred and properties are in third-party hands, the matter becomes less urgent rather than more urgent. The opposite is true. Plot s105 was seized by the government and could be recovered through government channels. Plots r101, r027, and c330 are now in the hands of private third parties (peuko, RylandW, and the Government), making immediate judicial intervention more critical, not less.

III. The Penalty Is Grossly Disproportionate​

Even if Appellant's conduct somehow constituted contempt, the penalty of $1,000 and imprisonment is grossly excessive and inconsistent with the Court's own precedent. In YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76, this same presiding officer found a party in contempt for "pinging the presiding officer and subsequently debating the Hon. Judge Ameslap regarding this case" - conduct that involved not only pinging but also engaging in substantive debate with the judge. The Court imposed only a $500 fine with no imprisonment.

Here, Appellant engaged in far less intrusive conduct: a single informational ping with no debate, no argument, and no challenge to judicial authority. Yet the penalty was doubled, and imprisonment was added. The only apparent explanation for this disparate treatment is the judge's subjective annoyance at being notified about a matter the judge deemed insufficiently urgent. Such an arbitrary application of penalties violates basic principles of equal justice and due process.

Supporting Evidence:
 

Attachments

  • Screenshot 2025-12-02 163036.png
    Screenshot 2025-12-02 163036.png
    68.9 KB · Views: 71
Last edited:
In a 3-0 decision, the Supreme Court has decided to grant this appeal.

The Appellant, has seventy-two hours to post their Appellant Brief.

@ToadKing
 

Appeal


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
APPELLANT BRIEF

Can a Federal Court find a litigant in contempt of court based solely on the judge's subjective feeling of being "pestered" rather than any actual obstruction of justice? The answer must be no.

The Federal Court explicitly approved Appellant's first notification about an emergency involving Plot s105 being actively auctioned, stating that "Emergency action was absolutely warranted and Omega was right to ping me and opposing." However, when Appellant made a second notification about the subsequent discovery that the Defendant had fraudulently transferred three additional collateral plots to third parties, the Court found this to be contempt of court. The Court's stated reasoning was not that the second notification obstructed justice, but rather that the judge had "11 cases presently on its docket" and would "review the EI in good course and not be pestered to hurry up." The Court concluded: "Pinging a presiding officer on an active case is obstruction of justice."

This ruling is legally and factually wrong on multiple levels. It transforms contempt of court from a mechanism to protect judicial proceedings into a tool for judges to punish litigants who make communications the judge finds personally annoying. It misconstrues the factual urgency of the matter at issue. And it imposes a penalty double what this same judge imposed for objectively worse conduct in a prior case. The contempt finding must be reversed.

I. The Federal Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard For Contempt​

The Criminal Code Act establishes two distinct offences involving obstruction, each with specific elements:

2. Contempt of Court:
A person commits an offence if the person:
(a) disobeys a lawful order of the court; or
(b) engages in conduct that obstructs or interferes with the administration of justice.
Click to expand...

3. Obstruction of Justice:
A person commits an offence if the person:
(a) willfully interferes with the process of justice by influencing, threatening, harming, or impeding a witness, potential witness, or law enforcement officer; or
(b) knowingly provides false information to a law enforcement officer in the course of their duties.
Click to expand...
The Federal Court's ruling fundamentally misapplies both statutes. In denying Appellant's Motion to Reconsider, the Court made a sweeping and legally incorrect pronouncement: "Pinging a presiding officer on an active case is obstruction of justice." This statement conflates two distinct offences and mischaracterises what constitutes obstruction under either statute.

First, the conduct at issue does not constitute Obstruction of Justice under Section 3. That offence requires either:
(a) willfully interfering by influencing, threatening, harming, or impeding a witness or officer; or
(b) knowingly providing false information to law enforcement.
A Discord ping notifying a judge of an emergency filing does none of these things. There is no influencing, threatening, harming, or impeding. There is no false information. The Federal Court's characterisation of the ping as "obstruction of justice" under Section 3 would be plainly wrong.

