Appeal: Pending [2025] FCR 30 - Appeal

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Muggy21

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Muggy21
Muggy21
Magistrate
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Username: Muggy21

I am representing a client

Who is your Client?: lukeyyyMC_

File(s) attached

What Case are you Appealing?: [2025] FCR 30

Link to the Original Case: RaiTheGuy v. lukeyyyMC_ [2025] FCR 30

Basis for Appeal: I. CONGRESS ACTS WITH INTENT, THE COURTS CAN'T GO BEYOND IT.
1. Laws are interpreted both for their context and their underlying meaning ("spirit of the law").
2. This underlying meaning can be ascertained by reasonable analysis, societal impact, or on a reasoning of common law.
3. The Courts, by virtue of separation of powers between the branches, are not able to abstract authorities not explicitly nor reasonably ascertained from statute.
4.Judicial expansion of a statute’s meaning beyond its reasonable intent would, in effect, substitute the court’s will for the legislature’s.
5. To maintain fidelity to constitutional design, courts must confine their analysis to the statutory text and its necessary implications, avoiding creation of new rights or obligations not contemplated by Congress.
6.Any ambiguity in legislative drafting must be resolved in a manner consistent with legislative history and purpose, but never in a way that confers powers or duties outside the plain scope of the law.

2. THE COURT MIS-APPREHENDED THE MEANING OF "INSTITUTION" UNDER LAW

1. The Commercial Standards Act treats “gaming institutions” as a special category subject to oversight, which shows that the legislature intended only certain organized establishments.
2. The Cool DEC Casino Investigation Act was enacted specifically to close a loophole where the Department of Commerce (formerly DEC) lacked warrant authority to investigate casinos advertising odds. The Act permitted warrantless inspections only for casinos that had “displayed odds,” recognizing that these operations held themselves out as organized, quasi-public enterprises.
3. By singling out casinos with displayed odds, the legislature demonstrated that not every gambling business was to be treated as an institution, only those that created a reliance relationship with the public by advertising a system of play. Small, private, or informal gambling operations were not the focus of the law.
4. Informal or private gambling arrangements were not the target of the Act.
5. Accordingly, the statutory scheme demonstrates that “institution” was meant to denote formal, outward-facing casinos subject to regulatory reliance, not every gambling activity, and the Court’s broader interpretation impermissibly expands the scope of the law beyond both its text and its legislative history.

3. COMMERCIAL STANDARDS ACT ONLY APPLIES TO PHYSICAL CASINOS/GAMING SALONS
1. Section 15(1) of the Commercial Standards Act expressly imposes obligations only on “gaming institutions” with respect to “gaming machines and activities.” The natural reading of this language confines its scope to physical gambling devices or games where odds can be displayed.
2. The reference to “a visible area adjacent to the machine/activity” further reinforces this narrow construction, since auctions do not involve physical gaming machines or chance-based activities where statistical odds are relevant.
3. Legislative history, including the Cool DEC Casino Investigation Act, shows that oversight was designed to address false odds in casinos, not transactions like auctions. This demonstrates that the purpose was consumer protection in gambling environments, not market regulation of property sales.
4. To stretch §15 to cover bidding at auction would create absurdity, requiring auctioneers to post “odds” where none exist, thereby contradicting both the plain text and legislative intent.
5. Therefore, §15 must be interpreted as applying only to physical casino-style gambling institutions, not to auction bids or other commercial dealings outside the gambling context.