Second, the conduct does not constitute Contempt of Court under Section 2(b) because it does not "obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice." The Federal Court found contempt not because the notification obstructed judicial proceedings, but because the judge felt "pestered" by being notified twice about separate emergency matters in the same case. The Court's explicit reasoning was that it had 11 other cases on its docket and did not want to be "pestered to hurry up" on reviewing the second emergency injunction. This is not a finding of obstruction - it is a finding of personal judicial annoyance.

Personal judicial annoyance is not a legal basis for contempt. The question under Section 2(b) is whether the conduct obstructed or interfered with the administration of justice, not whether the judge found it bothersome. Many legitimate litigation activities may be inconvenient or annoying to judges - filing lengthy motions, seeking long extensions and submitting large amounts of evidence. None of these becomes contempt merely because they add to a judge's workload or require attention when the judge is busy with other matters. The test is whether the conduct obstructs justice, not whether it inconveniences the judge.

The Federal Court's blanket statement that "pinging a presiding officer on an active case is obstruction of justice" cannot be reconciled with either statute or this Court's own precedent. If taken literally, this would mean that any notification to a judge about any matter in any active case constitutes a criminal offence. This cannot be right. The Appellant's notification was proper in both form and substance. The ping included both the presiding officer and the opposing party, ensuring transparency and avoiding any ex parte communication concerns. This was not a private sidebar attempting to influence the judge outside the presence of opposing counsel - it was an open, on-the-record notification visible to all parties. The notification was purely informational: it stated that an emergency injunction had been filed and provided a link to the filing. Appellant did not debate the merits, did not argue for a particular outcome, did not challenge the Court's authority, and did not attempt to make substantive points outside the formal court record.

This Court's own precedent in Appeal: Denied - [2025] FCR 119 requires "misconduct that obstructs or interferes with the administration of justice (the court proceedings)." That case involved suspected collusion between parties - conduct that would genuinely undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings. Here, there is no misconduct whatsoever. Appellant engaged in entirely proper conduct: filing an emergency motion and then openly notifying both the Court and the opposing party of that filing, without debate or argument. There is no obstruction - the notification facilitated rather than impeded justice by ensuring timely awareness.

The Federal Court's reasoning would transform contempt into a subjective tool for judges to regulate communications based on personal preference rather than legal standards. If a judge with a light docket might tolerate multiple notifications while a judge with a heavy docket considers the same notifications "pestering," then the law becomes arbitrary and unpredictable. Litigants would have no way to know whether their communications constitute contempt except by guessing at each judge's individual tolerance level and workload at any given moment.

​

II. The Federal Court's Factual Premise Is Fundamentally Flawed​

The Federal Court stated that the second emergency injunction was not as urgent as the first because "all of the alleged property transfers occurred last week," implying the matter was stale. This characterisation is factually and logically wrong. The Court's reasoning that week-old transfers are less urgent than an ongoing auction is perverse - it suggests that once fraudulent transfers have occurred and properties are in third-party hands, the matter becomes less urgent rather than more urgent.

First, while the transfers may have occurred over a week ago, they were only discovered and documented by Appellant shortly before the second emergency injunction was filed. Appellant cannot be faulted for not notifying the Court of fraudulent transfers that Appellant did not yet know had occurred. The relevant timeframe is not when the transfers happened, but when they were discovered and when judicial intervention became necessary.

Second, and more critically, the transferred properties remained in the possession of third parties at that moment, meaning the harm was ongoing and immediate action was necessary to prevent permanent loss of collateral. The passage of time since the transfers makes judicial intervention more urgent, not less urgent. With each passing day, the third parties who received the fraudulently transferred plots become more entrenched in possession, making recovery more difficult and harm more likely to be irreparable.

Third, the nature of the emergency differs between the two injunctions in a way that makes the second more urgent, not less. Plot s105 was seized by the government and listed for auction through official government channels. While immediate action was needed to halt the auction, there were at least established legal procedures for the government seizure and potential recovery. By contrast, Plots r101 and c330 were in the hands of private third parties (peuko, RylandW) who received them through what appears to be fraudulent transfers. These private parties may have no notice of Volt Bank's security interest, may have already made investments in the properties, and may assert good-faith purchaser defences. The difficulty of recovering properties from private third parties who received them through fraudulent transfers made immediate judicial intervention even more critical than recovering a single plot from a government auction.

The Federal Court's suggestion that the second emergency was less urgent because the transfers "occurred last week" demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the harm at issue. The harm is not the moment of transfer - the harm is the ongoing possession of secured collateral by third parties and the increasing difficulty of recovery with each passing day. This harm was occurring at the moment Appellant filed the second emergency injunction. If anything, the delay between the transfers and their discovery makes the matter more urgent because it gave the third-party possessors more time to become entrenched.

​

III. The Penalty Is Grossly Disproportionate And Violates Equal Justice​

Even if Appellant's conduct somehow constituted contempt, the penalty of $1,000 and 10 minutes imprisonment is grossly excessive and inconsistent with the Federal Court's own precedent. The disparate treatment reveals that the contempt finding was based on arbitrary judicial preference rather than neutral application of legal standards.

In YeetGlazer v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2025] FCR 76, this same presiding officer found a party in contempt for "pinging the presiding officer and subsequently debating the Hon. Judge Ameslap regarding this case." The conduct in that case involved not only pinging the judge but also engaging in substantive debate with the judge about the case - conduct that far more clearly interferes with judicial proceedings than a simple notification. Yet the Court imposed only a $500 fine with no imprisonment.

Here, Appellant engaged in far less intrusive conduct: a single informational ping, with a link to the emergency filing. There was no debate. There was no argument. There was no challenge to judicial authority. There was no discussion of the merits. It was purely a notification that a second emergency filing had been made. This conduct is objectively less intrusive and less disruptive than pinging and then debating with the judge.

Yet the penalty was doubled from $500 to $1,000, and imprisonment of 10 minutes was added where there had been none in the prior case. The only apparent explanation for this disparate treatment is the judge's subjective annoyance at being notified about a second emergency in the same case. The penalty increased not because the conduct was more serious, but because it occurred after the judge had already been notified once. This arbitrary application of penalties based on subjective judicial preference rather than objective severity of conduct violates basic principles of equal justice.

The Criminal Code Act authorises "up to 50 Penalty Units; up to 10 minutes imprisonment" for contempt, giving judges discretion in imposing penalties. But discretion must be exercised reasonably, consistently, and proportionally. When the same judge imposes a $500 fine for pinging and debating but a $1,000 fine plus imprisonment for merely pinging about a separate emergency, the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily. The penalty should reflect the severity of the obstruction to justice.

​

IV. CONCLUSION​

The Federal Court committed reversible error by finding Appellant in contempt for making a second notification to the Court about a separate emergency matter in the same case. The contempt finding rests on the legally incorrect premise that personal judicial annoyance at being "pestered" constitutes obstruction of justice. It mischaracterised the urgency of ongoing harm from fraudulent property transfers. And it imposes a penalty grossly disproportionate to similar conduct in prior cases before the same judge.

Notifying a court of an emergency filing does not obstruct justice - it serves justice. Making a second notification about a subsequently discovered emergency does not become contempt merely because an earlier notification was made about a different emergency. The Criminal Code Act requires actual obstruction or interference with judicial proceedings, not merely multiple communications that a busy judge finds inconvenient.

The contempt finding must be reversed, the $1,000 fine and 10 minutes imprisonment must be vacated, and this Court should clarify that the legal standard for contempt under Section 2(b) requires actual obstruction of justice, not subjective judicial annoyance at the volume or timing of legitimate communications.

 

Verdict



Associate Justice Smallfries4 writes the unanimous opinion of the court.

Appellant Omegabiebel appeals their conviction of the summary charge of Contempt of Court by the trial court in Volt Bank, Inc. v. Alta Group Corp [2025] FCR 128. Appellant raises three issues: (1) An incorrect legal standard was applied, (2) the factual premise was incorrect, and (3) the penalty given was grossly disproportionate to the offense.