4. COURT ERR'D IN INTERPRETATING GAMING LAWS.
1. Gambling, in its ordinary sense, requires three elements: (a) a wager or stake of value, (b) an element of chance, and (c) the possibility of winning or losing a prize. These elements together distinguish gambling from other forms of recreation or speculation.
2. Gaming, by contrast, is a broader category of structured play. It may involve chance and skill but does not necessarily include a wager or prize, and therefore cannot be assumed to constitute gambling.
3. The Court errs in collapsing the two categories. Just as elections cannot be forced into the statutory categories of “terrorism,” “war,” or “assassination” by mere analogy, ordinary gaming cannot be transformed into gambling by stretching the definition. A contract or activity must actually involve the core elements of gambling, not merely “amount to” it by a loose equivalence.
4. Consider the example of a “loot box” in a video game: a player purchases the box and is guaranteed to receive it. The element of chance lies only in the specific contents, not in whether the player loses their payment. The essential feature of gambling, a stake placed at risk for possible total loss, is absent.
5. For gambling to exist, the stake must be subject to a binary outcome: either forfeiture or conversion into a prize. Here, the player never loses their consideration; they always receive the purchased item. The subjective variation in value does not substitute for the win/lose structure that defines gambling.
6. Since gambling requires all three elements, and the activity at issue lacks both a true wager and a true prize, it cannot be classified as gambling. Gaming may overlap with gambling in some contexts, but the two are not synonymous.
7. Collapsing the categories would erase their definitional boundaries and flunk basic canons of interpretation. A category cannot be expanded simply because it could be rhetorically stretched to fit; it must actually involve the prohibited or regulated conduct.

5. FRAUD FINDINGS WERE MISAPPLIED
1. The Court erred in holding that the “Filthy Rich Mystery Box” title was fraudulent. Such language is textbook puffery, non-literal advertising exaggeration long recognized as non-actionable (see CSA § 18 (8))
2. Collectible value is inherently subjective. Departures from CPI metrics do not equate to fraud, especially when regulators themselves admit there is no formal process for pricing or approval.
3. Fraud requires intent to mislead with material falsity. Here, bidders voluntarily assumed the known risk of uncertain contents. Exaggerated branding and subjective valuation do not meet the threshold of intentional deception.

Supporting Evidence:
 

Attachments

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The Supreme Court finds it necessary to inform the petitioner that all 3 justices have recused from this appeal. Chief Justice Aladeen has recused due to being the one issuing the verdict, Justice Smallfires4 recused for being the managing attorney at Dragon Law at the time who represented the defense and finally Myself, Justice ko531, am recusing due to Aladeen seeking my legal advice on said verdict prior to posting. We are sorry for the inconvenience.
 

Motion


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
Motion to Reconsider - Recusal of the Entire Court

May it please the Court,

Your Honours’ decision to recuse is wholly inconsistent with the fundamental freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of Redmont. Per our Charter, every citizen has a right to a fair trial (Const IV § (9) and every citizen shall be equal under the law (Const IV § (13). A citizen’s right to a fair trial is trivialized if an appeal, whose sole purpose is to impeach the fairness of a verdict and trial, is unjustly denied.

Accordingly, and as required by fundamental justice, this case invokes the Rule of Necessity (the doctrine that when all judges are otherwise disqualified, they are still required to hear the case to prevent a denial of justice). This principle ensures that litigants are never deprived of justice merely because recusals would leave no tribunal to decide their appeal. In such circumstances, the Rule of Necessity commands that the Court proceed. This doctrine has been recognized various times in real-world jurisprudence as a safeguard against judicial paralysis, ensuring that no litigant is denied a forum simply because recusals would otherwise render justice impossible. Understandably, Redmontonian law exists outside of real-world law, but nonetheless is influenced by it. Where every Justice has some connection, the Rule presumes their capacity to rise above those interests. If the Court could recuse en masse whenever difficulty arises, any politically sensitive case could be extinguished by avoidance, undermining the very rule of law.