By unanimous vote, we granted certiorari.


I. Rule​

Contempt of Court is a summary judgment crime under the Criminal Conduct Act (“CCA”). Under the act, a summary offense is one that “may be carried out by the relevant Government Department without a trial.” CCA, Part I, § 6(3)(b). In the context of the courts, “Judicial Officers may impose punishments for any Summary Offense committed during proceedings.” Id. § 6(3)(c).

Contempt of court is an offense committed when an individual either disobeys a lawful order of the court or engages in obstructive or interfering conduct relative to the administration of justice. Id. Part III, § 2(a)–(b). Under this second prong, the trial court is not required to give a warning, order, or other initial pretext before conviction. See [2025] FCR 119 Appeal (Contempt of Court). This is starkly in contrast with the first prong, which must follow a prior directive from the court. Id. Contempt has a maximum penalty of fifty penalty units and ten minutes of imprisonment.

​
II. Facts​

Appellant filed the instant case seeking damages from the defendant under theory of breach of contract. In the course of the case, two emergency injunctions regarding asset freezes. Appellant pinged the presiding officer in both instances. Upon the second, the trial court in response accused and summarily convicted the Appellant of Contempt of Court, finding that Appellant did obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice. The trial court specifically mentioned they were holding the Appellant liable for Contempt under subsection (b) of the CCA.

​
III. Application​

In their order, the trial court found that the Appellant had—by pinging the presiding officer in discord—obstructed or interfered with the administration of justice.
​
a. Incorrect Legal Standard​

Appellant argues in the first issue that after the court approved Appellant’s first injunction following a ping, a secondary ping about a new item should have followed in line with the response from the first. The trial court found that the second ping, however, was a nuisance, and that the presiding officer should “not be pestered to hurry up.” The rationale for this difference in response is because of the apparent urgentness of the first injunction, and the relative non-emergency nature of the second.

Reviewing courts should not undermine the authority or discretion of trial courts, nor should they seek to supplant the judgment of trial courts for their own. The administration of the law is a difficult affair, and the structure of the three-layered judicial system ascribed in our Constitution seeks to spread out work and judgment among multiple officers. This is done to promote efficiency and diversity of legal thought, without compromising uniformity. The standard of uniformity is set by the Supreme Court under Court Rule 1.3.

If the reasonable discretionary actions or judgments of lower courts could be overturned by a reviewing court, the ultimate effect would be that all legal issues would only be final once the Supreme Court had heard them. Therefore, when matters of judicial discretion are implicated in an appeal, so long as that discretion is reasonable a reviewing court may not question it.

However, here we do not see judicial discretion as an issue to consider. As discussed infra, the apparent disparity both between the first and second pings and various contempt of court charges are not relevant to any real legal issue at hand. Even if they were, there is no indication that the trial court’s determinations were unreasonable or outside judicial discretion. Thus, we do not consider these arguments.

However, the instant case does not turn on judicial discretion. Here, Appellant argues that the application of the CCA by the trial court is incorrect as to which of the two requirements for Contempt of Court are proper. (Appellant also argues that the trial court, in some manner, applied the Obstruction of Justice crime. We do not see the relevance in referencing this crime, and dismiss its argumentation as irrelevant and insufficiently briefed)

The trial court states that it used the obstruction or interference clause for Contempt, and not the lawful order clause. Though not explained in great detail, it is evident that the trial court’s decision came down to the extra-judicial communication outside of the courtroom from the Appellant. Though the trial court tolerated (and in fact seemingly appreciated) the first ping, the second ping for a comparatively less urgent affair was of such unnecessary character that it in some way impeded on the court’s efforts, and thus warranted a Contempt charge under the obstruction or interference clause.

We do not agree with the trial court’s reasoning here. Obstruction or interference, while not explicitly defined in statute, do indeed have a particular meaning. In common parlance, obstruction and interference both mean some action that delays, slows, or impedes in some way. To obstruct something would best mean to block or delay it entirely. An example of this would be to entirely block a water faucet, thus obstructing the water from leaving. Interference here best means the illegitimate or unconsented alteration of a proceeding. An example of this would be to block a part of a faucet with one’s finger, which has the effect of both increasing the water pressure and altering the course of the water (usually to the side), thus interfering with the water’s path.

It is clear in this instance that neither occurred. While no doubt annoying and perhaps disrespectful to the presiding officer, the conduct displayed by the Appellant does not seem to have either obstructed justice—perhaps by stopping it entirely or delaying to some illegitimate extent—or by interfering with the administration of justice—perhaps by withholding information necessary for a fully reasoned and just verdict. (Neither of these examples are inclusive).

Thus, the trial court made a reversible error when it convicted Appellant of Contempt under the obstruction or interference clause of the Contempt of Court charge. The proper method for dealing with these less serious, more “social” contempts would be under the lawful order clause.

We are sympathetic with the workload burden, stressors, and priorities of the trial court, and all judicial officers in the Commonwealth generally. There is much work to be done, too few hands to do it, and seemingly not enough time, assistance, or money. Judicial officers should not be subject to constant harassment, targeting, or extra-judicial communication regarding the status of an ongoing case. However, to punish an individual for doing such a thing—outside of the jurisdiction of ex parte communications offenses or staff action—a judicial officer must pursue a contempt charge under the lawful order prong. This can be done simply, effectively, and uniformly by attaching an order at the beginning of every case saying that all parties are ordered to not initiate communications with the judicial officer regarding an ongoing case. With this order submitted, a judicial officer would be free to pursue contempt charges.
​
b. Factual Premises​

Appellant contends, inter alia, that the factual premise underlying the contempt charge—particularly that the second ping was less of an emergency than the first—was flawed. As discussed supra, we do not consider this argument. It appears that this was a reasonable determination by the trial court, regardless of one’s personal opinion. Reviewing courts must not supplant their judgment for that of the trial court.

Further, judicial officers are not the errand-boys or servants of parties to a case. They shall rule on matters as they see them. They have lives, duties, and most importantly other cases to attend to. It is unreasonable to expect constant vigilance or to demand instant performance from a judicial officer, who must weigh competing interests and implications of law in their decision. In the instant case, Appellant pinged the presiding officer twenty minutes after the emergency injunction was requested. There is no reason to say that the presiding officer in question was derelict from his duty, and certainly does not seem to have any history of inactivity, alleged or otherwise.

Because of the above, we do not consider this argument. Such refusal to consider does not impact the outcome of this case.
​
c. Proportionality​

Finally, Appellant contends that even if the conduct warranted a contempt, the penalty was grossly excessive and inconsistent. We dismiss this argument out of hand.

As discussed supra, the decisions of judicial officers are committed to discretion. This is both implicit in the mere fact of judicial interpretation, and explicit in the instant case with the CCA’s written language. Appellant argues that the trial court arbitrarily applied the penalties of the contempt charge, as it had previously issued a lower penalty for a somewhat similar act.

We do not find this argument convincing. Appellant has produced no evidence of arbitrary conduct besides the mere fact that two contempt charges had different sentences. Judicial officers do not need to adhere to a rigorous and objective scheme for assigning punishments. So long as the sentencing discretion utilized by a judicial officer is not monstrously unequal, unfair, or burdensome beyond what justice requires, a sentence is not arbitrary or capricious. An example in this instance would be one party talking out of bounds constantly within one case, and receiving only $1 fines, while another party in that same case accidentally spoke out of line and received a contempt charge carrying a $5000 fine and 10 minutes imprisonment for every single syllable in their response. See generally [2025] DCR 104 - Contempt of Court Appeal.

Therefore, we overrule the Appellant’s third point.

​
IV. Conclusion​

Because we hold that the trial court applied the improper legal standard for contempt of court, holding the Appellant in contempt through the obstruction or interference clause rather than the lawful order clause, we overturn the order of lower court and vacate the contempt of court charge in its entirety. Appellant is to be remunerated as applicable under relevant law for any fines paid or jail time served as a result of the trial court’s sentencing.

​

​
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top