To Defendant's best knowledge, a complete recusal of this Court has never happened in the history of our Commonwealth. Although Defendant respects and appreciates the Court’s apprehension as a result of possible conflicts, Defendant absolutely rejects the horrible precedent it allows; The Supreme Court of Redmont may choose to be derelict on his own volition. To tolerate such dereliction, would be a gross divestiture of the trust in the Courts. Justice Aladeen’s verdict, as defined under the Court’s very own guidance, is “a previous ruling” (see Guide - Motions); Judicial officers are expected to consider misapprehensions in their prior adjudications. If a Justice of this Court refuses to sit in judgment of his own prior rulings, it strips litigants of the only avenue provided to correct error and undermines the very doctrine of appellate review. Justice Smallfries4’s prior representation as Defendant’s counsel has very little in bearing; will the Justice consider facts not in evidence, arguments not in the records? We seek Justice Smallfries4’s viewpoint on the law. Within Mask3D_Wolf v. Judiciary of Redmont, the Supreme Court was able to decide on the actions undertaken by the former Acting Chief Justice, the Honourable Matthew100x (see Mask3D_Wolf v. Judiciary of Redmont)
To deny the Defendant this right, on this basis, would be to silence a voice uniquely positioned to clarify the reasoning and principles underlying the earlier verdict; such silence would not serve impartiality, but instead obstruct the Court’s pursuit of justice.




To each Justice, I challenge you. You’ve been appointed to the highest bench of the Commonwealth for your legal tenacity and veracity, Defendant humbly requests you set aside any controversies and ensure justice prevails.




 
Muggy21 said:
Justice Smallfries4’s prior representation as Defendant’s counsel has very little in bearing; will the Justice consider facts not in evidence, arguments not in the records? We seek Justice Smallfries4’s viewpoint on the law.
Click to expand...

Verdict


MOTION TO RECONSIDER - VOLUNTARY RECUSAL OF JUSTICE SMALLFRIES4

I am moved by Appellant's arguments and sympathetic to their concerns. It is highly unfortunate that each of the three individuals who sat on this three-person bench believed they had a duty to recuse from this case, and its extreme improbability cannot be understated. Here, I speak for myself in my position as Associate Justice, and myself alone. Chief Justice Aladeen22 may make his own statement.

There is no debate that the recusal of even two individuals on the Supreme Court of Redmont effectively dooms a case to sit idly in perpetuity without much recourse. It is perhaps reasonable at first glance to say that one or more of those recused should consider revoking their recusal in the interest of justice. However, this belief does not consider the long-term implications of such a position.

If I were to revoke my recusal here, it would open the door down the road for others who may similarly cloak their intentions in "pursuing justice," with their true aims being anything but. We must be ever vigilant against any attempt to use the Courts as a weapon that can disturb the democratic legitimacy of our nation, and one of the key pillars of that protection is recusal. An individual forced to recuse may, if allowed to revoke that recusal, wreak havoc upon the rights and liberties of our fellow citizens if there are no safeguards in place. Due to the extremely limited nature of judicial manpower, I do not think it wise to allow even one judicial officer to unilaterally revoke their recusal for any reason. We rely on principled, consistent, and honorable judicial officers to protect the law and the Constitution, and we should never attempt to undermine their long-term efforts by making tyrannical abuse easier for another down the line.

If this were not enough, I feel it is quite certain that Congress has mandated I recuse in this matter. The Judicial Standards Act ("JSA") states that a judicial officer should be recused when any conflict of interest is present, and specifically listed as one of those conflicts is "Prior Work as a Lawyer for either party." JSA § 16(1); JSA § 16(4)(e).

It is abundantly clear to me that Congress demanded an officer recuse in this instance, as I worked for one of the parties in my private practice in this very case. Congress included no release valve for the possibility of such a mandatory recusal causing gridlock, and I see no reasonable interpretation that eludes my reading of this act.

While I believe I am certainly capable of not "consider[ing] facts not in evidence, [and] arguments not in the records," as well generally being more than capable of being impartial in this case, a reasonable person may believe otherwise due to my history. Additionally, as noted above, Congress demands my recusal here. For these reasons I will not reverse my voluntary recusal. If Chief Justice Aladeen22 does not revoke his recusal, the only solution to this case may come from Congressional action, or at least one of the two of us resigning.

 
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